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INTRODUCTION
Warranties. They are a natural response to the natural
law-Murphy's Law-that if something can go wrong, it will.
Ideally, warranties protect those who buy goods that are not as
good as they should be. Yet lawyers squirm beneath the mass of
words and rules that grew from this simple seed.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code endeavored
to disentangle warranty law from much pre-Code terminology
and some pre-Code concepts. Unhappily, some courts have failed
to recognize or refused to accept the Code's scheme. This Project
attempts to explicate the Code's design and to shed light on par-
ticular problems courts have encountered. Because consumer sales
implicate special policies and bodies of law, the ensuing discussion
focuses on sales of goods to be used in buyers' businesses.
I
THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANTY SECTIONS
Before he ventures very far toward judgment, the warranty
plaintiff must determine whether he is on the right road. Al-
though section 2-102 defines the scope of Article Two as "transac-
tions in goods," the language of the warranty sections seems to
limit their applicability to contracts for sale.' But many courts
have spread the protection of Code warranties to certain nonsale
transactions, most commonly, sale-service hybrids and chattel
leases.2
A. Sale-Service Hybrids
Although the most familiar sale-service cases arise in the con-
sumer context, 3 many also arise in commercial transactions. A
1 Section 2-314 states that "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale." (Emphasis added.) Although neither § 2-313 nor § 2-315 is as
explicit, all three sections use the term "seller," and § 2-315 uses the term "buyer," to
describe the parties to the warranties. Moreover, § 2-313, Comment 2, quoted in text follow-
ing note 21 infra, limits express warranties to those "made by the seller as part of a con-
tract for sale."
2 See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. Most of the cases
that consider the extension of warranty protection to nonsale transactions involve implied
warranties.
' See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1205
(1969).
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finding that a warranty exists may depend upon whether the sales
or the service element predominates. 4  This determination turns
on the nature of the transaction, 5 the intent of the parties as re-
flected in the agreement, 6 and a common-sense judgment of
whether the buyer paid for goods or for services. 7
' Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 652-53, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 39,
42-43 (N.D. 1977) (citing Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1318,
1332-33 (8th Cir. 1974)). See Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d
1115, 1118, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 88, 92-93 (10th Cir. 1971) (contract for design, production and
sale of aluminum floor material to be used in amusement ride constitutes contract for sale);
Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 577, 595, 342 N.E.2d 65, 78-79, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 629, 635 (1976) (contract for design and construction of ammonia plant exclu-
sively a service contract beyond scope of Article Two); Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev.
Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 488, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885-86, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. 561, 565 (1977) (predominantly service-oriented contract for installation of sprinkler
system beyond scope of Article Two).
' See, e.g., Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 356, 278 N.Y.S.2d
531, 532, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 73, 74 (App. Term 1967):
A transaction involving the medical care and treatment of a patient at a
hospital is regarded in its entirety, and may not be broken down so as to label
some parts of it as sales and others as contracts for services .... Where that
entirety is actually directed to a restoration of the patient's health the whole
contract is categorized as one for services.
6 See, e.g., Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 I11. App. 3d 577, 594-95, 342 N.E.2d
65, 78, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 635 (1976):
[T]hroughout the contract plaintiff is denominated "Owner" not buyer, and
defendant is denominated "Contractor" not seller. The agreement expressed a
desire by plaintiff to have an ammonia plant "designed, constructed and com-
pleted" by defendant, not a desire to purchase the facility from defendant. De-
fendant was represented as being engaged in the business of "designing and
constructing" rather than selling. The agreement called for defendant to do all
process, design and engineering work. It did not call for defendant to sell any-
thing to plaintiff. With respect to the converter and other component parts,
defendant was to "procure, expedite, receive, install and erect all equipment."
No mention is made of selling equipment. Defendant's sole fixed fee was to be
compensation for services including "purchasing services, including the services
of buyers, expediters and inspectors." Most important to our determination are
two provisions found in Article VIII of the contract. As noted above, section
8.2 placed ultimate control of purchasing decisions in the hands of plaintiff, not
defendant. Under section 8.23 "title to all machinery and equipment and
supplies for the work shall, as between Owner and Contractor, be in Owner."
Thus defendant never had title to any component part of the plant, including
the converter.
We believe the foregoing demonstrates that the contract clearly and unam-
biguously was intended by the parties as one for the provision of services exclu-
sively, not a contract of sale.
See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 1118, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 88, 92 (10th Cir. 1971):
Electro Flo did not order or contract for engineering. Alcoa's full charge was
for materials furnished; its offer was by price quotation for the products only,
and it did not bill for engineering services or seek compensation therefor save
as the cost of such services entered into the price for the materials delivered.
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Public utilities contracts, for example, give rise to suits involv-
ing property damage caused by defective utility services. By anal-
ogy to the Code, at least two courts have imposed warranties
where defective electrical equipment caused fires.8 In another
case, however, a court denied recovery under the Code for dam-
ages caused by an explosion of natural gas. 9 The defect,
reasoned the court, arose in the meters and service lines rather
than in the gas.' 0 Yet another court refused to impose warranty
protection in the sale and supply of water, reasoning that water,
as a nonmovable, does not fit within the Code definition of
"goods." No "transaction in goods" arose, therefore, to trigger Ar-
ticle Two."
8 See Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196
N.W.2d 316, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 977 (1972); Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d
694, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 597 (C.P. 1975). In these cases, the courts took distinct yet similar
approaches. The Buckeye court held that the Code did not govern a contract for the supply
of electricity because electricity does not fit the definition of "goods" under § 2-105(1).
Although it thus declined to find a sale of goods, the court did conclude that supplying
electricity constitutes a sale of a service, which gives rise to an implied warranty. 38 Mich.
App. at 328-30, 196 N.W.2d at 317-18, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 979.
The Wivagg court, on the other hand, drew the line between sales and services rather
than between goods and services. This court rejected a rigid sale-service dichotomy and
concluded that although the supply of electricity contains elements of a service contract, it
"is sufficiently analogous to a 'sale' to justify the extension of the code's warranty protec-
tion." 73 Pa. D. & C.2d at 702, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 602.
The differences between these two approaches appear more semantic than conceptual.
Each court concluded that no sale of goods took place (Buckeye emphasizing the word
"goods," Wivagg emphasizing "sale"), and each focused on the rendering of services for
consideration. The Wivagg court noted the social policy considerations specifically applica-
ble to supplying electricity to consumers:
(1) Public interest in safeguarding the consumer from his own inability to pro-
tect himself from harm caused by the defectively manufactured product; (2)
societal pressure upon those who market and advertise the product to meet
their implied assurances of the safety of the goods, and (3) the superior risk-
bearing ability of the manufacturer and seller to spread the cost of the injury
through the price of the product or by liability insurance.
Id. at 701, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 601. These policy considerations parallel those supporting
implied warranties in sales of goods. See note 162 infra.
9 Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 61 Ill. 2d 6, 329 N.E.2d 228, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 61 (1975).
10 "What was sold was the gas, and it would be the gas, and not the defendant's equip-
ment that would be covered by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at
15-16, 329 N.E.2d at 233, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 65. We question the court's inelastic approach.
Enjoyment of the gas depends upon the functioning of the lines and meters. A sounder
inquiry would find implied warranties on the entire transaction using the nexus test pro-
posed in the text following note 18 infra.
11 Coast Laundry, Inc. v. Lincoln City, 9 Or. App. 521, 497 P.2d 1224, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
1379 (1972). Under U.C.C. § 2-105(1):
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
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Courts frequently find warranties in contracts that encompass
both the sale of goods and their installation.'" In such cases, the
warranties may apply to the installation as well as to the goods.'"
Similarly, courts have imposed warranties in crop spraying con-
tracts, but without discussing the hybrid nature of the transac-
tions. 1
4
As the foregoing discussion indicates, courts frequently apply
Code warranties, or their common-law counterparts, to sale-
service hybrids. Once a court employing the predominance test
determines that the sale element of the transaction predominates,
the court must decide whether to apply warranties to the service
element as well. Cases may arise where the service component is
so peripheral that extending warranty protection to it would be
unreasonable.' 5 On the other hand, the service might be so inti-
mately wrapped up in the sale that it falls within the reasonable
reach of Article Two.' 6  Rarely, however, do courts articulate any
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities ... and things in
action.
The court relied upon Comment I to that section, which reads in part: "The definition of
goods is based on the concept of movability and the term 'chattels personal' is not used. It
is not intended to deal with things which are not fairly identifiable as movables before the
contract is performed."
12 See, e.g., Dunn Buick, Inc. v. Belle Isle Plumbing, Heating & Air Cond. Co., 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (installation of heating system). Cf. Walker v. Decora, Inc.,
225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1205 (1971) (recognizing cause of action
for breach of warranty on sale and installation of floor although seller not liable because of
lack of privity).
13 See, eg., Insurance Co. of North America v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410,
222 N.W.2d 323, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 761 (1974). Radiant Electric involved extra-Code warran-
ties:
Apart from statute, implied warranties may apply. They may apply to the sale
of services as well as to the sale of goods.... Here we have a combination of
factors. The services involved the installation of goods supplied by the supplier.
The statutory implied warranty applies to the goods being installed.... LT]he
goods being installed were to be used for handling electricity, a dangerous
force. We do not hesitate to rule that under such circumstances there is an
implied warranty of fitness and merchantability with respect to the manner in
which the goods were installed.
Id. at 412, 222 N.W.2d at 324-25, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 762 (footnote omitted).
14 See Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (N.D. 1976); Ful-
wider v. Flynn, 243 N.W.2d 170, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 350 (S.D. 1976).
15 Suppose a wholesaler sells asphalt to a retailer for resale and, at the same time,
agrees to pave the retailer's parking lot with asphalt that the retailer has purchased
elsewhere. The two parts of the transaction are sufficiently severable to fail the nexus test
proposed in the text following note 18 infra. In such a case, a warranty might properly
apply to the asphalt sold for resale, but not to the paving service.
16 Suppose a paving company agrees to pave a supermarket's parking lot. The consid-
eration covers the paving services and the cost of the asphalt. Here, the transaction would
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systematic rationale for applying Code warranties to the service
component of sale-service hybrids.
One attempt at articulation arose in a cattle feed case. 17  A
manufacturer sold feed supplements to a feed lot operator and
also provided the services of staff nutritionists for the selection
and use of the feed. The plaintiff claimed that both the feed sup-
plement and the nutritionists' advice were defective. The court
extended Code warranties to the transaction, tersely stating: "It is
commercially unrealistic to treat separately the sale of the ration
supplement and the rendering of professional advice and assis-
tance." 18  The court found its way to the right conclusion but,
unfortunately, it left no discernible trail.
We propose a nexus test: Where a sale would not be made
but for the accompanying services, a sufficient nexus exists to jus-
tify applying Code warranties to both components of the transac-
tion. Similarly, a nexus exists where the service is necessary to the
enjoyment of the goods. Of course, the tail cannot wag the
dog-courts must find that the transaction is predominantly a
sale before employing the nexus test. This approach draws no
bright lines, but it should provide courts with a rational and pre-
dictable system for determining liability.
B. Leases
Chattel leases occupy another region on the fringes of the
Code. When determining whether to bring leases within the grasp
of warranty law, courts employ and often combine four distinct
approaches.' 9
1. Judicial Deference to the Legislature
Some courts refuse to apply warranties to lease transactions in
the absence of an express legislative command. 20  These courts
treat Article Two, which does not govern lease transactions, as
though it preempted the warranty field. The drafters of the
pass the nexus test proposed in the text following note 18 infra, and warranties could apply to
the asphalt and to its installation.
"' Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210
(5th Cir. 1971).
IS Id. at 668, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 220.
19 See Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 220-21, 541 P.2d 1184,
1188-89, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 340, 345-46 (1975); 13 IDAHO L. Ray. 283, 286-87 (1977); Annot.,
48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973).
10 See cases cited in 13 IDAHO L. REV. 283, 286 n.26 (1977).
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Code, however, did not expect such trepidation. Section 1-102(1)
states: "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies." As one commentator
has noted:
[T]he Code's rule of thumb for construction is in the form of a
command from the legislature to the courts: unless a given con-
struction or application in determining a particular dispute
clearly contravenes the statute, either by commission or omis-
sion, courts should not defer to the legislature for a change in
the rules. In short, "passing the buck" to the legislature is no
longer a fashionable means by which a court may reach an ad-
mittedly unjust or illogical result.2 1
Beyond this general denunciation of abdication to the legisla-
ture, the Code's drafters specifically invited courts to take an ex-
pansive view toward warranty protection. Comment 2 to section
2-313 provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct pur-
pose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a
contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a con-
tract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances ....
[Generally,] the matter is left to the case law with the intention
that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in deal-
ing with further cases as they arise.
Neither the drafters nor the legislatures have stolen the ball from
the courts' court. Comment 2 does not take a stand on whether
warranties should apply in nonsales contexts; it only suggests who
the decisionmaker should be.
2. "Transactions in Goods"
Some support exists for applying Article Two to chattel leases
as "transactions in goods" within the meaning of section 2-102.22
Although the warranty sections ostensibly reach only sales,23 some
21 5 F. HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 9 12.03(1), at 1-65 (1977).
22 U.C.C. § 2-102 provides in part: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
applies to transactions in goods ....
22 See note 1 supra.
1978]
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courts stretch them further. In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v.
Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc. ,24 the court reasoned that
"[t]he use in some sections, of the words, 'contract for sale', and in
others, of the word 'contracts', can also be taken to mean that the
scope of the article was not limited to a transaction involving
solely a 'sale' with 'title' and 'property' as its symbols and marks." 25
The Hertz court 26 and others have also noted that section 2-102's
use of the word "transactions" instead of "sales" invites a broader
sweep. 27
Although section 1-102 requires liberal construction of the
Code "to promote its underlying purposes and policies," the
drafters probably did not intend Article Two to apply directly to
chattel leases. Recall Comment 2 to section 2-313: "ITlhis section
is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by
the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale ... ." The
Comment endorses judicial expansion of warranty coverage, but
not directly under the aegis of the Code. Note too that the title of
Article Two is "sales." 28 The drafters likely intended that the
common law, not Article Two, govern the quality terms of lease
transactions. Moreover, blanket application of the Code's warranty
provisions to leases might obscure the policy considerations in any
given case.
3. Disguised Sales
Some courts apply the warranty sections of Article Two to
leases that look like sales.29  These courts consider factors similar
214 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969), revd on
other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Term 1970).
25 Id. at 230, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 397, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 136.
26 See id. at 230, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 396, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 136.
27 See, e.g., Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 993-94, 354 N.Y.S.2d
778, 780-81, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 610, 612-13 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d
866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (2d Dep't 1975).
28 U.C.C. § 1-109 states: "Section captions are parts of this Act."
2 See KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 324, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649,
661 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (lease of television equipment at least analogous to sale where lessee
had option to purchase at end of contract, was responsible for maintenance and repair,
and was originally offered sales contract), modified on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 50 (8th Cir. 1972); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 951, 428
S.W.2d 46, 54, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 453, 462 (1968) (lease of ice machine analogous to sale where
lessee required to pay repair and maintenance expenses and probably would have oppor-
tunity to purchase at end of lease); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381,
389-92, 215 S.E.2d 10, 16-18, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 82, 89-92 (1975) (lease of tractors and re-
frigerated trailers analogous to sale where lessee required to purchase goods upon cancella-
tion of lease); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Everett School, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 849, 850
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to those used in determining whether a lease constitutes a security
interest under Article Nine.30 Thus, if the lessee has an enforce-
able option to purchase, or if title automatically passes to the les-
see at the end of the lease term, Article Two warranties will likely
apply.3 ' Similarly, a provision requiring purchase of the goods
upon cancellation of a long-term lease may bring the transaction
within Article Two's domain. 32
Although the disguised-sale approach demonstrates some
preference for substance over form, it requires no examination of
the warranty sections' underlying policies.33  Fortunately, some
courts have adopted the more policy-oriented technique of
reasoning by analogy to the Code.
4. Reasoning by Analogy to the Code
We would impose warranties upon lease transactions by anal-
ogy to the Code. The Code, as a general legislative statement of
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (lease of copy machine held sale of goods where tide would pass to
lessee at end of lease for no additional consideration); Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 609, 611 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (Code provisions on exclusion or modification of
warranties applied to lease-purchase of truck-tractor that required lessee to repair and
maintain and allowed transfer of title at end for no additional consideration), vacated on
other grounds, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974).
In Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 309 So. 2d 69, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 972 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the court apparently applied the disguised-sale approach to a non-
lease bailment. The owner left his truck at the store to have its tires changed. One of the
truck's wheel rims exploded, injuring some of the store's employees. Although
it recognized that courts have applied Article Two warranties to chattel
leases, the court held that the employees had no warranty claim against the truck's owner
because the bailment did not resemble a sale. Id. at 72, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 976.
30 See Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1971); Note, Warranties in the Leasing of Goods, 31 OHIo ST.
L.J. 140, 142-44 (1970). U.C.C. § 1-201(37) defines "security interest" and states:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each
case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance
with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become
the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
'1 See KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 324, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649,
661 (W.D. Ark. 1971), modified on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 50 (8th Cir.
1972); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Everett School, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 849, 850 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1971).
32 See Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 82 (1975).
33 Several commentators have criticized the disguised-sale approach. See, e.g.,
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 653, 667-69
(1957); Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus. LAw. 847,
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public policy regarding commercial transactions, becomes a pre-
mise for judicial reasoning.3 4 Commercial realism underlies the
analogy approach. Its advocates point to the increased use of
leases in business transactions and the resemblance of many leases
to sales. 35
When courts adopt the analogy approach, the character-
ization of a lessor as a "merchant" under section 2-314 becomes
problematic. 36 Often, lessors serve primarily as financiers and
not suppliers; in effect, they lend money to lessees who wish to
acquire certain merchandise. 7 Other lessors look more like sell-
ers in their expertise and familiarity with the goods. Courts must
determine whether the policies underlying Code warranties apply
to the particular lease transaction. For example, the Idaho Su-
preme Court, in All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass,38 determined that a
lessor of automatic car wash systems did not bear sufficient re-
semblance to a merchant to justify imposing an implied warranty
of merchantability.
It is true that prior to the execution of the lease in issue,
[the lessor] handled between forty to fifty transactions over a
period of six to eight months, concerning the same Budg-O-
Matic Car Wash System that is the subject of this dispute. How-
ever, this in our mind does not make All-States Leasing a "mer-
chant" for purposes of the Code. The record discloses that [the
lessor] does not build, manufacture or sell any equipment or
854-55 (1969); Murray, supra note 30, at 451-52; Note, supra note 30, at 144; Comment,
Implied Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel Leases, 1969 U. oF ILL L.F. 115, 125.
14 For general discussions of reasoning by analogy to the Code, see 5 F. HART & W.
WILLIER, supra note 21, 12.02(1], at 1-64; Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise
for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLum. L. REv. 880 (1965).
35 See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212
A.2d 769, 776 (1965); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 226, 228-29, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 135 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1969), revd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Term
1970); Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 673-74; Comment, supra note 33, at 119-20.
Several tenets of consumer protection may occasionally apply to commercial transac-
tions: the greater reliance by a lessee on a lessor than by a buyer on a seller; the greater
ability of a lessor to control the quality of the goods and bear the loss; and the frequency
with which lessors double as vendors of the same goods. See, e.g., KPLR TV, Inc. v. Visual
Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 324-25, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649, 662 (W.D. Ark. 1971), modified
on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 50 (8th Cir. 1972).
36 For a discussion of § 2-314's "merchant" requirement, see notes 164-182 and accom-
panying text infra.
17 See Note, supra note 30, at 147. An example is "where the lessor advances money to
the lessee who purchases the chattel and conveys it to the lessor who then leases it back to
the lessee." Id.
" 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 933 (1975).
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machines of any kind, but rather is in the business of purchas-
ing or financing the purchase of equipment specifically selected
and specified by an approved lessee.39
Although correct in its result, the All-States court applied the
merchant requirement mechanically, failing to probe the Code's
policies. In a later case, 40 the same court applied the All-States
analogy approach; this time, it more closely examined the policies
underlying Article Two and found that the lessor of heavy con-
struction equipment qualified as a "merchant" under section
2-314.
In this lease transaction, the same considerations which
give rise to creation of implied warranties in a sales transaction
are present. [The lessor] was a merchant specializing in the sale
and leasing of heavy construction equipment and [the lessee]
argues that it relied on [the lessor's] expertise. [The lessor]
placed the product into the stream of commerce and sought to
reap economic benefits from the lease of the products. Finally,
[the lessor] was in a better position to control the antecedent
factors which affect the condition of the product.4 '
The Idaho Supreme Court set a good example. Article Two does
not impose quality terms in leases, but courts can. And courts
should, with the guidance of historical warranty policies and the
refinements available by analogy from the Code.42
II
ExPREss WARRANTIES-SECTION 2-313
Express warranties are chisels in the hands of buyers and sell-
ers. With these tools, the parties to a sale sculpt a monument
representing the goods. Having selected a stone, the buyer and
seller may leave it almost bare, allowing considerable play in the
qualities that fit its contours. Or the parties may chisel away in-
exactitudes until a well-defined shape emerges. The seller is
39 Id. at 880, 538 P.2d at 1184, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 942.
4' Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr. Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 340 (1975).
41 Id. at 225, 541 P.2d at 1193, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 350.
42 For examples of common-law cases turning to the Code for guidance, see DeKalb
Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 75 (N.D. Ala. 1974), affd per
curiam, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975), and Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
63 Mich. App. 109, 234 N.W.2d 424, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 367 (1975). See Note, The Extension of
Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 127, 141 (1968).
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bound to deliver, and the buyer to accept, goods that match the
sculpted form.
4 3
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the sell-
er to the buyer which relates to the goods and be-
comes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express war-
ranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a war-
ranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Section 2-313 thus provides a skeletal blueprint of express war-
ranties that is thinly fleshed out by the Official Comments. The
section identifies two elements essential to the creation of an ex-
press warranty. First, the seller must make a representation of
quality that takes one of three forms: an affirmation of fact or
promise that relates to the goods, a description of the goods, or a
sample or model of the goods. The seller need not intend to
create a warranty, nor must he utter any magical words such as
"'guarantee" or "warranty."
43 A manufacturer may by express warranty assume responsibility in connection
with its products which extends beyond liability for defects.... [D]efects in the
product may be immaterial if the manufacturer warrants that a product will
perform in a certain manner and the product fails to perform in that manner.
Defects may be material in proving breach of an express warranty, but the
approach to liability is the failure of the product to operate or perform in the
manner warranted by the manufacturer.
Huebert v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 725, 494 P.2d 1210, 1215, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
545, 552 (1972). Accord, Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 327, 521 P.2d
281, 293, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 933 (1974); Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 474
S.W.2d 789, 792, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 30, 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971). See Interco Inc. v. Randust-
rial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 263, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 464, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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Second, the quality representation must become "part of the
basis of the bargain." Undefined in both the section and the
Comments, this phrase generates more litigation than any other in
section 2-313, and courts have not reached a consensus on its
meaning.
A. The Quality Representation
1. Affirmations of Fact or Promises
The simplest method of creating a warranty is to make an
affirmation of fact or promise. The Code does not distinguish af-
firmations of fact from promises. A court applying section 2-313
would, for example, treat the following contractual clauses identi-
cally: "The airplane instruments are shock resistant" and "Seller
promises that the airplane instruments are shock resistant."
Affirmations may arise in many contexts, such as letters, 44
advertisement brochures, 45 dealer production manuals,46 product
labels,47 billboard and magazine advertisements, 48 and order
forms. 49  Affirmations may be oral as well as written, 50 but oral
"" See Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151, 155, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 420, 423 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (letter claimed engine would satisfy buyer's needs).
" See Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearny & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 370,
21 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 88 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (sales brochure specified machine qualities);
Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 921, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 382 (Mont. 1977)
(brochure affirmed high quality of irrigation system); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews
Co., 190 Neb. 546, 564-65, 209 N.W.2d 643, 654, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1013, 1024 (1973)
(brochure affirmed scaffolding's ability to withstand weight).
46 Cf Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 641 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (product
manual's affirmations of seeds' good blight tolerance held opinion insufficient for creation of
express warranty).
"' See Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D. 1975)
(label affirmed insecticide's suitability).
48 See Eddington v. Dick, 87 Misc. 2d 793, 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
50, 53 (City Ct. 1976) (refrigerator advertised in newspaper); Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-
Tunnell, 474 S.W.2d 789, 792, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 30, 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971) (billboard,
television, magazine, and brochure advertising affirmed weed-killer's effectiveness).
41 See Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, -, 337
A.2d 672, 675, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1245 (1974) (seller's representations considered to-
gether with provision in order form warranting product against defects and operational
failure).
50 See KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 324, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649,
661 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (oral statement that commercial television equipment would produce
top-quality picture), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C.
Rep. 50 (8th Cir. 1972); Fred J. Miller, Inc. v. Raymond Metal Prods., Co., 265 Md. 523,
525-27, 290 A.2d 527, 528-29, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 959, 961-63 (1972) (oral statements that ends
of dredging pipe would seal); Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App. 653,
656, 177 S.E.2d 428, 430, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 696, 699 (1970) (oral statement that goods sold
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statements must satisfy the parol evidence rule.5'
2. Descriptions
Subsection (1)(b) provides that descriptions of the goods may
also give rise to express warranties. Like affirmations, descriptions
can arise from such writings as brochure advertisements, 52 repair
logbooks, 53 quotation forms, 54 labels,55 and order forms. 56  They
may also derive from the spoken word, subject to the same parol
evidence hurdles that affirmations face. 5" Nor need these de-
scriptions flow from lay language. Comment 5 to section 2-313
states: "A description need not be by words. Technical specifica-
tions, blueprints and the like can afford more exact description
than mere language and if made part of the basis of the bargain
goods must conform with them." 58
identical to goods ordered); Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundry Co., 17 Wash.
App. 761, 763, 565 P.2d 819, 821, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1231, 1233 (1977) (oral statement that, inter
alia, engines would deliver certain horsepower at certain r.p.m.).
51 See, e.g., Shore Line Props., Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chems., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331,
335, 538 P.2d 760, 764, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 353, 356 (1974) (parol evidence rule kept out oral
statement that paint required only one application).
U.C.C. § 2-202 codifies the parol evidence rule. Counsel for buyers might circumvent
the rule by classifying the oral statements as mere interpretations or clarifications, not sub-
stantive additions, to the warranty terms. For example, where a seller in writing guaran-
teed a machine against "operational failure," the court admitted in evidence several oral
statements that defined the diverse capabilities of the machine: "The statements and rep-
resentations of [the seller] must be read together with the written warranty .... " Acme
Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, - 337 A.2d 672, 675, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1245 (1974). The preferred method, of course, is to write every affirma-
tion and description in the contract. This precaution is especially important if the contract
includes a merger clause. See generally WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at §§ 2-9 to 2-12.
" See, e.g., Rinkmasters v. City of Utica, 75 Misc. 2d 941, 944, 348 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943,
13 U.C.C. Rep. 797, 800 (City Ct. 1973) (catalog described ice-rink equipment); Drier v.
Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 502, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 323, 329 (S.D. 1977) (pamphlet
described printing press's capacity).
'3 See, e.g., Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090, 1092, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 911, 913 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1977) (airplane repair logbook presented before sale described repairs and parts
replaced).
54 Cf. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Ents., Inc., 39 Ill. App. 48, 50, 349 N.E.2d
627, 630, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1313 (1976) ("formal quotation" read: "75 ton, 40 foot
boom Brownhoist Steam Locomotive Crane," but circumstances precluded express war-
ranty).
" See, e.g., Woodbury Chem. Co. v. Holgerson, 439 F.2d 1052, 1055, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1971) (label guaranteed chemical content and emulsifiability of herb-
icide).
S6 See, e.g., Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Halverson Corp., 90 Nev. 114, 117, 520
P.2d 234, 235, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 605, 607 (1974) (purchase order described carpet in detail).
'7 See note 51 supra.
5 See, e.g., S-C Indus. v. American Hydroponics Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852, 855, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1972) (greenhouse plans and specifications).
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One court citing Comment 5 interpreted "and the like" to
include illustrations in a purchasing guide. 59  Relying on the sell-
er's catalog, a municipal buyer purchased a resurfacing tank for
an outdoor ice-skating rink. The guide's language addressed only
the size of the tank. An illustration, however, showed the water
release handle close to the pushing bar and a blade in front of the
tank that was considerably wider than the tank itself. The unit
delivered conformed to the written description, but not to the il-
lustration. Noting an increase in the prevalence of illustrated ad-
vertisements, the court ruled that the illustration created an ex-
press warranty that the goods would conform to it.
The traveling salesman has been replaced by the catalogue.
Multi-colored catalogues are thrust upon the public as invita-
tions to purchase. Description by words is limited, but drawings,
photographs and blueprints are profusely used to guide and
entice the purchaser. It is axiomatic that "a picture is worth a
thousand words". 60
It is often difficult to distinguish between Code affirmations
of fact and descriptions; "one inch sheet-rock," 61 for example,
could be either. Yet the two categories do not overlap com-
pletely. 62 The Code requires that affirmations of fact, but not
descriptions, be "made by the seller." 63  This distinction recog-
nizes that a buyer cannot make an affirmation of fact relating to
goods he has not received, but can describe the goods he wants.
"Thus," says Professor Nordstrom, "when a buyer sends his
purchase order to the seller [describing] the goods he wishes to
purchase and the seller responds by shipping goods, a description
warranty has been created."' 64  The difference between subsec-
tions (1)(a) and (1)(b) reflects a practical distinction between the
buyer and the seller, and should not be read to do more. Thus,
" Rinkmasters v. City of Utica, 75 Misc. 2d 941, 944, 348 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943, 13
U.C.C. Rep. 797, 800 (City Ct. 1973).
60 Id.
61 Tracor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446, 447, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
75, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (description). See Rinkmasters v. City of Utica, 75 Misc. 2d
941, 943, 348 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 797, 799-800 (City Ct. 1973) ("top quality
aluminum" scrapers description).
62 Comment 3 to § 2-313 suggests that affirmations of fact are a subset of descriptions:
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain
are regarded as part of the description of those goods .... "
63 U.C.C. § 2-313(I)(a), (b), reprinted in text following note 43 supra.
64 R. NoRDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES § 71, at 222 (1970) (footnote omit-
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an affirmation of fact originally made by a third party and sub-
sequently conveyed by the seller to the buyer would be "made by
the seller" within the meaning of section 2-313(1)(a). 65  Once an
affirmation becomes part of the basis of the bargain, its third-
party origin is irrelevant.
Descriptions that create express warranties may range from
epic to haiku. Professors White and Summers appear to suggest
the extreme: "that a generic title such as 'auto' or 'haybaler' is an
express warranty that the machine described will carry passengers
on the highway or bale hay." 66  We disagree, humbly. It seems
more likely that the quality promise described in the quote above
is not expressed in "haybaler" but implied in law. True, a buyer
who pays good money for what is obviously a haybaler can
reasonably expect a machine that bales hay. But his expectation
probably does not arise from the magical word "haybaler"; it
would arise even if the seller had merely quoted a price and re-
mained otherwise mute. By identifying the goods as a "haybaler"
the seller describes their general nature and function, but he has
not expressly characterized their quality. Professors White and
Summers concede that a generic description warranty would "not
normally promise more than an implied warranty of mer-
chantability would give," but suggest that a buyer could use the
former when the seller had effectively disclaimed the latter.67
Such a result would negate the effect of a bargained-for dis-
claimer on the strength of a single word that, as noted above,
probably has little to do with the buyer's expectations. 68  Even if a
65 But cf. Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, -, 572 P.2d
1322, 1325 & n.1, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 304, 308 & n.1 (1977) (holding that third-party descrip-
tion conveyed to buyer by seller creates express warranty, suggesting that third-party af-
firmation would not).
66 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-3, at 276 (footnote omitted).
6I Id. at 276 n.26. For discussion of the standards of merchantability, see notes 183-228
and accompanying text infra.
61 A generic description argument was rejected in Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital
Equip. Ents., Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1310 (1976). The
seller of a used crane had identified the machine as a "75 ton, 40 foot boom Brownhoist
Steam Locomotive Crane." Id. at 50, 349 N.E.2d at 630, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1313. The
plaintiff complained that because the crane could lift only 15 tons, the seller had breached
an express warranty that it could lift 75 tons. The agreement contained the following
clause: "All equipment is subject to inspection and descriptions are approximate and in-
tended to serve as a guide ...." Id. at 57, 349 N.E.2d at 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1320.
Referring to this language, the "used" condition of the crane, the absence of any affirma-
tive representations that the crane would lift 75 tons, and the buyer's reliance on its inspec-
tors' examination of the crane, the court held that the generic description did not create an
express warranty. Id. at 58, 349 N.E.2d at 636, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1320-21.
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generic title were read as a quality description, the buyer's sur-
render of his implied warranty of merchantability would appear
to preclude his reasonable reliance on a similar express warranty.
Nevertheless, the Code does not explicitly bar the generic express
warranty, and the cagey seller will qualify appropriately: "This is a
haybaler, for purposes of identification only."
3. Samples and Models
Section 2-313(1)(c) provides that goods must conform to any
sample or model that becomes part of the basis of the bargain.
Comment 6 to this section analogizes samples and models to ver-
bal statements regarding the quality of the goods:
The basic situation as to statements affecting the true es-
sence of the bargain is no different when a sample or model is
involved in the transaction.
Without actually defining the terms, the Comment differentiates
samples from models:
This section includes both a 'sample' actually drawn from the
bulk of goods which is the subject matter of the sale, and a
'model' which is offered for inspection when the subject matter
is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the bulk of
the goods.
Buyers asserting generic titles as express warranties might seek solace in Comment 4 to
§ 2-313:
[A] contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and de-
scribed. A clause generally disclaiming "all warranties, express or implied" can-
not reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such description and therefore
cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316 [Exclusion or Modification of
Warranties].
Because it assumes that the seller has made a description and incurred obligations, this
language merely begs our question. Comment 4 qualifies itself and then shows the buyer
another ray of hope:
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they consciously desire,
cannot make their own bargain as they wish. But in determining what they
have agreed upon good faith is a factor and consideration should be given to
the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be ex-
changed for a pseudo-obligation.
How much a buyer pays for goods may well reflect what he expects from them. See Alan
Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equipment Ents., Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 58 n.2, 349 N.E.2d
627, 636 n.2, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1322 n.2 (1976). Even so, his acceptance of a contract
disclaiming implied warranties may indicate his willingness to gamble on receiving more
quality than the seller has guaranteed.
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A recent Utah case demonstrates the difficulties courts en-
counter in determining what constitutes a sample or model. In
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp. ,69 the seller gave
the buyer a piece of molded acrylic, representing that it was of
the thickness used in the construction of boats he would sell to
buyer. The acrylic on the boats subsequently delivered was thin-
ner than the molded piece submitted for inspection. The court
concluded that the acrylic piece did not create an express war-
ranty via "sale by sample" under subsection (1)(c), apparently be-
cause it represented only a part and not a whole unit of the
goods. Nevertheless, the court affirmed a judgment against the
seller, finding that "the piece of molded acrylic and the represen-
tations made in regard thereto could be found to constitute ex-
press warranties under [section 2-313(1)(a) or (b)]."17
The Pacific Marine court could have reached the same result
without resort to the affirmation or description subsections. Sec-
tion 2-313(1)(c) and Comment 6 are easily broad enough to in-
clude examples of components and materials. To limit "samples"
and "models" to integrated units ignores a common business prac-
tice and may frustrate the parties' intent to communicate a quality
standard. That frustration cuts deep where, unlike Pacific Marine,
the buyer has no other source of warranty protection.
B. The Basis of the Bargain
Section 2-313 requires that affirmations, descriptions, samples
and models become "part of the basis of the bargain" before they
can qualify as express warranties. This slippery fish muddies the
waters of case and commentary. The contents of the rule surface
only when its history and comments are dredged.
1. Reliance Versus the Basis-of-the-Bargain Test
The basis-of-the-bargain test replaced the Uniform Sales Act's
express requirement that the buyer purchase goods in reliance
upon the seller's affirmations.7 ' The ambiguity of the Code's re-
69 525 P.2d 615, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 354 (Utah 1974).
70 Id. at 618, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 359.
71 Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provided:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
[Vol. 64:30
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placement prompted Professor Honnold to remark in the 1955
Report of the New York Law Revision Commission: "There re-
mains the central question: What is the meaning of 'basis of the
bargain'? Possibly for lack of any other meaningful standard,
courts must employ the test of whether buyer relied on the affir-
mation or promise ... ," rz The language and comments of sec-
tion 2-313 indicate the contrary; they indicate that Professor
Honnold was closer to the mark when he later noted that "the
Code's rejection of the present reliance language might well imply
an intent to modify present law." 7 3
The Uniform Sales Act appeared to require that 1) the buyer
prove that he 2) actually and 3) reasonably relied upon the seller's
affirmation 4) at the time he purchased the goods. Although the
issue is far from clear, we would read section 2-313 to modify all
but the "reasonableness" requirement. Seller's affirmation,
whenever made, should become part of the basis of the bargain
unless seller can show that a reasonable buyer aware of the affir-
mation would not expect the promised quality.
Nevertheless, some courts insist that, to establish an ex-
press warranty, the buyer must prove actual reliance on the sell-
er's quality representations. 74  The buyer may be required to
prove "that he acted on the basis of the representations," 75 or that
the representation "would naturally tend to and does induce a bar-
gain."76  For these courts, reliance becomes a major component
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.
72 1 STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 392 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 N.Y. LAW REVISION
COMM'N].
73 Id. at 393.
74 See Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 397, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 681, 684
(10th Cir. 1967) (no express warranty where no showing that buyer of studs for powder-
loaded gun relied on seller's advertising pamphlet, promise, or description); Hagenbuch v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1005, 1007 (D.N.H. 1972)
(no express warranty where no evidence that buyer relied on catalog statement that ham-
mer meets federal specifications); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 217, 219, 490 P.2d'475,
477, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 794, 795 (Ct. App. 1971) (no express warranty where no evidence
lessees relied on terms of rental agreement that stated car in good condition), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1010 (1972);
Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1968) (no express warranty where statement that
well would produce 400 gallons per hour did not "induce" bargain).
75 Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1005,
1007 (D.N.H. 1972).
"e Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1968) (emphasis in original) (citing Nielson
v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 183, 166 P.2d 536, 537 (1946)).
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of,7 7 or perhaps synonymous with, 7  basis of the bargain. A few
courts, apparently combining the Uniform Sales Act requirement
with the Code's test, treat reliance as an independent requirement
for express warranty claims. For example, a Texas court required
that the buyer asserting an express warranty prove that the "af-
firmation of fact or promise became a part of the basis of the
bargain; [and] ... that the injured party, in making the purchase,
relied on the representations, affirmations of fact or promises
" 79
Courts that require buyers to prove their reliance cannot be
relying upon the Official Comments. Comment 3 to section 2-313
provides in part:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the descrip-
tion of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such state-
ments need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of
the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirma-
tions, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirma-
tive proof.
Thus, Comment 3 recognizes a presumption that the seller's af-
firmations go to the basis of the bargain. By proving that the
seller has made an affirmation of fact relating to the goods, the
buyer establishes prima facie an express warranty.80
77 Of course, even where courts require reliance, it need not be the exclusive motiva-
tion for the bargain. U.C.C. § 2-313 requires only that affirmations, descriptions, samples
and models become "part of the basis of the bargain" (emphasis added) for an express
warranty to arise.
7s See, e.g., Sessa v. Riege, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 753 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (basis of the bargain "essentially a reliance requirement") (dictum), aff'd mem., 568
F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
79 General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 917, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 40
(Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis added). Accord, Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234
N.W.2d 38, 42, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67, 72 (S.D. 1975) (quoting General Supply).
'o See Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(dictum) (paraphrasing Comment 3), affd mein., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978). Cf. Hawkins
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 564-66, 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 1013, 1023-25 (1973) (seller's act of supplying advertising brochure representing that
scaffolding would safely carry weight sufficed for finding of express warranty); cases cited
in note 86 infra (stating that Code abolished requirement of actual reliance).
Even before the enactment of the Code, Professor Williston cautioned against condi-
tioning a buyer's warranty recovery on proof of specific acts of reliance:
There is danger of giving greater effect to the requirement of reliance
than it is entitled to. Doubtless the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish
this as one of the elements of his case. But the warranty need not be the sole
inducement to the buyer to purchase the goods; and as a general rule no evi-
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A seller seeking to rebut the buyer's presumption must first
determine what Comment 3 presumes, that is, what the basis-of-
the-bargain test requires. In Sessa v. Riegle,8 ' a federal district
court adopted the Code's presumption but revived the Uniform
Sales Act's requirement of actual reliance. Sessa bought a horse
upon the recommendation of his friend and agent, Maloney, who
had inspected the horse. The only thing lamer than Maloney's
advice was Sessa's new horse. Sessa claimed that the seller, Riegle,
had expressly warranted a sound horse. The court disagreed,
finding that the seller's statements were not affirmations but mere
opinions. 82  But, the court continued, "even assuming that [sell-
er's] statements could be express warranties, it is not clear that
they were 'part of the basis of the bargain' .... This is essentially
a reliance requirement ... ." '3 Echoing Comment 3,84 the court
concluded that Riegle's statements were not part of the basis of
the bargain. Apparently, Sessa's reliance upon his agent supplied
"clear affirmative proof" that he had not significantly relied upon
the seller.8 5
A number of courts 86 and at least two state legislative com-
mittees 87 heap doubt upon Sessa's requirement of actual reliance.
dence of reliance by the buyer is necessary other than the seller's statements
were of a kind which naturally would induce the buyer to purchase the goods
and that he did purchase the goods.
1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 206, at 534-35 (rev. ed. 1948)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON ON SALES], quoted in 1955 N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, supra note 72, at 393.
81 427 F. Supp. 760, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d
Cir. 1978).
82 For a discussion of the effect given to sellers' opinions, see notes 109-158 and ac-
companying text infra.
83 427 F. Supp. at 766, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 753.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 767, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 754.
'6 Observed the court in Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 464 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976): "There is no mention of reliance in [§ 2-313]. And the
comments to that section of the UCC reveal that the concept of reliance as required in
pre-UCC warranty cases was purposefully abandoned .... Id. at 261, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at
469. See'Brunner v. Jensen, 215 Kan. 416, 428, 524 P.2d 1175, 1185, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 64,
76 (1974). Cf Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 324, 327-28, 521 P.2d 281,
291, 293, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 930, 933 (1974) (refers to "elimination of the element of
reliance" when reversing seller's directed verdict but recites evidence of reliance).
8 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-313, Kansas Comment (1968) ("[Ihe definition [of ex-
press warranty] is simplified by elimination of the element of reliance."). The official Vir-
ginia Comment states that the basis-of-the-bargain test might change the result in Gillette v.
Kelling Nut Co., 185 F.2d 294, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1950), in which there was a sale by de-
scription, but the buyer relied on his own inspection rather than the seller's description.
VA. CODE § 8.2-313, Virginia Comment (1965). In Gillette, as in Sessa, the absence of actual
reliance doomed buyer's express warranty claim. But only Sessa arose under the Code.
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Comment 3 to section 2-313 suggests why. It refers to reliance
just once, and then to emphasize that "no particular reliance ...
need be shown." In contrast to the Uniform Sales Act, Comment
3 tiptoes around reliance. Thus, "affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of
the description of those goods." To overcome this presumption,
the seller attempts "to take [his] affirmations, once made, out of
the agreement." Had the drafters reached a firm decision on the
role of reliance in express warranties, they could easily have said
so. Apparently, they decided to let the courts decide.
Comment 7's treatment of post-delivery affirmations adds log-
ical force to the semantic case against actual reliance:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation
are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole ques-
tion is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to
be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after
the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery
asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty be-
comes a modification and need not be supported by considera-
tion if it is otherwise reasonable and in order .... 88
One commentator has argued: "If an affirmation or description is
made by the seller after the closing of the deal, it could hardly
have been relied upon by the buyer in entering into the con-
tract."8 9  Basis of the bargain, the commentator concludes, can-
not logically require reliance. 90
The Second Circuit tracked this analysis in Bigelow v. Agway,
Inc. 91 Mr. Bigelow, "Vermont's Outstanding Farmer in 1972,"
bought chemical spray designed to retard mold in baled hay, al-
lowing farmers to bale early without risking spontaneous combus-
tion. After Bigelow purchased the "Hay Savor," the seller's rep-
s Comment 7 to § 2-313 cites § 2-209, which is reprinted in note 658 infra.
s Note, "Basis of the Bargain"-What Role Reliance?, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 152
(1972). But see 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313:10 (2d ed. 1970).
" Clearly, the type of reliance normally associated with express warranties-reliance in
the inducement-cannot support a post-delivery warranty. Professors White and Summers,
however, suggest that the buyer may rely on the seller's post-delivery promises by forego-
ing his practical option to return the goods soon after the sale. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra
note 2, § 9-4, at 280-81. Nothing in Comment 7 suggests that post-delivery warranties arise
only in such a narrow range of cases.
91 506 F.2d 551, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 769 (2d Cir. 1974).
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resentatives visited his farm. These traveling salesmen examined
the unbaled hay and told the farmer that, with one spritz of the
Hay Savor, he could safely bale away. Although the hay's moisture
content exceeded the level recommended on the product's label
for safe baling, Bigelow followed the salemen's instructions and
stored the hay in his barn. The baled hay caught fire. Vermont's
outstanding (but barnless) farmer sued on an express warranty
allegedly created by the seller's post-delivery affirmations. Revers-
ing a directed verdict for the seller and remanding for a new trial,
the court concluded:
Although defendants might conceivably contend that since
[the salesmen's] representations postdated the delivery of the
Hay Savor ..., [they] ... could not be the "basis of the bar-
gain" as required for recovery under [section 2-313], it is un-
disputed that the [salesmen's] visit on June 15th was to promote
the sale of the product. Thus they might constitute an actiona-
ble modification of the warranty.9 2
The Bigelow court understood that sellers build valuable
goodwill-"promote the sale of the product"-by providing
post-delivery assistance beyond what their contracts require.9 3
This assistance may take the form of further representations of
quality. Section 2-313, as interpreted in Comment 7, permits these
representations to become part of their bargain without further
consideration. Comment 7 implicitly recognizes that post-delivery
representations will create expectations in the buyer, will benefit
the seller, and thus may fairly be enforced against the seller.
92 Id. at 555 n.6, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 775 n.6. But see Hrosik v. J. Keim Builders, 37 Ill.
App. 3d 352, 354, 345 N.E.2d 514, 515, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 472, 474 (1976); Terry v. Moore,
448 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1968).
" Courts could include post-delivery affirmations in the basis of the bargain by treating
them as extensions of the bargain beyond the time of delivery.
A "bargain" is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is
forever fixed as to its content; instead, it describes the commercial relationship
between the parties in regard to this product. The word "bargain" is not en-
crusted with pre-Code concepts which had attached themselves to contract
formation- notions that a contract came into existence at some specific point in
time, some split second when offer and acceptance coincided, thereafter to be
binding unless a new contract complete with the trappings of agreement and
consideration superseded the old one. The Code's word is "bargain"-a process
which can extend beyond the moment in time that the offeree utters the magic
words, "I accept."
R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, § 68, at 206, quoted in part in Autzen v. John C. Taylor
Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, -, 572 P.2d 1322, 1325, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 304, 308-09
(1977). See WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-4, at 280-82.
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In sum, we think that courts should read section 2-313 to
abandon the Uniform Sales Act's requirement of actual reliance
on express warranties. Express warranties fundamentally differ
from the implied warranty of fitness, which does require actual
reliance. 94  The law thrusts the latter upon the parties to protect
the buyer's reliance. In contrast, the seller normally introduces ex-
press warranties into the agreement and is more likely to incorpo-
rate their cost to him into the price of the goods. 95  Thus, a
buyer should receive the quality promised him, even if he pur-
chased in reliance upon the representation of a third party, and
even if he would have paid the same amount for the same goods
without the seller's promise. It follows from this that an express
warranty results even if the buyer does not learn of the affirma-
tions until his goods go bad and he reads his contract for the first
time on the eve of litigation. 6
The basis-of-the-bargain test, then, is one of reasonable, con-
structive expectation based on the context of the sale and assum-
ing the buyer's awareness of the seller's affirmations. Courts un-
comfortable with new-fangled language can still speak in terms of
reliance: "If the buyer had heard seller's affirmations, would he
be justified in relying upon them?" In the discussion that follows,
this Project uses "reliance" as a shorthand for the formulation
suggested here.
2. Samples and Models as the Basis of the Bargain
Samples and models typically pose two questions for lawyers
litigating the basis-of-the-bargain issue: (1) does the presumption
that affirmations form part of the basis of the bargain apply to
samples and models; and (2) to what characteristics of the ex-
hibited sample or model must the goods conform?
'4 See notes 251-74 and accompanying text infra.
95 The analysis here would apply as well where the buyer introduced the quality term in
a purchase order and the seller acquiesced by shipping goods.
96 One might argue for a distinction between affirmations in a contract and
affirmations-for example, in a brochure or a catalogue-not directed exclusively at or
signed by the particular buyer. It may be less appropriate to presume knowledge of the
latter than the former. Cf Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W. 2d 257, 261-62, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 464, 469-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (no particular reliance necessary, but buyer
must at least have read brochure) (dictum). Further, Comment 1 to § 2-313 states that
"'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain." Yet the language
of § 2-313 and the Comments seems to favor holding the seller to his promises, whether
he makes them to an individual buyer or to buyers in general. Cf., eg., U.C.C.
§ 2-313, Comment 4 ("[T~he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it
is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell.").
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a. The Basis-of-the-Bargain Presumption. Comment 6 to section
2-313 states:
In general, the presumption is that any sample or model
just as any affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of
the bargain. But there is no escape from the question of fact.
Thus, where the facts undermine the presumption, it may col-
lapse. For example, in a Sixth Circuit case, 97 an okra seed seller
attempted to escape the force of an affirmation by pointing to an
inconsistent express warranty by sample.98 The seller claimed
that prior sales to the buyer from the same seed lot constituted
samples to which the seed in question conformed. Rejecting this
contention, the court stated:
In order for past descriptions or samples to become part of the
bargain, both parties must mutually agree to the arrangement
and the descriptions or samples must conform to the under-
standing.... [Seller] has pointed to no such mutual under-
standing; rather, [buyer] testified that it purchased the seed in
question from [seller] because of the "good experience" it had
in the past with the [warranted variety of] okra seed, not be-
cause of past descriptions or samples. 99
That the "samples" alluded to were prior sales defeated the
basis-of-the-bargain presumption. 00 But some courts have ig-
nored Comment 6's presumption even in the absence of such
facts. Rejecting a buyer's claim that samples of coal presented dur-
ing the contract negotiations created an express warranty, one
court said: "The exhibition of a sample does not necessarily create
97 Agricultural Servs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 443 (6th Cir. 1977).
98 U.C.C. § 2-317(b) provides: "A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description."
99 Agricultural Servs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1064, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 451 (6th Cir. 1977).
100 Although one could read this case to mean that the buyer must prove a mutual
understanding, such a reading exceeds the facts of the case. Here the seller attempted to
establish the existence of an express warranty based on a prior sample in order to displace
an inconsistent, stricter warranty. One might narrowly interpret the case, then, as holding
that a seller cannot use goods from prior sales as samples in present sales to avail himself
of the presumption Comment 6 creates in the buyer's favor. The case is in keeping with
Comment 6's "question of fact" language. Finally, Comment 5 appears more apposite than
Comment 6. Comment 5 treats past deliveries as warranties by description under
§ 2-313(1)(b), not warranties by sample under § 2-313(1)(c): "Past deliveries may set the de-
scription of quality, either expressly or impiedly by course of dealing."
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an express warranty; the agreement must evidence an intention to
contract by sample."'01
Sometimes samples or models enter the basis of the bargain
without dispute. A buyer may withhold his order until he receives
the samples or models,' 0 2 or he may refer explicitly to them in his
order form. 0 3 These tend to be "easy" cases, because the facts
show that the parties indisputably acted with reference to the
samples.
b. Qualities of the Sample or Model Included in the Basis of the Bargain.
To what extent must the goods conform to the sample or model?
Even the simplest item displays multiple qualities.' 0 4  If all of the
qualities are incorporated into the bargain, the seller must deliver
duplicate goods. If the basis of the bargain includes a few of the
qualities, the goods may differ significantly from the sample or
model without breaching any express warranty.
The surrounding circumstances help determine the degree of
conformity required. Comment 6 to section 2-313 explains:
[I]n mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a "sample"
does not of itself show whether it is merely intended to
"suggest" or to "be" the character of the subject-matter of the
contract. The question is whether the seller has so acted with
reference to the sample as to make him responsible that the
whole shall have at least the values shown by it. The cir-
cumstances aid in answering this question.
Language accompanying the sale may constitute an important
surrounding circumstance. Thus, if the seller said, "This sample is
identical to the goods I am selling," the court should require
101 Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 95, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
1117, 1122 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (citing Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W.
Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 650 (1967)). See Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins
Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 10, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 588, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Where there is a sale
by sample it must appear that such sample was treated by the parties involved as the
standard of quality ....").
102 See Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86, 89, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 862,
866 (8th Cir. 1977) (sample of polystyrene beads); Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co.,
402 F. Supp. 1017, 1026-27, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636, 647-48 (D. Conn. 1975) (model of wiglet
case).
103 See Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 260-61, 284
N.E.2d 880, 888-89, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1363, 1372-73 (1972) (sample component for electrical
switch).
104 For example, a wholesaler of shoes might point to a brown cement brick as de-
monstrating the color of goods he is selling to a retailer. The retailer, however, would not
expect the shoes to possess the same texture, size, and durability as the brick.
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complete conformity. If the seller said, "The sample and the
goods match in color only," the court should not require more. 10 5
Comment 6 suggests that greater conformity should be re-
quired for samples than for models. l06  For example, a manufac-
turer of wiglet cases provided a model which apparently became
part of the basis of the bargain.' 0 7  The buyer contended, to no
avail, that the thickness of the cases' walls failed to conform to the
model's thickness. Citing Comment 6's weakened presumption for
models, the court answered that "a variation in thickness, even if
it did exist, would not necessarily constitute a breach of the war-
ranty expressed by the sample."'108
One final caveat. However closely the goods must ultimately
conform, the standard is the sample or model, not the buyer's
particular purpose. A sale by sample does not create an express
warranty of fitness that the goods will satisfy the buyer's needs.
3. Reasonableness of Reliance, "Puffing," and the Basis of the Bar-
gain
a. Introduction. An affirmation, description, sample, or model
will not become part of the basis of the bargain, and consequently
will not create an express warranty, unless the buyer would be
justified in relying upon it.'0 9 Of course, courts should not delve
into the reasonableness of the quality agreements themselves. Al-
lowing such interference would undercut the very purpose of en-
105 If the seller intended this language as a disclaimer to an independent express war-
ranty, § 2-316(1) may render the disclaimer inoperative. For example, where the seller also
stated that the goods would conform to the sample in regard to thickness, the disclaimer
would not attach. Assuming the sample referred to constitutes the only possible source of
express warranty, the language undermines that warranty not by disclaimer but by the
removal of the sample from the basis of the bargain. That is, the sample fits within "con-
duct relevant to the creation of an express warranty" under § 2-316(1), which throws the
issue back to § 2-313(1)(c) for the basis-of-the-bargain determination. See notes 589-606
and accompanying text infra.
106 If the sample has been drawn from an existing bulk, it must be regarded as
describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompanied by an
unmistakable denial of such responsibility. If, on the other hand, a model of
merchandise not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption that it has
become a literal description of the subject matter is not so strong ....
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
107 See Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636
(D. Conn. 1975).
108 Id. at 1027, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 648.
109 What statements by the seller were part of the basis of the bargain? This
should be determined probably on a more objective standard rather than sub-
jective, although good argument can be made for utilizing the subjective base
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forcing express warranties-granting parties the freedom to de-
termine the quality of goods they must deliver and accept. Only
substantive inequality approaching unconscionability as deter-
mined under section 2-302 should trigger an examination of the
reasonableness of the warranty agreement. At least in commercial
cases, such examinations will be rare indeed.
The question of the reasonableness of a buyer's reliance often
masquerades under another inquiry: Are the seller's affirmations
unenforceable sales talk? Section 2-313 (2) provides the applicable
rule:
[A]n affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a state-
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty.
This section, commonly known as the "puffing" section, 10 ex-
presses the contrapositive of the basis-of-the-bargain test-puffs
are statements upon which the buyer cannot reasonably rely.
Comment 8 to section 2-313 provides:
Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or
commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains
the same: What statements of the seller have in the cir-
cumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis
of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the
seller do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary. The
provisions of subsection (2) are included, however, since com-
mon experience discloses that some statements or predictions
cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain.
Some courts pose the puffing question differently. Instead of
or in addition to asking whether a seller's affirmation is reason-
ably part of the basis of the bargain, they ask if the affirmation is
a fact or an opinion."' Except at the extremes, this approach
of a particular buyer. What was he led to believe and what could he justifiably
rely upon?
R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 6.05, at 6-10 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as DUESENBERG & KING ] (emphasis added), quoted in part in Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz.
App. 225, 229, 501 P.2d 401, 405, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 481, 485 (1972).
110 See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §§ 9-2, 9-3.
1I See, e.g., Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 9 Ill. App. 3d 906, 914-15, 293 N.E.2d 375,
381, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 429, 432 (1973); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311,
321-22, 521 P.2d 281, 289-90, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 927-28 (1974); Interco Inc. v. Randus-
trial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 262-63, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 464, 470-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 917, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 40 (Tex.
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requires courts to make distracting theoretical distinctions. It is
easy to distinguish between "This horse is sound" and "I believe
this horse is sound," 112 but harder to categorize "This corn seed
has 'good blight tolerance.' "113
Despite superficial differences in approach, courts that attempt
to distinguish between affirmations of fact and opinions and that
examine reasonableness of reliance weigh the same factors." 1 4
These factors include specificity, 1 5 "hedging," 116 the experimen-
tal nature of the goods, 1 7 and the buyer's actual or imputed
knowledge of the true condition of the goods."18
b. Elements of the Reasonableness Requirement.
i. Specificity. The more specific a quality statement, the more
likely it is to become an express warranty. Specific representations
that goods are fit for a buyer's particular purpose usually create
express warranties of fitness for that purpose." 9  In addition,
Ct. App. 1972). Some courts do not set up a fact-opinion dichotomy, but merely determine
whether the seller's affirmation is an opinion, which is enough to bar warranty protection.
See, e.g., ITT-Indus. Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 462-63, 229
S.E.2d 814, 822, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1067, 1075 (1976).
112 See generally 1 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 80, at §§ 202, 203.
113 See notes 121-31 and accompanying text infra.
114 Section 1-201(3), which equates "agreement" with "bargain," anticipates such excur-
sions into the factual background of the transaction:
'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their lan-
guage or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
or usage of trade or course of performance ....
Comment 3 to § 1-201 explicitly provides for judicial recognition of "surrounding cir-
cumstances" as part of an agreement. An Illinois case employs the proper analysis: "As
implemented by the Code in all of its provisions, the terms 'bargain' and 'agreement' are
intended to include full recognition of several pertinent elements relating to the parties'
dealings.... Accordingly, we examine the [entire] commercial relationship .... " Alan
Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Ents., Inc., 39 I1. App. 3d 48, 53-54, 349 N.E.2d 627,
633, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1317 (1976).
115 See notes 119-34 and accompanying text infra.
116 See notes 135-47 and accompanying text infra.
117 See notes 148-52 and accompanying text infra.
11 See notes 153-58 and accompanying text infra.
119 See Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, -, 337 A.2d
672, 675, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1245 (C.P. 1974) (bookkeeping machine fit for wide variety
of specified functions); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88,
100, 192 N.W.2d 580, 586, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57, 65 (1971) (crane fit for buyer's purpose and
needs); Potter v. Tyndall, 22 N.C. App. 129, 134, 205 S.E.2d 808, 812, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 58,
63 (fertilizer fit for use on tobacco), cert. denied, 285 N.C. 661, 207 S.E.2d 762 (1974);
Wilson v. E-Z Flo Chem. Co., 13 N.C. App. 610, 612, 186 S.E.2d 679, 681, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
580, 582 (herbicide fit to control grasses and weeds in squash crop), affd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 281 N.C. 506, 189 S.E.2d 221, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 299 (1972); Swenson v.
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courts and parties appear to assume that affirmations expressed
with mathematical precision cannot be mere opinions,'120  but that
affirmations clothed in generalities usually are.
Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co.121 illustrates the danger to the
buyer of the seller's verbal imprecision. Plaintiffs purchased seed-
corn seed from the defendant company, which also furnished
plaintiffs with a Dealer's Product Manual. The manual listed such
seed characteristics as "very good standability, can stand high
population under adequate fertility program, good blight toler-
ance, [and] high test weight." 122 The plaintiffs relied principally
upon the "good blight tolerance" language as the source of an
express warranty. The court dissected this language to dem-
onstrate that no express warranty arose. First it focused on the
word "good": "The word 'good' is defined in Webster's New
World Dictionary of the American Language as 'a general term of
approval or commendation, meaning as it should be, or better
than average.' "123 The court also relied on the case of Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Moushon. 124  In Olin, a seller of explo-
sives told the buyer that the explosives were "of good quality, that
good results would be obtained and he would be pleased with the
breakage and the whole operation." 125  The Olin court affirmed
on appeal the trial court's finding that the statements represented
"the seller's opinion or sales talk rather than matters of express
warranty." 126
Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 42, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67, 71-72 (S.D. 1975) (insecticide fit
for control of corn rootworm larvae).
120 See Woodbury Chem. Co. v. Holgerson, 439 F.2d 1052, 1054, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 999,
1001 (10th Cir. 1971) (weed-killer 80% effective); Chemical Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278, 283-84, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 56, 60 (E.D. Mo.
1973) (weed-killer 90-100% effective); Waddell v. American Breeders Serv., Inc., 161
Mont. 221, 223, 229, 505 P.2d 417, 419, 422, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1157, 1158, 1162 (1973)
(70% success rate in artificial insemination of cows); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co.,
190 Neb. 546, 549, 564-65, 209 N.W.2d 643, 646, 654, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1013, 1016, 1024
(1973) (scaffolding equipment holds 20,000 pounds per panel); Drier v. Perfection, Inc.,
259 N.W.2d 496, 502, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 323, 329 (S.D. 1977) (printing press capable of
producing 8,500 impressions per hour). Cf. Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359
Mass. 474, 482-83, 269 N.E.2d 664, 669-70, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 17, 25-26 (1971) (specification
of five percent accuracy ambiguous and thus not part of basis of bargain).
121 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
122 Id. at 633.
123 Id. at 634.
124 93 Ill. App. 2d 280, 235 N.E.2d 263, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 363 (1968).
125 Id. at 281-82, 235 N.E.2d at 264, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 363-64.
126 Id. at 282, 235 N.E.2d at 264, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 364. Of course, the Bickett affirmation
that the seed corn had "good blight tolerance" appears to be more specific than Olin's
promise of "good results." Thus, although common language appeared in the two cases,
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The Bickett court also focused on the word "tolerance": "The
word 'tolerance' does not mean immunity, or absolute absence of
a condition to those engaged as both buyers and sellers in the
seed corn trade." 127  The court found support in Whittington v.
Eli Lilly & Co. 12 8  In that case, a pamphlet accompanying the sale
of birth control pills stated that "[w]hen taken as directed, the
tablets offer virtually 100% protection." 129 The Bickett court
explained: "[Whittington] held that the word 'virtually' is defined in
Webster's as 'almost entirely', and that it clearly does not mean
'absolutely'. Neither does 'good blight tolerance' mean that there
will never be blight." 130 The Bickett court concluded that the
Dealer's Product Manual contained mere "expressions of the sell-
er's opinion or commendation," not express warranties.' 31
Bickett illustrates that imprecise affirmations may constitute
mere puffing rather than express warranties. The unreasonable-
ness of relying on vague affirmations that an engine "will fill the
bill" 132 or that a "horse is sound" ' 33 has prompted courts to ques-
tion or deny a buyer's right to recovery. In any given case, how-
ever, other circumstances may make a buyer's reliance on impre-
cise affirmations reasonable.' 34  A seller should not assume,
therefore, that he can safely lure a buyer into a bargain merely by
adorning his quality representations in glittering generalities.
ii. Hedging.3 5  A second factor courts examine in deciding
whether a quality term has become part of the basis of the bar-
such language should not be interpreted outside its particular context; "good" may have a
different connotation in one case than in another.
127 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 634.
128 333 F. Supp. 98, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1178 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
129 Id. at 100, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 1180.
130 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 641.
131 Id. The Whittington court did not conclude that the seller's representations were mere
opinion; it simply held that the parties created no warranty of absolute protection. 333 F.
Supp. at 100, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 1180-81. Presumably, if a disproportionately large number
of women using the pills had become pregnant, the less stringent express warranty would
have been breached. Bickett differed because in that case no warranty existed.
"Ia Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151, 156-57, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 420, 425-26
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
133 Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 764-67, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 751-54 (E.D. Pa.
1977), affd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
14 See KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 324, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649,
661 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (television equipment in "'first class' condition" and would "produce
a quality picture"), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
50 (8th Cir. 1972); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 315-22, 521 P.2d 281,
285-90, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 921-28 (1974) (promise to deliver "clean" and "good reputa-
ble" cattle herd).
131 And be these juggling fiends no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense,
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
gain is the degree to which the seller has equivocated. In Matlack,
Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 136 a trailer operator wanted to purchase
equipment that would allow it to haul dry cement. In a letter con-
cerning whether the engine of the pneumatic process used to un-
load the cement could be started while engaged to the blower, the
seller stated that its engineers did not want to commit themselves
because of their "scant knowledge about the application." 137
However, the letter went on to state: "we do believe that we have
the engine that will 'fill the bill' in all categories so far as your
application is concerned." 138 Although the court denied the sell-
er's motion for summary judgment, it noted: "Set against the
background of the essentially novel character of the pneumatic
unloading arrangement, it seems to us that the statement that the
engine would 'fill the bill in all categories' makes out a pitifully
weak case of express warranty."1 39  In all likelihood, the seller's
equivocation, as well as the lack of specificity and the experimen-
tal nature of the goods, contributed to the court's conclusion.
Sometimes the buyer's hedging may defeat his express war-
ranty claim. The buyer of an experimental valve-setting machine
claimed that the seller expressly warranted a "turnkey" device,
that is, one which operates fully from the day received.140  The
seller's letter equivocated: "With few reservations the automatic valve
setter would be a turnkey operation." 141 The buyer compounded
this hedging in its purchase order by requesting that the seller
deliver a machine "substantially as per" its attached letter.' 42 The
buyer's letter closed by stating: "It is probable that some toler-
ances on this will have to be established but deviations from our
basic specification can be determined when the machine is
checked out." 143 The court held that no express "turnkey" war-
ranty was created.
The context of the equivocations may also bear upon the
reasonableness of reliance. In a case involving the sale of insec-
That keep the word of promise to our ear
And break it to our hope!
W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act V, sc. viii, lines 23-26.
136 57 F.R.D. 151, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 420 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
137 Id. at 155, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 424.
138 Id. at 156, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 424.
139 Id. at 157, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 426.
140 Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
17 (1971).
141 Id. at 481, 269 N.E.2d at 669, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 24 (emphasis added).
142 Id. at 482, 269 N.E.2d at 669, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 24.
143 Id. at 482, 269 N.E.2d at 669, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 25.
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ticide,'144 the insecticide bags contained conspicuous labels that
read: "Chevron Ortho Bux Ten Granular for control of corn
rootworm larvae (insecticide)." 145 In fine print on the reverse
side, however, the bags read:
Critical and unforeseeable factors beyond Chevron's con-
trol prevent it from eliminating all risks in connection with the
use of chemicals. Such risks include, but are not limited to,
damage to plants and crops to which the material is applied,
lack of complete control, and damage caused by drift to other
plants or crops. 146
The court held that the conspicuous language created an express
warranty despite the fine-print hedging. 147
iii. Experimental Goods. The experimental nature of the goods
sold may belie the reasonableness of a buyer's reliance on a seller's
representations. In U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.,' 4 a
manufacturer agreed to produce resinated cotton pads through
an "unproven process." 149 Although the contracts created an
"express warranty against defects in materials or workmanship,"
they also stated that "in view of the variables present effecting [sic]
the capacity of the machine, no guarantee can be extended." 150
The agreements also contained language precisely describing the
machine. The court held that because of the machine's experi-
mental nature the descriptions created no express warranty.' 51
The court's holding promotes sound social policy. If affirma-
tions and descriptions of experimental machines generally created
express warranties, manufacturers might hesitate to produce and
market new products. Of course, when the circumstances of a sale
indicate that such representations clearly did form the basis of the
bargain, courts should recognize express warranties. Novelty
should be only one factor used in determining whether a war-
ranty attaches. 152
144 Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D. 1975).
145 Id. at 41, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 70-71.
146 Id. at 41-42, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 71.
147 Id. at 42, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 72.
148 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 449, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 254 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
149 Id. at 1046, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 3.
150 Id. at 1045, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 2.
151 Id. at 1046, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 3-4.
152 For example, the court in Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich.
App. 88, 100, 192 N.W.2d 580, 586, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57, 65 (1971), upheld a trial court's
finding of an express warranty in the sale of a type of crane the seller had never before
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iv. Buyer's Knowledge and Expertise. Buyers often acquire first-
hand knowledge of the quality of goods by inspecting them. Ac-
tual knowledge that a power tool is unsafe 153 or that a truck is
not in good mechanical condition 54 precludes reasonable reliance
on the seller's affirmations to the contrary. On the other hand, a
reasonable inspection that does not reveal the defect should not
remove the quality representation from the basis of the bar-
gain. 55 Between these poles of known and unknowable lies a
marshy middle ground. A buyer may refuse the seller's invitation
to inspect, or he may agree to inspect but carelessly overlook a
discoverable defect. A seller's inspection offer may betray suffi-
cient doubt about the goods to preclude buyer's reasonable re-
liance upon his contemporaneous quality representations. In addi-
produced. The trial court had considered such factors as the good reputation and experi-
ence of the seller and the seller's good faith belief that it could adequately modify an
existing model to meet the buyer's requirements.
15 See Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 9 Ill. App. 3d 906, 915, 293 N.E.2d 375, 381, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 429, 432 (1973).
154 See Janssen v. Hook, 1 Ill. App. 3d 318, 321, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
846, 849 (1971).
155 Misguided courts requiring actual reliance (see notes 71-96 and accompanying text
supra) might take a different tack. One court analyzed the issue as follows: "[S]ignificant
reliance by the buyer on his examination of the product before the deal is completed has
been held by prevailing case law to indicate that buyer's lack of reliance on seller's affirma-
tions or descriptions precluded the creation of an express warranty." Alan Wood Steel Co.
v. Capital Equip. Ents., Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 57, 349 N.E.2d 627, 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
1310, 1320 (1976). See Simmons v. Williams, 32 Agric. Dec. 1427, 1430, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
355, 357 (1973). Comment 8 to § 2-316, the section on exclusions and modifications of
warranties, appears to support these courts:
Application of the doctine of "caveat emptor" in all cases where the buyer
examines the goods regardless of statements made by the seller is, however,
rejected by this Article. Thus, if the offer of examination is accompanied by
words as to their merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer indicates
clearly that he is relying on those words rather than on his examination, they give rise
to an "express" warranty.
(Emphasis added.) Although this language suggests a requirement of actual reliance, courts
should bear in mind that it attaches to a section dealing with the exclusion, not the crea-
tion, of warranties. Second, read literally, it poses a sufficient and not a necessary condition
to the creation of an express warranty. Third, it alludes to actual reliance as if that were
enough to establish an express warranty, ignoring the reasonableness required by the
basis-of-the-bargain test. Finally, it suggests that the buyer must take the initiative in estab-
lishing an express warranty, despite the teaching of Comment 3 to § 2-313 that "no par-
ticular reliance.., need be shown." In sum, courts cannot reasonably rely on this language
from Comment 8.
Even if actual reliance were necessary, this approach fails to recognize that reliance on
an examination is not clear affirmative proof that the buyer did not rely on the seller's
affirmations; a buyer may rely on more than one source of information when purchasing
goods. See Werner v. Montana, 378 A.2d 1130, 1137, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 894, 904 (N.H.
1977).
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tion to the usual factors involved in the basis-of-the-bargain ques-
tion, reasonableness in this context will vary inversely with
the urgency of the inspection offer-invitation, request, or
demand-and its proximity to the quality representation.
A buyer's knowledge of the trade may also affect the deter-
mination of reasonableness. For example, the custom in the horse
trade is to treat sellers' representations of soundness as mere opin-
ions unless "there is an 'understanding' that an ignorant buyer, is
relying totally on a knowledgeable seller not 'to make a mean
deal.' "156 Nevertheless, a buyer's trade knowledge is inherently
more tenuous than knowledge acquired through examination.
Trade knowledge is thus of less help to sellers; courts have held it
insufficient against a strong showing of actual reliance 157 or when
other circumstances make deviation from the normal dependence
on trade practice reasonable. 58
III
IMPLIED WARRANTIES- SECTIONS 2-314 AND 2-315
Experience has been not only the life of the law,' 59 but the
progenitor of implied warranties. The idea of imposing warranties
of quality by law was probably conceived in the experience of the
unfortunate who bought the unfit from the unscrupulous. Dean
Prosser encapsulates the concept's evolution:
Early in the nineteenth century the slow growth of a busi-
ness, practice by which reputable sellers stood behind their
goods, and a changing social viewpoint toward the seller's re-
sponsibility, led to the development of "implied" warranties of
15' Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(footnote omitted), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
"7 See Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551, 554, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 769, 773-74 (2d Cir.
1974) (trade custom not to bale hay until moisture level below 25% did not make reliance
on seller's representations that use of chemical product allowed baling at higher moisture
level unreasonable as a matter of law).
158 See Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
916 (1974). Trade usage normally barred warranties that cows were brucellosis-free absent
a blood test. The buyer knew the test had not been performed. Other circumstances, how-
ever, lent credence to the buyer's reliance: the state's department of agriculture and the
United States Department of Agriculture allowed cows to be brought into the state only if
the cows were reasonably certain to be clean. Id. at 326-28, 521 P.2d at 292-94, 14 U.C.C.
Rep. at 932-34.
159 O.W. HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
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quality, which were attached by the law to certain types of sales,
and which in effect made the seller an insurer of his goods. 160
An implied warranty "is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract" 161 a contractual term promis-
ing quality but imposed by law rather than agreement. While
strict liability in tort developed in personal injury and property
damage cases as a detour around contract defenses, the implied
warranty was codified in the Uniform Sales Act and, later, in sec-
tions 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 162
A. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability-Section 2-314(1), (2)
Section 2-314(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
in part:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind.
Thus, a court may find an implied warranty of merchantability
only where (1) the warranty has not been excluded or modified;
(2) a contract for the sale of goods exists; and (3) the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. This Project dis-
cusses the first two conditions elsewhere; 163 we focus here on the
third.
160 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF TORTS § 95, at 636 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER ON TORTS].
161 Id. at 634.
162 One commentator has identified four reasons for imposing warranties in sales:
These are: (a) public policy which requires that the party which puts goods into
the stream of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused by defective
goods, rather than the person injured by it; (b) the fact that one party has
induced the reliance of the consumer on his skill and knowledge; (c) the fact
that the former is in a better position to control the antecedents which affect
the quality of the product; and (d) the fact that he is better able to distribute
the loss.
Note, supra note 42, at 140-41. These reasons, based on the relative position of sellers and
buyers in the marketplace and in the manufacturing and selling processes, are primarily
consumer-oriented. The Code, however, recognizes that they often apply to commercial
buyers as well.
16 See notes 629-748 and accompanying text infra; notes 1-42 and accompanying text
supra.
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1. The Merchant Requirement-Section 2-314(1)
Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant" as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or
to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.
A merchant is thus someone who possesses special knowledge or
skill relating either to the business practices or to the goods in-
volved in the transaction, or to both. 1 64  Section 2-314(1) limits
the class of merchants subject to an implied warranty of merchant-
ability to those who are merchants "with respect to goods of that
kind." Consequently, sellers with knowledge of the practices in-
volved but without special knowledge or skill as to the goods fall
outside the coverage of section 2-314(1).
This distinction derives from the rationale underlying the
"merchant" requirement of section 2-314(1). The implied war-
ranty of merchantability is a codified version of strict liability, 165
imposed on the merchant seller because of his supposedly
superior position in the marketplace in general and relative to the
particular goods.1 66  The reasons justifying this heavy obligation
lose force as we turn from merchants knowledgeable about the
goods themselves to merchants familiar only with the trade prac-
tices, and dissipate entirely with nonmerchant sellers. 67 Whether
the Code holds the seller responsible for the quality of goods de-
pends upon his expertise.
164 Comment 2 to § 2-104 adds:
The term "merchant" as defined here roots in the "law merchant" concept
of a professional in business. The professional status under the definition may
be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as
to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of
specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish the merchant status is indi-
cated by the nature of the provisions.
The Comment goes on to indicate that, under § 2-314, the warranty of merchantability
is implied only 'if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.'
Obviously this qualification restricts the implied warranty to a much smaller
group than everyone who is engaged in business and requires a professional
status as to particular kinds of goods.
165 See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-6, at 286.
166 See note 162 supra.
167 See 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
70-71 (1964):
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The breadth of the "merchant" definition exemplifies the
salutary flexibility of Article Two.' 6 8 Code merchants may be
found at all market levels and in all occupations. Manufactur-
ers 169 as well as wholesalers and retailers 170 and, occasionally,
auctioneers 171 may qualify as merchants under section 2-314(1). A
mechanical contracting firm that supplied manufactured goods on
order was a merchant; 172 a finance lessor that did not build,
This "merchant" limitation on the warranty of merchantability is related
directly to the fact that section 2-314 imposes a heavy obligation with respect to
merchantability. Merchants can satisfy this obligation because they should know
what kind of goods pass in the trade without objection. If the goods in question
are not of such "fair average" quality, they should realize this fact and protect
themselves by an appropriate quality term or by a disclaimer. An inexperienced
seller, such as a housewife selling her used sewing machine does not have this
knowledge, nor does she know how to protect herself. Furthermore, the buyer
should not rely on a casual seller to the same extent he does on a professional
dealer with respect to quality. For these reasons, the Code imposes no warranty
of merchantability on the non-merchant seller.
168 See U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
169 See, e.g., Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 636, 645 (D. Conn. 1975) (wiglet case manufacturer); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D.
Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 509, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 407, 414 (W.D. Mo. 1971)
(cheese manufacturer), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Stand-
ard Milk Co., 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972); Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1307,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 697, 699 (Okla. 1975) (cleaning product manufacturer); Bell v. Harrington
Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 472, 219 S.E.2d 906, 908, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 626, 628 (1975) (tobacco
barn manufacturer). That the manufacturer does not sell directly to consumers does not
affect its characterization as a merchant in a suit by a consumer, although it may raise
privity issues. See notes 953-90 and accompanying text infra.
170 See, e.g., Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033, 1035 n.2, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1143, 1145
n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (horse dealer); R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 838, 846, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 310, 319 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (antifreeze seller); Sessa v.
Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 769, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 758 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (person who "sold
and raced horses for a living"), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodruff v. Clark
County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 43, 286 N.E.2d 188, 195, 11 U.C.C.
Rep. 498, 508 (1972) (bureau regularly selling chickens); Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244
N.W.2d 691, 697, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63, 70 (N.D. 1976) (professional crop sprayer held mer-
chant of herbicide); Farmers Union Coop. Gin v. Smith, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 823, 826 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1971) (seed retailer); Tracor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446,
448, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 75, 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (sheetrock seller).
Of course, a sham organization cannot be a merchant. Thus, a trust company that had
no employees, "was formed solely as a tax-saving device," and purchased and leased
equipment to the buyer "simply because at the time [the buyer] was low on cash," was not a
merchant under § 2-104(1). Brescia v. Great Rd. Realty Trust, 373 A.2d 1310, 1311-12, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 769, 770 (N.H. 1977).
171 See Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 859, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490, 492, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 300, 302 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (corporate auction house held
merchant of restaurant equipment); text accompanying note 182 infra.
172 See Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams, Inc., 520 S.W.2d 313, 315, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
1022, 1024 (Ky. 1975).
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manufacture, or sell any of the carwash systems it leased was
not. 17 3 In short, merchant status depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each case viewed in light of the language and
policies of sections 2-314(1) and 2-104(1).
Comment 3 to section 2-314 provides an important corollary:
"A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant'
within the meaning of the full scope of this section and, thus, no
warranty of merchantability would apply." 174 The Comment
presumes that a person who makes an isolated sale neither deals
in nor by his occupation represents that he has special knowledge
or skill with respect to the goods sold. Even where a seller posses-
ses such knowledge or skill, however, courts read Comment 3 lit-
erally. For instance, one court held that a beer producer was not a
merchant of carbon dioxide, which it made for use in its beer
production, because its direct sale of excess carbon dioxide was an
isolated event.' 75 Similarly, the isolated-sale rule helped a sawmill
owner escape section 2-314(1) liability in the sale of a saw to
another sawmill.' 76  But a court could easily find that the brewer
dealt in carbon dioxide (albeit indirectly) or held himself out by
his occupation as having knowledge or skill peculiar to sellers of
carbon dioxide. So also with the sawyer and his saw. Yet courts
interpret Comment 3 to require not only that the seller's "mer-
chanthood" be based upon the goods, but also that he deal in
them directly. Special knowledge or skill related to the goods and
derived from the seller's occupation will not, without more, trig-
ger an implied warranty of merchantability.
We would interpret the Comment to say only that a person
who makes an isolated sale is presumed not to deal in goods of
that kind. If the buyer demonstrates that the seller has by his
occupation held himself out as knowledgeable or skillful in regard
to the goods, the buyer has rebutted the presumption. That the
sale is isolated should then not preclude the court from finding
173 See All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 880, 538 P.2d 1177, 1184, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 933, 942 (1975). For criticism of this case, see 13 IDAHo L. REv. 283 (1977);
notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, supra note 42, at 141.
M1' See Donald v. City Nael Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 324, 329 So. 2d 92, 95, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 891, 894 (1976) (bank not merchant of repossessed boat); Prince v. LeVan,
486 P.2d 959, 964, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 367, 375 (Alas. 1971) (persons making isolated sale of
commercial vessel not merchants). See also DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, at
§ 7.01[2][a].
"' Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 528, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 810, 817 (D.D.C. 1971).
178 Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 964, 341 N.E.2d 713, 715, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 884,
887 (1975).
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that the seller is a merchant for purposes of section 2-314(1). In
light of the policies behind section 2-314(1), a seller's close rela-
tion to the goods justifies finding an implied warranty in an iso-
lated sale.' 77
One limitation on the isolated-sale rule arises when a mer-
chant who sells a variety of products allegedly breaches the im-
plied warranty of merchantability on a particular product he has
never before sold. In such cases, "[t]he limiting concept of being a
merchant 'with respect to goods of that kind' [should] be liberally
construed so as to embrace any products that are sold within the
general category in which the defendant had been dealing." '7 8 In
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co.,' 79 a manufacturer who
blow-molded plastic equipment was held to be a merchant of wig-
let cases, even though the instant contract was apparently its first
wiglet case contract and probably represented only a small part of
its total business. Wiglet cases easily fall within the general cate-
gory of blow-molded products.'8 0 Similarly, when a building
177 See notes 165-67 and accompanying text supra. Refusing to find a warranty in an
isolated sale may create the anomalous result of placing greater liability on a retailer who
knows nothing about the goods than on a seller with substantial expertise as to the goods
and upon whose reputation a buyer could more reasonably rely.
Although it does not explicitly discuss the isolated-sale rule, Fear Ranches, Inc. v.
Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 27 (10th Cir. 1972), deserves mention. Rancher
Berry, who had previously sold only to meat-packers, sold a herd of cattle to a trader for
resale to other ranchers. Fear, the ultimate purchaser, intended to use the cattle for breed-
ing. Fear soon discovered that some of the cattle had brucellosis, a highly contagious dis-
ease that renders cows unfit for breeding but not for eating. The court held that the seller
was not a merchant of breeding cattle:
[T]his sale was the dealing in a different classification of stock than this cow
and calf sale for resale. This was a sufficiently different type of business and
type of goods than theretofore sold .... It is not sufficient to say that [the
sellers] had always dealt in "cattle," as such a category includes too many en-
tirely different "goods."
Id. at 907, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 31. In essence, the court treated the transaction as an isolated
sale, even though the specific goods sold were identical to the goods in which the seller
normally dealt. Unlike the beer and saw cases, however, Fear Ranches was correctly decided.
A rancher selling cattle to packers need not worry about brucellosis because the disease
does not affect the cattle's edibility. A rancher regularly selling cattle for breeding, how-
ever, must ensure that they are free from the disease, since brucellosis affects cattle's ability
to breed.
178 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at § 2-314:61.
179 402 F. Supp. 1017, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636 (D. Conn. 1975).
180 The Blockhead court approached but missed the general-category analysis. The court
first noted that the seller "has contended that it was not a merchant of wiglet cases but a
blow-molding equipment manufacturer and custom molder. The implication of this con-
tention is that manufacturers who produce a variety of goods would never fall within the
broad scope intended for ... 2-314." Id. at 1025, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 654. The court then
concluded that because the manufacturer was familiar with the process that produced the
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materials supplier sold a particular hammer and bit that it did not
ordinarily sell, an implied warranty of merchantability arose be-
cause the supplier customarily sold the manufacturer's general
line of merchandise. 181  Another court applied section 2-314 to
an auction sale of restaurant equipment:
Clearly an auctioneer who regularly sells merchandise of a
particular kind would come within the coverage of section
2-314.... But it seems to me almost equally plain from the
standpoint of the language of the section as well as its purpose
that it applies also to auctioneers who sell different kinds of
goods on an ongoing basis under circumstances that imply the
likelihood of repetition with regard to the goods in question. 82
defects, it had held itself out "as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices ...
involved in the transaction" (id. (emphasis in original) ) within the meaning of § 2-104(1).
Two flaws mar this analysis. First, although the court's analysis addresses the manufac-
turer who produces a variety of goods, it fails to account for the seller who sells such a
variety. Because a seller who is not a manufacturer will probably be unfamiliar with pro-
duction processes, he may not fall within the court's interpretation of "practices" under
§ 2-104. The Blockhead court thus failed to put forth a unified theory able to encompass
both manufacturers and sellers unfamiliar with production processes. Second, the court
failed to recognize that § 2-314(1) renders the "practices" component of § 2-104(1)'s mer-
chant definition inapplicable to implied warranties of merchantability. See text accompany-
ing note 164 supra. Mercanti v. Persson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 969
(1971), cited in Blockhead as analogous authority, involved the definition of merchant for
purposes of § 2-509, to which the "practices" component does apply. In Valley Iron & Steel
Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 562 P.2d 1212, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 760 (1977), a manufacturer of
cast iron products was held a merchant with respect to hoedad collar castings which the
buyer ordered, even though the seller had never made such castings before. Citing Block-
head, the Thorin court based its reasoning on the "practices" component of § 2-104(1).
A better approach would hold that a manufacturer of a class of products, who sells a
new product within that class, is a merchant as to that product because of his working
knowledge of the class. The plastics manufacturer in Blockhead would be a merchant with
respect to blow-molded products in general and thereby be subject to § 2-314 in the sale of
wiglet cases. This approach would preserve the merchant categories outlined in Comment
2 to § 2-104, and thus prevent the over- or under-extension of any of the special merchant
provisions of Article Two.
"I Mutual Servs. of Highland Park, Inc. v. S. 0. S. Plumbing & Sewage Co., 93 Ill App.
2d 257 (abstract of opinion), 235 N.E.2d 265, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 365 (1968).
"52 Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 859-60, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490, 492, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 300, 302-03 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
Note the analysis in the quoted language. First, auctioneers who regularly sell the kind
of goods in question "deal" in those goods within the meaning of § 2-104. Second, the
court discusses auctioneers who may not be familiar with the goods in question, but whose
established business practices "imply the likelihood of repetition with regard to [those]
goods." Such auctioneers have, by their ongoing sales of various kinds of goods, implied
that they have "knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved." U.C.C.
§ 2-104(1).
Logically extended, this analysis states: Auctioneers who do not and are not likely to
regularly sell the goods are not merchants. Such auctioneers generally serve as mere con-
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In sum, the section 2-314 requirement that the seller be a
merchant with respect to the particular goods sold ensures that
the heavy obligation of merchantability rests only on those capable
of bearing it. The isolated-sale rule of Comment 3 helps to weed
out those sellers upon whom the obligation should not fall. Courts
should not, however, transform that guideline into a tether, lest
commercial sellers thereby escape obligations they properly should
bear.
2. The Standards of Merchantability-Section 2-314(2)
Once an implied warranty of merchantability arises under
section 2-314(1), section 2-314(2) sets the standards of merchanta-
bility:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
These standards of merchantability are not entirely discrete,18 3
nor are they exhaustive.'8 4  Moreover, the conjunctive language
duits, channeling goods from owner to owner. Their attenuated relationship with the
goods does not justify imposing upon them the strict requirements of merchantability.
183 [Tlhe criteria for the concept of merchantability largely duplicate one another.
Most courts have employed the "ordinary purpose" or the "fair, average" tests
found in § 2-314(2)(b) and (c). Practically, therefore, it may be said that mer-
chantable goods must be of fair and average quality and fulfill the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used.
W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 86 (3d ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
184 Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "merchantable" nor
to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the stat-
ute, but arising by usage of trade or through case law. The language used is
"must be at least such as .... " and the intention is to leave open other possible
attributes of merchantability.
U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 6.
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of section 2-314(2) indicates that the breach of any one of these
standards constitutes a breach of warranty. 18 5
Reasonableness, not perfection, lies at the heart of the mer-
chantability standards, 8 6 as the case of the lame racehorse 8 7 dem-
onstrates. A horseracing enthusiast paid a merchant $25,000 for
a horse named Tarport Conaway. Tarport might have been better
named "Tarpit." The buyer soon discovered tendinitis in the ani-
mal's front legs. This affliction soon disappeared, only to be re-
placed by lameness in the hind legs. After rest and treatment, the
undaunted beast won three of the thirteen races it entered, earn-
ing a scant $1,306, surely a disappointing return on the $25,000
investment. Even assuming that the alleged defects existed at the
time of sale, the court dubbed the steed merchantable:
The standard established does not require that goods be out-
standing or superior. It is only necessary that they be of
reasonable quality within expected variations and fit for the or-
dinary purposes for which they are used ....
Even with tendinitis and intermittent claudication Tarport
Conaway met this standard. The tendinitis was merely tempo-
rary and of no long term effect. The intermittent claudication
did not prevent him from becoming a creditable if unspectacu-
lar race horse. After rest and recuperation, he won three races
in thirteen starts in 1975. Certainly he did not live up to Sessa's
hopes for a preferred pacer, but such disappointments are an
age old story in the horse racing business. Anyone who dares to
deal in standardbreds knows that whether you pay $2500.00 or
$250,000.00, a given horse may prove to be a second
Hambletonian or a humble hayburner. Consequently, since
Tarport Conaway was able to hold his own with other stand-
ardbreds, he was reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for
which race horses are used, and was merchantable.'88
Thus in the speculative field of standardbred racing, one might
read section 2-314 to say simply that there is no such thing as a
sure bet.
As this case poignantly illustrates, whether goods pass the
reasonable fitness test of section 2-314(2) may depend upon how
181 See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, § 76, at 233.
186 See, e.g., Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 643 (W.D. Ky. 1972)
(merchantable seed corn need not be perfect). See also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 9-7, at 295; 1 WILLISTON ON SAL.ES, supra note 80, at § 243.
187 Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 568
F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
188 Id. at 769-70, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 758-59.
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they stack up against the competition. 18 9 If the goods "are of av-
erage grade, quality and value of similar goods sold under similar
conditions," 190 courts will probably find them merchantable. But
if the goods are substandard, courts will find them unmerchanta-
ble. For instance, one court declared a printing press with certain
defects unmerchantable because "[a]ll of the defects in the press
... are not present in other presses of the same type whether they
be machines sold by other companies or the defendant com-
pany." '9 Reasonable fitness, in other words, is a relativistic
standard defined in large part by the norms of the marketplace
rather than by notions of perfection.
From this core concept of reasonable fitness radiate subsec-
tion (2)'s particular standards of merchantability. 192
a. Pass Without Objection in the Trade. To be merchantable
under section 2-314(2)(a), goods must "pass without objection in
the trade under the contract description." Although few cases
have interpreted this paragraph, Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel
Co. 193 aptly illustrates the fundamental concept. The court held
that, to be merchantable, steel must have a carbon content of
1010 to 1020, for such was the custom and usage of the trade.
"[P]laintiff breached the implied warranty of merchantability in
selling to defendant steel of a different quality than ordinarily
sold in the custom and usage of the steel business, and not fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 194 The
court reached this conclusion via Comment 2 to section 2-314,
which provides in part:
The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically
on the meaning of the terms of the agreement as recognized in
the trade. Goods delivered under an agreement made by a
merchant in a given line of trade must be of a quality compara-
ble to that generally acceptable in that line of trade under the
description or other designation of the goods used in the
agreement.
189 This comparison with similar goods is reflected in § 2-314(2)(b). See notes 199-202
and accompanying text infra.
190 Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 42, 286
N.E.2d 188, 194, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498, 507 (1972).
'91 Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Il. App. 3d 350, 355, 360 N.E.2d 1168, 1171, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 1009, 1012 (1977).
192 For detailed analysis of these standards, see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at § 76.
19' 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1019 (1971).
194 Id. at 502, 190 N.W.2d at 279, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 1023.
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Although Comment 2 appears to clarify section 2-314(2)(a), the
Ambassador Steel court only briefly mentioned that standard. In-
stead, the court stressed the more general concepts of custom and
usage of trade as the source of the warranty, citing sections
1-205(2) 195 and 1-205(3) 196 for the definitions of trade usage.
The specificity of section 2-314(2)(a), however, makes resort to
section 1-205 unnecessary. 97  The court should simply have said
that steel that does not have a carbon content of 1010 to 1020
can not "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description." 198 Where a trade usage provides standards of quality
for goods described in a contract, goods falling short of those
standards will ordinarily not satisfy the implied warranty of mer-
chantability.
b. Fair Average Quality (Fungible Goods). Like paragraph (a),
paragraph (b) of section 2-314(2) controls few cases. To be mer-
chantable under paragraph (b), fungible goods must be of "fair
average quality" within the contract description. According to
Comment 7,
[plaragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) are to be read
together. Both refer ... to the standards of that line of the
trade which fits the transaction and the seller's business. "Fair
195 U.C.C. § 1-205(2) states:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regular-
ity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and
scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a
usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation
of the writing is for the court.
196 U.C.C. § 1-205(3) provides:
A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation
or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
197 Although § 1-205 alone should adequately protect the buyer's right to goods that
"pass without objection in the trade," § 2-314(2)(a) is not mere surplusage. The value of
§ 2-314(2)(a) derives from its separateness and its specificity, which focus the attention of
aggrieved buyers on the precise quality assurances the statute affords them. For a similar
discussion of course of dealing warranties arising under § 2-314(3), see notes 299-314 and
accompanying text infra.
198 Of course, for a product to "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description," a "trade" in goods of that kind must exist. Thus where a seller-manufacturer
agreed to design and build three valve-testing machines, a court found no breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability. "[B]ecause the machines were 'semi-experimental'
prototypes ... [tihere was no showing that the machines were not 'such as pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description,' UCC § 2-314(2)(a), for there was no
trade in goods of the same kind." Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474,
484, 269 N.E.2d 664, 670, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 17, 26 (1971).
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average" is a term directly appropriate to agricultural bulk prod-
ucts and means goods centering around the middle belt of
quality, not the least or the worst that can be understood in the
particular trade by the designation, but such as can pass "with-
out objection." Of course a fair percentage of the least is per-
missible but the goods are not "fair average" if they are all of
the least or worst quality possible under the description. In
cases of doubt as to what quality is intended, the price at which
a merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature
and scope of his obligation under the present section.'9 9
Two cases citing paragraph (b) illustrate the overlap between the
merchantability standards. In Mindell v. Raleigh Rug Co., 20 0 the
buyer purchased floor tiles which soon yellowed. The court com-
bined the language of sections 2-314(2)(a) and (b) in declaring
that tile "which discolors shortly after installation, is not of 'fair
average quality that would pass without objection in the trade' as
required by [section 2-314] .... It must not only be durable but
also hold its pattern and color for a reasonable length of time
consistent with the degree of quality selected." 2 0 ' Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that warped lumber was unmer-
chantable because seller
did not send to [buyer] building studs which were of "fair aver-
age quality" within the description or sample agreed upon. The
District Court found that the majority of the studs in question
were much lower in quality than the "#2 spruce studs" agreed
upon. These delivered studs were not "fit for the ordinary
purposes" for which such studs were to be used, the construc-
tion of buildings which would meet minimum general construc-
tion standards. 20
2
At best, then, paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2-314(2) pro-
vide handy synonyms for the basic reasonable fitness test, the
former paragraph focusing primarily on trade practices, the latter
on comparisons with similarly described goods.
c. Fit For Ordinary Purposes. Paragraph (c) of section 2-314(2),
which provides that goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used," is "[t]he most widely quoted of
199 See also DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, at § 7.01[31[c].
200 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1124 (Mass. Hous. Ct. 1974).
201 Id. at 1125.
202 Jetero Constr. Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F.2d 1348, 1352-53, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 478 (text of opinion not reprinted) (6th Cir. 1976).
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the synonyms in subsection (2)."' 203 As one commentator main-
tains, fitness for ordinary purposes "is the key thought-the
heart-of the merchantability warranty." 20 4  To meet this stand-
ard, goods must be reasonably safe when put to their ordinary
use 205 and reasonably capable of performing their ordinary func-
tions.206
To prove a breach under paragraph (c), a party must estab-
lish first, the ordinary purposes of the goods and second, that the
goods are unfit for such purposes.207 All goods are unfit for
some purposes: an automobile is unfit for transoceanic transporta-
tion; a C. B. radio, for extraterrestrial communication. Difficulties
arise, however, in proving that a given purpose is one of the "or-
203 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-7, at 293.
204 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at 235. Similarly, Comment 8 to § 2-314 explains that
"[f]itness for the ordinary purposes for which goods of the type are used is a fundamental
concept of the present section."
205 See, e.g., R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 846, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 310, 319 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (adulterated antifreeze damaging machinery held
unmerchantable); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504,
509-10, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 407, 414-15 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (contaminated cheese unsafe for
human consumption held unmerchantable); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahem, 352 N.E.2d 774,
782, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 343 (Ind. App. 1976) ("implied warranty of merchantability that
the brush unit would effectively wash automobiles without knocking off their exterior ac-
cessories" may accompany sale of car wash); Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691,
696-97, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63, 71 (N.D. 1976) (herbicide damaging wheat crop held unmer-
chantable); Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 140, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 351,
358-59 (S.D. 1977) (vaccine contaminating cattle held unmerchantable). See also R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at 236.
206 Among the cases holding goods unfit for their ordinary purposes are: S-C Indus. v.
American Hydroponics Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852, 855, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 937, 941 (5th Cir.
1972) (greenhouse that partially collapsed unfit for ordinary purpose); Brickman-Joy Corp.
v. National Annealing Box Co., 459 F.2d 133, 135, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1972)
(galvanizing kettle that cracked while packed with zinc and heated); Curtis v. Murphy
Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 947, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 145, 154 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (elevators
that operate erratically); Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Mach. Co., 65 Mich. App.
426, 431, 237 N.W.2d 488, 491, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 857, 861 (1976) (tube mill incapable of
producing satisfactory square tubing); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35
Mich. App. 88, 101, 192 N.W.2d 580, 586, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57, 65 (1971) (crane that made
excessive noise and would not shift properly); Garner v. S & S Livestock Dealers, Inc., 248
So. 2d 783, 786, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 418, 422 (Miss. 1971) ("feeder pigs" infected with hog
cholera); Christensen v. Eastern Neb. Equip. Co., 199 Neb. 741, 743-45, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
51, 53-54 (1978) (leaky storage tank); Rodd v. W.H. King Drug Co., 30 N.C. App. 564,
566, 228 S.E.2d 35, 36, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 345, 347 (1976) (color photograph processing unit
with malfunctioning enlarger); Jorritsma v. Farmers' Feed & Supply Co., 272 Or. 499,
509-10, 538 P.2d 61, 66-67, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 696, 703 (1975) (unpalIatable cattle feed); Bell
v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 472, 219 S.E.2d 906, 908, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 626, 628
(1975) (bulk curing tobacco barn with loose boards, jamming doors, faulty floors, and
more).
207 See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 183, at 86.
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dinary" purposes for whieh the goods are used. For instance, a
buyer sued because his new valve-testing machines failed to set
valves within plus or minus five percent.2 0 8  He lost because he
failed to produce "any evidence which proves the existence of any
purpose other than merely setting valves .... Moreover, because
the machines were 'semi-experimental' prototypes they had no rec-
ord of past use on which to base a determination of their ordi-
nary purpose. 209 On the other hand, a clamp ordinarily used
to straighten sheet metal was applied to its ordinary purpose
when the buyer used it to straighten an automobile body made of
sheet metal.210 When goods are used under conditions placing
abnormal demands upon them, the goods are probably not being
put to their "ordinary purposes."' 21' Also, the ordinary purpose
of custom-made goods may depend upon the intended use that
the buyer communicates to the seller when he orders them.
21 2
208 Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
17 (1971).
209 Id. at 483, 269 N.E.2d at 670, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 26. See note 198 supra.
210 Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 380-81, 368 A.2d 993, 998, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 473,
480-81 (1977). The court also stressed the seller's representation that the clamps were ap-
propriate for the buyer's intended use, apparently implying that the seller was therefore
estopped from denying that the clamps were being put to their ordinary purpose. Such
representation, however, would more appropriately support a claim under an express war-
ranty (§ 2-313) or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (§ 2-315).
11 For instance, in Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28 N.C. App. 684, 222 S:E.2d
709, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 106 (1976), plaintiff purchased equipment for a water filter plant.
Apparently as a result of excessive water pressure, the equipment failed to filter the water
sufficiently to meet governmental regulations. The court concluded that "[tihe evi-
dence.., merely establishes that the distributor heads were not fit for use under excessive
water pressure as contained by the Water Corp.'s system, which was not the ordinary pur-
pose for which the goods were sold." Id. at 688, 222 S.E.2d at 712, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 109.
See Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 548, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 920, 935 (D. Mass. 1977) (where ordinary purpose of pollution control device
was normal air cleaning or oil mist control, failure to control large quantity of plastic parti-
cles and odors did not demonstrate unmerchantability).
212 See, e.g., Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 108, 562 P.2d 1212, 1216,
21 U.C.C. Rep. 760, 765 (1977): "The ordinary purpose of custom-made castings depends
upon their designated use. Without such a tag the uses would vary so much that any
function could be isolated as 'ordinary."' Because the manufacturer "knew that the castings
were to join the handle and blade in the tree-planting impact tools which occasionally
would strike rock," and "the castings were not fit for this purpose, the warranty was
breached." Id.
In Valley Iron, a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose also arose. Id. at 109, 562
P.2d at 1216-17, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 765-66. The implied warranty of merchantability that
attaches to custom-made goods' seems to duplicate the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose; the distinction may only be important in the rare case where the latter
warranty alone is disclaimed. Perhaps in that rare case, it would be unfair to stick a mer-
chant who has attempted to contract away the only potential liability he foresaw. But where
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d. Run of Even Kind, Quality, and Quantity. Section 2-314(2)(d)
requires that goods "run, within the variations permitted by the
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit
and among all units involved." Thus where a buyer purchases a
quantity of goods from a merchant seller, the Code imposes a
uniformity requirement. Anxious to avoid the "hobgoblin of little
minds,' 213 Comment 9 emphasizes that "precautionary language
has been added as a reminder of the frequent usages of trade
which permit substantial variations both with and without an
allowance or an obligation to replace the varying units." Surpris-
ingly, no reported cases raise the issue of uniformity. 214
e. Adequately Contained, Packaged, and Labeled. Paragraph (e) of
section 2-314(2) requires that goods be "adequately contained,
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require." Adequate
packaging generally entails protection of the goods or persons
using the goods from harm. For example, a distributor shipped
automobile parts that had sharp projections in a box without any
covering on the projections or warning about them.215 The court
held that the seller breached his implied warranty "that the pack-
age was reasonably safe to open and that the receiver of the pack-
age could safely introduce his hand into the package and extract
the merchandise and that the potentially dangerous parts of the
product were covered and protected." 216 In a case involving pro-
tection of goods, the glass lining of a chemical reactor broke in
transit as a result of defective bracing.217 The court held that
"the shipper, when it loaded the reactor on the trailer for ship-
ment to the plaintiff, impliedly warranted that the reactor was
properly braced for shipment by motor freight," 21' and that the
shipper breached this warranty.
custom-made goods are of a common variety, rather than having a use peculiar to the
particular buyer, a merchant seller should be required to make the goods fit for their
ordinary purpose.
213 R.W. EMERSON, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS 35, 47 (Boston 1841).
214 For discussions of the uniformity issue, see I R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at
§ 2-314:79; DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, at § 7.01[3][d]; R. NORDSTROM, supra note
64. at 236.
2'1 Pugh v. J.C. Whitney & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
216 Id. at 231.
217 See Standard Brands Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d
1029, 319 N.Y.S.2d 457, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 422 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
218 Id. at 1034, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 463, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 427. The court concluded that
"[t]he bracing installed inside the reactor was just as much a part of the sale of goods as
the reactor itself." Id. at 1033, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 462, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 426. Such an ap-
proach centering on whether the defective element was "part of the sale" is unnecessary
under a literal reading of § 2-314(2)(e), and could lead a court astray. For instance, Ander-
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Inadequately labeled goods may be unmerchantable. 219
Whether the goods are adequately "labeled as the agreement may
require" 220 hinges on the particular circumstances of the transac-
tion. In one case, a subcontractor ordered bathroom hardware of
the brand required by his construction contract.221 The goods
arrived in large cartons marked with the correct brand name, but
the cartons contained individual packages marked with another
brand name. Apart from their packages, the goods appeared un-
identifiable. The buyer notified the seller of the problem, but re-
jected the goods before receiving assurance that they were the
correct brand. To show that the goods were adequately labeled,
the seller introduced evidence demonstrating that the correct
labels were on the large shipping cartons, that no labeling- re-
quirement appeared in the buyer's order, and that even without
labels the fixtures could be identified by persons in the trade. The
buyer tried to show "that brands of bathroom fixtures cannot be
identified by characteristics and customarily are put in labeled in-
dividual cartons." 22  Since reasonable inferences could be drawn
from the evidence in support of either party's contentions, the
court refused to overturn the jury's verdict in favor of the
seller. 2 3
son v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 11 Wash. App. 774, 525 P.2d 284, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 367
(1974), involved a sale of bananas to a grocer. In handling the banana box, the grocer was
fatally bitten by a six-inch banana spider which crawled out of the banana box. In denying
recovery to the administratrix for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, the
court said:
[Pilaintiff contends that the bananas delivered to the Pasco Thriftway and
handled by her deceased husband were defective and thereby unfit for the
ordinary purpose for which the bananas were to be used. The trial court re-
jected this contention because there was no showing that the bananas were in
any way defective or unfit for the purpose intended. The court noted that the
spider was not in the bananas nor in the container, and ruled that although the
container may have transported the spider, the product was not defective or
unfit. We affirm.
Id. at 776, 525 P.2d at 285, 15 U.C.C. at 369. The court seems to make an implicit distinc-
tion between the goods and packaging, which were part of the sale, and the spider, which
was not part of the sale. Instead, the court should simply have held that a banana con-
tainer that is not cleared of deadly spiders is inadequate within the meaning of
§ 2-314(2)(e), because it endangers persons who handle the goods.
219 See., e.g., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1065, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 452 (6th Cir 1977) (mislabeled okra seed unmerchantable).
220 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(e) (emphasis added).
221 Carnes Constr. Co. v. Richards & Conover Steel & Supply Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 797
(Okla. Ct. App. 1972) (not to be considered as precedent by direction of Oklahoma Su-
preme Court).
222 Id. at 801.
223 Id. at 802.
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f. Conform to Representations on Container or Label. To be
merchantable under section 2-314(2)(f), goods must "conform to
the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any." Based on express representations, this standard of
merchantability apparently coincides with the express warranty of
section 2-313.224 For instance, a farmers' cooperative in Okla-
homa sold seed labeled "Sorghum Sudangrass Hybrid" to a
farmer who intended to seed cattle pastures.2 25 The plant failed
to perform as "Sorghum Sudangrass Hybrid" normally does. The
court held that since the goods did not conform to the label de-
scription, and the description formed the basis of the bargain, the
seller had breached both the express warranty and the implied
warranty of merchantability.
Despite its overlap with express warranties, section 2-314(2)(f)
may possess greater independent significance than some commen-
tators recognize. 226 Suppose a farmer buys an insecticide to spray
on his wheat crop. He later notices a label on the package indicat-
ing fitness for corn as well as wheat. Pleasantly surprised, the
farmer sprays his corn crop, which promptly dies. A court might
find that no express warranty arose because the label's representa-
tion did not go to the basis of the bargain. 22 7  Under section
2-314(2)(f), however, the farmer could still show a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability, 228 assuming the conditions of
section 2-314(1) are satisfied.
3. Used Goods
The implied warranty of merchantability often applies to the
sale of used as well as new goods. Although the Code is silent on
the issue, Comment 3 to section 2-314 states that
A contract for the sale of second-hand goods ... involves
only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is
their contract description.
Because the seller of second-hand goods is often their past user
and not a merchant, the implied warranty of merchantability at-
224 See notes 43-158 and accompanying text supra.
225 Farmers Union Coop. Gin v. Smith, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
22' See, e.g., DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, at § 7.01[3][f].
227 A court reading § 2-313 (express warranty) to require actual reliance by the pur-
chaser might exclude post-delivery affirmations from the basis of the bargain. See notes
88-93 and accompanying text supra.
228 See 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 69-70.
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taches less frequently to used than to new goods. Suppose Sam
purchases a new car from Ace Motors. After using the car for two
years, Sam sells it to Joe. Unless Sam is an automobile merchant,
no merchantability warranty attaches to the transaction between
him and Joe.229 Moreover, Joe's ability to recover from Ace
Motors depends upon the privity rules of his jurisdiction. 230 Even
if privity creates no barrier, Joe could sue Ace Motors only for
latent defects that existed when Ace had the automobile.231
If the seller of used goods is a merchant within section
2-314(1), the extent of his obligation depends upon the circum-
stances of the transaction.23 2 In holding that no implied warranty
of merchantability attached to the sale by auction of used restau-
rant equipment, one court said:
The specific question here is whether a breach of warranty is
made out by evidence that used restaurant equipment bought
at an auction did not function upon delivery, in the absence of
any competent evidence establishing the character of the defect.
The standard formulated in the Official Comment clearly re-
quires careful attention to the realities of the individual transac-
tion.
What we are concerned with here are two pieces of restaurant
equipment-a dishwasher and an ice-maker-undoubtedly
larger and more complex than similar equipment intended for
home use-both of which had undergone the heavy wear and tear
normal in the operation of a restaurant. The possibility that
individual components might be worn out or otherwise defective,
requiring replacement or repair, is surely implicit in such a transac-
tion.
Where such pieces of equipment are purchased for con-
tinued commercial use at a significant discount from new
equipment of the same kind, more is surely required to estab-
229 See notes 164-82 and accompanying text supra.
230 See notes 953-90 and accompanying text infra.
231 As a remote purchaser, Joe may experience difficulty in proving that the defects
arose while the goods were in Ace's control, and not during Sam's intervening possession.
Joe's claim could also run aground on the statute of limitations (see notes 1013-29 and
accompanying text infra), or disclaimers or limitations of remedy included in the original con-
tract (see notes 629-748, 769-904 and accompanying text infra).
232 See Moore v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc., 563 P.2d 369, 370, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1223, 1224
(Colo. App. 1977) (used tractor-trailer); Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co.,
125 Ga. App. 404, 405, 118 S.E.2d 108, 109, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 789, 790 (1972) (used airplane);
Roupp v. Acor, 384 A.2d 968, 969-70, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 894, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (used
truck). See also Note, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 630, 638 (1974).
Trax, Inc. v. Tidmore, 331 So.2d 275, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 92 (Ala. 1976), presents a
variation on this theme. Tidmore sold his used tractor to Trax and subsequently rented or
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lish a breach of the warranty than the bare circumstance that
they did not operate upon delivery.23 3
The court recognized that any number of things can foul the op-
eration of complex machinery and, in the case of used goods, not
all of these problems amount to a breach of the warranty of mer-
chantability. Moreover, under the approach endorsed by Com-
ment 3, the extent of prior use, the buyer's knowledge that the
goods are used, and whether the goods were significantly dis-
counted help determine what standards of quality will apply to
the transaction.
Only Texas courts have categorically refused to require mer-
chantability of second-hand goods. Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Machin-
ery Corp.23 4 involved the sale of a used "crawler-tractor." Uncon-
cerned with details, the court of civil appeals followed Texas
common law in holding that "no implied warranty of merchant-
ability is appropriate in the case of goods purchased with the
knowledge that they are used or second-hand."2 3 5  This case has
been justly criticized. 3 6 If the drafters of the Code had intended
to rule out warranties of used goods, they could easily have made
this exclusion explicit in the statute or used stronger language in
the Comment. Only careful analysis of the facts surrounding a
transaction can reveal when an implied warranty of merchant-
ability should attach to used goods.
B. The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose-
Section 2-315
Section 2-315 of the Code provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
bought it back. The court held that no implied warranty of merchantability attached to the
rental/repurchase because "Tidmore had owned the tractor, used it, and knew much more
of its quality and condition than did Trax." The court emphasized that its holding was
limited to the unique factual setting. Id. at 277, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 96.
233 Regan Purchases & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 860, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490, 492-93, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 300, 303 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
234 500 S.W.2d 877, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 806 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
235 Id. at 878, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 808.
231 See Moore v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc., 563 P.2d 369, 370, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1223, 1225
(Colo. App. 1977); Note, supra note 232, at 641.
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The rationale for this warranty is clear. A seller's conduct in
selecting or furnishing goods for a buyer when the seller has
reason to know the buyer's purpose and that the buyer is relying
on his skill or judgment amounts to a tacit representation that the
goods are suitable for the buyer's purpose.237 This representation
closely resembles an express warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.238 But given the requisite facts, the act of selling the
goods will itself trigger the implied warranty. Section 2-315 holds
the seller to his tacit representation and protects the buyer's justi-
fiable reliance. Professors White and Summers identify three ele-
ments of the warranty: 239
(1) The seller's "reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required";
(2) The buyer's reliahce in fact; and
(3) The seller's reason to know that the buyer is relying
on his "skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods."
This Project will refer to the first element as "knowledge of pur-
pose" and the last two elements as "reliance."
1. Knowledge of Purpose
A buyer claiming an implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose must prove that the seller had "reason to know" the
buyer's particular purpose. 240 As White and Summers have said:
237 See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 90, at 437-38 (2d ed. 1959). Cf
Covington & Medved, The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose: Some Persistent
Problems, 9 GA. L. REv. 149, 150-51 (1974):
[Wihen the seller is or should be aware of the particular use or purpose for
which the goods are designed and has knowledge, superior to that of the buyer,
of their suitability for that purpose, there exists a disparity of bargaining
power. This disparity is curtailed by the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose since the seller incurs liability if he overreaches in the bargaining pro-
cess by misusing his superior knowledge.
238 The seller creates the express warranty by his affirmation that the goods are fit for
the buyer's purpose.
239 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-9, at 297.
240 This test modifies its predecessor, Uniform Sales Act § 15(1):
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufac-
turer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purpose.
(Emphasis added.) Note that the Code requires that the seller have constructive, not actual,
knowledge of the buyer's purpose. Moreover, under the Code, the buyer need not make his
purpose known to the seller; the source of the seller's reason to know is immaterial. See
note 242 and accompanying text infra.
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The most common circumstance in which one meets the war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose is where one
businessman buys goods that have to be specially selected or
particularly manufactured and assembled for his business....
In such cases, the "particular purpose" of the buyer is com-
municated to the seller in the course of the negotiations and
occasionally through the contract itself.241
A buyer can satisfy the knowledge requirement by showing that
he communicated his particular purpose to the seller, or that the
seller through other means knew the buyer's purpose. 242 At-
tempts to sell the buyer goods for his particular purpose tend to
show the seller's knowledge. 243 Documents, such as sales certifi-
cates, may also demonstrate the seller's knowledge of the buyer's
purpose. 44 In some instances, the seller's knowledge may be ob-
vious from the circumstances of the sale so that the buyer need
not prove he communicated his purpose. For example, the goods
sold might be so specialized that their particular purpose is com-
mon knowledge; 245 or the buyer might purchase the goods for
241 WHrrE & SuMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-9, at 297-98.
242 See Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1065, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 452 (6th Cir. 1977) (order of large quantity of seed indicated seller knew
buyer intended to resell); Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 636 (D. Conn. 1975); General Instrument Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals,
Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 147, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 829, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d
1051 (3d Cir. 1974); Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965, 341 N.E.2d 713, 716, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 884, 888 (1975) (sawmill operator knew buyer's intended use for saw); Janssen
v. Hook, 1 111. App. 3d 318, 321, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 846, 849 (1971)
(seller of milk trucks and routes knew buyer would use trucks for milk delivery); Atlas
Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 214, 531 P.2d 41, 43, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 302, 304 (1975) (seller's representative analyzed buyer's needs and recommended ap-
propriate accounting system); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. U-Vend, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1244,
1245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (lessor's representative visited lessee's business premises to
suggest type of soda machine appropriate for premises); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc.
v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70, 73, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 804, 809 (N.D. 1972) (asked if he had known
buyer's purpose at time of sale, pipe-seller replied: "'Yes, I could care less."'); cases cited in
notes 253-54 infra.
243 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 43,
286 N.E.2d 188, 195, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498, 508-09 (1972) (chicken seller solicited order
from farmer). Cf. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal,
Inc., 26 Md. App. 452, 462, 339 A.2d 302, 309, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 87 (1975) (building
contractor's reliance demonstrated where seller of roof system solicited order).
244 For instance, in Lanphier Constr. Co. v. Fowco Constr. Co., 523 S.W.2d 29, 39-41, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 713 (relevant language edited out of U.C.C. Rep.) (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), sell-
er's certificate expressly declared that certain paving material was appropriate for the par-
ticular project to which buyer applied it. This certificate supported a subcontractor's con-
tention that the seller knew of the intended use for the material.
245 See, e.g., Jones, Inc. v. W.A. Wiedebusch Plumbing & Heating Co., 201 S.E.2d 248,
13 U.C.C. Rep. 818 (W. Va. 1973). TheJones court said: "The very nature of the sprinkler
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:30
use in business dealings with which the seller is familiar; 246 or the
parties might have a long-term course of dealing with each
other.247 From a planning perspective, the buyer should always
communicate any particular purpose to the seller during the
course of negotiations, preferably in writing.
The seller need not actually know the buyer's particular pur-
pose. Section 2-315 requires only "reason to know," and Com-
ment 1 elaborates:
Under this section the buyer need not bring home to the seller
actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods
are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judg-
ment, if the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to
realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists. 248
Ignorance is not bliss for the seller who had reason to know the
buyer's purpose.249 Proof that the seller neither knew nor had
reason to know the buyer's purpose will, however, defeat the war-
ranty.250
heads indicates not only to a company experienced in the business, but to any layman, that
the sprinklers should discharge water in case of a fire and remain safe from such discharge
'until such emergency." Id. at 254, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 826. In such a case the implied
warranty of merchantability will probably apply as well because the buyer used the goods
for their ordinary purpose. See notes 203-12 and accompanying text supra.
24' See, e.g., Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 609, 614 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973)
(seller knew intended use when it sold buyer truck tractor for purpose of hauling concrete
for seller's company), vacated on other grounds, 521 P.2d 394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla.
1974).
247 See, e.g., Utah Coop. Ass'n v. Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., 550 P.2d 196, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 1095 (opinion not reprinted) (Utah 1976). The court, finding a fitness war-
ranty in the sale of hog feed to a farmer, said: "In view of the fact that there had been a
course of dealing between the [seller] and the [buyer] for a period of approximately two
years it must be inferred that the [seller] knew of the purpose to which the feed was being
put by the [buyer] ...." Id. at 198.
248 (Emphasis added.) As the Comment indicates, this "reason to know" standard applies
to both the buyer's reliance and his particular purpose. See note 251 and accompanying
text infra.
249 See DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, § 7.02(1], at 7-23.
250 See Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 907-08, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 27, 31 (10th
Cir. 1972) (sellers of cattle had no reason to know buyer's purpose where buyer "did not
tell [sellers] what his plans were for the cattle he purchased from them and they did not
inquire nor was there any discussion of the kind of ranching activity [buyer] was engaged
in"); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 484, 269 N.E.2d 664, 670, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 17, 26 (1971) (no fitness warranty where buyer failed to prove that seller of
valve testing machines had reason to know particular purpose at time of contracting); Am-
bassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 501, 190 N.W.2d 275, 279, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 1019, 1022 (1971) (no fitness warranty where seller of steel not made aware of
intended purpose); Tracor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446, 448, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 75, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (no fitness warranty where buyer did not inform
seller of particular purpose intended for sheetrock).
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2. Reliance
Reliance is the other leg of the fitness warranty. For the war-
ranty to arise, the buyer must rely, and the seller must have
reason to know of his reliance. 251  In the absence of any explicit
agreement by the parties, the law has injected into their contract a
protection for the buyer's reliance. 252  If the seller had no reason
to know he was being relied upon, his conduct in providing goods
cannot fairly be deemed a tacit representation of their suitability
for a particular purpose. And if the buyer did not in fact rely,
then the principal justification for imposing a fitness warranty
disappears.
The seller's reason to know and the buyer's actual reliance
are two sides of an evidentiary coin. At trial, the buyer will intro-
duce circumstances of the transaction to convince the court and
jury that he actually relied upon the seller; the same cir-
cumstances probably gave the seller reason to know of the buyer's
reliance. Thus when we speak in the following pages of the
buyer's reliance, we implicitly include the seller's reason to know.
Occasionally, direct evidence establishes that the buyer forth-
rightly told the seller of his reliance upon the seller to select suit-
able goods. Such evidence easily satisfies the reliance require-
251 See U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1; WHIrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-9, at 298-99.
Some courts seem to suggest that the fitness warranty will arise only where the seller has
special skill or judgment regarding the goods. See, e.g., Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959, 965,
9 U.C.C. Rep. 367, 376 (Alas. 1971); Janssen v. Hook, 1 Ill. App. 3d 318, 321, 272 N.E.2d
385, 388, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 846, 849 (1971). The statutory language, however, requires only
that the buyer rely on the seller's skill or judgment. Section 2-315 is silent as to seller's
actual skill or judgment. A seller without actual skill or judgment as to the goods will less
often have reason to know of the buyer's reliance than will the experienced seller, and
hence will be subject to the fitness warranty less often. But where the inexperienced seller
has reason to know of the buyer's misplaced reliance, the underlying rationales of tacit
representation and disparity of bargaining power apply, and the buyer deserves warranty
protection. See note 237 and accompanying text supra. See also DUESENBERG & KING, supra
note 109, § 7.02[3], at 7-28:
It would even seem immaterial whether or not the seller had any particular skill
or judgment to use. The mere fact that he is selling the goods would be an
indication to the buyer that he has the requisite skill and judgment and he
should not thereafter be able to defend on the ground that he was just an
ordinary retailer who did not know the qualities of the goods.
Of course, the seller's lack of special skill or knowledge does affect the comparative exper-
tise of the parties, and may therefore lead to a conclusion that the more experienced buyer
did not in fact rely.
"' Compare the Code's treatment of reliance upon the seller's express warranties, notes
71-96 and accompanying text supra.
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ment.2 53  Often, however, courts simply infer reliance from the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. These cases commonly
involve buyers who make their general needs known to sellers
who then select the particular goods accordingly. 254  Express rep-
resentations of fitness by the seller or instructions that the buyer
follows in using the goods may also establish reliance.155  In
planning, the careful buyer will inform the seller, preferably in
writing, of his reliance on the seller's skill or judgment to provide
2'53 See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 504, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 632 (8th
Cir. 1971) (fitness warranty applied where buyer "made it clear that the oil was purchased
for his system, that he didn't know what oil should be used, and that he was relying on
[seller] to supply the proper product").
254 See, e.g., Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86, 90-91, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 862, 868 (8th Cir. 1977) (manufacturer 'informed supplier of needs and type of
machine used in process) (dictum); Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451
F.2d 1115, 1119, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 88, 94 (10th Cir. 1971) ("Electro Flo informed Alcoa of
its needs in general terms and relied on Alcoa's expertise in developing the specific prod-
uct."); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 503, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 631 (8th Cir.
1971) (buyer told seller he wanted oil for particular hydraulic system); R. Clinton Constr.
Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 845-46, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 310, 319 (N.D.
Miss. 1977) (buyer of antifreeze informed seller of quality desired and seller selected
goods); Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1312, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
1055, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (buyer of meat chiller told seller his requirements and seller
supplied goods); Chemical Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
F. Supp. 278, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (buyer of herbicide informed sales rep-
resentative of intended use); Donald v. City Nat'l Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 325, 329 So. 2d 92,
96, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 891, 895 (1976) (buyer told seller he wanted boat for charter service);
Wilson v. E-Z Flo Chem. Co., 281 N.C. 506, 510, 189 S.E.2d 221, 223, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 299,
303 (1972) (farmer told seller he wanted pre-emergent herbicide to kill weeds and grasses
in yellow squash crop); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 641,
291 N.E.2d 92, 100, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 50 (1972) (buyer told seller she wanted truck to
haul rock and gravel); Dunn Buick, Inc. v. Belle Isle Plumbing Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep 827, 830
(Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (where seller submitted proposal in response to buyer's inquiry about
replacing heating system, buyer relied on seller's judgment in selecting the goods); Valley
Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 109-10, 562 P.2d 1212, 1216-17, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
760, 765 (1977) (buyer informed seller of purpose for hoedad collar castings); Roupp v.
Acor, 384 A.2d 968, 969-70, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 894, 895-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (buyer told
seller he wanted truck for timber hauling business); Fulwider v. Flynn, 243 N.W.2d 170,
171, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 350, 351 (S.D. 1976) (farmer asked crop sprayer to spray alfalfa fields
for greenbugs); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 199, 491 P.2d 1346,
1349, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42, 45 (1971) (farmers told seller they wanted herbicide to control
weeds in corn fields).
255 See, e.g., Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 667-68, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 210, 220 (5th Cir. 1971) (assurances and advice regarding fitness of feed
ration supplement); Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, Inc., 192 Neb. 168, 176-77, 219 N.W.2d
750, 755-56, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1093, 1100 (1974) (assurances that hogs free of rhinitis and
written affirmations that hogs vaccinated); Fulwider v. Flynn, 243 N.W.2d 170, 171, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 350, 351 (S.D. 1976) (representation that seller had used insecticide with satis-
factory results raised jury issue of implied fitness warranty). Such representations may also
give rise to express warranties of fitness.
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suitable goods. Similarly, a prudent seller will try to elicit from the
buyer a statement to the contrary whenever he can do so without
jeopardizing the sale.
The most effective way to defeat a buyer's claim that he re-
lied on the seller to select suitable goods is to show that the buyer
participated in the selection process. A buyer who examines and
selects the goods he will purchase probably does not rely on the
seller's skill or judgment. 5 6  Evidence that the buyer incurred
expenses in inspecting the goods bolsters this argument. 257
Moreover, any such examination performed by the buyer's agent
indicates that the buyer is relying on his agent's skill or knowledge
rather than on the seller's. 258  On the other hand, the buyer's
reliance on a third party's recommendation of a seller does not
necessarily rule out a fitness warranty. The third party may sim-
ply have pointed out a seller upon whom the buyer subsequently
relied. 259  Inspection of the manufacturer's literature describing
the goods may also defeat an allegation of reliance. 260 Finally, a
buyer who selects the process by which the goods are manufac-
tured may be relying on his own, rather than on the seller's, skill
or knowledge. 2
6 1
2" See, e.g., Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 908, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 27, 31 (10th
Cir. 1972) (no reliance where buyer examined cattle before seeing or talking to seller);
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 95, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1117,
1122 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (no fitness warranty where buyer inspected coal before purchase);
Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 257, 206 N.W.2d 377, 390-91, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
830, 838 (1973) (no fitness warranty where commercial buyer examined salmon before
purchase). U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) provides:
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or
the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him ....
See notes 704-726 and accompanying text infra.
2" See, e.g., Donald v. City Nat'l Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 325, 329 So. 2d 92, 96, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 891, 895 (1976) (no reliance where buyer had boat inspected at own expense).
2"58 See, e.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 770, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 759 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (buyer relying on agent's examination of horse did not rely on seller); U.S. Fibres,
Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 459, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 266 (E.D.
Mich. 1972) (no reliance on seller where prior to sale buyer's employee at buyer's direction
supervised tests of manufacturing equipment), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th
Cir. 1975).
2-9 See, e.g., El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 703-04, 261
N.W.2d 358, 362-63, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 342, 346-47 (1978).
260 See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 879, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 933, 940-41 (1975) (no reliance where lessee of car wash system made selec-
tion solely by inspecting manufacturer's literature).
281 See, e.g., Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1024, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 636, 644 (D. Conn. 1975) (buyer choosing process for manufacturing wiglet cases and
rejecting manufacturer's suggestions did not rely on manufacturer).
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Courts often examine the comparative expertise of the buyer
and seller in determining whether the buyer relied on the seller to
provide suitable goods. 262  A finding that the buyer has less ex-
perience with or knowledge of the goods than has the seller lends
support to a finding of reliance.263 At times, the disparity in ex-
pertise between the two parties is so great that the buyer is at the
seller's mercy and, in essence, must rely on the seller's skill or
judgment to select the goods.26 4  On the other hand, a buyer pos-
262 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 9-9, at 298.
263 See, e.g., Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 667-68, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 210, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1971) (feed lot operator relied on seller's staff nu-
tritionists to provide ration supplements); Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F.
Supp. 1306, 1312, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (meat packer relied on
manufacturer's judgment and experience in the furnishing of suitable meat chillers);
Chemical Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278, 284,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 56, 62-63 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (buyer inexperienced with herbicides relied on
seller's experienced representative); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F. Supp.
315, 323, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649, 660 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (lessee making first entry into television
field relied on lessor to provide suitable television equipment), modified on other grounds, 465
F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 50 (8th Cir. 1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau
Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 43, 286 N.E.2d 188, 195, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498, 508-09
(1972) (farmer new to egg business relied on Farm Bureau to provide suitable chickens);
Ralston Purina Co. v. Howell, 254 So. 2d 911, 913, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 102, 105 (Miss. 1971)
(pig farmer "placed his faith and trust in [seller's] superior knowledge and skill as the
manufacturer" of feed); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. U-Vend, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1244,
1245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (beauty parlor owner relied on vending machine seller to
provide suitable vending machine); Standard Brands Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1029, 1034, 319 N.Y.S.2d 457, 462, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 422, 426-27
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (chemical company relied on seller of chemical reactor to prepare reactor
for shipment); Wilson v. E-Z Flo Chem. Co., 281 N.C. 506, 511, 189 S.E.2d 221, 224-25,
11 U.C.C. Rep. 299, 304 (1972) (farmer relied on chemical company to recommend and
supply suitable herbicide for use on squash crop); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v.
Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70, 73-74, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 804, 809-10 (N.D. 1972) (farmer with little
knowledge of classification of pipe relied on pipe seller to provide suitable pipe for man-
ufacturing harrow attachments); Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 609, 614 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1973) (where buyer of trucks had limited experience in driving trucks and seller
had extensive experience, trial court not erroneous in denying sellers' directed verdict),
vacated on other grounds, 521 P.2d 394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla. 1974); Fulwider v. Flynn,
243 N.W.2d 170, 171, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 350, 351 (S.D. 1976) (farmer relied on crop
sprayer's previous success in application of insecticide); Jones, Inc. v. W.A. Wiedebusch
Plumbing & Heating Co., 201 S.E.2d 248, 253-54, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 818, 825-26 (W. Va.
1973) (department store operator relied on experienced plumbing company to install suit-
able sprinkler heads in building).
264 See, e.g., Acme Pump Co., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69,
-, 337 A.2d 672, 676, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1246 (C.P. 1974) (buyer with no prior
experience with bookkeeping machines "compelled to rely on the experience and expertise
of the [seller]"); Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694, 702, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
597, 601 (1975) (because of nature of utility's electric service, printing company "forced to
rely upon [utility's] skill and electrical apparatus for providing safe and hazard-free electri-
cal power"). Of course, disparity in expertise is more likely to arise in consumer than in
commercial contexts.
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sessing knowledge and skill superior to that of the seller probably
has not relied on the seller, and no fitness warranty attaches to
the sale.26 5
When a buyer purchases goods according to precise specifica-
tions, he has not relied on the seller's skill or judgment in select-
ing the goods.266 For example, the builder of a water and sewer
system in North Pole, Alaska, ordered pipe by precise specifica-
tions.267 Upon exposure to the cold, part of the pipe's interior
lining had cracked away from the outer casing, rendering it unfit
for use in the water and sewer system. The seller might have
faced the dilemma of complying either with the specifications or
with the fitness warranty, since the two were incompatible. The
court avoided this problem by focusing on the absence of reliance
and held that no fitness warranty arose in the transaction.
[Buyers] Lewis and Sims ordered a specific size and type of
pipe and ... any deviation from the coal-tar enamel lined pipe
that was manufactured would not have been accepted by Lewis
265 See, e.g., Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Hydrotex Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 969, 973-74, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 1971) (where buyer's employee making purchase of compressor
oil had considerable experience with compressors and seller's representative had almost
none, trial court properly denied buyer's directed verdict on fitness warranty); Blockhead,
Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1024, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636, 644 (D. Conn.
1975) (buyer experienced with goods and manufacturing process chose process by which
goods manufactured); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449,
458-59, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (buyer having extensive experience
with compression dryers), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975); Prince v.
LeVan, 486 P.2d 959, 965, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 367, 376 (Alas. 1971) (no reliance where buyers
of commercial fishing boat more familiar than sellers with fishing requirements); Valiga v.
National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 256-57, 206 N.W.2d 377, 391-92, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 830,
838-39 (1973) (salmon buyer professional in animal food field). But see Valley Iron & Steel
Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 109, 562 P.2d 1212, 1216, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 760, 765-66 (1977)
(although more familiar with goods than manufacturer, purchaser relied upon manufac-
turer).2" See, e.g., Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 430-31, 494 P.2d 115, 117, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 582, 584 (1972) (water tanks constructed in accordance with government specifica-
tions); Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28 N.C. App. 684, 688, 222 S.E. 2d 709, 712,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 106, 109 (1976) (buyer of filter tanks relied on engineers' specifications);
Layne-Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 473-74, 201 S.E.2d 609, 614-15, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 70, 77 (1974) (pipe purchased pursuant to specifications). See also U.C.C.
§ 2-316, Comment 9:
The situation in which the buyer gives precise and complete specifications
to the seller is not explicitly covered in this section, but this is a frequent cir-
cumstance by which the implied warranties may be excluded. The warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose would not normally arise since in such a situa-
tion there is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer.
2'67 Lewis & Sims, Inc. v. Key Indus., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 619, 557 P.2d 1318, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 1148 (1976).
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and Sims. In short, neither Liberty [the seller] nor Northwest
[the manufacturer] was asked for its recommendations, nor did
either select the pipe or lining to be used. Liberty merely filled
a specific purchase order for pipe-a job it held itself out to
do. Moreover, Mr. Sims testified that he knew exactly what he
was ordering from Liberty and that it would not have been
within Liberty's province to substitute another type of pipe....
The warranty for fitness for a particular purpose was not
meant to be applied in a situation such as we face today. The
central tenet-reliance upon the skill, judgment, or experience
of the seller-is not manifested. What is apparent is the fact
that both parties to this action knew what was desired, and that
desire was fulfilled. 268
Ordering goods by their brand name usually precludes a
finding of reliance.2 6 9 Such a purchase indicates that the buyer
has selected the brand of goods before communicating with the
seller. The "patent or other trade name" exception of the Uni-
form Sales Act was not adopted by the Code,2 70 so that designa-
tion of goods by trade name "is only one of the facts to be consid-
ered on the question of whether the buyer actually relied on the
seller." 27 1 Nevertheless, absent strong affirmative evidence of re-
liance, courts should normally not impose a fitness warranty
where a buyer purchases goods by trade name.
Finally, past dealings between the buyer and seller may also
bear on the reliance issue. In one case, farmers purchased a herb-
icide to battle weeds in their corn fields. 2 7 2  The herbicide
weakened the corn, leaving it defenseless against the parasitic dis-
ease known as "common smut." In finding a breach of the fitness
warranty, the court took into account past reliance by these buyers
on this seller, as well as common knowledge that the class to
which the buyers belonged generally relied on the class to which
the seller belonged. 273  Thus, where an individual or class has in
268 Id. at 624-26, 557 P.2d at 1322-23, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 1152-53.
260 See, e.g., Siemen v. Alden, 34 111. App. 3d 961, 965, 341 N.E.2d 713, 716, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 884, 888 (1975) (buyer purchased saw by brand name); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 634 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (buyer purchased seed by trade name).
270 Section 15(4) of the Uniform Sales Act provided: "In the case of a contract to sell or
a sale of a specified article under its patent or other tradename, there is no implied war-
ranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
271 U.G.C. § 2-315, Comment 5. See DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 109, at § 7.02[2].
272 Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
42 (1971).
273 The court found that "[p]laintiffs had dealt with the defendants for several years and
had relied on their advice in the past." Id. at 199, 491 P.2d at 1349, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 45.
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the past relied on another individual or class in the sale of goods,
courts might infer similar reliance in a subsequent transaction be-
tween the same parties.274
3. Overlap with Other Warranties
The quality warranties of Article Two may overlap. For in-
stance, when an express warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose arises, so may the related implied warranty, assuming the
buyer demonstrates reliance.275 Of course, where the elements of
section 2-315 exist in the absence of any affirmations, promises,
descriptions, samples or models, the implied warranty of fitness
arises although its express counterpart does not.276
Authorities disagree as to whether the implied warranty of
merchantability and the implied warranty of fitne~s overlap.
Comment 2 to section 2-315 makes clear that the warranties may
coexist. 277  To borrow the Comment's example, if a seller selects
shoes for a buyer to use for climbing mountains, then the buyer
may be protected by both a warranty that the 9hoes are fit for
walking on ordinary ground (their ordinary purpose), and a war-
ranty that they are fit for the particular purpose of climbing
mountains.
That the warranties coexist, however, does not necessarily
mean they overlap. Suppose the shoe purchaser gives the seller
reason to know that he is relying on the seller to select shoes suit-
able for normal terrain. The implied warranty of merchantability
normally will protect such a buyer, since merchantable goods must
be fit for their ordinary purpose.278 Suppose, however, that the
It then quoted Udell v. Rohm & Haas Co., 64 Wash. 2d 441, 444, 392 P.2d 225, 227
(1964): " 'The growers rely heavily, perhaps conclusively, on the directions given. All par-
ties, manufacturers, retailers and growers realize and intend that the counsels of the field
representative be acted upon . Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. at
199, 491 P.2d at 1349, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 45.
274 An underlying assumption in all reliance cases is that the buyer and seller are in fact
different persons or entities. Thus, where a trust company, formed as a tax-saving device,
leased a crane to a corporation, and the sole stockholder of the trust company was also the
sole stockholder of the lessee corporation, the court said: "To speak of 'reliance' in these
circumstances would be to indulge in an absurdity." Brescia v. Great Rd. Realty Trust, 373
A.2d 1310, 1313, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 769, 772 (N.D. 1977).
27' See notes 237-38 and accompanying text supra.
276 See notes 44-70 and accompanying text supra.
277 "A contract may of course include both a warranty of merchantability and one of
fitness for a particular purpose." U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2.
278 See notes 203-12 and accompanying text supra.
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merchantability warranty is unavailable. 7 9 Could the buyer re-
cover for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose, even though his purpose was perfectly ordinary?
The North Carolina Supreme Court says he can.280 A Ten-
nessee trucking company purchased 150 trailers from a Pennsyl-
vania manufacturer. When used for their ordinary hauling pur-
poses, the trailers broke in two. In the ensuing action, the buyer
inexplicably "stipulated that it was not relying on the implied war-
ranty of merchantability .... Therefore, the suit was only for
breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose .... ",281 Rejecting the seller's contention that the buyer's
particular purpose cannot be the product's ordinary purpose, the
court said:
Although the primary purpose of [section 2-315] is indeed to
protect a buyer who purchases goods with the intention of
using them in a "particular" manner, meaning a manner in
which they would not normally be expected to be used, we do
not think that section is limited exclusively to purchases of such
a nature. That warranty also protects a buyer when his particu-
lar purpose is the general or ordinary purpose. 282
No other cases have expressly held that a fitness warranty can
arise where the buyer uses the goods for their ordinary purpose.
Yet several decisions implicitly condone the merging of the two
warranties.8 3 For example, in a case involving a defective book-
279 For example, an implied warranty of merchantability cannot arise if the seller is not a
merchant with respect to goods of the kind in question. See notes 164-82 and accompany-
ing text supra. Comment 4 to § 2-315 suggests that the fitness warranty may occasionally
apply to such sales:
Although normally the [fitness] warranty will arise only where the seller is a
merchant with the appropriate "skill or judgment," it can arise as to non-
merchants where this is justified by the particular circumstances.
The merchantability warranty would also be unavailable where the buyer's counsel,
through ignorance or mistake, omits it from his complaint or waives it by stipulation. Con-
ceivably, a seller could disclaim the merchantability warranty but leave the fitness warranty
intact, although most commercial disclaimer forms exclude both implied warranties.
280 Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (1973).
281 Id. at 431, 196 S.E.2d at 717, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 1062.
282 Id. at 432, 196 S.E.2d at 717, 12 U.C.C. Rip. at 1063 (emphasis in original). For
commentary on this case, see 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 248 (1974); 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 169
(1974). See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at § 78; L. VOLD, supra note 237, § 90, at 438-39.
But see Covington & Medved, supra note 237. Cf. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at
§ 2-315:14 ("A particular purpose within the scope of Code § 2-315 is a use to which the
goods are not ordinarily put.").
2'3 See, e.g., cases cited in Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, at § 24[a].
[Vol. 64:30
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
keeping machine, the court found that both implied warranties
had been breached, although no purpose out of the ordinary
seemed implicated. 284 A sprinkler head installed in a building for
fire protection breached its fitness warranty when the sprinkler
discharged water without provocation, damaging the buyer's
property.2 85 Certainly the buyer was using the sprinkler head for
its ordinary purpose. Pregnant or "breeding" livestock sold for the
purpose of propagation violated the fitness warranty, even though
their unfitness apparently related only to their ordinary pur-
pose.28 6  Finally, a defective manufacturing machine, apparently
put to its ordinary purpose, breached the implied warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose.28 7
Despite these implicit holdings that an ordinary purpose may
qualify as a particular purpose under section 2-315, other courts
treat the purposes as mutually exclusive. For instance, no fitness
warranty attached to the sale of wiglet cases because "[tihe wiglet
cases were never intended for any purpose other than the ordi-
nary purpose of carrying hairpieces and accessories."288  Nor did
section 2-315 protect the buyer who bought a milk truck to de-
liver milk but could not "show that such use would differ from
the ordinary use of trucks in general." 289  Similarly, a court de-
nied relief under a fitness warranty theory to a buyer of defective
carpets because his purpose -resale-was not a "particular pur-
264 See Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, -, 337 A.2d
672, 675-76, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1246 (1974). "The warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose and the warranty of merchantability may coexist or merge under certain cir-
cumstances." Id. at __, 337 A.2d at 676, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 1246.
285 Jones, Inc. v. W.A. Wiedebusch Plumbing & Heating Co., 201 S.E.2d 248, 253-54, 13
U.C.C. Rep. 818, 824-25 (W. Va. 1973). Here, "the parties ... (chose] to treat their dispute
solely as one relating to an implied warranty for fitness of purpose [sic]." Id. at 254, 13
U.C.C. Rep. at 825.
286 See, e.g., Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, Inc., 192 Neb. 168, 177, 219 N.W.2d 750, 756,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 1093, 1100 (1974) (infected breeding gits unfit for breeding purposes);
S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777, 782-83, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 820, 828-29
(Wyo. 1973) (infected pregnant ewes unfit for raising lamb crop breached both implied
warranties). Cf. Torstenson v. Melcher, 195 Neb. 764, 771-72, 241 N.W.2d 103, 107, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 484, 489-90 (1976) ("An implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of a
breeding bull is for all intents and purposes identical with a warranty of fitness for breed-
ing purposes.") (dictum).
287 Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723, 727 (D. Colo.
1963) (decided under Uniform Sales Act § 15(1)).
286 Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
636, 645 (D. Conn. 1975).
289 Janssen v. Hook, 1 111. App. 3d 318, 321, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 846,
849 (1971).
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pose" under section 2-315.290 Another court found no fitness
warranty in allegedly defective recreational vehicles because "nio
purpose other than that for which an all terrain vehicle is gener-
ally used is involved in this case." 2 91
The issue of overlap pierces to the heart of the two warran-
ties. If the essential difference between the warranties rests in the
nature of the buyer's purpose, then the purposes must be mutu-
ally exclusive. We think, however, that the fundamental distinc-
tion between the .warranties lies not in the nature of the buyer's
purpose but in the origin and object of the buyer's reliance.
Both implied warranties protect and promote the buyer's re-
liance upon the seller. Under the warranty of merchantability, the
seller's status as a merchant entitles the buyer to count on receiving
goods of a standard quality.292  Given the seller's merchant status,
the Code presumes the buyer's general reliance. Under the war-
ranty of fitness, the circumstances of the transaction entitle the buyer
290 Bruce v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 134 Ga. App. 790, 794, 216 S.E.2d 622, 625, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 739, 740-41 (1975).
291 Recreatives, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wis. 2d 255, 264, 226 N.W.2d 474, 478, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 1258, 1262 (1975). Another court, in dictum, expounded the same conclusion. Al-
though holding that a breach of warranty action in the sale of a tractor was time-barred,
the court also stated: "In this case, the tractor was sold and used for ordinary farm work,
which includes, without question, heavy-duty plowing. Thus, section 2-315 is not relevant
in this case, and the implied warranty of merchantability (§ 2-314), is the only relative [sic]
concept here." Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 111. App. 3d 867, 870, 315 N.E.2d 580,
582, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 654, 657 (1974). For similar cases finding no fitness warranty, see
Bogacki v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 417 F.2d 400, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1969) (bowling
alley pin setters used for ordinary purpose); Giant Mfg. Co. v. Yates-American Mach. Co.,
111 F.2d 360, 365 (8th Cir. 1940) ("'Particular purpose', as used in [Uniform Sales Act
§ 15(4)] means a usage other, or different (in kind or extent), than the ordinary uses the
article was made to meet."); Regula v. Gerber, 34 Ohio Op. 206, 209, 70 N.E.2d 662, 665
(C.P. 1946) (under Uniform Sales Act § 15(1), automobile purchased for "general purpose"
of transportation); Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 293-94, 446 S.W.2d 521,
531, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 798, 801-02 (1969) (no fitness warranty where tractor used for general
farming purposes). Covington and Medved discuss several reasons for maintaining a clear
distinction between the two warranties. First, confused courts might require the buyer to
show that the goods are defective before finding a breach of the fitness warranty. In fact,
all that the warranty requires is unsuitability for the buyer's purpose. Second, confusion
might undermine the distinctness of the disclaimer requirements for the two warranties (see
notes 629-37 and accompanying text infra). Third, nonmerchant sellers lacking knowledge
of the buyer's purpose might be held responsible for unmerchantable goods via § 2-315.
On the other hand, courts might apply § 2-315 only to merchant sellers. See Covington &
Medved, supra note 237, at 160-65. Although these are valid reasons for keeping the two
warranties distinct, they do not rule out all overlap. A broad definition of "particular pur-
pose" should not undermine the fundamental distinctions between the two warranties.
292 See 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 70-71; Lorensen, The Uniform Commercial Code
Sales Article Compared with West Virginia Law, Part II, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 142, 161 (1962);
notes 165-67 and accompanying text supra.
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
to count on receiving goods fit for a specific purpose (whether
ordinary or not) actually or constructively communicated to the
seller. By furnishing goods when he knows or ought to know of
the buyer's specific reliance, the seller obligates himself to meet
the buyer's needs.
The section dealing with fitness for a particular purpose re-
quires something more than a mere sale by a merchant to be
shown to establish an implied warranty. Under this latter sec-
tion, the emphasis shifts to an actual reliance upon the skill and
knowledge of the merchant. Under the former section of mer-
chantability, reliance is not relevant save when positive acts by
the buyer demonstrate that he is in fact not relying on the mer-
chant's skill or knowledge but rather upon his own examination
of the goods in question.293
In essence, the reliance-related factors of section 2-315 serve a
function analogous to the merchant requirement of section 2-314.
Admittedly, the Code's drafters created section 2-315 with the
nonordinary purpose in mind.294  That is not to say, however,
that they intended to place ordinary purposes beyond the section's
reach. Seldom will a buyer who is using goods for their ordinary
purpose satisfy the requirements of the fitness warranty yet lack
protection under the merchantability warranty.295 The drafters
may not have contemplated these rare cases. The "particular pur-
pose" language of section 2-315 probably does not represent a
conscious determination by the drafters to leave a gap in the pro-
tection offered by sections 2-314 and 2-315. Courts should use
warranty policies to bridge superficial gaps, lest deserving buyers
fall in.
The policies underlying the fitness warranty apply regardless
of the buyer's purpose for the goods. Aware of the buyer's pur-
pose and reliance, the seller selecting the goods tacitly represents
their particular suitability. 296  Such a tacit representation may
exist even where the buyer's purpose happens to be ordinary.
Moreover, the presence of the fitness elements often suggests a
293 Lorensen, supra note 292, at 161.
294 Comment 2 to § 2-315 states:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods
are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the
nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used
are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are
customarily made of the goods in question.
295 See note 279 supra.
298 See notes 237-38 and accompanying text supra.
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disparity of bargaining power. 297  Section 2-315 seeks to relieve
buyers from the oppression such disparity might engender. 298
The presence of bargaining disparity does not depend upon the
nature of the buyer's purpose for the goods. Hence to advance
fully the policies underlying the implied warranty of fitness,
courts should not require that the aggrieved buyer's purpose be
other than ordinary.
C. Supplemental Implied Warranties -Section 2-314(3)
No contract exists in a vacuum. The drafters of the Code
recognized this when they provided in section 1-205(3) that
courses of dealing and trade usages "give particular meaning to
and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." 299 As noted
above, 300 section 1-205(3) overlaps section 2-314(2)(a), which pro-
vides that goods must "pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description" to be merchantable. Each of these sec-
tions appears to overlap yet a third, section 2-314(3), which pro-
vides:
Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Comment 12 to section 2-314 explains:
Subsection (3) is to make explicit that usage of trade and course
of dealing can create warranties and that they are implied
rather than express warranties and thus subject to exclusion or
modification under Section 2-316.
Section 2-314(3) thus performs a limited function; it tells parties
that they may label some of the terms endorsed by section
1-205(3) "warranties."
What's in a name? By affixing the warranty label to otherwise
nameless entities, the Code subjects them to the hazards of section
2-316. The significance of section 2-314(3) thus depends upon the
extent to which section 2-316's reach exceeds that of the Code
provisions governing avoidance of run-of-the-mill supplemental
terms.
Section 2-316 provides three methods of disclaiming supple-
mental implied warranties-"as is" disclaimers (section
297 See note 237 supra.
298 See note 237 supra.
299 The full text of § 1-205(3) is reprinted in note 196 supra.
... See notes 193-98 and accompanying text supra.
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2-316(3)(a)), 3° ' buyer's examination (section 2-316(3)(b)), °3 2 and
"course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade"
(section 2-316(3)(c)). 30 3  "As is" disclaimers pose no additional
threat to supplemental implied warranties. Any language satisfy-
ing section 2-316(3)(a)'s requirements necessarily meets the stand-
ards of section 1-205(4)'s broader language:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasona-
ble as consistent with each other; but when such construction is
unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and
usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
Similarly, disclaimers effective under section 2-316(3)(c) throw no
new hurdles into the path of supplemental terms. Section 1-205(3)
incorporates supplemental exclusions, as well as warranties, into
commercial agreements, and section 2-208 allows exclusions
created by course of performance to override supplemental im-
plied terms.3 0 4
Only paragraph (b) of section 2-316(3) introduces a
mechanism peculiar to the warranty field. A buyer's examination
of or refusal to examine the goods represents an exclusion by
conduct as to those "defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him." Section 1-205 parallels
this only to the extent that such exclusions can arise from course
of dealing and usage of trade. Thus, a facial analysis of these
Code sections indicates that the only independent significance of
301 See notes 678-703 and accompanying text infra.
302 See notes 704-26 and accompanying text infra.
303 See notes 727-48 and accompanying text infra. Section 2-316(2) addresses only im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and therefore may
not apply to supplemental implied warranties.
304 Section 2-208 provides:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for perfor-
mance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance ac-
cepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the
meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of perfor-
mance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction
is unreasonable, express terms shall control course of performance and course
of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade (Section
1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and
waiver, such a course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
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section 2-314(3) rests in the buyer's undoubtedly unwanted power
to waive supplemental warranties by examining or refusing to
examine the goods under section 2-316(3)(b).
Buyers may fail to cite section 2-314(3) for at least four
reasons. First, there may be no relevant course of dealing or
usage of trade to create a supplemental warranty. Second, if the
buyer can prove the existence and breach of any other warranty,
he need not resort to section 2-314(3), although he would be wise
to raise it in the alternative. Third, the seller may have effectively
disclaimed all implied warranties under section 2-316(3), leaving
the buyer no implied warranty protection. Finally, the buyer may
confuse this genus of implied warranty with the implied warranty
of merchantability because of their shared location in section
2-314. Thus, failing to establish a merchantability obligation, the
buyer may cry "uncle," unaware that sections 1-205(3) and
2-314(3) provide additional protection. Or, if the seller has effec-
tively disclaimed only the merchantability and fitness warranties
under section 2-316(2), the buyer may not realize that such dis-
claimers leave section 2-314(3) warranties intact.
Although the few cases that discuss section 2-314(3) shed no
light on its relation to section 1-205, they do reveal a peculiarity
about the type of obligation imposed. The only two cases that sub-
stantially discuss section 2-314(3) indicate that it may create war-
ranties that "are not restricted to what might ordinarily be re-
garded as warranties but also include obligations related to a sell-
er's performance." 30 5 A section 2-314(3) warranty may involve a
remedy or ancillary service rather than an obligation that directly
relates to the quality of the goods. Comment 12 to section 2-314
lends support to this analysis: "A typical instance [of a supplemen-
tal warranty] would be the obligation to provide pedigree papers
to evidence conformity of the animal to the contract in the case of
a pedigreed dog or blooded bull." 306 Thus one court, citing sec-
tion 2-314(3), found an implied warranty that a seller of semi-
trailers would repair or replace defective parts.30 7
305 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at § 2-314:82.
306 The Comment may not support this "warranty of performance" analysis as fully as it
appears to. Because of the special nature of the sale of a pedigreed animal, the pedigree
papers may be part of the "goods," and the animal delivered without papers may be "de-
fective." For a fuller treatment of the warranty-remedy distinction, see notes 826-33 and
accompanying text infra.
307 Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 390, 268 A.2d
345, 349, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1257, 1262-63 (1970).
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Adams v. J. I. Case Co. 30 8 presents a more convoluted analysis
involving the sale of a crawler loader tractor. The sale included a
written "warranty" that the manufacturer or dealer would repair
and replace defective parts. The warranty also contained a provi-
sion excluding liability for consequential damages and disclaiming
all other warranties. Of course, the tractor was defective. Accord-
ing to the buyer, the seller failed to repair the tractor until fifteen
months after the buyer called the defects to the seller's attention.
This delay cost the buyer several bulldozing jobs.3 0 9
Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the buyer's implied
warranty claim, the appellate court held that the seller's alleged
dilatoriness may have constituted a repudiation of its express war-
ranty, which included the limitation of liability. The court stated:
"The limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable from
the obligations of the warranty. Repudiation of the obligations of
the warranty destroys its benefits." 310 Thus, the seller's dilatori-
ness may have nullified its warranty disclaimer and limitation of
liability. Having overcome the disclaimer barrier, the court
suggested that "an implied warranty for reasonably prompt and
timely repairs upon breach of the express warranty" 311 may have
arisen under section 2-314(3).
In essence, the court indicated that section 2-314(3) may
create a remedy in place of the one that failed of its purpose.312
Because the blurring of the warranty-remedy distinction creates
problems in other contexts, 31 3 however, we think courts should
limit section 2-314(3) to obligations relating to the goods rather
than to the seller's performance. 31 4
Seldom used and seldom useful, section 2-314(3) is a rough-
hewn arrow in the buyer's quiver. Buyers should consider it when
more conventional warranties fail them. Sellers should disclaim all
implied warranties, not just those for merchantability and fitness.
And courts must exercise care in distinguishing supplemental
308 125 111. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1270 (1970).
309 Id. at 396-97, 261 N.E.2d at 5-6, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at 1272-74.
310 Id. at 402, 261 N.E.2d at 7, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at 1276. The court held that the exclusive
remedy may have failed of its essential purpose within the meaning of § 2-719(2).
31 Id. at 403, 261 N.E.2d at 8, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at 1277.
312 "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
313 See notes 826-33 and accompanying text infra.
314 Because of the overlap with § 2-314(2)(a), a supplemental warranty as defined here
may have significance only where a course of dealing creates an obligation stricter than
that imposed by the trade, or where the merchantability warranty, but not the supplemen-
tal warranty, is effectively disclaimed.
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warranties from other terms to properly apply the disclaimer
rules.
IV
DAMAGES
There comes a time when Bert Buyer has run the obstacle
course of sections 2-313 through 2-315 and leaped or lumbered
over hurdles of privity, notice, exclusion and limitation erected by
Sam Seller. Finally he faces the Door of Remedies. In haste he
pushes ahead, spurning the four lines of script artfully etched in
the rough-hewn oak. The ancient door creaks open upon the
arched brilliance of a rainbow bridging the Sea of No Recov-
ery.315 A pot of gold glimmers at the distant end. Bert shinnies
up the near end but alas, becomes lost in the clouds; he cannot
see clearly enough to count the coins in the pot.
Had Bert paused but a moment to ponder the runes on the
Door, somewhere over the rainbow he might have found some-
thing to sing about. For the runes spell out four principles avail-
able to buyers and sellers alike as they follow the Uniform Code:
(1) The court awarding damages for a breach of warranty
should endeavor to place the aggrieved party in the position in
which performance would have placed him; no more and no
less. 3
16
(2) The court should encourage the parties to minimize the
damage flowing from a breach of warranty. 1 7
3'5 The soulless perfectionist would say "the Sea of Diminished Recovery." Buyers estab-
lishing breach of warranty liability seldom leave the courtroom empty-handed. The differ-
ence between damage awards, like the difference between the North Pole and the South
Pole, is one of degree.
316 U.C.C. § 1-106(1) declares:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal dam-
ages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of
law.
M7 Comment 1 to § 1-106 states that "[T]he Act ... makes it clear that damages must be
minimized. Cf. Sections 1-203, 2-706(1), and 2-712(2)." Section 1-203 establishes the re-
quirement of good faith in the performance and enforcement of every contract. This om-
nipresent duty is made incontrovertible by § 1-102(3). From merchants, § 2-103 requires a
special measure of good faith: "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing in the trade." The definition of "merchant" contained in
§ 2-104(1) and Comments 2 and 3 indicates that this special standard will normally apply to
the commercial parties to transactions covered in this Project. It is the essence of commer-
cial reasonableness that waste be avoided and that goods be put to their best use. Thus,
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(3) The court, where consistent with public and statutory
policies, should respect the intentions of the parties.
318
(4) The court should be guided not by semantics but by
common sense, commercial practicality and Code policies.3 19
Where the buyer has accepted and retained nonconforming
goods, he may seek damages from the seller under section
2-714.32 The injuries the buyer has suffered fall into two
from the duty of good faith springs the merchant's obligation to mitigate damages. Finally,
§ 2-715(2)(a) and Comment 2 make explicit the duty to mitigate certain consequential
damages.
318 Section 1-102(2)(b) declares that one of the "[u]nderlying purposes and policies of
this Act [is] ... to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage and agreement of the parties" (emphasis added). Moreover, § 1-102(3) permits
parties to vary the effect of the Code within certain boundaries. Comment 2 elaborates:
"Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of
the Code.
319 See generally Note, How Appellate Opinions Should Justify Decisions Made Under the
U.C.C., 29 STAN. L. REv. 1245 (1977). The author contrasts the "Formal Style" of opinion
writing with the "Grand Style" and finds the latter superior. The Formal Style mechanically
applies a legal rule while ignoring its rationale, often working injustice in the individual
case or contorting the rule to achieve an equitable result. The Grand Style overtly "encom-
passes the rules, the reasons for the rules and the common sense of the court." Id. at 1249.
The author contends that Karl Llewellyn, Chief Reporter for the Code, adopted the Grand
Style because it fosters recognition of relevant legal and commercial values and enhances
predictability of results. The Code itself mandates this approach in § 1-102:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial trans-
actions ....
Comment 1 adds:
It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be de-
veloped by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and
practices.
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes
and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of... the Act
as a whole, and ... should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may
be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
320 Section 2-714 provides:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3)
of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender
the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the
time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special cir-
cumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next
section may also be recovered.
Comment 1 adds that § 2-714 "deals with the remedies available to the buyer after the
goods have been accepted and the time for revocation of acceptance has gone by."
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categories which we shall call "primary" and "resultant."' 321  To
the extent that the goods are worth less than they were warranted
to be, the buyer has suffered primary damages. The magnitude of
primary damages in commercial cases varies widely, depending
upon the nature of the goods and their nonconformity. Any other
damages the buyer might sustain fall into the box marked "resul-
tant." These damages may include property damage, personal in-
jury, lost profits, and collateral expenditures made in reliance
upon the seller's warranties but converted to losses by the breach.
Section 2-714(3)'allows recovery for resultant damages "in a
proper case," as determined under section 2-715. Although the
standard of proof may vary with the nature of the injury al-
leged, 322 the buyer bears the burden of proving the existence and
extent of damage, whether primary 323 or resultant,324 caused by
the seller's breach.
A. Primary Damages-Section 2-714(2)
Section 2-714(2) provides a formula for measuring primary
damages in warranty cases but does not identify the variables to
plug in:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the differ-
ence at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show prox-
imate damages of a different amount.
Although the abstract concept of "value" may fill jurisprudes with
sound and fury, to the working lawyer it signifies nothing. The
buyer's burden of proving his damages necessarily requires flesh-
321 We chose these terms to avoid confusing our analysis with common-law concepts of
"direct" and "special" damages, which the Code eschews.
322 See notes 510-29 and accompanying text infra.
323 See Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp.
1306, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 360
N.E.2d 1168, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (1977); Bob Anderson Pontiac, Inc. v. Davidson, 155
Ind. App. 395, 293 N.E.2d 232, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 248 (1973); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane
& Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57 (1971); HPS, Inc. v.
All Wood Turning Corp., 21 N.C. App. 321, 204 S.E.2d 188, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 949 (1974);
Jorritsma v. Farmers' Feed Supply Co., 272 Or. 499, 538 P.2d 61, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 696
(1975); Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254
(Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
324 See generally notes 414-582 and accompanying text infra.
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ing out the formula. The case law reveals several approaches to
the buyer's task.
1. Cost of Repair
When a reasonable expenditure will bring the goods into con-
formity with their warranties, the cost of repair may provide an
objective measure of the difference in their value as warranted
and as received.3 2 5 Courts deciding whether cost of repair is an
appropriate measure of primary damages must bear in mind the
formula in secion 2-714(2). Thus, repair costs exceeding the full
value of the goods as warranted 32 6 could not logically represent
the difference in value. 327 This does not mean that the buyer
must premise his demand for repair costs upon a showing that
"I See, e.g., Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz. App. 225, 230, 501 P.2d 401, 406, 11 U.C.C.
Rep. 481, 487 (1972). Cf. Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290, 1294, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. 33, 40 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (cost of repairs better measure than buyer's estimate of
greater damages), aff'd, 574 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney
& Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 383, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 103 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (repair
recoverable under § 2-714(1), but buyer failed to show cost); American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 459, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (buyer recovers price of all uncorrected components of defective generator); Curtis
v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 948, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 145, 156 (E.D. Tenn.
1976) (buyer recovers estimated cost of converting from AC to DC to make balky elevators
function properly); Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 998, 1007 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973)
(with no reference to Code, buyer awarded cost of repairing motorcycle subject to proof of
reasonableness of amount); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435,
441, 208 S.E.2d 321, 326, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 78, 84 (1974) (where consumer testified that
repairs would make defective car "all right," jury award greater than repair cost excessive);
Southern Concrete Prods. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ga. App. 534, 536, 191 S.E.2d 314, 316, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 316, 318 (1972) (court labels buyer's recovery of expense of sandblasting
mud-stained bricks "consequential" under § 2-715); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 646,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 1102, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (consumer case: estimated cost of repair
reasonable yardstick of difference in value); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490
S.W.2d 913, 919, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) ("While the diminution in
market value is evidence of damages, ... the measure of damages is the cost of repair.").
But see Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 1035 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1973) (consumer case: affirming award of difference in market value of mobile
home ($4,000) despite evidence that repairs would cost $200-300); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gard-
ner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 806, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
("measure of damages ... is the difference in market value ... not... the cost of repairs"
(citations omitted)).
326 For a discussion of warranted value, see notes 345-53 and accompanying text infra.
327 See Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875, 878, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 254, 257 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (buyer denied full recovery for repairs to defective
truck scale where repair cost exceeded purchase price). But ef. American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 454, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (replacement of defective parts exceeding purchase price of generator may be recov-
erable as primary damages).
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the same figure would result from subtracting value as received
from value as warranted. Such a requirement would cripple the
repair measure as a commercially practical shortcut to section
2-714(2). Courts should presume that cost of repair accurately
represents the buyer's primary damages unless the seller presents
evidence to the contrary. 28
Once a court decides to measure primary damages by the cost
of repair, it must have available a means of measuring that cost.
As an abstract concept, cost of repair represents a reliable esti-
mate 329 by the "reasonable mechanic." But reality complicates life.
Suppose, for example, that the frustrated buyer chooses to
desert his sinking ship. He would prefer to junk the goods, grab
his damages, and run. Because section 2-714 provides monetary
relief and not specific perfomance, the court may award estimated
repair costs although the buyer never actually repairs the goods.
On the other hand, if the buyer is more tenacious and repairs
have been made by the time of suit, the ultimate roost of the
repair bill will depend upon the circumstances of the repairs and
contractual allocations of risk. 330
When the buyer has paid to have the goods repaired, he may
recover the cost of repairs as primary damages if that amount
fairly represents the difference in value of the goods. 331 Simi-
larly, where repairs are appropriate and buyer has made them
himself, he should recover his out-of-pocket expenses and the
reasonable value of his labor. The commercial buyer should also
328 But cf. Foremost Mobile Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646, 14 U.C.C.
Rep. 657 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (consumer case: evidence of estimated cost of repairing
mobile home legally insufficient to support § 2-714(2) damages unless accompanied by
additional evidence establishing reliability and probative value of estimate).
329 Two consumer cases deal specifically with estimates of repair costs. In Jones v. Ab-
riani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), the court used the
buyer's lump-sum estimate for repairs of numerous defects in a mobile home:
While the testimony as to the actual cost of repairs may not be as precise as
defendants would like, the difficulty ... is due ... to the nature of the dam-
ages. There is no question but that substantial defects are present ... as op-
posed to purely speculative elements of damage ... usually frown[ed] upon.
Id. at 646, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1117. Accord, Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,
110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d 1119, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 958 (1974) (where buyer's witness estimated
cost of repair at $2,000, and seller offered no contrary figure, award of $690 inadequate).
330 Where the contract excludes recovery for consequential damages, for example, buyer
could not recover "consequential" repair expenses. See generally notes 333-44 and accom-
panying text infra.
3" The same considerations apply to actual as to estimated repair costs (see notes 325-28
and accompanying text supra). Nevertheless, courts may show more deference toward re-
pair as afait accompli than as an incorporeal estimate.
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receive a reasonable sum to cover fixed costs allocable to the time
spent on repairs, and opportunity costs in the form of profit that
he would have made by devoting to his business the time he spent
repairing.332  If repair costs exceed the difference in value, the
buyer is not necessarily barred from recovering the excess. The
buyer who can show that he effected the repairs in an attempt to
minimize the overall injury caused by the seller's breach may be
entitled to recover the excess cost as a resultant damage under
sections 2-714(3) and 2-715.3 33 In any case, he should recover no
more than the reasonable cost of the work actually performed. 33 4
Efforts to repair the goods may fail or achieve only partial
success. The cost to the buyer of attempts that utterly fail does
not represent the difference in value of the goods, but might be
332 "Profit," in this sense, is compensation for repairs. In Robert T. Donaldson, Inc. v.
Aggregate Surfacing Corp. of America, 47 A.D.2d 852, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
375 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 793, 337 N.E.2d 612, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1975),
buyer was entitled to expenses plus reasonable profit for repair work made necessary by
seller's breach of warranty. "If another contractor had been hired to perform the repair
work it would have been entitled to a profit." Id. at 853, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 196, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. at 377. The opinion does not reveal whether buyer repaired the goods in question or
other property injured by the defective goods, that is, whether repair costs were primary
or consequential damages. The principle applies equally to both classes of damages, how-
ever, because in either case the buyer is diverted from other profit-making activities. Of
course, buyer should not benefit from seller's breach. In Willred Co. v. Westmoreland
Metal Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 59, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1961), the court denied
profits to a buyer who hired extra labor to repair defective furniture.
This is not a case ... in which employees and equipment that "could have been
otherwise utilized on profitable jobs" were diverted to repair work .... [But for
the breach] the extra labor ... simply would not have been employed ... and,
though the [buyer] is entitled to be made whole ... he is not entitled to make a
profit out of the breach.
Id. at 66 (language edited out of U.C.C. Rep.) (citations omitted).
333 Expenses incurred in mitigation of damages should be treated as resultant damages.
See notes 414-75 and accompanying text infra. Suppose a buyer orders goods worth $400.
The goods prove worthless, and substitute goods are not readily available. The buyer can
reasonably expect to lose $10,000 in profits if he does not repair the goods. He therefore
repairs them, but the repairs cost $1,000 and he unavoidably loses $5,000 in profits. The
buyer should be able to recover $400 (the difference between the value of the goods as
warranted and as delivered) as primary damages under § 2-714, and $5,600 (the excess
cost of repair plus lost profits) as consequential damages under § 2-715(2)(a).
"" In Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973), the court required
that buyer prove the reasonableness of the cost of repairing his motorcycle. Moreover, the
court warned that buyer's "failure to do so may result in a judgment in favor of [seller]."
Id. at 1007. This dictum is puzzling in light of the court's assertion that it was "[clonvinced
that the cost of repairs is substantial." Id. at 1002, n.1. To the extent that the court
threatened forfeiture, we disagree. If buyer's claim is excessive it should be reduced, not
extinguished. But ef. Foremost Mobile Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646, 649,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 657, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (buyer's failure to show reasonableness of
repair cost extinguishes claim) (alternative holding).
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recoverable as a resultant damage.3 3 5  In some cases, it may be
appropriate to treat the cost of the seller's fruitless efforts as a
resultant damage to be allocated according to the contract and the
Code.a 6  Costs of attempts that contribute to the ultimate success
of later repairs should be considered primary damages to the ex-
tent of their contribution. Similarly, where the quality of the
goods has improved but still falls short of the warranty, repair
costs are primary to the extent of the improvement, and resultant
335 The costs of unsuccessful repairs are consequential damages under our analysis at
notes 417-66 and accompanying text infra, and therefore must meet the tests of § 2-715(2).
Basically, this means that seller must have been able to foresee at the time of contracting
that buyer would attempt repairs if the goods proved defective. Furthermore, buyer's con-
duct in connection with the attempt must be reasonable. For example, buyer's attempt to
repair his delivery truck to avoid losing profits might be reasonable. His attempt to tinker
with a complex piece of accounting equipment not immediately essential to his operations,
on the other hand, would probably be both unreasonable and unforeseeable.
The distinction between primary and resultant damages acquires importance if the
contract excludes consequential damages. The categorization suggested here may be
criticized for discouraging buyer's attempts at self-help. But a court awarding as primary
damages the cost of unsuccessful or unreasonably expensive repairs would frustrate the
parties' intent. The consequential damages exclusion was clearly meant to bar buyer from
recovering profits lost while the goods were inoperative. The buyer should not be permit-
ted to shift this risk back to the seller by gambling on repairs that, if successful, would
prevent lost profits, and then recovering the cost of the repairs when they fail. Although
the gamble may be a reasonable attempt to minimize overall losses, it should be financed
by the buyer in accordance with the contractual allocation of risks. But see Curtis v. Murphy
Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 948, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 145, 156-57 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (buyer
recovers cost of unsuccessful repair attempt despite clause excluding consequential dam-
ages).
336 Seller's attorney should remain alert to his client's failed repair attempts where the
contract excludes consequential damages. Seller might claim reimbursement for his good
faith attempts wherever a third-party repairman would be so entitled. On the other hand,
as a party protecting his own goodwill in an existing relationship, seller may not be entitled
to all the rights of a disinterested repairman hired through arms-length dealing.
Seller's attorney might too easily ignore pretrial attempts at repair made or paid for by
his client. In Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 302
Minn. 19, 225 N.W.2d 217, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 801 (1974), the seller of defective institutional
furnaces had deducted $8,637 from the purchase price to account for pretrial maintenance
done by buyer. Noting that "this adjustment was not treated by the parties as an element in
the case" at trial (id. at 30, 225 N.W.2d at 224, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 811), the court ignored it
on appeal and sustained a jury award of the full purchase price plus resultant damages
(id). The jury could accept expert testimony that the eleven furnaces were valueless, even
though ten were still in use at the time of trial, because "[seller] offered no evidence what-
ever of [their] value . Id. at 28, 225 N.W.2d at 223, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 809. If the
furnaces in fact remained worthless after the pretrial maintenance, then seller's expendi-
tures became consequential losses. More probably, by offering his $8,637 maintenance ex-
pense as evidence of value added after delivery, seller might have reduced his primary
damage liability by explaining the mysterious utility of the "valueless" furnaces.
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thereafter. The balance of the buyer's primary damages is the dif-
ference in value that remains after the repair attempts.3
Just as repairs may fall short of bringing the goods into full
conformity, they may also overshoot that mark. For instance, if a
defect present at the time of acceptance surfaces later, repair may
involve replacing parts or all of the defective goods with new,
conforming goods. If seller bears the full expense of these re-
pairs, buyer receives as a windfall the use-value of the original
goods while they lasted .3 3  A Texas case, General Supply &
Equipment Co. v. Phillips,3 3 9 illustrates the problem. The buyer
purchased for his commercial greenhouses a number of plastic
panels warranted to remain clear for five years. The panels dark-
ened after two years. The court held that the buyer should re-
cover "the reasonable cost of replacing the defective paneling with
[paneling of] equal quality as that represented by [the seller], less
the salvage value, if any, of the defective paneling."3 40  Because
replacement panels of the warranted quality would last five years,
the buyer under this holding would receive a total of seven years'
use of paneling for the price of five. The court, by requiring an
award of full replacement, treated the original paneling as value-
less despite its two years of utility. Ironically, the buyer's windfall
increases as the original goods last longer.
It would be more reasonable to allocate the cost of the im-
provement in value to the buyer.3 41 Thus, another Texas case 3 42
reversed a jury award of the estimated repair cost of a used truck
337 "The buyer is not limited to repair costs when repair does not completely restore the
goods to the value which they would have had if built in conformity with the contract;
remaining diminution in value may also be recovered." Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
547 F.2d 1365, 1377-78, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1193 (8th Cir. 1977). Cf. Northern Pet-
rochem. Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 297 Minn. 118, 124-25, 211 N.W.2d 159, 165
(1973) (in non-Code case, court awards cost of repairing defectively constructed building
plus remaining diminution in value).
338 Of course, many factors may operate to reduce buyer's windfall, including the inter-
ruption of his business and the costs of recovering damages from seller. However, buyer
may recover the former as a resultant damage under § 2-715, and is generally denied the
latter by operation of law.
339 490 S.W.2d 913, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
340 Id. at 920, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 44. The court referred to this part of the award as
"incidental damages." Id. However, the costs of repair or replacement of defective goods
more appropriately represent primary damages under § 2-714(2). See notes 325-28 and
accompanying text supra.
341 The court should place the buyer in as good a position as if the seller had fully
performed, but no better. See note 316 and accompanying text supra.
342 Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254
(Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
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scale, where repairs included new parts and cost more than the
purchase price of the used scales. The court reasoned that the
buyer "purchased an old used scale ... and his recovery is for the
cost of a new scale.... [T]here is a difference in value between a
used and a new item of mechanical equipment." 3 43  Bravo. An
aggrieved buyer should not be surcharged for unsolicited "im-
provements" that are of no practical value to him, but the com-
mercial buyer should pay for improvements, such as greater effi-
ciency or longer life, that do benefit him in the ordinary course of
his business. 344
2. Independent Indicia of Value
Where repair of the goods is impossible or otherwise inap-
propriate to measure his primary damages, the buyer must inde-
pendently establish "the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted."
a. Value as Warranted. Although section 2-714(2) designates
no indicia of "value as warranted," two principal contenders-
purchase price 345 and fair market value at the time of accep-
tance 3 46-dominate the field. Where ascertainable, fair market
343 Id. at 878, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 257.
34" See Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1378-79, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181,
1195 (8th Cir. 1977) (buyer cannot recover full amount spent for repairs that placed cov-
ered hopper cars in better condition than warranted); Community Tel. Servs., Inc. v. Dres-
ser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214, 217-18 & n.4, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 686, 688-90 & n.4 (D.S.D.
1977) (allowing recovery of replacement cost for collapsed broadcasting tower less depre-
ciation).
'45 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 552, 181 S.E.2d 694, 696-97, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 1180, 1182 (1971) (consumer case); Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 302 Minn. 19, 28-29, 225 N.W.2d 217, 222-23, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
801, 809-10 (1974); Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 211, 213, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 768, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (consumer case). Cf. Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I.
Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1314, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(purchase price not necessarily value as warranted but used where clear that parties valued
goods at purchase price); Thompson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Myers, 48 Ala. App. 350,
354-55, 264 So. 2d 893, 896-97, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 90, 92-94 (1972) (consumer case: jury may
consider credit price (cash price plus finance charges) in determining value as warranted);
Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 357, 360 N.E.2d 1168, 1172, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
1009, 1014 (1977) (purchase price plus finance charges sufficient evidence of printing
press' value as warranted); McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 136, 138,
360 N.E.2d 818, 820, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 532, 533-34 (1977) (consumer case: affirming award
of purchase price to buyer of "lemon" car); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774,
783, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 344, (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (contract price "competent evidence"
of carwash equipment's warranted value).
34' See Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1377-78, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181,
1193-94 (8th Cir. 1977); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196, 202, 13
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value provides the more appropriate standard. 347  This measure
leaves the parties with the bargain they originally struck. To illus-
trate: Buyer agrees on Friday to pay $1,000 for a shipment of
hot-selling, punk-rock bumper stickers to be delivered on Mon-
day. By Monday, punk-rock music is pass6 and the fair market
value of the warranted stickers has fallen to $50. Furthermore,
because the stickers adhere poorly to automobile bumpers, their
fair market value drops to $49. Upon discovering this defect, buyer
stops weeping and sues seller for breach of warranty. If the court
equates purchase price with value as warranted, buyer's recovery,
$951, will include the $950 he lost by gambling on the persever-
ance of punk-rock. In contrast, a court using market value at the
time of acceptance would award buyer $1, thereby giving him
the equivalent of performance.
Similarly, the buyer making a good bargain should retain the
fruits of his acumen. 48 If our hypothetical buyer were blessed
by a punk-rock explosion, with the market value of the bumper
stickers soaring to $2,000 by Monday, the buyer should recover
primary damages of $1,951. Thus, where the market defines
value as warranted, the buyer's primary damages may exceed the
purchase price of the goods.
A buyer in a falling market might contend that section
2-714(2) contemplates a subjective measurement of warranted
value to the particular buyer, best represented by the price he
U.C.C. Rep. 1035, 1039-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp.,
500 S.W.2d 877, 878, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 806, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Neuman v. Spector
Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875, 877, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 255-56 (Tex. Ct. App.
1973).
347 One court has described fair market value as
the highest price ... for which a product would have sold on the open market,
the seller having a reasonable time within which to sell and being willing to sell
but not forced to do so; the buyer being ready, willing and able to buy, but not
forced to do so, and a full opportunity to inspect the property ....
Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1379, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1195 (8th
Cir. 1977) (quoting with approval trial court charge to jury). The problem of proving the
relevant market value is beyond the scope of this Project. For a general discussion, see 1 W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 250-52, and WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-4, at 190.
'4" "It is to be noted that [§ 2-714(2)] uses the term 'value', rather than contract or
purchase price.... [The buyer] is entitled to the benefit of his bargain .... Ricklefs v.
Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 134, 531 P.2d 94, 100, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 322, 329 (1975).
"Under [§ 2-714(2)], the trial court properly utilized the actual cash market value of
the mobile home [as warranted] instead of the base contract price, even though the base
contract price may have been a lesser sum." Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502
S.W.2d 196, 202, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 1035, 1040 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). See 1 W. HAWKLAND,
supra note 167, at 263; WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-2, at 307.
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agreed to pay for the goods. After all, section 2-714 refers only to
"value," not to "fair market value." By contrast, other Code dam-
age sections expressly mandate the use of "market price" in com-
puting damages. 349 If "market price" were the intended measure
of value in section 2-714(2), the drafters would have included a
similar express provision, or so the argument goes.
Two observations undermine this position. First, the purchase
price often does not equal the subjective value the buyer places on
the goods. Where a ready market exists for the goods, the pur-
chase price is determined by the going market price at the time of
contract formation, not by the particular buyer's independent val-
uation. Thus purchase price might simply represent an outdated
market price. Because section 2-714(2) focuses on value at the
time the goods are accepted, 350 the current market price is the
more appropriate measure.
Second, the Code's drafters may have used "value" instead of
"market price" to allow flexibility where the fair market value of
warranted goods cannot readily be determined. The contract
price may then present the best evidence of warranted value. In-
cidentally, it is in these cases-where there is no general market
for the goods-that the contract price is most likely a product of
the buyer's subjective valuation.3 51
Most courts applying one of the indicia do not mention the
other, presumably because the parties' attorneys have not con-
tested the choice. 52 In many cases the purchase price will be the
same as the market price, or so similar as to render uneconomical
the effort necessary to establish the latter.353 Nevertheless, to as-
349 U.C.C. §§ 2-708, 2-713.
3" "Special circumstances," such as the buyer's ignorance of the defect at the time of
acceptance, may alter the time-frame for determining market value. See notes 390-400 and
accompanying text infra.
351 For example, a buyer might engage a seller to design and build a unique piece of
machinery for use in his manufacturing operation. Because the goods are unique, there is
no relevant market to supply an objective measure of their warranted value. The contract
price will therefore depend more directly upon other factors, such as seller's cost of pro-
ducing the goods and buyer's estimate of their utility in his operations.
35'2 See, e.g., Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1314, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 1055, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("there is no question ... that both parties felt the value
of the [goods] was the purchase price").
353 This may be the rule with many standardized consumer-goods sales, as in the new-
automobile cases cited in note 345 supra. In contrast, the sale price of a used car is more
likely to differ from its market value as warranted. Similarly, the volatility of commercial
markets will vary with the nature of the goods involved.
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sure his client the benefit of his bargain, the attorney must watch
for those situations where the indicia significantly diverge.
b. Value as Accepted. When proving warranted value, the
buyer normally has at least one easily established evidentiary
fact-the contract price. No such constant star illuminates the ac-
tual value of defective goods. Nevertheless, most commercial
buyers can draw on one of two objective measures of value as
accepted-resale price and fair market value.
Courts have recognized, as evidence of actual value, the price
obtained when the buyer 354 or seller 3 55 resells defective goods.
Three criteria should determine the propriety of using the resale
measure. First, the goods must be resold in a reasonable market.
Standardized goods freely traded in a commercial market will
usually meet this test. Resale of custom-made goods in a noncom-
petitive market or in other than arms-length transactions does not
provide a reliable measure of their value. Second, the resale must
be timely. The degree of promptness required will depend on the
nature of the goods; the goods themselves may be perishable or
the market for them may fluctuate dramatically. Thus, a buyer
waiting over one month to resell defectively marked eggs could
not use the price received as their value at the time of accep-
tance.35 6 Courts require less haste in reselling nonperishable
goods in a stable market. In one case, the price brought by defec-
tive automatic carwash equipment, resold several months after de-
livery, provided evidence of its value as accepted.357  Third, the
"4 See, e.g., B & L Produce, Inc. v. Mims Produce, Inc., 37 Agric. Dec. 201, 206, 24
U.C.C. Rep. 341, 344 (1978) (value of defective tomatoes equals "gross proceeds of a
prompt and proper resale"); ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App.
450, 462, 229 S.E.2d 814, 822, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1067, 1075 (1976) (concrete pump's resale
price some evidence of market value, but not controlling); WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 10-2, at 309.
' See, e.g., Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahem, 352 N.E.2d 774, 783, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 345
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (resale price of repossessed carwash system helps form evidentiary
boundaries of actual value); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 288,
329 A.2d 28, 35, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1025, 1034 (1974) (under § 2-714(2) lessee could have
used as value of printing equipment price that lessor obtained on resale after repossession)
(dictum).
"' See Th. Van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 598, 601, 603-04 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1972).
"" Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahem, 352 N.E.2d 774, 783, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 345 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976). Accord, Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 278-79, 288,
329 A.2d 28, 30, 35, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1025, 1027, 1034 (1974) (resale more than two years
after delivery). However, even nonperishables depreciate. In Judd Constr. Co. v. Bob Post,
Inc., 516 P.2d 449, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973), the trial court had awarded
buyer the contract price of a new car less its resale price two years after delivery. The
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price obtained on resale will accurately reflect the goods' actual
value only if the resale purchaser knew of the defects.3 58
Although courts often use fair market value to measure value
as accepted,3 59 the appropriate market price is likely to be even
more elusive for defective goods than for conforming goods.
Nevertheless, it may be ascertainable. In Soo Line Railroad Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 6 ° the Eighth Circuit affirmed an award based in
part on expert testimony of the market value of a number of rail-
road hopper cars with structural defects.361 The buyer had also
appellate court reversed, noting that the award gave buyer free use of the car for two
years. Id. at 451, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 803. Accord, Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick
Corp., 286 N.C. 235, 240, 210 S.E.2d 181, 184, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 116, 119 (1974) (trade-in
value of trucks six years after acceptance not competent evidence of value at time of accep-
tance).
358 Even buyer's resale of the goods at a profit might not preclude primary damages, if
the resale purchaser was unenlightened. In Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 302 Minn. 19, 225 N.W.2d 217, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 801 (1974), a
contractor purchased furnaces and installed them in various institutions. When the fur-
naces subsequently exhibited various defects, the contractor recovered his full purchase
price from the original seller, although he had at that time replaced a defective burner for
only one of the contracting institutions. The decision may be criticized as awarding the
contractor-buyer damages he had not sustained, especially when, as the court indicated in
dictum, the original seller may incur double liability if sued by the institutional consumers.Id. at
26-27, 225 N.W.2d at 222, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 808.
Although either party could have made the institutional consumers parties to the ac-
tion and resolved all questions of liability, neither did so. Nevertheless, the court could
have avoided the double-liability problem by limiting the contractor's award to expenses he
had already incurred and ordering the seller to agree to indemnify the contractor in any
subsequent warranty actions brought by the contracting institutions. See, e.g., Lycos v. Gray
Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 165, 256 N.W.2d 63, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 404 (1977)
(affirming court-ordered indemnity agreement between seller of defective mobile home
and buyer facing potential actions by finance company or FHA for balance of purchase
price).
159 See, e.g., KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs., Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 1387, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
50, 57 (8th Cir. 1972); Galigher Trucks, Inc. v. McKenzie, 553 S.W.2d 294, 295, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 996, 998 (Ky. 1977) (§ 2-714(2) damages equal difference between contract price and
actual market value); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878, 13
U.C.C. Rep. 806, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co.,
490 S.W.2d 875, 877-78, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 255-56 (Tex Ct. App. 1973). But cf. General
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 919, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 44 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1972) ("While the diminution in market value is evidence of damages, it is generally
understood that the measure of damages is the cost of repair.").
360 547 F.2d 1365, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181 (8th Cir. 1977).
361 Id. at 1377, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 1193. Buyer-railroad company's expert was its own
vice-president, whose duties included determining the market value of buyer's rolling
stock. Similarly, in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196, 202, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 1035, 1040 (Tex Ct. App. 1973), the testimony of a mobile-home dealer supported
the trial judge's determination of a mobile home's warranted market value, and the jury's
estimate of actual market value.
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introduced evidence of the cost of past and prospective repairs on
the goods. 2
3."Special Circumstances"
Laymen lament that law complicates life. Every lawyer knows
the opposite. Marshalling the facts of a large commercial lawsuit
and fitting them into section 2-714(2) is like counting the legs on
a dancing centipede.3 6 3  The drafters of the Code attempted to
assure that a buyer receiving clearly defective goods would not be
frustrated by difficulties of proof or rigid application of a well-
intended formula. Thus, they explain that section 2-714(2) "de-
scribes the usual, standard and reasonable method of ascertaining
damages in the case of breach of warranty but it is not intended
as an exclusive measure." 36 4  Nevertheless, courts are not free to
dispense with that method at will. The difference-in-value stand-
ard controls buyer's primary damages "unless special cir-
cumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." 365
Neither Code nor Comment defines "special circumstances." But
nature abhors a vacuum, and courts have discovered a number of
uses for so attractive an escape clause.
a. Courts most often cite the clause to introduce resultant
damages, that is, the incidental and consequential damages al-
lowed under section 2-715.366 These courts err. In view of sec-
tion 2-714(3)'s express provision for resultant damages "[i]n a
362 547 F.2d at 1378, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 1194.
363 You know there are a hundred, but try to prove it.
364 U.C.C. § 2-714, Comment 3.
365 U.C.C. § 2-714(2). South Dakota's Supreme Court recently observed:
The duality of standards between [§ 2-714(1) & (2)] is taken from precode law
[Uniform Sales Act] § 69(6), (7)] and presumably courts will continue to inter-
pret the more specific rule ... as governing where applicable. Thus defects
relating to the goods, their quality or their title (rather than to the manner of
their delivery) will invoke the "formula" of [§ 2-714(2)] ....
Carlson v. Rysavy, 262 N.W.2d 27, 30, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 353, 358 (S.D. 1978).
366 See, e.g., Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 574 P.2d 102, 104, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 637, 639
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Rose v. Helm, 501 P.2d 753, 755, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 496, 497-98 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1972); Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436, 443-44, 354 N.E.2d 415,
422, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 298, 305 (1976); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 404-06,
261 N.E.2d 1, 8-9, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1270, 1277-79 (1970); Eckstein v. Cummins, 46 Ohio
App. 2d 192, 194-96, 347 N.E.2d 549, 550-51, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1140, 1142-43 (1975); Wis-
neiwski v. Great At. & Pac. Tea. Co., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 574, 580, 323 A.2d 744, 747, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 599, 601 (1974) (consumer case); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 213-14, 206 N.W.2d 414, 424-25, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 794, 804
(1973). For a discussion of resultant damages, see notes 414-582 and accompanying text
infra.
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proper case," this construction of "special circumstances" renders
one clause or the other superfluous. 367  This error may generate
wrong results in two ways. First, courts reading "special cir-
cumstances" as a threshold to resultant damages have applied
common-law rules that differ from the requirements of section
2-715.368 Second, courts reading "special circumstances" as an es-
cape from section 2-714(2) into section 2-715 have confused mat-
ters by treating primary damages and resultant damages as mutu-
ally exclusive.3 69
M Nevertheless, the reference to "proximate damages" immediately following "special
circumstances" lends some support to these courts' reading of the clause, since proximate-
ness is a concept ordinarily associated with resultant damages. To hang statutory construc-
tion on so slim a semantic thread, however, is to abandon the common-sense approach to
the Code. See note 319 and accompanying text supra.
3'8 "[N]either consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifi-
cally provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1). One might argue that
"other rule of law" refers to states' common law, whether or not consistent with the Code.
However, the drafters clearly meant to exclude something. Section 2-715 is positive law;
conflicting pre-Code case law must yield to the statutory criteria governing resultant dam-
ages.
Under the guise of "special circumstances," the "tacit agreement" test for consequential
damages survived in Pennsylvania long after its banishment from the Code.
"Special circumstances" entitling the buyer to [resultant damages] exist
where the buyer has communicated to the seller at the time of entering into the
contract sufficient facts to make it apparent that the damages subsequently
claimed were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.
Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 225, 191 A.2d 376, 378, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
184, 186 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently overruled Keystone, retired the
"tacit agreement" test, and returned "special circumstances" to its proper place. See R.I.
Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 474 Pa. 199, 206, 378 A.2d 288, 291-92, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 1172, 1177-79 (1977) ("Section 2-714(2) is concerned with value of the goods
damages and not with incidental ... or consequential damages") (emphasis in original). See
generally notes 491-97 and accompanying text infra.
369 Section 2-714(3) makes clear that § 2-715 resultant damages supplement but do not
supplant § 2-714(2) primary damages: "In a proper case any incidental and consequential
damages under the next section may also be recovered." (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless at
least two courts, misreading § 2-714(2), appear to have overlooked § 2-714(3). In Lanphier
Constr. Co. v. Fowco Constr. Co., 523 S.W.2d 29, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 713 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975), a subcontractor had purchased defective asphalt and used it in a school project. The
subcontractor received his reasonable expenditure in replacing the asphalt but the court
mislabeled the items of damage:
Since the asphalt was defective, it had no value.... [§ 2-714(2)] is not applica-
ble because of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a different
amount. The proximate damages, in this case consist of incidental and conse-
quential damages as provided by [§ 2-715].
Id. at 42, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 720 (citations omitted). Presumably, replacement costs included
the price of new asphalt and the cost of putting it down. The first element should be
considered primary under § 2-714(2) and the second, consequential (see notes 467-75 and
accompanying text infra). Suppose the sale contract had excluded consequential damages.
The court's characterization would then bar all recovery, or force the court to mislabel
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b. Courts faced with complex fact patterns have found sup-
port in "special circumstances" for awards that appear fair but
ill-fitted to the framework of sections 2-714(2)and 2-715.370 In
such cases, "special circumstances" furnishes entry into the com-
fortably broad language of section 2-714(1), providing recovery
for "the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable."
Although apparently permissible under the Code,3 7' this ma-
neuver is probably unnecessary3 72 and potentially dangerous.3 73
primary damages as incidental. The Lanphier court cited General Supply & Equip. Co. v.
Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972), a case using language
similar to that cited above (id. at 919, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 43). The General Supply court
mistook primary damages for incidental damages (id. at 920, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 43-44) and
allowed the buyer to retain excessive damages. See notes 339-40 and accompanying text
supra. A careful application of § 2-714(2)'s difference-in-value formula would have exposed
the windfall. See notes 341-44 and accompanying text supra.
370 See, e.g., Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, -, 337
A.2d 672, 677, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1248 (1974) (plaintiff's damages include deficiency
judgment stemming from defendant's breach); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co.,
366 F. Supp. 1, 12, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 588, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (manufacturer's damages
for purchase of defective fabric include credits issued to customers and production cost of
unsaleable swimsuits).
37' Comment 2 to § 2-714 indicates that § 2-714(1) applies to "any failure of the seller to
perform according to his obligations under the contract," including "breaches of warran-
ties." Accord, 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 263. See American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 454 n.34, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1025 n.34
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Read together, subsections (1) and (2) of § 2-714, provide that plaintiff
may recover for its direct damages in any manner which is reasonable.").
372 We foresee no situations in which the difference-in-value formula of § 2-714(2),
thoughtfully applied together with § 2-715, would inadequately compensate a breach of
warranty plaintiff. Not all courts agree:
The difference [in value standard] ... is not the exclusive measure of
damages in breach of warranty cases. The rule is more generous where special
circumstances are present. In essence, the loss directly and naturally resulting is
the measure of damages.... The damages awarded should essentially place the
plaintiff in the same position as it would have been in if the defendant had
fully performed its agreement.
Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, -, 337 A.2d 672, 677,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242, 1248 (1974) (citations omitted). Sections 2-714(2) and 2-715 are not
less "generous" than § 2-714(1), but simply more precise. Consequently, they provide a
truer, albeit narrower, path to the goal of full performance.
373 Courts in complex cases need not "pigeonhole" every item of damages, but fitting
elements of damage into Code categories may simplify conceptualization. The difference-
in-value formula of § 2-714(2) defines primary damages that are clearly distinguishable
from the resultant (incidental and consequential) damages of § 2-715. In American Elec.
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), buyer had purchased a turbine generator under a contract that effectively excluded
consequential damages (id. at 459, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1032), and incorporated it into his
production process before its defects surfaced. Having shunned § 2-714(2) in favor of
§ 2-714(1), the court struggled to distinguish consequential from primary damages: "ITIhe
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Courts turning to "special circumstances" as an escape from
rigorous analysis of damage awards should recognize that even
the right result, wrongly explained, makes poor precedent.
c. "Special circumstances" might serve as more than a mere
passageway from section 2-714(2) to sections 2-715 and 2-714(1).
Courts could use the clause to modify the difference-in-value
formula from within. Professors White and Summers suggest that
"special circumstances" exist when the value of the defective
goods to the particular buyer differs from their value to a general
class of buyers.374 Instead of the objective market value, "[slec-
tion 1-106 ... suggests that the court should use a subjective
measure, at least in those cases in which an objective measure
would overcompensate the buyer."375
When the particular buyer values the defective goods more
highly than does the market, the court should employ a subjective
standard of value as received. The resulting decrease in the
buyer's primary damages is appropriate; he simply has not suf-
fered injury in the amount that the goods' value to him exceeds
their fair market value. This approach makes commercial sense
because it emphasizes practical performance over technical con-
formity. If the commercial victim of an economically harmless
breach of warranty loses confidence in his supplier he may take
precise demarcation between direct and consequential damages is a question of fact, and
the commercial context in which a contract is made is of substantial importance in deter-
mining whether particular items of damages will fall into one category or the other." 418
F. Supp. at 459, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1033. The court further elucidated: "[E]xpenditures
which are not incurred as a consequence of the breach, but were instead incurred before
the breach occurred and in reliance on the contractual warranties, are recoverable as direct
damages." Id. at 460 n.44, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1033-34 n.44. To the extent that the court
permits primary (the court calls them "direct") damages to exceed the warranted value of
the goods, it abandons the Code scheme expressed in § 2-714(2). Section 2-715(2) does not
confine consequential damages to post-breach expenditures, but addresses all losses (includ-
ing prior expenditures converted to losses) resulting from the breach. By allowing the
boundaries of the damage categories to vary with the facts of each case, .the court weakens
the consequential damage exclusion as a certain allocation of risk and impedes the predict-
ability of contract planning.
Further, despite its apparent breadth, § 2-714(1) may be read to exclude some conse-
quential damages that § 2-715 would allow. In Nassau Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin
County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d 982, 984, 403 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 84,
88 (2d Dep't 1978), the court affirmed a denial of damages for harm to buyer's reputation
because, applying § 2-714(1), such injury was beyond "the ordinary course of events." Sec-
tion 2-715(2) would allow any foreseeable damages whether or not they were "ordinary."
374 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-2, at 310.
375 Id.
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his business elsewhere. 376  For these adjustments, the marketplace
offers a better arena than the courtroom. 377
An Illinois case 378 poses the issue. A contractor purchased
and poured ready-mix concrete with a compressive strength war-
ranted at 3,000 pounds per square inch. Although the concrete's
actual strength was only 2,400 pounds per square inch, tests
showed it to be satisfactory for the contractor's purposes. The
court did not discuss the value of the defective concrete, 3 79 but
the analysis above suggests that the contractor should not recover
the difference in market value of the concrete.380
37' The key adjectives in this sentence are "commercial" and "economically." The frus-
tration and disappointment of the mail-order buyer receiving a red patio set instead of the
white one he ordered is, for two reasons, primarily a consumer problem. First, aesthetic or
noneconomic qualities are usually more important to consumers than to commercial
buyers. Although § 2-714(2) makes no explicit distinction between classes of buyers, the
words "value" and "special circumstances" invite such distinctions. The essence of "value"
in the archetypical commercial setting is usefulness in production; to the consumer, "value"
means personal satisfaction. Even in consumer cases, however, "value" will probably not be
wholly personalized; courts may refuse to account for idiosyncracies of the buyer which are
neither specially communicated to the seller nor widely shared by other consumers. Sec-
ond, the individual consumer is likely to have less market power and, consequently, greater
need for legal protection than a commercial buyer.
177 We reach this conclusion by applying Code principles of damages. However,
common-law principles Imay supplement Code principles (see U.C.C. § 1-103) and thereby
modify the result. For example, a seller who induces a buyer to purchase higher quality
goods than buyer needs, all the while intending to provide inferior goods, may be guilty of
fraud. The buyer may then be entitled to rescind the contract and return the goods or
keep them and pay the seller their actual market value. This latter option may create a
windfall for the buyer to the extent that his subjective value of the goods exceeds their
market value. The conniving seller, however, is hardly in a position to complain.
Even absent fraud, the seller may make a greater profit by delivering inferior goods
than by delivering the warranted goods. This would most likely be true if the goods were
not merely defective examples of the model ordered, but different models costing seller
less to produce. Here, the difference in the seller's costs might constitute unjust enrich-
ment recoverable by the buyer in quasi-contract.
378 S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 353, 350
N.E.2d 321, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1125 (1976).
'9 The court affirmed a judgment for the seller in the amount representing the value
of the concrete the buyer accepted, set off by a judgment for the buyer for the cost of
testing the concrete and purchasing additional concrete from another seller after the origi-
nal seller stopped deliveries. Id. at 357-58, 350 N.E.2d at 325, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1130.
380 The commercial buyer who orders higher quality goods than his business cir-
cumstances require and receives goods of lower yet sufficient quality might object to the
use of a subjective standard. In the cement case described above an imaginary Bert Buyer
and Sam Seller might argue as follows:
Sam: Why sue me? The 2,400 PSI I gave you works perfectly as well as the 3,000 PSI you
ordered.
Bert: I ordered 3,000 PSI and not 2,400 PSI because I wanted a 600 PSI margin of safety
in compressive strength. That security was important to me, I paid for it, and you deprived
me of it.
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The buyer's subjective valuation of defective goods may be
difficult to measure. Where this standard would decrease the
buyer's primary damages under section 2-714(2), requiring the
buyer to prove subjective value would be unfair. 81  Although the
warranty plaintiff must prove his damages, courts should recog-
nize a presumption in favor of the objective standard. A buyer
showing primary damages by reference to the market value of
defective goods is entitled to recover that amount unless the seller
offers substantial evidence indicating a higher subjective value.38 2
When the market values the defective goods more highly
than does the aggrieved buyer, the subjective standard will not
always be appropriate. 83 Suppose a warehouseman pays the
market price, $20,000, for a forklift guaranteed capable of lifting
4,500 pounds. In fact, the forklift will lift only 3,500 pounds and
is thus unable to budge the two-ton spools of cable which consti-
tute the bulk of buyer's stock. Such a forklift is worth $4,000 to
the buyer for spare parts, but would bring $15,000 on the open
Sam: You can't get damages for lost security because you can't measure its value.
Bert: Nonsense. That margin of compressive strength was worth just what I paid for
it-the difference in price between 2,400 PSI and 3,000 PSI concrete.
Sam: That's clever, Bert, but it won't wash. First, if I give you the difference in price -it
would be as if you had ordered 2,400 PSI to begin with. You can't ignore our contract just
because I breached my warranty. The Code gives damages, not reformation. Second, the
difference in price results from the needs of the whole class of buyers, not from the value
you attach to security.
Bert: Well, I've lost something in this deal.
Sam: Granted, but your feeling of security is not compensable under the Code scheme.
True, we can properly read "value" to allow a subjective measurement of value to the
particular buyer. But look at § 2-608(1), allowing the buyer to revoke a commercial unit
whose nonconformity "substantially impairs its value to him . (Sam's emphasis). For
commercial buyers like you, courts extend this particularization only to business cir-
cumstances, not to personal preferences. Read Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, for
example, right there in 78 Wash. 2d 343, 347-48, 474 P.2d 270, 272-73, and 8 U.C.C. Rep.
31, 34-35 (1970). Your risk-aversion is a personal trait, not a business necessity. Your loss
of security might be compensable if you were a consumer. [Here Sam cites Zabriskie Chev-
rolet v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 458, 240 A.2d 195, 205, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 30, 42 (1968),
where a consumer buyer's lack of faith in a new car offered by seller in an attempt to cure
under § 2-508 supported buyer's rejection, but he forgets about Eckstein v. Cummins, 46
Ohio App. 2d 192, 347 N.E.2d 549, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1140 (1975), where the buyer's preoc-
cupation with and unsuccessful attempts to remedy defects in a new car were not "special
circumstances" entitling him to damages exceeding the difference in objective value.]
381 See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 269 (1963).
38' Professor Peters would not only allow the buyer to rest on a showing of objective
market value as received, but would also deny seller the right to show a higher subjective
value. See id. Professor Peters goes a step farther than we would.
383 But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-2, at 310-11 (§ 1-106 "would seem to
argue for the use of a subjective standard in cases in which that standard would increase
the buyer's damages").
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market. Under a subjective standard, buyer recovers $16,000
(purchase price minus spare parts value), and may then resell the
lift for $15,000, realizing a windfall of $11,000 on seller's breach
of warranty. 384  Under an objective standard, buyer recovers only
$5,000 (purchase price minus market value); he must then resell
in order to break even.3 85  The latter standard encourages the
buyer to put the goods to their best use, and does not allow him
to profit from the seller's breach.3 86
But what if resale is uneconomical 387 or impossible? 388
Where the objective market standard reduces his recovery, buyer
is made whole only if he is able to resell in the open market and
recover his costs of reselling from seller. These costs must be less
than the increased valuation of the goods by resale for overall
384 It is not clear whether White and Summers would account in their "subjective" stand-
ard for the price which the buyer could obtain on reselling the goods. See id.
385 Of course, courts using the objective standard should also allow buyers to recover
their reasonable expenses in resale. Under the subjective standard, such expenses diminish
the buyer's windfall.
36 Consider Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 45 (6th Cir. 1974). Buyer learned the hard way that his $20,000 boat was not seawor-
thy in rough seas beyond Lake Erie's 12 mile limit as guaranteed. Seller repaired the dam-
aged boat but could not render it fit for heavy seas. The court awarded buyer $10,000
against the likelihood of future damages in heavy seas. Assuming the boat was fit for use in
light seas and could be resold for such use at a price greater than $10,000, an objective
standard of actual value would properly have given buyer the difference between the
purchase price (or market price as warranted) and the resale price. By putting the goods to
their best use, the total damages flowing from the breach are minimized.
A related problem arises when the buyer, by the time he sues seller, has resold the
defective goods and realized more than their subjective value to him. If the third party
knew of the defects before the resale, the resale price (less reasonable costs of resale)
supplies the best measure of value as received. But in one such case a court held that the
resale price of a concrete pump to an informed third party was not conclusive of value as
received. See ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 462, 229
S.E.2d 814, 822, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1067, 1075 (1976). Apparently, the subjective value of the
pump to the buyer was less than its resale price, for it was seller who urged the court to
use the latter. See id. To the extent that the buyer recovered primary damages in excess of
his actual monetary loss, employing a subjective value as received granted him a windfall.
A different result should follow if the third party was ignorant of the defects at.the
time of resale. The third party may have a cause of action against the buyer. In Louis
DeGidio Oil & Burner Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 302 Minn. 19, 26-27, 225
N.W.2d 217, 222-23, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 801, 808 (1974), discussed in note 358 supra, the court,
effectively, treated buyer's dormant liability to resale purchasers as a consequential dam-
age.
387 The expenses of reselling may exceed the added value accruing to the goods by
resale (i.e., the resale expense exceeds the difference between the resale price and the
subjective use-value to the buyer).
388 Buyer may have incorporated the goods into his production process to the point
where they cannot economically be withdrawn and resold. This "impossibility" is an exten-
sion of the cost of resale mentioned in notes 373 and 387 supra.
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primary loss to be minimized. Absent these conditions, the court
should apply a subjective standard of value to the particular
buyer. 3 8
9
The subjective-objective dichotomy, although theoretically ac-
curate, may be unnecessarily confusing. A simpler approach
would speak only of value to the particular buyer, while recogniz-
ing that the buyer should obtain the maximum value possible
from the goods, whether this requires using them or reselling
them. The buyer may recover primary damages from the seller
only to the extent that the maximum realizable value of the
goods falls short of their warranted value.
d. There is another way courts could use "special cir-
cumstances" to modify the difference-in-value formula from
within. We suggest that the drafters intended "special cir-
cumstances" to allow a shifting of the time-frame for assessing
primary damages.3 9 0  Section 2-714(2) requires courts to compute
the difference between the goods' warranted and actual value "at
the time and place of acceptance." Comment 3 adds:
"9 Seller might argue that any increased liability resulting from buyer's particular needs
must pass the foreseeability test of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854).
But the Code incorporates the Hadley test only in reference to consequential damages
under § 2-715(2). See notes 491-97 and accompanying text infra. Furthermore § 1-106(1),
reprinted in note 316 supra, makes clear the Code policy of giving the buyer the full value of
the goods he purchased, even where he is unable to recover resultant damages.
390 This construction of "special circumstances" does not bar courts from using a subjec-
tive standard for value as received in the manner described in notes 374-89 and accom-
panying text supra. "Value" invites a subjective construction without the aid of the "special
circumstances" clause. See Peters, supra note 381, at 260. But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 2, § 10-2, at 311 (expansive definition of "special circumstances" avoids need for
"bending the word 'value' ").
Pre-Code law supports this temporal reading of "special circumstances." In Perkins v.
Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 139 N.E. 276 (1923), a seller had delivered less sugar than his
contract called for. Buyer, unable to discover the deficiency until the bill of lading reached
him and the price of sugar had soared, sued under § 67(3) of the Uniform Sales Act,
which provided:
Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure
of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate dam-
ages of a greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the
market or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to
have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to
deliver.
Said the New York Court of Appeals: "'Special circumstances' are present, showing 'prox-
imate damages of a greater amount' than those provided for by the general rule. The time
as to when the damages are measured is shifted. It is now the date when the buyer knew
or should have known of the default." 235 N.Y. at 305, 139 N.E. at 277. See WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-4, at 183 (discussing Perkins, U.S.A. § 67, and U.C.C.
§ 2-713).
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If, however, the non-conformity is such as would justify revoca-
tion of acceptance, the time and place of acceptance under this
section is determined as of the buyer's decision not to revoke.391
Courts have expressly found such "special circumstances"
only in section 2-312 warranty of title cases. 92 Beyond these
largely consumer-oriented cases, the primary damages awarded a
commercial buyer may turn on the time-frame in which they are
viewed. This can occur in two ways.
First: value as accepted. Suppose a farmer purchases a flock of
sheep guaranteed to be healthy. Upon delivery, most of the flock
is pure as virgin wool, but one sheep carries a bacterial infection
not discovered during the farmer's reasonable inspection. The
farmer accepts the flock under a contract which effectively
excludes consequential damages. When the infected sheep sud-
denly drops dead two months later, medical tests reveal that the
entire flock has become contaminated and must be destroyed. Be-
cause of the consequential damages exclusion, the farmer must try
to recover the value of the flock as primary damages. A court
might find "special circumstances" demanding that the actual
value of the flock be measured at the time the farmer could have
revoked, (i.e., when the breach of warranty surfaced), rather than
at the time of acceptance.
Of course, the seller might argue that Comment 3 is inappo-
site because the buyer could not have revoked. In order to justify
revocation, a nonconformity must substantially impair the value of
the goods to the buyer within the meaning of section 2-608(1).
Since only one sheep was infected at the time of the acceptance,
the seller could contend that the value of the entire flock was not
substantially impaired. Courts have not treated this issue under
391 The quoted passage is a veritable debutant; we have not found it cited in any case or
commentary.
'9' See, e.g., Ricklefs v. Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 531 P.2d 94, 16 U.C.C. 322 (1975); Itoh
v. Kimi Sales, Ltd., 74 Misc. 2d 402, 345 N.Y.S.2d 416, 13 U.C.C. 64 (Civ. Ct. 1973);
Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 536 (N.D. 1976). In these
cases, seller has breached a duty to deliver good title to the merchandise sold. Buyer's
primary damages are measured from the time he lost the use of the goods. The goods'
actual value to the buyer is zero and their warranted value is determined as of the time
buyer's possession was disturbed. This method compensates buyer for improvements he
has made upon the goods and, by discounting for depreciation, roughly accounts for the
use-value he has derived from the goods. But in Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977), buyer recovered the purchase price of an antique
pistol confiscated by police. This was a proper recovery if the pistol's market value had not
changed since the sale. It is unlikely that the antique depreciated, and it would be hard to
affix a value to the buyer's passive enjoyment during his term of possession.
1978] 125
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Comment 3, nor have they inquired into the buyer's right to re-
voke, nor have they hesitated to award the full loss mushrooming
from minor but latent defects.393
These courts apparently recognize that goods with undiscov-
erable flaws are no more valuable at acceptance than they will be
when the flaws surface. The flock is a commercial unit only as
healthy as its sickest contagious sheep. It would be unfair to deny
full primary damages for smoldering defects merely because the
buyer had no right to revoke. 94
Second: value as warranted. As noted earlier,395 courts should
preserve the parties' bargain by employing an objective standard
to measure the value of the goods as warranted. In using the fair
market value at the time of acceptance, that discussion assumed
that the buyer learned of the defects when he accepted the goods
or, in the case of latent defects, that their market value as war-
ranted had not changed since the time of acceptance. However,
where the warranted fair market value of latently defective goods
fluctuates between the time of acceptance and the time of discov-
ery, the latter is the relevant time-frame.
Suppose a sweater manufacturer purchases pre-dyed wool in
January at the current market price of $50 per hundred-yard. By
February, when he receives, inspects, and accepts the wool, its
market value has risen to $100 per hundred-yard. In early March,
rampant bacterial infection decimates western sheep flocks. Thus,
by the time the manufacturer processes the wool, its market value
has soared to $150. Unfortunately, the dye in the wool is not col-
orfast, as warranted; it fades badly when processed, reducing to
M See Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 481 (1972)
(primary damages for extensive injury to airplane when loose bolt caused oil leak); W & W
Livestock Ents. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 169 (Iowa 1970) (primary
damages on entire slew of pigs exposed to latent diseases). In Holm v. Hansen, 248
N.W.2d 503, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 870 (Iowa 1976), a farmer received 51 head of cattle, one or
more of which carried latent brucellosis and spread the disease throughout the herd. The
court found the buyer entitled to recover primary damages on the entire herd:
We also find the [trial] court erred in limiting plaintiff's damages for loss of the
purchased herd to the difference between its value as warranted and its actual
value at the time of purchase. We think this is a proper case for application of
the exception in [§ 2-714(2)], which is to be used when special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount.
Id. at 510, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 883.
311 Cf § 2-607(2) (acceptance, even where irrevocable, "does not of itself impair any
other remedy provided by [Article Two]").
31' See notes 345-48 and accompanying text supra.
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$15 the fair market value of the wool. The buyer must decide
whether to revoke under section 2-608 or keep the wool and seek
damages under sections 2-714 and 2-715. If he revokes, sections
2-711 and 2-713 allow him to recover his purchase price ($50)
plus the benefit of his bargain ($100) (the warranted value at the
time of discovery ($150) minus the purchase price ($50)).396 If
he keeps the wool, his primary damages depend upon the time-
frame the court selects. At the time of acceptance, his difference-
in-value damages were only $85 ($100 market value as warranted
minus $15 market value as received). 39 7  At the time he discovers
the breach and decides not to revoke, his primary damages total
$135 ($150 minus $15). Thus, the revoking buyer recovers $150;
the retaining buyer recovers $150 ($135 damages plus $15 wool)
if the court applies the Comment 3 version of "special cir-
cumstances," and $100 ($85 damages plus $15 wool) if it does not.
If the court limits primary damages to the time of acceptance,
the rational buyer will protect the benefit of his bargain by revok-
ing. The goods must then be passed from the buyer (who might
have put them to use) back to the seller (who must now find
another buyer). Such transfers increase the overall cost of the
breach and will normally be borne by the seller as incidential
damages under section 2-715(1).398 On the other hand, if the
court adopts the approach suggested here, the buyer can opt to
keep the goods and recover damages computed by reference to
the same market in which he might obtain substitute or
supplementary goods.399  Thus, the "special circumstances" of
"' Section 2-711(l) allows the revoking buyer to recover his purchase price and then
seek damages under § 2-713. Section 2-713 grants buyer "the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together
with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but
less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach." (Emphasis added.)
397 Of course, the court would probably use the $15 measure of value as received only
where the fair market value of defective goods has not varied with the market or is not
ascertainable for the time of acceptance. Where a different value for defective goods at the
time of acceptance is ascertainable, a court using time of acceptance for measuring war-
ranted value would most likely use the same time-frame for value as received.
398 See notes 417-66 and accompanying test infra.
'" But cf. I W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 262-63: "A buyer who has accepted the
goods does not have the problem of cover.... In most cases, the time and place of accep-
tance are more reliable guides to establish his loss. Subsection 2-714(2) makes the time and
place of acceptance the rule for measuring damages in warranty cases." Hawkland does not
mention the "special circumstances" of § 2-714(2) in this context, nor does he discuss
Comment 3. Comment 3's authorization for shifting the time-frame applies only where the
circumstances justify revocation. Under § 2-608(1), the nonconformity must substantially
impair the value of the goods to the buyer in order to justify revocation. Where the value
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section 2-714(2), as developed by Comment 3, makes commercial
sense.
40 0
4. Proving Primary Damages
We have discussed numerous ways in which the buyer could
show the difference in value between the goods he received and
those he was promised. We emphasize that these indicia-cost of
repair, purchase and resale price, market value, and usefulness to
the particular buyer-merely evidence diminution in value. The
appropriateness of each will vary with the circumstances. The
Code demands flexibility in the proof of primary damages, 40 1 and
courts generally refrain from reading section 2-714 as exclusively
requiring any one of these indicia.40 2
If courts generally have been flexible, some have been down-
right loose with sellers' money. Some goods are really no good.
They may have been destroyed by their own defects, 40 3 or con-
sumed in the natural course of buyers' use of them.40 4  Insec-
of the goods is substantially impaired, the buyer will probably need to augment even if he
retains the goods. Thus, the Code drafters might have anticipated that such buyers would
retain defective goods, put them to use, and still need to purchase substitute or supplemen-
tal goods of the warranted quality. The relevant market in such a case is that existing when
the buyer discovers his need. Whether this is equivalent to Comment 3's "time ... of the
buyer's decision not to revoke" is not clear. Nevertheless, Comment 3 apparently attempts
to neutralize the effect of the Code on the buyer's choice between revocation and retention
of the goods. This nonpartisan position should encourage the buyer to put the goods to
their best use, thus reducing the overall cost of the breach.
400 Although the Comments should not change or add to the enacted law of the Code,
they help decipher cryptic language such as "special circumstances." See generally Skilton,
Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 597.
401 "The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered ....." U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1). "Compensatory damages are often at best approximate: they have to be proved
with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more." U.C.C. § 1-106,
Comment 1. Nevertheless, in Fredrick v. Dreyer, 257 N.W.2d 835, 839-40, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
55, 58-59 (S.D. 1977), the court reversed a jury award of primary damages to a consumer
buyer because the damages were not proved to a "reasonable certainty." The buyer had
introduced evidence on cost of repair, wholesale value, and value to himself, but not on
fair market value.
402 See, e.g., Carlson v. Rysavy, 262 N.W.2d 27, 31, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 353, 358-59 (S.D.
1978) (consumer case discussing use of purchase price, fair market value, and repair costs
as alternative measures of value).
40' See, e.g., Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 211, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 768
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (automobile burned because of defective wiring).
404 See, e.g., Lanphier Constr. Co. v. Fowco Constr. Co., 523 S.W.2d 29, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (defective asphalt laid in construction site).
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ticides 405 and livestock-feeds 406 are common examples of the lat-
ter situation. But nonconforming goods often have some value.
Nevertheless, many buyers have recovered the entire value of
goods inaccurately described as worthless. This phenomenon oc-
curs in commercial, 407 as well as consumer,40 cases. The commer-
cial buyer will normally glean some value from the goods,
whether by use,40 9 resale on the market, or resale for scrap. By
declaring these goods worthless, the court grants the buyer the
equivalent of a revocation while allowing him to keep the goods.
In Puritan Manufacturing, Inc. v. L Klayman & Co., 410 a federal
district court attempted to side-step this double-compensation
problem: "Since the [refrigeration units] were of no use to
[buyer], except for scrap, the entire value may be recovered as
damages. In fairness, [buyer] should tender the [goods] to [seller]
which can then reclaim any salvage there might be in the machin-
ery." 411  Although the district court's approach appears reasona-
ble, it lacks support in the Code. The result would have been cor-
rect had the buyer justifiably revoked under section 2-608.412 But
405 See, e.g., Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D.
1975) (insecticide failed to control corn rootworm).
406 See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Howell, 254 So.2d 911, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (Miss.
1971) (defective finishing feed made hogs sick).
4'7 See, e.g., Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 302
Minn. 19, 28, 225 N.W.2d 217, 223, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 801, 809 (1974) (upholding jury
finding that I 1 furnaces worthless although 10 still in service at trial date); General Supply
& Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (award-
ing full replacement costs on greenhouse panels used for one to two years). But see KLPR
TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 1387, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 50, 56-57 (8th Cir.
1972) (overturning jury finding that television broadcasting equipment worthless where
buyer used it until trial date).
408 See, e.g., Lee v. Air Care, Inc., 325 A.2d 598, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 612 (D.C. 1974) (buyer
awarded full value of air conditioning equipment which never worked correctly); Mintz v.
Daimler-Benz of North America, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 212, 341 N.Y.S.2d 781, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
974 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (buyer awarded full value of car radio which never worked correctly).
But see Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 441, 208 S.E.2d 321,
326, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 78, 84 (1974) (car repairable by new motor and wiring not worthless).
409 See, e.g., Community Television Servs., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214,
217, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 686, 688-89 (D.S.D. 1977) (recovery of replacement value for de-
stroyed broadcasting tower reduced by depredation accumulated during useful life). But see
Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1314, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055,
1064 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding goods have only scrap value even though buyer used them
until he could afford substitutes).
410 379 F. Supp. 1306, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
411 Id. at 1314, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 1064.
4'12 See note 396 and accompanying text supra. Buyer did not attempt to revoke. See 379
F. Supp. at 1310, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 1058.
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section 2-714(2), which the court cited, 413 would leave the goods
with the buyer and grant the seller an offset equal to their scrap
value.
B. Resultant Damages-Section 2-715
Commercial buyers who receive defective goods routinely sus-
tain losses beyond the diminution in the value of the goods
purchased. 414  Section 2-715 outlines the rules governing recov-
ery of these resultant damages:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach
include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully re-
jected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or com-
missions in connection with effecting cover and any other
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular re-
quirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty.
A buyer may seek resultant damages not only for breach of
warranty, but also for any other breach of seller's obligations. 415
Where the buyer has accepted and retained defective goods, sec-
tion 2-714(3) provides entry into section 2-715.416
1. Incidental Damages-Section 2-715(1)
Which resultant damages are incidental, and which conse-
quential? In many cases it makes no difference which label applies,
and courts awarding resultant damages often do not differentiate
413 See 379 F. Supp. at 1314, 15 U.G.C. Rep. at 1063-64.
414 See text accompanying notes 321-24 supra.
415 Where "the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects
or justifiably revokes," § 2-711 refers the buyer to §§ 2-712 and 2-713, both of which allow
him to seek incidental and consequential damages.
416 "In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next section
may also be recovered." U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
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between the two. 4 1 7  Nevertheless, inaccurate classification
of resultant damages may skew results in two ways. First, sec-
tion 2-715(2) places on the recovery of consequential damages cer-
tain restrictions 4 18 not expressly imposed by section 2-715(1),
which requires only that incidental damages be "reasonably incur-
red" as a result of the breach. A court mislabeling a consequential
loss as incidental might improperly employ the "reasonableness"
test in lieu of the more restrictive analysis section 2-715(2) im-
poses.419 Second, the importance of the distinction between inci-
dental and consequential damages looms largest where the parties
have contractually excluded consequential damages. By mislabel-
ing elements of the buyer's loss, a court risks rewriting the parties'
agreement.
The following discussion of the language of the Code, the
experience of the courts, and the intent of the parties dem-
onstrates that a buyer who has accepted and retained defective
goods should never recover damages labeled "incidental."42 o
a. The Code's Language. Section 2-715 does not define inciden-
tal or consequential damages; 421 rather, it enumerates examples
417 See, e.g., R.1. Pohlman Co. v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 330, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record
Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (M.D. Tenn. 1975); Acme Pump Co. v.
National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242
(1974); La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d 825, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 120 (1976); Cambern v. Hubbling, 307 Minn. 168, 238 N.W.2d 622, 18 U.C.G. Rep.
653 (1976); Jorritsma v. Farmers' Feed & Supply Co., 272 Or. 499, 538 P.2d 61, 17 U.C.C.
696 (1975).
418 These restrictions involve the foreseeability and certainty of damages. See notes 489-
582 and accompanying text infra.
419 Suppose the owner of a small commercial hothouse orders a $25 "Insta-Tan" per-
sonal sun-lamp through a mail-order catalogue. Seller ships the lamp in October, unaware
that buyer needs it to keep his buds warm through the winter. In mid-December the lamp,
which the seller had unconditionally guaranteed for two years, breaks down. Buyer stands
to lose hundreds of dollars in frozen flora if the lamp is not back in service within two
days. Unable to find a ready replacement, buyer has the lamp repaired for $85. Since the
lamp had a total value of $25, buyer cannot recover more than that amount under
§ 2-714(2). A court applying § 2-715(1) might award buyer the excess as a "reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other breach." Cf. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assoc. v.
S.S. Sovereign Faylene, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 74, 80-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (buyer's mitigation ex-
penses labeled "incidental"). However, a court treating the same expense as a consequential
loss under § 2-715(2) would disallow the excess repair cost, although reasonably incurred,
because it was not a "loss resulting from ... needs of which the seller at the time of
contracting had reason to know."
420 See Stimson Tractor Co. v. Heflin, 257 Ark. 263, 268, 516 S.W.2d 379, 382, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 1074, 1078 (1974) (dicta).
421 "'Consequential' or 'special' damages ... are not defined in terms in the Code, but
are used in the sense given them by the leading cases on the subject." U.C.C. § 1-106,
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and describes situations in which buyers may recover these dam-
ages. Section 2-715(1) and Comment 1422 identify three factors
which control recovery of incidental damages:
(1) Seller's conduct-section 2-715(1) broadly allows inciden-
tal damages for seller's "delay or other breach." Comment 1 re-
states this as "non-conformity or non-delivery."
(2) Types of expenses-section 2-715(1) provides a laundry
list of expenses typically involved in handling defective goods or
obtaining cover. Comment 1 reiterates that this list of expenses is
''merely illustrative."
(3) Buyer's conduct-section 2-715(1) refers expressly to ex-
penses connected with "goods rightfully rejected" and "effecting
cover." 423 Comment 1 makes explicit that the object of the
drafters' concern is "the buyer who incurs reasonable expenses in
connection with the handling of rightfully rejected goods or goods
whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked, or in connection
with effecting cover." Apparently, then, a buyer must reject, re-
voke, or cover to activate section 2-715(1). Buyer's conduct in re-
taining the goods and suing for breach of warranty damages
renders section 2-715(1) irrelevant.
Admittedly, the meaning of section 2-715(1) is veiled.42 4 We
offer this construction, not as wordplay, but as statutory authority
for the pragmatic arguments that follow.
Comment 3. However, the Uniform Sales Act, predecessor to U.C.C. Article 2, contained
no provision for incidental damages, and "recognized [consequential damages] only infer-
entially as 'special damages."' 1955 N.Y. LAw REVIsION COMM'N, supra note 72, at 700-01.
Thus, it is not surprising that pre-Code law offers little assistance in understanding the
distinction between consequential and incidental damages.
422 U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment I provides:
[2-715(1)] is intended to provide reimbursement for the buyer who incurs
reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of rightfully rejected
goods or goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked, or in connection
with effecting cover where the breach of the contract lies in non-conformity or
non-delivery of the goods. The incidental damages listed are not intended to be
exhaustive but are merely illustrative of the typical kinds of incidental damage.
423 Section 2-712(1) defines "cover" as the buyer's purchase of substitute goods. Under
§ 2-71 1(1), buyer is considered to "cover" only after nondelivery, repudiation, rejection, or
revocation.
424 The drafters of the Comment to Minnesota's version of § 2-714 threw their hands up
in frustration: "[U]nder the Code the distinction between the damages allowed by subsec-
tion 2-714(1) and the 'incidental' and 'consequential' damages allowed by U.C.C. § 2-715 is
unclear." 21A MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-714 (West 1966) (McClure, Minn. Code Com-
ment).
The astute reader might raise three arguments against our "bright-line" interpretation
of § 2-715(1). First, he might point to the broad language at the end of the section-"and
any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach"-as encompassing any
[Vol. 64:30
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b. The Nature of Incidental Damages. Commentators list exam-
ples and attributes of incidental damages but, like the Code, they
stop short of definition. 425  Comment 1 426 best describes inciden-
tal damages. Under the Comment's description, incidental dam-
ages arise from expenses naturally and inextricably intertwined
with the buyer's rejection, revocation, or cover. Once a buyer
chooses one of these courses of conduct, his incidental losses do
not depend upon his needs, but on the nature of the goods them-
selves and on the requirements of the Code.42 Since the buyer
does not keep the goods, he cannot obtain value from them.42 8
attributable damages regardless of the buyer's conduct. This language, however, could just
as easily be read as presupposing a requirement of rejection, revocation, or cover, and
simply opening the statute to all expenses flowing from such conduct of the buyer.
Second, one could contend that the use of the words "may be justifiably revoked" in
Comment I to § 2-715 (emphasis added) suggests that incidental damages, like primary
damages, are recoverable even when the buyer chooses not to revoke. This construction
would require courts to determine the revocation rights of buyers who had not asserted
them. Cottrts should avoid such gymnastics absent the degree of reason and authority be-
hind the construction of § 2-714(2)'s "special circumstances" offered in notes 390-400 and
accompanying text supra. There, Comment 3's explicit focus upon "the buyer's decision not
to revoke" fits nicely into § 2-714(2)'s "special circumstances." By contrast, the intent of
Comment I to § 2-715 is neither clear nor tied to any language in the statute. Here, the
drafters might simply have been loose in their use of language without intending to extend
incidental damages to buyers choosing to retain the goods.
Third, and perhaps most important, the discerning reader might point to § 2-714(3)
and Comment 4, which seem to indicate that the retaining buyer may recover incidental
damages. Section 2-714(3) states that, where the buyer has accepted and kept defective
goods, "in a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under [N 2-715] may
also be recovered," and Comment 4 reiterates. Here again, the drafters may simply have
been sloppy. Section 2-714(3) and Comment 4 probably do not authorize incidental
damages-that is the job of § 2-715(1)-but merely remind aggrieved buyers that primary
damages are not the sole compensation the Code provides.
425 White & Summers appear to reaffirm the limited applicability of § 2-715(1) to cases
involving rejection, revocation, and cover. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-3, at 312.
However, they cite Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625 (8th Cir.
1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 432-37 infra, as an application of § 2-715(1) to a
warranty case.
The New York Law Revision Commission, in its Study of the Uniform Commercial
Code, noted that "[many items of incidental damage ... arise 'naturally and directly' from
the contract breach," but referred only to rejection, revocation, delayed delivery, and cover
as exemplary circumstances. 1955 N.Y. LAw REvisION COMM'N, supra note 72, at 701.
426 Reprinted in note 422 supra.
4'7 Section 2-602(2)(b) requires the rejecting buyer who has possession of the goods "to
hold them with reasonable care at the seller's disposition." Additional duties accompany the
rejecting buyer's "merchant" status under § 2-603. Section 2-604 provides several options
to buyers attempting to salvage rejected goods. Finally, § 2-608(3) imposes on the revoking
buyer the same obligations that the Code places on the rejecting buyer.
428 This statement is wrong in fact but correct in Code theory. A buyer may indeed
derive use-value from the defective goods before revoking. Even so, § 2-711 enables him to
recover the full amount he has paid seller, with no offset for use-value derived. If the
134 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:30
Therefore, his rejection or revocation not only commits him to
future expenses, 429 it automatically converts into loss any prior
expense of handling the goods. In contrast, where the buyer re-
tains the goods, the extent of his resultant damages will depend
upon his particular needs.
Suppose Bert Buyer purchases goods and pays a carrier to
deliver them from seller. If the goods are defective and Bert re-
jects, he automatically suffers loss in the amount of the shipping
charges. Furthermore, the Code may require that he store and
care for the goods 4 30-added expense from which he derives no
benefit. If, however, Bert retains the goods, he has not necessarily
sustained a loss of the shipping charges. Once he is compensated
for his primary loss and any consequential damages, his necessary
handling expenses are no more a loss than if the goods had prop-
erly performed. Any increase in handling expenses resulting from
the breach will also depend on the particular buyer's situation
and, therefore, must survive scrutiny under section 2-715(2)'s
criteria for recoverable consequential damages. 431
c. Confusion in the Courts. Ambiguity in the Code and ambiva-
lence among commentators inevitably stirs confusion among the
courts applying section 2-715(1). Consider the oft-cited 432 dam-
drafters contemplated this use-value, they apparently considered it de minimis or justified
as compensation for otherwise uncompensated losses of aggrieved buyers (time, court costs,
etc.). But at least one court has side-stepped this problem by treating revocation under
§ 2-608 as equivalent to the equitable remedy of rescission:
[Buyer] is entitled to judgment of rescission and the return of his purchase
price with interest against [seller]. As to any offset for use of the car the U.C.C.
is silent. Thus general equitable principles apply and must be brought into play.
Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 379, 382 A.2d 954, 957, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
929, 934 (1978). The court allowed seller an offset for buyer's pre-revocation mileage. Id.
at 380, 382 A.2d at 957, 23 U.C.C. Rep. at 935. Cf. Hardwick v. Dravo Equip Co., 279
Or. 619, 621, 569 P.2d 588, 589, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 968, 969 (1977) (seller's offset for pre-
revocation rental value unchallenged by buyer on appeal).
429 See note 427 supra.
430 See note 427 supra.
431 See, e.g., Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090, 1093, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 911, 915 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (cost of transporting defective airplane for repairs constitutes conse-
quential damage recoverable if "proximately caused" by warranty breach). Since the deserv-
ing buyer may recover, as a consequential damage, the added expense of handling goods
retained, the interpretation offered here does not revive election-of-remedies problems.
And if buyer is barred by a consequential damages exclusion, he is barred by his contract
and not the Code.
432 See, e.g., R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
AND CONSUMER LAW 1101 (2d ed. 1974); W. WARREN, W. HOGAN & R. JORDAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 232 (2d ed. 1978);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-3, at 313.
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ages case of Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp.433 The seller had breached
his implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by supply-
ing oil of the wrong grade for Lewis' sawmill equipment. Lewis'
incidental damages, said the Eighth Circuit, included his outlay
for excessive quantities of nonconforming oil and for repair and
replacement of his damaged equipment. 434  The court of appeals
mislabeled both items of damage. First, the cost of nonconforming
oil qualifies as a primary damage under section 2-714(2). 435  The
oil was of no value to Lewis nor, by the time it revealed its non-
conformity, to anyone else.436 The second item, the cost of
equipment repairs necessitated by the breach, falls squarely within
the category of consequential damages described by section
2-715(2)(b): "injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty." 437
Although the Lewis court's errors proved harmless, 438 other
courts have been less fortunate. When clear plastic panels violated
their five-year warranty by darkening after two years, a Texas
court spurned section 2-714(2) in favor of section 2-715. 43 9  The
court awarded as incidental damages the replacement cost of new
five-year panels, overlooking the value the buyer derived from
using the original panels for two years. Had the court focused
instead on the difference-in-value formula of section 2-714(2), it
might have avoided this forty-percent primary damage windfall.
The second sin of the Lewis court-mistaking consequential
for incidental damages-was magnified by a sister circuit in Coun-
433 438 F.2d 500, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625 (8th Cir. 1971).
434 Id. at 507, 8 U.C.C. Rep. at 636-37.
435 Reprinted in note 320 supra.
430 See generally notes 354-62, 393, and accompanying text supra. In Tarter v. MonArk
Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 33 (E.D. Mo. 1977), the purchaser of a defec-
tive houseboat recovered the amount he had spent for replacement parts, materials, and
service plus the estimated cost of completing repairs. The district court allowed future
repair costs under § 2-714(2) and then, citing Lewis, granted the out-of-pocket replacement
and service expenses as incidental damages. Thus, the court considered some primary
damages primary and others incidental. The court did not explain its dichotomy, other
than to gather the latter items under the umbrella of § 2-715(1): "reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach." Read this way, the omniverous language of
§ 2-715(1) could swallow all damages.
437 A recent case supports this analysis. In R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves,
Inc. 442 F. Supp. 838, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 310 (N.D. Miss. 1977), a seller supplied antifreeze
of a type unfit for buyer's needs, causing damages to buyer's heavy machinery. The court
treated the price of the antifreeze as a primary damage and the buyer's repair costs as
consequential damages. Id. at 846, 23 U.C.C. Rep. at 319-20.
438 Lewis would have been entitled to recover the same damages under correct labels.
4"' General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 339-40 supra.
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cil Brothers, Inc. v. Ray Burner Co. 440  The buyer purchased, from
a steel fabricator, a $2,299 pressure vessel which he incorporated
into a boiler unit and resold for a total of $5,859.73. Because the
pressure vessel was defective, the buyer incurred liability to his
customer in the amount of $13,455.21 ($5,859.73 purchase price
plus $5,095.48 labor and repairs plus $2,500 removal of defective
boiler and installation of new boiler). The buyer sought indem-
nification from the fabricator under their contract, which barred
recovery for the "cost of removing, returning or replacing defec-
tive parts or for other consequential damage. ' 441 The court of
appeals found it "difficult to visualize a clearer way to express an
exclusive limitation on the measure of damages." 442 Nevertheless,
in addition to a refund of the contract price ($2,299), the court
allowed "incidental" damages consisting of buyer's expenses in
adding to, shipping, and starting-up the boiler, plus $5,025.48 for
labor and attempted repairs by buyer's customer.443 Beyond a
passing reference to the "merely illustrative" qualifier in Com-
ment 1 to section 2-715, 44 4 the court's opinion utterly failed to
consider the nature of incidental damages. Although this sort of
end-run around the parties' intent may appear fair at first blush,
it violates the Code's policy of contractual freedom in commercial
settings. 445
Some of the losses described above cannot properly be called
incidental even when the buyer rejects or revokes. The property
damage in Lewis and the failed repair attempts in Council Brothers,
for example, were losses arising from the buyer's particular situa-
tion, and should have been treated as consequential damage. 446
440 473 F.2d 400, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (5th Cir. 1973).
441 Id. at 403 n.3, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1130 n.3.
442 Id. at 406, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1135.
44' The court cited Lewis. Id. at 408, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137.
444 Id. at 407, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1136. U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 1, is reprinted in note
422 supra.
445 The Code is not without a sense of fairness. But fairness in a commercial context
does not necessarily mean splitting losses down the middle or placing them all upon the
breaching party. The Code allows parties of comparable bargaining power to allocate most
risks. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-303, 2-316, 2-718, 2-719. Most of the parties to transactions
covered within this Project could insure against economic losses, directly or through their
market behavior. To the extent that small commercial parties begin to look more like con-
sumers, courts may shield them with the unconscionability doctrine in § 2-302. But by
shifting items of damage in and out of amorphous categories, courts impair the outcome-
predictability necessary when evenly-matched parties plan transactions.
446 If buyer's repairs have improved the goods, and he subsequently relinquishes the
goods to the seller, his repair expenses may come within § 2-715(1) as reasonable "care and
custody" of the goods. This recovery is no more than restitution for the value added to his
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Most challenging, however, are cases where the buyer retains
the goods and incurs expenses that resemble those listed in sec-
tion 2-715(1). In one such case,447 a buyer incurred expenses in
isolating 130,000 pounds of contaminated cheese mixed in a four
million pound shipment purchased from the manufacturer. Al-
though the court considered these to be incidental inspection ex-
penses, 448 we would characterize them as primary. Because the
entire shipment was tainted, its market value as accepted was di-
minished not only by the value of the contaminated portion, but
by the necessary expense of separating that portion from the rest
of the commercial unit. By removing the taint, the inspection "re-
paired" the defect in the noncontaminated cheese.449
Finally, cases may arise where a buyer would not formally re-
voke, even though the goods are absolutely worthless. Suppose
that under a contract excluding consequential damages, a food
market chain accepts a shipment of fresh mutton later discovered
to be wholly contaminated by a bacterial toxin. The buyer pays to
have the meat, initially worthless and rapidly spoiling, carted away
and buried. In his subsequent suit, the buyer claims damages
under sections 2-714 and 2-715 -for breach of warranty on ac-
cepted goods. A court applying our analysis to the cause of action
framed by the buyer might deny him the cost of dumping the
mutton.450  However, a buyer revoking under section 2-608 could
goods by the buyer. But cf. Four Sons Bakery, Inc. v. Dulman, 542 F.2d 829, 831, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1976) (revoking buyer recovers "incidental" expense of
unsuccessful repair attempts).
"' Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
407 (W.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Standard
Milk Co., 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972).
448 Id. at 512, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 417-18. The court quoted § 2-715(1) but omitted the
reference to rejection. Id. at 512 n.24, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 418 n.24.
44' This characterization should also signal the court that the buyer cannot recover in-
spection costs exceeding the value of the goods unless he passes § 2-715(2)'s tests governing
consequential damages. See notes 327, 333, and accompanying text supra. See also S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 353, 350 N.E.2d 321, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 1125 (1976), where a buyer recovered for tests costing over five times the
purchase price of defective concrete he had already used in a job site. The tests, which
were probably justified because they cost less than removing the cement, were labeled both
incidental and consequential by the court.
410 Section 2-715(1)'s incidental damages are unavailable where buyer has not rejected,
revoked, or covered; any consequential damages are barred by the contract. Arguably, the
cost of dumping resulted in a negative value of the goods as accepted, which the court
could award as part of buyer's primary damages. This expansive reading of § 2-714(2) is
unnecessary under the analysis that follows.
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recover such expenses as incidental damages. 45 ' This divergence
in remedies is unjustified because, with truly worthless goods, it
makes no practical difference to the parties whether the buyer
declares his revocation or merely dumps the goods. Common
sense and Comment 6 to section 2-608 indicate that the drafters
envisioned as revocation the buyer's disposal of worthless
goods. 452  The court should, therefore, treat the buyer's claim as
one for revocation, and award him the incidental damages he
seeks. 453
Courts adopting the proposed construction of sections 2-714
and 2-715 need not sacrifice flexibility in awarding proper war-
ranty damages. The categories labeled "consequential" and "inci-
dental" fundamentally differ from open-ended Code principles
such as "reasonableness"; only the latter were meant to draw their
meaning anew from the particular context of each case. 454  Dam-
age categories have two functions: (1) Precision-to provide an
analytical framework for courts to use in assessing damages accu-
rately; and (2) Planning-to allow the parties to allocate risks
under the contract.455  If applied haphazardly, the Code's dam-
age categories serve neither goal.
d. Intent of the Parties. When a commercial contract incor-
porates Code terms that the Code itself leaves undefined, courts
should consider the meaning commonly attached to those terms
by the business community. In warranty cases, exclusions of con-
sequential damages illustrate this principle. It would be difficult
for a common commercial understanding of such exclusions to
root in the arid soil of inconsistent and inscrutable damage
awards. Nevertheless, most parties probably intend the consequen-
tial damage exclusion to limit the seller's liability to the difference
in the value of the goods he promised and those he delivered. A
"'I Cost of dumping appears to fit within "expenses reasonably incurred in inspection,
receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected," and Comment 1
points out that § 2-715(1) applies to revocation as well as to rejection.
452 Sections 2-602, 2-603, and 2-604 set forth the buyer's rights and duties as to rejected
goods. Section 2-608(3) imposes the same rights and duties upon a buyer who revokes.
Depending upon the circumstances of the transaction, the Code may require buyer to hold
the goods, follow seller's reasonable instructions, or resell them. These provisions appear
inapposite to worthless goods, especially when delay in their disposal will cause additional
damage. Accordingly, Comment 6 to § 2-608 flatly states: "Worthless goods ... need not
be offered back .... "
"5' Cf. John C. Taylor Co. v. William J. Hanlon Co., 30 Agric. Dec. 398, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
840 (1971) (court awards cost of dumping rotten potatoes, citing only § 2-714).
4 See note 319 supra.
4 Comment 3 to § 2-715 states: "Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of
consequential damages has available the section on contractual limitation of remedy." To
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businessperson 4 56 might reasonably wish to risk no more in a
transaction than he expects to receive as revenue. Moreover, the
buyer is often in a better position to insure against consequential
losses because such losses depend upon his particular situation.
An express limitation of remedies to repair, replacement, or re-
turn of the purchase price evidences the same general intent to
place a ceiling on liability.457 Significantly, consequential damage
exclusions and exclusive remedies often travel together.45 s This
occurred in Council Brothers v. Ray Burner Co., 459 presented earlier
as an example of an improper award of incidental damages. 460
The manufacturer's warranty clearly evidenced an intent to limit
his liability to the value of the goods sold.461  Although the court
properly refused to restrict the buyer to the enumerated rem-
edies, 462 it failed to recognize that the exclusion of consequential
damages was designed to make the buyer bear all resultant dam-
benefit fully from this contractual freedom, the parties must be able to predict the con-
sequences of using the labels provided by the Code.
456 We recognize that differences of interpretation will exist not only among individual
businesspersons, but among whole classes of commercial parties. To the attorney, the term
"consequential damages" might invoke pre-Code notions of "special" or extraordinary
damages. The businessperson, on the other hand, may contemplate the common usage of
consequential as "following as an effect, result, or outcome; resultant," RANDOm HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 312 (unabridged ed. 1967), thus including true
incidental damages in his interpretation.
457 These approaches, however, are not functionally equivalent. A limitation to the
purchase price allows a buyer to recover any type of damage permitted by the Code, but
limits the amount to the price he paid for the goods. But a consequential damage exclusion
limits the types of loss recoverable, and only indirectly restricts their total amount. The
former approach allows primary or resultant damages up to the purchase price; the latter
permits only primary damages, which may exceed the purchase price. The exclusive rem-
edy of repair or replacement is similar to the consequential exclusion because it allows only
the equivalent of primary damages and establishes a ceiling not necessarily determined by
the purchase price.
458 See, e.g., Synthetic Indus., Inc. v. Whitlock, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (N.D. Ga.
1977).
459 473 F.2d 400, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (5th Cir. 1973).
460 See notes 440-46 and accompanying text supra.
461 The warranty provided in part:
If any part of the equipment appears to be defective ... and if such part is
returned to the [manufacturer's] factory, transportation charges prepaid, ...
and if the same is found by [manufacturer] to be defective ... , it will be re-
placed or repaired, free of charge, F.O.B. [manufacturer's] factory ... , or, at its
option, [manufacturer] may refund the price paid for said part. No claim for
cost of removing, returning or replacing defective parts or for other consequential
damage will be allowed.
473 F.2d at 403 n.3, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1133 n.3 (emphasis added).
462 Because the warranty did not expressly make exclusive the remedies of repair, re-
placement, or refund, it failed to meet the requirements of § 2-719(1)(b) for limitations of
remedies. 473 F.2d at 405-06, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1133-34. See generally notes 834-47 and
accompanying text infra.
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ages. The buyer recovered its expenses for repairing and replac-
ing the defective boiler it had sold. The court, in effect, found
only lost profits to be consequential.463
Had the seller in Council Brothers shared the court's under-
standing of section 2-715, he would have specifically excluded in-
cidental damages in order to assure the protection he apparently
sought. However, amid the arsenal of imaginative limitations
employed by nervous sellers, we have discovered only one express
exclusion of incidental damages. 46 4  Neither timidity nor philan-
thropy accounts for this phenomenon. Rather sellers, unlike
courts, are more concerned with the amount of their liability than
with fine distinctions of terminology. Even when they do recog-
nize specific types of resultant losses, most businesspersons proba-
bly do not consider them legally distinct.
Courts should consider the parties' understandings when in-
terpreting undefined Code terms. But courts should not rewrite
the parties' contract or the Code. Thus, a consequential damage
exclusion should not reach true incidental damages even if the
parties intended to bar all resultant damages. As we interpret it,
the Code draws a clear and reasoned line between consequential
and incidental damages, depending on whether the buyer retains
the goods or returns them to the seller. 465 Further, section 2-719
expressly allows parties to exclude consequential damages, but it is
silent as to incidentals. Whether a court should give effect to an
express exclusion of incidental damages is considered later in this
Project. 466
2. Consequential Damages-Section 2-715(2)
Where the buyer has accepted and retained defective goods,
his consequential losses include all losses beyond the diminution in
the value of the goods received. The catalogue of consequential
damages available to commercial plaintiffs in warranty cases in-
463 The court apparently considered the express exclusion of removal and reinstallation
costs as independent of the consequential exclusion. But it seems clear from the warranty
that the seller included removal and reinstallation as illustrations of consequential loss.
464 See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 355 n.9, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
945, 954 n.9 (Minn. 1977).
465 See notes 427-31 and accompanying text supra.
466 See note 782 infra.
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cludes physical injuries to person 467 or property, 468 and economic
losses such as unsuccessful attempts to repair the warranted
goods,46 9 investments made in reliance on seller's promises but
converted to losses by his breach,47 0 increased production costs, 471
467 Although primarily consumer phenomena, personal injuries occur in commercial
cases when buyer's employees are injured (see, e.g., Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d
774, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); notes 973-83 and accompanying text infra),
or when the breach causes buyer to incur liability for the injury of a third party.
488 See, e.g., Holm v. Hansen, 248 N.W.2d 503, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 879 (Iowa 1976) (seller's
diseased cows infected buyer's entire herd); Ralston Purina Co. v. Howell, 254 So. 2d 911,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (Miss. 1971) (defective feed killed hogs); Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244
N.W.2d 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (N.D. 1976) (herbicide caused wheat to become discolored
and limp); Jorritsma v. Farmers' Feed & Supply Co., 272 Or. 499, 538 P.2d 61, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 696 (1975) (defective feed caused cows to "dry up" prematurely); Swenson v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D. 1975) (failure of insecticide to control
corn rootworm larvae damaged crop); Ligon v. Chas. P. Davis Hardware, Inc., 492 S.W.2d
374, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 447 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (buyer's goods stolen when seller's burglar-
alarm malfunctioned); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 42 (1971) (herbicide weakens corn crop's resistance to "common smut").
489 Unsuccessful repair costs are best viewed as items of consequential loss, which will
vary with the needs of the particular buyer (see notes 335-36 and accompanying text supra),
and should undergo scrutiny pursuant to § 2-715(2).
Courts disagree with this view and with each other. Compare Four Sons Bakery, Inc. v.
Dulman, 542 F.2d 829, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (10th Cir. 1976) (cost of unsuccessful repair
attempts prior to revocation recoverable as incidental damages) and Council Bros. v. Ray
Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 408, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126, 1137 (5th Cir. 1973) (cost of unsuc-
cessful repair attempts recoverable as incidental damages) with Curtiss v. Murphy Elevator
Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 948, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 145, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (cost of unsuccess-
ful repair attempts recoverable as primary damages).
470 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 88 (10th Cir. 1971) (cost of building trailer adapted to defective equipment specially
designed by seller); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F.Supp. 1, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (cost of manufacturing swimsuits unsaleable because of defective
material); Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 298 (1976) (cost of preparing land and buildings to accommodate unfit pigs); Bemidji
Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 250 N.W.2d 185, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1137 (Minn. 1977) (cost of
feeding and caring for unfit breeding cows). Cf. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., 361 F.Supp. 325, 334, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1070, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (revoking buyer
recovers interest paid on money borrowed to purchase goods).
471 See, e.g., Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588, 598-
99, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 261, 269 (4th Cir. 1972) (excess labor expense due to defective yarn-
producing machinery); Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1314,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 1055, 1064-66 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (added handling necessitated by failure of
offal chilling equipment); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal,
Inc., 26 Md. App. 452, 339 A.2d 302, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 80 (1975) (cost of borrowing money
to replace defective roofs); Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 360 N.E.2d 1168, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (1977) (excess paper wasted by defective printing press); Protection
Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1214 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (straightening metal pieces by
hand necessitated by failure of metal-bending machine); J. Landau & Co. v. L-Co. Cabinet
Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1132 (Pa. C.P. 1974) (extra labor to refinish defective cabinets). Cf.
Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 335, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1070,
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and attorneys' fees of buyers incurring liability to third par-
ties.47 12  A buyer may also recover profits lost when a breach of
warranty frustrates plans to resell the warranted goods 47 3 or to
employ them in revenue-generating activities. 47 4  Finally, courts
1081 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (buyer rejecting electronic accounting equipment recovers cost of
hiring outside accountants), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
472 See, e.g., Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 288-89, 329 A.2d
28, 35, 15 U.C.C Rep. 1025, 1034-35 (1974) (manufacturer liable for attorney's fees of
buyer defaulting on lease of defective equipment); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 648 (Mo. App. 1973) (used car
dealer defending customer's suit, having resold car on which auctioneer breached warranty
of title); Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 536 (N.D. 1976)
(buyer defending suit brought by original owner of car on which seller breached warranty
of title). Cf. De La Hoya v. Slim's Gun Shop, 80 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal. Rptr. 68,
24 U.C.C. Rep. 45 (Cal. Super. 1978) (consumer defending criminal charge of possession
of stolen gun on which seller breached warranty of title).
473 See, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 13 U.C.C. Rep.
588 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (manufacturer gives credits to customers for swimsuits made from
seller's defective material); Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 965
(M.D. Pa. 1972) (wholesaler receiving defective Christmas trees unable to fill seasonal con-
tracts with florists); Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246,
264-65, 284 N.E.2d 880, 890-91, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1363, 1375-76 (1972) (defective compo-
nent parts impaired sales of manufacturer's finished product); Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255
N.W.2d 824, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1057 (Minn. 1977) (buyer unable to sell peat moss because of
defective bags).
Lost resale profits are more common where the seller's breach consists of nondelivery,
or where the buyer rightfully rejects or revokes his acceptance of the goods. See, e.g., Hoef-
ferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1227 (7th Cir.
1975) (nondelivery); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 832 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (nondelivery), aff'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975); Everett
Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 111 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (non-
delivery); La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d 825, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 120 (1976) (rejection); Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 183 N.W.2d 598, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 1018 (1970) (revocation); National Farmers Org., Inc. v. McCook Feed &
Supply Co., 196 Neb. 424, 243 N.W.2d 335, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 821 (1976) (nondelivery);
Harbor Hill Litho. Corp. v. Dittler Bros., 76 Misc. 2d 145, 348 N.Y.S.2d 920, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 789 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (rejection).
474 See, e.g., R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122 (10th
Cir. 1975) (defective feed diminishes yield of breeding hogs); Brauer v. Republic Steel
Corp., 460 F.2d 801, 805, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 1972) (defective pipes
impede recovery of oil in waterflood project) (pre-Code); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane &
Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 110-11, 192 N.W.2d 580, 590-91, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57, 71-72
(1971) (lost profits from inability to use defective crane); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 671-72, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1971) (rebates
to feed-lot customers when defective feed fails to fatten cattle); Baden v. Curtiss Breeding
Serv., 380 F. Supp. 243, 245, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 400, 401-02 (D. Mont. 1974) (prospective calf
crop lost from failure of artificial insemination); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 359-60,
485 S.W.2d 183, 188, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, 1127 (1972) (lost profits from inability to use
commercial truck); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 832-33 (D.C.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (defective air-conditioning system causes loss of coffeehouse
business during summer months); Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 358-59, 360
N.E.2d 1168, 1173, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1016 (1977) (defective printing press decreases
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
have allowed recovery for injury to the buyer's business reputa-
tion or goodwill. 475
Section 2-715(2) supplies the litmus used by courts to deter-
mine which consequential losses a particular buyer may recover.
The provision makes no per se exclusions; a buyer may recover
any type of consequential damages that he can carry over the fol-
lowing hurdles.
a. Loss. Code sections 2-712(2) and 2-713(1) require that the
court reduce the buyer's damage award by any "expenses saved in
consequence of the seller's breach." Indeed, the essence of the
term "damage" in contract law precludes the award of an amount
exceeding the net injury sustained. It follows that the set-off pro-
visions of sections 2-712(2) and 2-713(1) merely express the im-
plicit rule governing warranty damages under sections 2-714 and
2-715. 476 Once again, the rule is more simply stated than
applied.
production); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 650-55, 291
N.E.2d 92, 105-07, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 56-59 (1972) (defect prevented commercial use of
truck), affd on rehearing, 154 Ind. App. 632, 294 N.E.2d 617 (1973); Boring v. Geis Irriga-
tion Co., 547 P.2d 988, 992, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 445, 446 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (defective
feeding equipment prevented swine breeder from operating at capacity); Dunn Buick, Inc.
v. Belle Isle Plumbing, Heating & Air Cond. Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 827, 828-29 (Okla. Ct.
App.) (automobile dealer loses business when showroom heating system malfunctions), rev'd
on other grounds, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1229 (Okla. 1971); Farmers Union Coop. Gin v. Smith, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (low pasture yield from defective seed causes pre-
mature sale of cattle at reduced profits); Kassab v. Central Soya, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 258, 263
(Pa. C.P. 1970) (defective feed diminishes market value of breeder cows by spurring com-
munity doubt of their fertility); Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 43-44, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 67, 73-74 (S.D. 1975) (defective insecticide diminishes corn crop yield); Gen-
eral Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 921, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 46 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1972) (diminished production of mums due to defective greenhouse panels);
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 166-69, 528 P.2d 992, 995-96, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 332, 336-37 (1974) (lost profits from defective commercial truck), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Dobias v. Western
Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42 (1971) (lost profits
from corn crop damaged by defective herbicide).
475 See, e.g., R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 752-53, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
122, 126 (10th Cir. 1975) (defective feed damages hog-breeder's reputation); Westric Bat-
tery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 987-88 (10th Cir. 1975) (defective component
incorporated in buyer's product damages reputation); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 671-72, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1971) (defective
feed damages feed-lot reputation). Cf. Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 870-77, 229 P.2d
348, 352-56 (1951) (awarding goodwill damages for breach of warranty under Uniform
Sales Act); Sol-o-Lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 223 Or. 80, 93-95, 353 P.2d 843, 849-50
(1960) (awarding goodwill damages for breach of warranty under Uniform Sales Act).
476 Comment 4 to § 2-713 provides: "This section carries forward the standard rule that
the buyer must deduct from his damages any expenses saved as a result of the breach."
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Although conceptually distinguishable, the types of losses de-
scribed in this Project often appear to overlap. In many cases,
courts find it more convenient to award general damages than to
identify the primary damages, reliance costs, increased operating
costs, and lost profits that constitute the lump sum. 47 7 This ap-
proach is acceptable so long as courts take care not to award both
the integrated whole and its component parts. However, a case
recently decided by the South Dakota Supreme Court 47 8 dem-
onstrates the danger of failing to differentiate between elements
of damage. 479 When insecticide applied to a farmer's corn crop
failed to control corn rootworm, the court assessed damages ac-
cording to the standard most commonly applied in cases of injury
to growing things: the difference between the crops' probable
value at maturity had the goods performed as warranted and
their actual value at maturity, less any savings in labor and ex-
penses attributable to the reduced yield. 480  This award alone was
sufficient to put the buyer in the position he would have occupied
had the insecticide performed effectively. But the court also al-
lowed the buyer to recover the full price of the "worthless" insec-
ticide, citing section 2-714(2). Although it properly characterized
the farmer's primary damages, 481 the court doubly compensated
him for the ineffective insecticide. Nevertheless, courts and coun-
sel have generally avoided such mistakes.482
477 See, e.g., General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 920, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 35, 44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Baden v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 380 F. Supp. 243, 244,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 400, 401 (D. Mont. 1974); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App.
194, 196, 491 P.2d 1346, 1348, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42, 44 (1971). Cf. Texsun Feed Yards, Inc.
v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 664 n.1, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 216 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971)
(jury awarded one sum for "damages or losses" and another for lost profits).
478 Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D. 1975).
479 See generally note 373 supra.
480 234 N.W.2d at 44, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 74. Accord, General Supply & Equip. Co. v.
Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 921, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 35, 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Dobias v.
Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 196, 491 P.2d 1346, 1348, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42,
44 (1971). See generally cases cited in 21 AM. JUR. 2d Crops §§ 78-80 (1965), and 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 85b (1966).
481 Even if the contract had excluded consequential damages, buyer would be entitled to
recover the difference in value of the insecticide.
482 In Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (N.D. 1976), an
almost identical situation, the court recognized that the seller was entitled to a set-off in the
amount of his crop-spraying fee. Id. at 698, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 72-73. Cf Soo Line R.R. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1378, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1194 (8th Cir. 1977) (buyer
cannot recover finance charges on defective railroad hopper-cars as lost reliance expense
where court had already awarded gross revenue lost by buyer's inability to use them during
repairs); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 383, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 80, 103-04 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (denying recovery for extra labor required to
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Just as seller's attorney must be wary of double recovery, his
adversary must keep an eye on what is being deducted as ex-
penses saved by the breach. Seller's breach does not reduce
buyer's fixed expenses, so a court should deduct only variable ex-
penses from buyer's recovery of gross revenue. 483  Furthermore,
the deduction should consist of expenses that would accompany
perfect performance, not those that buyer would have incurred
had he never made the contract. Assuming no change in the
buyer's output, his past expenses will most likely exceed his ex-
pected expenses, else he would not have purchased the goods.
Deducting past expenses leaves the buyer where he was before the
contract, and leaves his expectancy interest unprotected.4 84 Some-
supervise malfunctioning machine because buyer failed to show how much supervision
machine required when functioning properly); Baden v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 380 F.
Supp. 243, 244, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 400, 401 (D. Mont. 1974) (buyer recovered value of lost
calf crop for failure of artificial insemination but court did not award cost of semen);
Burgess v. Curly Olney's, Inc., 198 Neb. 153, 159, 251 N.W.2d 888, 892, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
794, 798 (1977) (buyer's evidence of lost profits not sufficient because failed to show ex-
pected cost of transporting goods to place of resale); Protection Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 1214, 1218 (Pa. C.P. 1975) (buyer entitled to seek difference between cost of
straightening metal pieces by hand and cost of doing same job by machine had machine
performed as warranted).
Dold v. Sherow, 220 Kan. 350, 356-57, 552 P.2d 945, 950-51, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1356,
1359-60 (1976), demonstrates the ease with which even a careful court may confuse over-
lapping elements of injury. When a number of cows purchased for breeding were unfit for
that purpose, buyer recovered his primary damages, lost profits from the anticipated calf
crop, and the cost of feeding the unproductive cows. Although the court did not explain
how lost profits were to be determined, it apparently awarded the value of the anticipated
calves at birth, or the gross revenue they would bring on resale less the cost of their nur-
ture. Neither standard would deduct the cost of feeding the breeding cows from the
buyer's recovery, even though the buyer had already recovered this necessary expense of
obtaining calves. The court cited cases awarding the reliance expense of feeding unproduc-
tive livestock. None of these cases, however, supports the double recovery achieved by
awarding both lost profits and the cost of feeding the breeders.
Problems of deductions and double recovery are not unique to agriculture; machines
need to be fed and maintained just as crops and cattle do. Thus, the Arkansas Supreme
Court accurately described the resultant damages of a buyer whose automatic icemaker
malfunctioned: "Since damages ... are intended to be compensatory, not punitive, [buyer
could] recover only the amount by which the cost of purchasing ice and preparing it for
use exceeded its cost of manufacture by use of the machinery if it had performed prop-
erly." Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 602, 510 S.W.2d 555, 567,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 1281, 1293 (1974).
483 See Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 259 n.24, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 832, 847 n.24 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (in action for nondelivery of goods intended for resale,
court notes that buyer's deduction of prorata share of fixed distribution costs "favored"
seller), aff'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975).
414 This error appears in Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974). A car dealer
purchased electronic accounting equipment that proved to be defective. From the cost of
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:30
what simpler are those cases where the defect in the goods re-
duces their productivity without preventing their use or reducing
the buyer's cost of using them.485 In such cases there are no "ex-
penses saved in consequence of the seller's breach."
Not all double compensation results from neglecting to de-
duct expenses avoided by seller's breach. The same injury mas-
querading in different costumes may be redressed more than
once. For example, a buyer recovering for damage to his good-
will, or to the overall value of his business, should not also recover
prospective profits prevented by the same breach.486  Conversely,
when a number of distinct items comprise the buyer's injury, the
attorney who fails to recognize one or more of these items fails his
client.487  The analysis suggested in this Project can minimize the
risk that an attorney focusing on lost profits, for example, will
overlook primary damages.
hiring last minute help to untangle buyer's books ($24,412.32), the court deducted not the
cost of operating the warranted machine, but the price buyer had paid in previous years to
have his books done by an outside accounting firm. The decision to invest $35,000 in account-
ing machinery reflected buyer's expectation that he would save money by producing his
own records. Thus, the court's award placed buyer where he was before making the con-
tract rather than where seller promised he would be.
465 See, e.g., Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1310-12, 15
U.C.C. Rep. 1055, 1058-61 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (buyer continued to use nonconforming chilling
equipment).
486 In R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122 (10th Cir.
1975), defective feed damaged buyer's herd of breeding hogs. Although entitled to profits
lost during his use of the feed and to the diminution in the value of his business when sold
two to three years later, the buyer could not recover profits lost after he had stopped using
the feed. Id. at 754-55, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 129. The court considered the injury to be
complete when buyer stopped using seller's feed, and apparently related the diminution in
herd value back to the time of the injury. This award was proper, since the calculation of
decrease in herd value took into account the profits the buyer lost subsequent to the injury.
When the injury was complete, buyer had the option of selling the herd or keeping it and
drawing some profit from it. He could not hold the herd and later sue for its diminished
value and for the profits he had lost during the interim.
4'7 See, e.g., Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 189, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 1002, 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (buyer seeking loss of prospective profits failed to seek
primary damages for defective carpets). In Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273
Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28, 15 U.C.C. 1025 (1974), a lessee receiving defective printing equip-
ment defaulted on his lease and recovered from the manufacturer for the deficiency
judgment taken by the lessor. Applying the Code, the court upheld the award and noted:
[F]or reasons not clear to us, [lessee] chose not to recover the difference be-
tween the value of the equipment as delivered, and ... as warranted, together
with any expense to which he may have been put. Instead, [lessee] ... claimed,
as consequential damage, only the amount that [he was] forced to pay [lessor]
under the guaranty.
Id. at 288, 329 A.2d at 35, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 1034. Furthermore, although lessee proved
the cost of farming out the work the equipment could not handle (id. at 283-84, 329 A.2d
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
b. Causation.48s  Section 2-715(2) allows only those losses "re-
sulting from" the seller's breach. The most fleeting reference to
the causation requirement belabors the obvious, yet the most
rigorous analysis punctuates with a question mark. Because issues
related to cause-in-fact and proximate cause will weave through-
out the fabric of the buyer's case, we interlace them throughout
this Project.
c. Foreseeability and Certainty. For as long as the common law
has encouraged reliance on promises by granting relief for their
breach, courts have struggled to encourage the making of prom-
ises by carving limits into that relief.48 9  The rules outlined
here-that a breaching party is liable only for losses that he could
have foreseen at the outset of the contract, and that an aggrieved
party must prove his consequential damages with reasonable
certainty- represent the law's principal attempts at line draw-
ing.4
90
Foreseeability.. Among the readers of this Project, several may
have memorized, most will have read, and all should at least have
heard of Hadley v. Baxendale.49' That cornerstone of consequen-
tial damages proclaimed that aggrieved parties could recover dam-
ages
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at
at 32, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 1031), he failed to demand the difference between that cost and
the cost of operating the equipment had it functioned properly.
Similarly, in Ralston Purina Co. v. Howell, 254 So. 2d 911, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (Miss.
1971), defective finishing feed literally finished 111 hogs which buyer had intended to
fatten and sell. Instead of the value the hogs would have had if the feed had conformed,
the court apparently awarded only their unfattened value, and even required buyer to pay
for the feed.
488 ... and now remains
That we find out the cause of this effect,
Or rather say, the cause of this defect,
For this effect defective comes by cause ....
W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act 2, sc. 2, lines 100-03.
489 See generally Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1145-47 (1970).
490 See C. McCo.micK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 25-26, 137-38 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-4, at 315; Barton,
The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUD. 277, 295
(1972). Cf. Reed, Trends in the Law of Damages,. 3 LITIGATION 8, 8-9 (1977) (tort damages).
491 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854). Baron Alderson's opinion has been run through the
mill. See, e.g., McCORMICK, supra note 490, §§ 138-41; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 10-41, at 314-18; Farnsworth, supra note 489, at 1199-1210.
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the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it.492
Because the pre-Hadley standard had allowed unlimited liabil-
ity for contractual breach, the 1854 case signaled a marked in-
crease in bench control over jury damage awards.493
Great waters of legal scholarship part on the proper interpre-
tation of Hadley. Did the case require that the parties tacitly agree
that the breaching party would be liable for consequential loss, 494
or merely that they know the facts that make such loss a foresee-
able result of the breach? 495 For the law of sales, the Code
closed the seas upon Hadley's conservative standard-bearers, pre-
serving its more liberal interpretation. 496 Section 2-715(2)(a) and
Comment 2 express the drafters' desire to bury forever the "tacit
agreement" test.497
492 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
193 See MCCORMICK, supra note 490, § 138, at 562-65. But see 11 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1356, at 289-91 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS].
"' See Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) (Holmes,
J.); MCCORMICK, supra note 490, § 141; Barton, supra note 490, at 296.
495 The weight of authority favors this more liberal construction. See, e.g., 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1007 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; MCCORMICK, supra note 490,
§ 138, at 565; 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 493, § 1355.
496 The Code appears slightly more liberal than Hadley in one minor detail. Hadley re-
quired that the injury be foreseeable to both parties at contract time, whereas § 2-715(2)(a)
addresses only the seller's knowledge.
497 Hadley required that the injury be the foreseeable result of facts actually known to
the seller:
(Ihf the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were
communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both par-
ties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they
would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special cir-
cumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the
most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not
affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.
156 Eng. Rep. at 151. But § 2-715(2)(a) (quoted in text accompanying note 106 supra) does
not expressly require foreseeability of injury or actual knowledge of facts. The section does
not make clear whether seller must have had "reason to know" of buyer's "requirements
and needs" (constructive knowledge of facts) or "reason to know" of the "loss" that might
result (foreseeability of injury). Comment 2 suggests that the statute requires "foreseeabil-
ity": "The 'tacit agreement! test... is rejected .... [T]he older rule at common law which
made the seller liable for all consequential damages of which he had 'reason to know' in
advance is followed...." (Emphasis added). Comment 3, on the other hand, indicates that
the seller need only have constructive knowledge of facts: "[T]he seller is liable for conse-
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Rarely does the foreseeability requirement deprive a commer-
cial buyer of consequential damages clearly shown to arise from a
breach of warranty. This result is hardly surprising. The commer-
cial buyer often communicates his special needs to the seller via
contract or negotiation, 498 and his general needs may be notorious
because they are common to an entire class of buyers. 499 Seller's
knowledge of buyer's status or occupation also suggests foresee-
quential damages in all cases where he had reason to know of the buyer's general or par-
ticular requirements at the time of contracting." (Emphasis added.)
Perhaps the drafters dismissed the distinction between knowledge of the buyer's needs
and foresight of the injuries that will result if those needs are not fulfilled as carrying no
practical significance. Comments 2 and 3 suggest that § 2-715(2)(a) combines the two con-
cepts, albeit ungracefully; constructive knowledge is allowed and foreseeability is required.
4" See, eg., Dold v. Sherow, 220 Kan. 350, 356-57, 552 P.2d 945, 950-51, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 1356, 1360 (1976) (buyer who told seller he wanted cows only for breeding recovered
for lost calf crop and feeding costs of cows too old to breed); Boring v. Geis Irrigation Co.,
547 P.2d 988, 992, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 445, 446-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (buyer who informed
seller of plans to feed 10,000 pigs recovered lost profits from inability of equipment to
feed more than 2,777).
The relationship between buyer and seller can help determine whether seller had
"reason to know" of the damages likely to follow his breach. In R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 752-53, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122, 125-26 (10th Cir. 1975), the seller
of defective feed actively advised buyer on the operation of his hog breeding farm and
therefore became liable for buyer's lost profits and goodwill damages. Similarly, in Murray
v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 436, 443-44, 354 N.E.2d 415, 422, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 298,
304-05 (1976), the court held a lessor of defective breeding hogs liable for the cost of
extensive preparations made at his direction on lessee's land and converted to loss by the
breach. Conversely, in Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
519 (7th Cir. 1976), buyer could not recover profits lost as a result of customer dissatisfac-
tion when seller failed to make timely delivery of goods intended for resale. The court
held that the damages were unforeseeable, in part because the relationship between buyer
and seller was not long-term but ad hoc. Id. at 744-45, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 522.
4 Comment 3 to § 2-715 states:
Particular needs of the buyer must generally be made known to the seller while
general needs must rarely be made known to charge the seller with knowledge.
Finance charges typify the commercial buyer's general needs. See Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v.
Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 334, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1070, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (in-
terest on loan taken to purchase $35,000 of contract goods), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir.
1974); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App. 452,
471-74, 339 A.2d 302, 314-15, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 89-91 (1975) (interest on $50,000 loan
taken to finance replacement of roofs follows in "natural course of events" from sale of
defective roofing material). But see Distco Laminating Inc. v. Union Tool Corp., 81 Mich.
App. 612, 622 & n.6, 265 N.W.2d 768, 773 & n.6, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 129, 135 & n.6 (1978)
(rejecting Certain-Teed "normal course of events" rationale and affirming jury denial of
interest on loan taken to purchase goods later rejected).
Whether a court should charge a seller with knowledge of the needs of members of a
particular trade may depend upon the degree of seller's familiarity with that trade. See
Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588, 598-99, 11 U.C.C.
Rep. 261, 269 (4th Cir. 1972) (seller experienced in building spinning mills had reason to
know defective knitting equipment would cause increased operating expenses); Franklin
Grain & Supply Co. v. Ingram, 44 Ill. App. 3d 740, 743, 358 N.F.2d 922, 925, 21 U.C.C.
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ability. Thus, the buyer need not make explicit his plans to resell
the goods if the seller is aware that resale is part of the ordinary
course of the buyer's business. 500 On the other hand, if the buyer
is not primarily a middleman, he may be barred from lost resale
profits unless he initially communicated to the seller his intent to
resell.5 0
1
A different problem arises when neither party at the time of
contracting possessed actual knowledge of events that would sub-
sequently combine with seller's breach to produce or exacerbate
buyer's damage. The seller could hardly be excused by an inter-
vening event the avoidance of which was the raison d'etre of the
contract. Thus, where the burglar alarm malfunctions, only a bold
seller would argue that the burglar was unforeseeable. 50 2  How-
ever, where prevention of the intervening event was not the
primary purpose of the sale, courts may deny recovery on
foreseeability grounds. In Cannon v. Yankee Products Co., 50 3 the
buyer's restaurant business languished after a patron discovered a
worm in a serving of the seller's peas. The customer had
promptly rallied thirty fellow diners and departed to spread the
news. The court limited the buyer's recovery to nominal damages
because the injury to his business
was caused as much by the utterances of the obviously upset
customer as by the presence of the worm and the fact that no
one was made ill by the alleged unwholesome food would seem
Rep. 53, 57 (1976) (seller in fertilizer business had reason to know late delivery of fertilizer
would cause reduced yield).
o00 "In the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them, resale is one of
the requirements of which the seller has reason to know .... " U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 6.
See La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 404-07, 548 P.2d 825, 833-35,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 120, 128-31 (1976) (where seller knew buyer would resell carpet, buyer's
damages on rejection of nonconforming carpet included loss of profits expected on resale);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385, 391, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 648, 652-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (auctioneer aware that buyer dealt in cars
liable for attorneys' fees of buyer sued by resale purchaser for defective title); National
Farmers Org., Inc. v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 196 Neb. 424, 428-33, 243 N.W.2d 335,
338-40, U.C.C. Rep. 821, 825-27 (1976) (buyer allowed recovery of anticipated profit on
resale of corn, where seller knew buyer normally bought for resale).
501 See Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 1091 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (seller
had no reason to know plywood manufacturer wanted logs to export as logs).
502 See Ligon v. Chas. P. Davis Hardware, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 374, 376, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
447, 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Cf Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa.
Super. Ct. 356, 372-74, 367 A.2d 304, 313, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 22, 34-36 (1976) (criminal
intrusion not superseding event precluding strict liability in tort or liability for breach of
express warranty for failure of mace spray).
503 21 U.C.C. Rep. 525 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
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to take the loss of customers out of the natural and probable
consequences of the breach.
50 4
The Yankee Products court applied a sterner test than section
2-715(2)(a) sets out. Had the worm turned up in a six-ounce can
plucked from the supermarket shelf, the holding would be correct.
But the buyer here made weekly bulk purchases from seller's rep-
resentative who, cognizant of his product's ultimate destination,
promised that "this is the very best brand you can buy, good
flavor, wholesome and will please your customers thus increasing
your business."50 5  That an eatery loses customers by serving
worm-ridden food should surprise no one; it is certainly not un-
foreseeable as a matter of law.
There is, in fact, little that lies beyond reasonable foreseeabil-
ity in the normal commercial case. Increased operating costs, lost
profits, and diminished reputation all flow naturally from inter-
ruptions of production, and a "manufacturer should know that
defective goods will disrupt production."50 6  Foreseeability under
the Code requires neither fault on the part of the seller nor that he
504 Id. at 531. Cf. Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 355 A.2d 898, 907, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 434, 444-45 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (denying recovery for economic loss occurring
after replacements purchased by buyer for seller's defective expansion joints also proved
defective; "intervening negligence" of third party supplier not foreseeable); Huebert v.
Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 727-28, 494 P.2d 1210, 1217, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 545,
554 (1972) (lightning that struck electrical system and injured repairman fixing defective
switch not unforeseeable as matter of law); Buffalo Tank Div., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Acme Process Equip. Co., 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 328, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 95 (C.P. 1972) (denying
recovery for late delivery because insolvency of buyer's customer not foreseeable or in
contemplation of parties). But cf. Kassab v. Central Soya, 12 U.C.C Rep. 258, 262-64 (Pa.
C.P. 1970) (allowing recovery for decreased market value of breeding cattle after defective
but harmless feed spurred reasonable public doubt about herd's potency).
505 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 527.
50s R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 752, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122, 125 (10th
Cir. 1975). But cf. Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 746, 19 U.C.C. Rep.
519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1976) (prospective profits lost through customer dissatisfaction not
foreseeable); Autrey v. Chemtrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1093-94, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 45, 54 (D. Del. 1973) (loss of goodwill neither within contemplation of parties nor
arising naturally from breach).
Under § 2-715(2)(b), injuries to person and property must follow proximately from the
breach, but need not pass the foreseeability test of § 2-715(2)(a). See, e.g., Wisniewski v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 574, 582-83, 323 A.2d 744, 748-49, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 599, 603 (1974). The exemption of personal and property injury from the
foreseeability requirement represents an attempt to promote social policy while preserving
judicial candor. Yet some courts achieve the former without the latter. Consider Huebert v.
Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 494 P.2d 1210, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 545 (1972), where the
court paid lip service to foreseeability. Seller had expressly warranted that the door to his
electrical switch would not open while the current was on. The system was struck by a bolt
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consciously accept an insurer's liability. 507  Section 2-715(2) does
not appear to require that the seller have contemplated the extent
of consequential loss; only its occurrence must be foreseeable. 50 8
Nevertheless, some courts continue to cloak in "foreseeability"
their notions of equitable risk allocation.50 9 The significant lesson
of cases embracing the Code standard is this: The foreseeability
doctrine is far too dull a knife with which to carve precise limits
into commercial liability.
Certainty. Like the foreseeability doctrine, "the standard of
'certainty' was developed, and has been used, chiefly as a
convenient means for keeping within the bounds of reasonable
expectation the risk which litigation imposes upon commercial en-
terprise."510 The effect of this nineteenth century American
case-law development is "to increase the injured party's burden of
persuasion well beyond the usual one of making out his case by
the 'preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.' 11 The
classic expression of the rule required that "the damages to be
recovered for a breach of contract must be shown with certainty,
and not left to speculation or conjecture."5 12  An "absolute cer-
tainty" standard was probably never fancied, and the rule has
of lightning carrying over 82,000 amperes, which welded the safety mechanism without
blowing the 600 ampere protective fuses. A repairman received a shock while attempting
to fix the charred switch without testing it for current. All this, said the court without
referring to § 2-715, could reasonably be considered the foreseeable result of seller's
breach of express warranty. Id. at 728, 494 P.2d at 1217, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 554.
507 See U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 3.
508 See Harbor Hill Lith. Corp. v. Dittler Bros., 76 Misc. 2d 145, 147, 348 N.Y.S.2d 920,
923-24, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 789, 791-92 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
509 The "tacit agreement" test dies hard. In Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South
Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), an aspiring
recording artist was denied recovery for a $500,000 stock underwriting allegedly lost be-
cause of a breach of warranty on the pressing of his first album. The court reasoned, inter
aia, that "it does not appear that [the underwriting] was discussed in such detail that
[seller] would have had any idea that it might be held liable for the failure of the under-
writing." Id. at 885, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 391. Still, most jurisdictions have yielded to the
Code's command. See, e.g., National Farmers Org., Inc. v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 196
Neb. 424, 429-31, 243 N.W.2d 335, 338-39, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 821, 825-26 (1976). Even
Pennsylvania, nearly the last bastion of the restrictive test, recently recanted. See R.I. Lam-
pus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 474 Pa. 199, 378 A.2d 288, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1172
(1977) (discussed in note 368 supra).
510 McComicK, supra note 490, § 28, at 105. Professor McCormick notes that the "cer-
tainty" rule refined an earlier per se ban on lost profits. Id., § 25, at 98-99. In this respect
the certainty doctrine differs from the foreseeability requirement whose development it
paralleled. The latter curbed the contract litigant's right to recover; the former relaxed a
prior absolute bar to recovery, yet preserved for the courts substantial control over jury
beneficence.
511 Farnsworth, supra note 489, at 1210-11.
512 Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858).
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long been qualified to require no more than "reasonable cer-
tainty." 513
Article Two of the Code did not continue the common-law
standard of certainty. Although the text of section 2-715 is silent
on matters of proof, Comment 4 makes clear that the drafters
viewed the doctrine as one more wooden rule to be swept from
the law of sales. 514  In its place the drafters envisioned a supple
standard: "Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances." 515 Here, as in other areas
where it tinkers with entrenched common-law doctrine, the Code
has met resistance in the courts.
Both the common law and the Code purport to apply their
respective standards of proof uniformly to all varieties of conse-
quential loss. Courts and commentators have long recognized,
however, that the certainty doctrine has little or no impact outside
the realm of lost profits.516  The doctrine's limited reach results
primarily from the relative ease and precision with which other
513 See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 490, § 26, at 100.
514 The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of consequential
damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal administration of remedies
[1-106] rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost mathematical
precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances.
U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 4.
515 Id. Even the lissome language of Comment 4 would not ensure consequential dam-
ages to every deserving buyer. The allowance of any reasonable manner of proof does not
guarantee its availability in a particular case. Nevertheless, in Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
America v. Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 284 N.E.2d 880, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1363 (1972), the
court affirmed a lump-sum award based on an informed conjecture of lost profits resulting
from breaches of warranty and other obligations in the sale of component parts. The man-
ufacturer of a new and innovative product, buyer aggressively presented his case and con-
vinced the court of its merit. The court upheld the award, citing § 1-106 ("[tlhe remedies
provided by this [Act] shall be liberally administered") and an excerpt from Comment 1 to
§ 1-106 ("Compensatory damages are often at best approximate: they have to be proved
with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more."). 362 Mass. at 264,
284 N.E.2d at 890, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 1375. If the latter statement applied to consequential
damages, as the court assumed, it would represent a more forceful rejection of the cer-
tainty rule than does Comment 4 to § 2-715 (reprinted in note 514 supra). It would com-
mend a "hands-off" approach to the bench with respect to jury awards. But Comment 1 to
§ 1-106 explicitly states that "compensatory damages .... do not include consequential ...
damages." Apparently, the drafters held sacrosanct the buyer's restitutionary interest but
were more reluctant to consecrate consequential damages. Given the finite nature of prim-
ary damages and the open-ended risk of consequential loss, the latter calls for greater
judicial supervision.
5'6 See McCoRMIcK, supra note 490, § 28, at 105-06. As the court explained in Aldon
Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 191, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1007 (5th
Cir. 1975), "proof of anticipated profits contains an inherent element of conjecture and
therefore ... a plaintiff has a more difficult time in bearing his burden of proving the fact
and amount of damages to a reasonable certainty."
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forms of loss, such as property damage, increased production
costs, and frustrated reliance expenditures, may be ascertained. It
may also indicate that courts are more firmly committed to pro-
tecting reliance than to protecting expectancy interests.
Courts employ the certainty requirement in three ways to
control juries. At trial, the judge may instruct the jury that the
plaintiff must prove his damages with reasonable certainty. At the
trial or appellate level, the court may find that plaintiff's proof
falls short of the standard as a matter of law. Finally, the court
may declare a particular kind of loss per se incapable of proof to
a reasonable certainty, regardless of plaintiff's evidence. Because
the first application has not been contested in the cases, this sec-
tion focuses on the second two. The role played by the certainty
doctrine in any warranty case will depend upon the situation of
the buyer and the nature of the injury for which he seeks satisfac-
tion.
Where a breach of warranty prevents the buyer from resell-
ing the goods at a profit, the certainty doctrine presents no special
impediment to recovery. He may establish his opportunity to re-
sell by identifying an available market for the goods.517 Evidence
of gross revenue lost, however, may not suffice to prove profits;
the buyer must deduct expenses saved due to his inability to resell.5 18
When the buyer purchases goods to incorporate into his own
product or production process, rather than to immediately resell
'17 See, e.g., Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 551, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1227, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1975) (nondelivery of trucks prevented dealer from
reselling; market established by showing average sales in months prior to breach); Cheme-
tron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 258-59, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 832, 846-47
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (nondelivery forced supplier to reject orders and allocate product at re-
duced quantities to contract customers); Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 462, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 965, 976 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (nonconformity of Christmas trees prevented
wholesaler from filling retailers' contracts); Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 478,
183 N.W.2d 598, 599, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1018, 1019 (1970) (allowing revoking retailer to re-
cover profits lost by inability to resell defective Christmas trees; market established by
showing good location and large expenditures in attempting to resell before revocation);
National Farmers Org., Inc. v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 196 Neb. 424, 426-29, 243
N.W.2d 335, 337-38, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 821, 823-25 (1976) (nondelivery of corn prevented
resale in proven existing markets).
Of course, the proof must be genuine. The buyer may not recover for lost profits
from a sham resale opportunity conjured up for the purpose of proving damages. See
Burgess v. Curly Olney's, Inc., 198 Neb. 153, 159, 251 N.W.2d 888, 892, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
794, 798 (1977).
518 See, e.g., Burgess v. Curly Olney's, Inc., 198 Neb. 153, 159, 251 N.W.2d 888, 892, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 794, 798 (1977) (buyers barred from recovering lost profits because they
failed to show cost of transporting goods to place of resale) (alternative holding). At the
other extreme, a mere allegation of net profit, without proof of gross income and operat-
ing costs, may be legally insufficient to establish lost profits. See, e.g., Bunch v. Signal Oil &
Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41, 43, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 116-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
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them, he adds new links to the chain connecting his lost profits
with the seller's breach of warranty. Each link is another con-
tingency, and every "if" must be resolved in the buyer's favor be-
fore he can recover.519 It is one thing for the retailer to say:
"Had I received conforming alfalfa seeds, I'd have resold them
the next day for profit." It will be much more difficult for the
farmer to prove: "If I'd received good seeds, I'd have planted
them on time, gotten decent weather, frightened off the crows,
bought forty head of healthy breeding cows, fed them with the
alfalfa, and sold their calves in the spring." Although both plain-
tiffs carry the same burden of proof, any standard approaching
certainty sits more heavily on the latter. 520  Sympathetic courts
have responded with the "fact-amount" doctrine.
Various expressions of the fact-amount doctrine appear in
the cases,521 but the effect of each is to relax the certainty stand-
519 See CORBIN, supra note 495, § 1022, at 135-39.
520 Conversely, the fewer the links in buyer's profitmaking chain, the less formidable the
certainty requirement. For example, in Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 323 (S.D. 1977), the buyer of a defective printing press had to channel work
to other printers. The buyer's testimony as to lost revenue and ordinary profit percentage,
supported by his other job records, fulfilled the reasonable certainty requirement. Id. at
505-07, 23 U.C.C. Rep. at 332-34.
521 See, e.g., Brauer v. Republic Steel Corp., 460 F.2d 801, 805, 10 U.C.G. Rep. 1146,
1150 (10th Cir. 1972) ("When [buyer] proves the fact of damage with reasonable certainty
Irecovery will not be denied because the damages are difficult of ascertainment.' ") (quoting
Garcia v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 315 F.2d 166, 167-68 (10th Cir. 1963)); Great
Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 883, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 381, 388 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) ("The rule which precludes the recovery of un-
certain damages applies to such damages as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect
of their amount.") (quoting Acuff v. Vinsant, 59 Tenn. App. 727, 737, 443 S.W.2d 669,
674 (1969)); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 652, 291
N.E.2d 92, 106, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 57 (1972) ("less certainty is required to prove amount
of loss than is required to prove the fact that profits were in truth lost"); Uganski v. Little
Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 110, 192 N.W.2d 580, 590, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
57, 71-72 (1971) ('[W]here injury to some degree is found, we do not preclude recovery for
lack of precise proof. We do the best we can with what we have.") (quoting Godwin v. Ace
Iron & Metal Co., 376 Mich. 360, 368, 137 N.W.2d 151, 156 (1965) (quoting Purcell -v.
Keegan, 359 Mich. 571, 576, 103 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1960))); Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255
N.W.2d 824, 826, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1057, 1059 (Minn. 1977) ("Once the fact of loss has been
shown, the difficulty of proving its amount will not preclude recovery so long as there is
proof of a reasonable basis upon which to approximate the amount."); Hardesty v. Andro
Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030, 1034, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 352, 357 (Okla. 1976) ("The
prohibition of recovery of damages because of uncertainty and too speculative in nature
applies to the fact of damage and not to the amount of damage.") [sic] (quoting Martin v.
Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976)); Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
234 N.W.2d 38, 43, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67, 73-74 (S.D. 1975) ("mere difficulty in the assess-
ment of damages [is not] a sufficient reason for refusing them where the right to them has
been established") (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 23, at 42 (1965)); Murray v. Holiday
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ard as to the amount of loss, once the buyer has convinced the
court that he has, in fact, suffered some loss. The doctrine has
been criticized as premised upon an artificial distinction, because
proof of the fact of loss necessarily proves some minimal
amount.522 Nevertheless, the doctrine strikes a responsive chord
in our aversion to procedural rules that smack of forfeiture.
It has been offered, in support of a lowered threshold of
proof, that the party whose wrong created the uncertainty should
not benefit therefrom. 52 '3  But fault-based rationales are inap-
propriate in the warranty context. 52 14  Ample justification for
mitigating the harshness of the certainty doctrine can be found
without resort to concepts of fault. Where the buyer establishes
the probability of some loss, such proof is "reasonable under the
circumstances" within the meaning of Comment 4 to section
2-715. Confronted with the alternative of probable undercompen-
sation, courts should not balk at the mere possibility of windfall.
By excising an element of the buyer's claim, a court relinquishes
control over the magnitude of potential error; the certainty rule
brooks no compromise. In contrast, by stepping aside and allow-
ing the buyer to petition the jury, the court minimizes the risk of
Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 432, 265 N.W.2d 513, 526, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 52, 70 (1978)
(buyer "must prove by credible evidence to a reasonable certainty that such damages were
suffered and must prove, at least to a reasonable probability, the amount of these dam-
ages"); cases cited in 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 172 (1965 & Supp. 1978); McCoRmicK,
supra note 490, § 27. But see Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 191,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 1975) ("amount of damages must be capable of proof
to a reasonable certainty"); Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists,
14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 221, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111, 119, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 643, 654 (1971) ("loss of
prospective profits may ... be recovered if the evidence shows with reasonable certainty
both their occurrence and the extent thereof" (emphasis in original) ); Robert T. Donaldson,
Inc. v. Aggregate Surfacing Corp. of America, 47 A.D.2d 852, 853, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 376-77 (2d Dep't 1975) ("damages [to reputation] must be reasonably
certain in amount and must be traceable with reasonable certainty to the breach") (citations
omitted).
522 17 MINN. L. REV. 194, 196 (1933).
'21 See 46 HARV. L. REV. 696, 701 (1933). Cf. Willred Co. v. Westmoreland Metal Mfg.
Co., 200 F. Supp. 59, 65-66, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 181 (relevant language edited out) (E.D. Pa.
1961) (breach of exclusive distributorship contract). This rationale has been applied in
non-sales (see, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263-66 (1946)
(where antitrust conspiracy had anticompetitive effect on market, conspirators not allowed
to evade damages by pointing to lack of evidence of competitive market conditions)), and is
as ancient as the famous case of the chimney sweep (Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505
(1722) (where defendant goldsmith failed to prove value of jewel which he had wrongfully
converted, damages in trover action calculated according tojewel's greatest possible value)).
524 The law of warranties, like the law of strict liability in tort, operates independent of
fault concepts. See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 160, § 75; WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 2, § 9-1. Seller's due care may be evidence that the goods were not defective (see
Comment 13 to § 2-314), but it is no defense to an established breach of warranty.
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judicial error. The jury is free to discount the buyer's proof and
award a compromise figure that reflects an intuitive valuation of
the buyer's "ifs." 525
But a court should not let go of all its reins. It can protect the
seller from unnecessary risk of error by requiring the buyer to
use the best available evidence of damages. 526 Should the jury's
estimate grossly exceed the court's own, the court may exercise its
power to reduce the award.527
Courts can ascertain proper guidelines for judicial action.
Judicial deference to jury approximation will naturally increase as
the buyer's evidence of the fact of harm waxes persuasive. Fur-
thermore, the court's reluctance to bar an element of damages
should mount in proportion to the alleged magnitude of the in-
525 See also Project, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on
Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1023-24 (1956); 46 HARV. L. REV. 696, 700 (1933).
526 "[Wlhere it is made to appear that some loss has been suffered, it is proper to let the
jury determine what the loss is from the best evidence the nature of the case admits."
Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030, 1035, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 352, 358
(Okla. 1976) (quoting syllabus from Southwest Ice & Dairy Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203
Okla. 279, 280, 220 P.2d 257, 258 (1950)). Accord, Multivision Northwest, Inc. v. Jerrold
Elec. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 207, 216 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (financial experts' testimony trans-
posing profits of one year to show prior year's loss sufficient proof of damages) (dicta);
Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 875-76, 229 P.2d 348, 355 (1951) (decided under Uni-
form Sales Act); Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 43, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67,
73 (S.D. 1975) (reciting need for reasonable certainty but upholding award for lost yield of
injured crop: "We do not ... demand the impossible.").
Courts show little solicitude toward the commercial buyer who bungles an already bor-
derline case. See Willred Co. v. Westmoreland Metal Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 59, 65-66, 1
U.C.C. Rep. 181 (relevant language edited out) (E.D. Pa. 1961) (relaxing "certainty" stand-
ard where breach prevents accurate damage assessment but not where buyer failed to
present best available evidence); Bunch v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41, 43, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 112, 116-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (buyer's allegation of lost net income from inability
to operate truck, absent some evidence of lost gross revenue and operating expenses, le-
gally insufficient to support lost profits); Cannon v. Yankee Prod. Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 525,
531 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977) (buyer's failure to show what part of reduced gross revenue
represented lost profits alternative reason for denying recovery); Shotkoski v. Standard
Chem. Mt. Co., 195 Neb. 22, 29-31, 237 N.W.2d 92, 97-98, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 328, 333-35
(1975) (failure to introduce specific evidence concerning how much of herd suffered de-
crease in milk production precluded recovery for nonconforming feed supplement).
527 See, eg., Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir.
1974) (reducing award for lost goodwill and lost profits); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc.
v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 654-55, 291 N.E.2d 92, 107, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 58-59 (1972)
(ordering remittitur or, alternatively, new trial on all issues); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-
Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 712, 261 N.W.2d 358, 367, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 342, 353 (1978)
(ordering remittitur over partial dissent that remittitur appropriate only when excess sub-
ject to exact determination); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 432-34, 265
N.W.2d 513, 526-27, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 52, 70-71 (1978) (giving consumer option of accept-
ingjury award reduced from $2,500 to $500, or proceeding to new trial on damage issue);
Project, supra note 525, at 1024; 46 HARV. L. REv. 696, 700 (1933).
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jury; a large claim may signal a strong likelihood that damage
indeed occurred.528 More important, the "certainty" doctrine's
inherent danger of forfeiture keeps pace with the amount in con-
troversy. High stakes place a premium on compromise. Where
high uncertainty accompanies high stakes, the court can protect
the seller by narrowing the allowable range of jury awards. 529
Once these judicial safeguards are applied, fairness dictates that
the seller share the uncertainty risk emanating from his contract
with the buyer.
d. Problems of Proof: Lost Profits, New Businesses, and Good-
will. Regardless of the evidentiary standard he faces, the alert
buyer need seldom approach the bench with young Oliver's naked
appeal: "Please, sir, I want some more." 530
Lost Profits. Where he has marketed a product and can trace
its subsequent rejection to the seller's breach, the buyer may estab-
lish the amount of his loss with evidence of refunds or credits
given to his customers. 531 Courts have not required that the re-
funds satisfy a legal obligation of the buyer,532 but like all conse-
quential damages they must be reasonable and foreseeable.533
The buyer who has marketed his product, but thanks to the
seller's breach of warranty has received less revenue than he
reasonably expected, stands in a similar position. The defect in
528 This holds true where the buyer's difficulty lies in establishing the amount of his loss
or in apportioning his known loss among several causal factors. But where the injury is
discrete, the damage observable, and the issue one of cause in fact, the magnitude of
buyer's claim should not affect his right to a jury verdict.
529 The buyer, of course, may not bluff his way through a bad case by raising the ante.
U.C.C. § 1-203 demands good faith in all aspects of commercial dealing, and judges and
juries alike are well able to detect frivolity.
530 C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST ch. 11 (1837-1838).
5'3 See, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 14, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 588, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (credits on swimsuits produced from defective material).
Buyer's product need not be "goods." See Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
447 F.2d 660, 672, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 211, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1971) (refund to owner who re-
moved pigs from buyer's feed lot because of seller's defective feed).
532 See WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-4, at 321. In Texsun Feed Yards v. Ralston
Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 211 (5th Cir. 1971), the court rejected seller's
attempt to treat this element as a claim for indemnity, which would require prior judicial
ascertainment of buyer's liability to his customers. Id. at 665-66, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 217-18.
533 To recover, of course, the buyer must show that he suffered a loss. Whether courts
should treat a credit, as opposed to a refund, as a total loss may depend upon the nature
of buyer's business. A credit most nearly resembles a refund where a customer cashes it in
for goods he would have purchased whether or not he had a credit (except that the cus-
tomer receiving a refund holds the cash in the interim). But when the subsequent purchase
would not have taken place but for the customer's need to spend his credit, the buyer has
not lost any profit.
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the seller's goods may have caused the buyer's product to decline
in quality 53 4 or, as with products normally sold in lots, in quan-
tity.53 5 The accomplished sale may help to prove the existence of
a market for the buyer's goods, leaving him to prove that seller's
breach caused their devaluation. Comparisons to similarly situated
operations may suffice to prove either a loss of quantity 536 or a
decrease in marketability. 537
Buyers often support claims for lost profits from the inter-
ruption of established businesses by pointing to profits made be-
fore the breach. But past profits do not assure continued success,
and the buyer should present any evidence available to prove that
the breach prevented him from taking advantage of existing op-
portunities. The buyer strengthens his claim by introducing sub-
'34 See, e.g., Kassab v. Central Soya, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 258 (Pa. C.P. 1970) (cows worth
$49,000 as breeders sold for beef at $5,500 due to defective feed); Dobias v. Western
Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42 (1971) (corn infested
with common smut due to defective herbicide sold as silage).
Quality, as used here, refers to market value. Thus, a defect that forces the buyer to
sell his product in an unfavorable market may have the same impact upon the buyer as
would a defect that directly harmed the goods. In Karlen v. Butler Mfg. Co., 526 F.2d
1373, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 400 (8th Cir. 1975), a leaky silo forced the buyer to evacuate and sell
his wheat in May. He alleged that he had planned to sell the wheat the following De-
cember. The going rate for wheat was higher in the later month. In Karlen, however, the
buyer was not entitled to recover lost profits because he failed to prove that he would
indeed have waited until December to sell. Id. at 1379-80, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 408-09.
M See, e.g., Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (N.D. 1976)
(defective insecticide decreased wheat yield); Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d
38, 43-44, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67, 73-74 (S.D. 1975) (defective insecticide decreased corn yield).
Cf. Franklin Grain & Supply Co. v. Ingram, 44 Ill. App. 3d 740, 358 N.E.d 922, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 53 (1976) (late delivery of fertilizer reduced crop yield).
536 See, e.g., Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 697-98, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63,
72-73 (N.D. 1976) (buyer testifies to average wheat yield on his and neighbor's fields);
Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 67 (S.D. 1975) (buyer
testifies that nondefective insecticide on portion of crop resulted in normal yield). Cf.
Franklin Grain & Supply Co. v. Ingram, 44 Ill. App. 3d 740, 358 N.E.2d 922, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 53 (1976) (reduced yield from late delivery of fertilizer shown by comparing nearby
farms that used fertilizer with others that did not).
"' See, e.g., Boring v. Geis Irrigation Co., 547 P.2d 988, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 445 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1975) (where defective feeding equipment prevented buyer from adding swine to
farm, he established lost profits using profit data from swine he fed and sold); cases cited
in note 542 infra.
The model operation, however, must resemble buyer's operation. In Melms v. Mitch-
ell, 266 Or. 208, 223-24, 512 P.2d 1336, 1343-44, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 223, 234 (1973), the
court refused to award the buyer of a cordwood business profits lost by the seller's failure
to provide sufficient wood. Although the seller had previously operated the business at a
profit, the buyer had little experience. The court did not find seller's past success persua-
sive proof of buyer's prospective profits.
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sequent profits to show that his operation returned to normal
after the breach. 38
New Businesses. Here lie more complicated problems of proof.
Courts vary considerably in their willingness to award lost profits
for the delay or demise of a new enterprise. Several jurisdictions
demonstrate hostility by retaining per se prohibitions against such
claims.539  Others adhere to "general rules" that appear less dras-
tic but no less effective.
540
"' See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 511, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 642 (8th
Cir. 1971) (profits lost during interruption of saw mill proved by showing past and sub-
sequent profits and receptive but unfulfilled market); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352,
360, 485 S.W.2d 183, 189, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, 1127-28 (1972) (lost profits from incapaci-
tation of truck supported by showing available but unfulfilled hauling contracts and aver-
age daily net income while in operation); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154
Ind. App. 632, 651-55, 291 N.E.2d 92, 105-07, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 56-59 (1972) (evidence
of average profits supports recovery for profits lost while buyer deprived of use of com-
mercial truck, but does not support losses accruing after return of truck).
5'9 The Florida rule is that future loss of profits is not recoverable for a breach of
warranty unless the plaintiff's business is established. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co. v. Utility Battery Manufacturing Co., 122 Fla. 718, 166 So. 856 (1935). A
business is established when "'it had such stability and regularity as to give its
past record of profits some probative value as indicating the probable sub-
sequent profit."'...
The result is the same .... [u]nder Illinois law .... Kolberg v. Cities Serv-
ice Oil Co., 343 Ill. App. 355, 99 N.E.2d 152 (1951).
Autrey v. Chemtrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1093, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 45, 53-54 (D.
Del. 1973). Cf. Bunch v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41, 43, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 116
(Colo. Ct. App. 1972) ("[i]t is settled that damages for loss of income will not be awarded
unless net profits are proved on the basis of past experience") (dictum).
540 It has been frequently stated that if a business is new, it is improper to
award damage for loss of profits because absence of income and expense
experience renders anticipated profits too speculative to meet the legal
standard of reasonable certainty .... However, the rule is not a hard and
fast one and loss of prospective profits may nevertheless be recovered if the
evidence shows with reasonable certainty both their occurrence and the extent
thereof.
Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 221, 92
Cal. Rptr. 111, 118-19, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 643, 653-54 (1971) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). Not surprisingly, the Gerwin buyer failed to meet his burdens. Quoting the Gerwin
language, the Nebraska Supreme Court recently ordered remittitur of a jury award of lost
profits from diminished sales of pizza, despite evidence of customer complaints while the
defective pizza oven was in use and a 20% increase in sales after the oven was replaced. El
Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261 N.W.2d 358, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
342 (1978). Similarly, in Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), the court silenced a claim for lost prospective profits of a
new television station while denying adherence to a per se rule: "When the business is new
and unestablished, future profits have been consistently denied under Texas law.... [Tihe
factor that the enterprise was new was not controlling, but rather what was conclusive was
the record of profits of the enterprise." Id. at 803, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 1112. But compare
Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824, 826, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1057, 1060 (Minn. 1977),
where the court approved an award of lost prospective profits to a buyer who showed that
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Should his new business survive the trauma of defective
goods, buyer may be able to transpose a record of subsequent
earnings onto the period of delay.541  Similarly, the buyer may
establish the profit potential of a new extension of his business by
referring to the success of established branches of the same en-
terprise. 542  But the certainty rule weighs heavily on the gambler.
The type of business that is likely to absorb initial losses in search
of long-term gains makes a poor candidate for recovery of
profits." 3  Innovative courts could use market data and financial
experts to gauge the success potential of such enterprises. 544  Fi-
his profits from selling the same product in markets other than the one from which the
breach excluded him increased 300%. Although in earlier cases the court had "adopted no
per se rule," it had "recognized the general rule" that lost profits in a new business are too
speculative to recover. Id. at 826, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 1059.
5'1 In Multivision Northwest, Inc. v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ga.
1972), a television station operator failed to prove that electrical equipment had fallen
short of its warranties. In dicta, however, the court approved the buyer's use of market
and accounting data and financial experts to transpose subsequent profit records onto the
period of the breach. Id. at 216-17 n.4.
542 See, eg., Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1057 (Minn. 1977)
(out-of-state profits help determine loss of in-state sales); Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-Webster
Div., 555 P.2d 1030, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 352 (Okla. 1976) (buyer supports claim of diminished
occupancy in new, defectively air-conditioned apartment complex by showing occupancy
rates in his other complexes).
"' See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (denying lost profits to television station folding after breach, having
made no profit during fleeting existence); Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp.,
451 F.2d 1115, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 88 (10th Cir. 1971) (buyer did not appeal trial court's
ruling disallowing lost profits on development of innovative project frustrated by breach);
Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 883, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 381, 388 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (no consequential recovery where defective rec-
ord pressing undermines financial investment in prospective showbusiness career: "The
question of allowable damages in this case is made more difficult by the speculative nature
of the business venture .... The proof clearly indicates the extremely hazardous nature of
an undertaking to produce a 'hit' record and create a 'star' ... ").
54" McCormick counsels that the success potential of a new enterprise can be evaluated
and that courts should accept such evidence where the wrong was done deliberately.
McCoRMICK, supra note 490, § 29, at 108. This approach should govern all warranty cases,
regardless of the seller's state of mind. The techniques available for assessing potential
profitability have become more reliable since McCormick wrote in 1935, and the wilfulness
of seller's breach has no bearing on the determination of buyer's loss in a commercial
warranty case. See note 524 supra.
Courts have long valued expert opinion on profits lost by established enterprises. See, e.g.,
Hardwick v. Dravo Equip. Co., 279 Or. 619, 569 P.2d 588, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 968 (1977)
(award of lost profits from lost use of revoked logging machine supported by expert tes-
timony on productivity and expenses of buyer's operations). The buyer himself, or a
member of his organization, may qualify to give his opinion. See, e.g., Burrus v. Itek Corp.,
46 Il. App. 3d 350, 360 N.E.2d 1168, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (1977) (awarding lost profits
on estimate by buyer's printing press operators and proof that productivity of press di-
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nally, courts have considered evidence of the commercial climate
surrounding a new business, 545 and of the particular buyer's abil-
ity to capitalize on his opportunities.5 46
In response to the difficulties noted above, it has been
suggested that, "[wihen it is not certain whether plaintiff's busi-
ness venture would have produced any profit, courts should
award plaintiff damages corresponding to the 'value of the
chance' to make profits which was lost because of the breach." 547
This approach focuses on the buyer's interest in the chance to
profit, rather than the actual profit that might have resulted but for
the breach. The buyer would have to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the breach was a proximate cause of the en-
terprise's failure, but he need not show that, absent the breach,
his enterprise would have succeeded. 548  Human experience
minished); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 110-11, 192
N.W.2d 580, 590-91, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57, 72 (1971) (buyer with 25 years experience and his
accountant estimate profits lost from defective crane); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12
Wash. App. 161, 169, 528 P.2d 992, 997, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 332, 338 (1974) (profits lost by
incapacitation of defective truck: "While it is true.., that [buyer's] testimony was not sup-
ported by documentary evidence ..... and the proof establishing the loss [of profits] must
be clear and convincing ..... ' oral testimony to which no objection is made may meet this
test."). Cf. Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp.
877, 884, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 381, 389 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (record company president and disc
jockey testify against probability of buyer's success).
545 In denying lost profits for a new television station, the court in Fredonia Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 804, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1089, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1973),
noted: "[Buyer] was also operating in an unfavorable business climate. Its... UHF station,
was in competition in the same town with a VHF station. [Buyer] admitted that a UHF
station was not as favorable as a VHF station .... " Cf. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v.
Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 254, 284 N.E.2d 880, 885, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1363, 1368 (1972)
(upholding award for profits lost from interrupted marketing of new product, court notes
that product "received much free and favorable publicity... reaching widespread audi-
ences .... throughout the country").
"" See Melms v. Mitchell, 266 Or. 208, 512 P.2d 1336, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 223 (1973) (deny-
ing lost profits to inexperienced buyer taking over formerly profitable business).
'47 Project, supra note 525, at 1024. Cf. 46 HARV. L. REv. 696, 699 (1933) (American
courts have rejected British rule allowing recovery for value of chance where abandoned
endeavor involved no risk of loss). We wish to thank Professor Ian R. Macneil of the
Cornell Law School for his helpful insights into the value-of-the-chance concept. Any mis-
takes are ours.
548 Suppose Bert, former sheep farmer, decides to be a country and western recording
star. Bert forms the Bighorn Band and asks Sam's Record Pressing Company to press
40,000 promotional copies of his first song: "Your Bleating Heart." Sam knows that Bert
will use all of his capital-$60,000-on advertisements promoting this first record. Sam
promises perfect pressing, aware that anything less spells disaster in the fast-paced music
industry. Because the records Sam distributes across the country are warped, they are sel-
dom played by disc jockeys and, consequently, are ignored by distributors and the public.
Debts come due and Bert's Bighorn Band goes bankrupt. Bert sues Sam for breach of
warranty, and the court finds a sale of goods subject to Article Two. Bert cannot prove
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abounds with demonstrations of the value of a chance. Lottery
tickets, horserace bets, and stock options are bought and sold like
any other property. Few would contend that a parimutuel stub
has no value unless the holder can prove to a reasonable certainty
that his horse will win the race.
The ideal measure of the value of a chance is the expected
income if the venture succeeds discounted by the odds against
success. 549  Few courts or parties will have access to this informa-
tion. Nevertheless, roughly similar estimates underlie the com-
mercial buyer's decision to invest in a venture. His investment
thus provides the handiest measure of the value of his chance. 550
If the goods themselves constitute the buyer's entire investment,
adequate compensation consists of primary damages. But the av-
erage buyer will have made other investments, both before and
after the sale, which are wholly or partially converted to losses
when the venture fails. 5 51
Although the buyer's investment provides a convenient
yardstick, it does not conclusively establish the value of his chance.
If the seller can show that the buyer's investment was unreason-
ably large in light of the odds of his success, the excess should not
be recoverable.5 52  Conversely, the buyer is entitled to show that
the value of his chance exceeded his investment. Expert tes-
timony, market analysis and statistics on the success rates of simi-
larly situated entrepreneurs may help to establish an objective
"value of the chance."
that, but for Sam's breach, "Your Bleating Heart" would have "hit the charts," making the
endeavor successful. The certainty standard would deny Bert not only lost profits but also
promotional costs, because these reliance expenditures would have become losses, regard-
less of the breach, unless Bert's music had appealed to the public. Nevertheless, the breach
fleeced Bert of the property he purchased with his investment-the chance to have his
music heard and evaluated by the public. This loss Bert can prove and should recover.
549 In our hypothetical (note 548 supra), suppose that the odds of selling one's first coun-
try and western record are one in ten, and that the average income from a successful
record is $500,000. The value of Bert's chance would be $50,000.
550 In our hypothetical (notes 548-49 supra), Bert invested $60,000 in promoting his
song, presumably believing that his chance of success was worth at least that much.
551 The investments referred to here are not confined to out-of-pocket expenditures, but
may include other costs such as time, labor, and opportunity costs. Not all business invest-
ments become losses if the venture fails. Buyer often can resell equipment and sublet
rented space. Only that part of his investment that is converted to loss upon failure prop-
erly reflects the price buyer paid for his gamble.
S32 Thus, in our hypothetical (notes 548-50 supra), if Sam can show that Bert overesti-
mated the objective value of his chance by $10,000 (Bert's investment ($60,000) less income
from success discounted by odds against success ($500,000 x .10= $50,000)), Bert should
recover only the objective value.
1978]
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By treating the buyer's chance of future profits as if it were
present property, the court properly uses a fiction to divide the
risk of uncertainty between the parties. Absent uncertainty, how-
ever, the fiction is unnecessary and unjustified. The seller may be
able to show, with the aid of hindsight, that the buyer's venture
would have failed even if the goods had performed as warranted.
The seller should then escape consequential liability, for he did
not insure the buyer against failure of his venture, only against
failure of the aoods. 553
Goodwill. Like the hopes of a new business, goodwill is an in-
tangible property that has perplexed courts awarding damages.
Goodwill has been defined as "that which attaches to a business on
account of name, location, reputation for competency and the im-
ponderables which cause buyers to return." 5 54  For anyone who
has had occasion to choose between two brands of fig bars, the
concept holds little mystery. In 1936 the Texas Supreme Court
matter-of-factly stated:
Good will is property. It may be sold and it may also be dam-
aged. There is no principle of law making any distinction be-
tween it and other property with respect to the right of the
owner thereof to recover damages for its destruction....
• ..Good will, though intangible, is in [sic] integral part of
the business the same as are the physical assets.... The rule
for measuring such damages is the same as that for measuring
damages to any other property. 555
This common-sense approach has not enjoyed wide recogni-
tion in warranty cases. In fact, thirty-six years later, Professors
White and Summers observed that "no court has yet granted re-
covery under the Code for lost profits resulting from a loss of
customer good will." 556  Nothing in section 2-715 explains this
phenomenon, and courts have since begun to allow recovery for
-'- Thus, in our hypothetical (notes 548-50, 552 supra), if "Your Bleating Heart" violated
a litigious songwriter's copyright, then the song never had a chance, and there appears no
justification for shifting Bert's loss to Sam. Cf. Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South
Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 884, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 381, 389 (M.D. Tenn. 1975)
(seller offers expert testimony that poor musical quality would have prevented success of
record even if properly pressed).
55' Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
551 Texas & P. Ry. v. Mercer, 127 Tex. 220, 225-26, 90 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1936).
556 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-4, at 322.
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injury to goodwill. 557  Even in the absence of a per se bar, how-
ever, the certainty rule may defeat the buyer's recovery of good-
will damages. 55 8
The type of evidence useful in assessing injury to any prop-
erty depends upon the nature of the property. Goodwill is a func-
tion of expected profit:
The specific elements to be considered in calculating the
"good will" value of a business are: "(1) What profit has the
business made over and above an amount fairly attributable to
the return on the capital investment and to the labor of the
owner?; (2) What is the reasonable prospect that this additional
profit will continue into the future, considering all cir-
cumstances existing and known as of the date of the valua-
tion?" 559
55' See, e.g., R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122 (10th
Cir. 1975) (applying Wyo. law); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986
(10th Cir. 1975) (applying Colo. law); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447
F.2d 660, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Tex. Law); Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255
N.W.2d 824, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1057 (Minn. 1977). A number of pre-Code decisions also
awarded goodwill damages for breach of warranty. See, e.g., Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d
864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); Sol-O-Lite Lam. Corp. v. Allen, 223 Or. 80, 353 P.2d 843
(1960). Despite these advances, many courts retain rigid proscriptions against the recovery
of damages for injury to business reputation. See Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455,
462, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 965, 976 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (loss of goodwill from inability of Christmas
tree wholesaler to meet seasonal contracts with retailer: "[d]amages of this nature are en-
tirely too speculative for reasonable calculation"); Harbor Hill Lith. Corp. v. Dittler Bros.,
76 Misc. 2d 145, 148, 348 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 789, 792 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(buyer cannot recover for loss of entire account with dissatisfied customer: "[t]hat kind of
an open-ended measure is far too speculative"); Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Dun-
can, 9 N.C. App. 653, 657, 177 S.E.2d 428, 431, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 696, 699 (1970) (where
buyer blacklisted by dissatisfied industrial customer, evidence of resulting damage "inad-
missible under the hearsay rule and the speculative damages rule"). Compare Autrey v.
Chemtrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1093, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 45, 54 (D. Del. 1973)
(under both Florida and Illinois law, "loss of reputation has been held to be too speculative
to serve as a basis for recovery in breach of warranty actions") with Aldon Indus., Inc. v.
Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 191-93, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1006-10 (5th Cir. 1975)
(buyer failed to prove goodwill damage, although not per se barred under Florida law).
55' See, e.g,, Agricultural Serv. Assoc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 443 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying Tennessee law, reversing buyer's recovery of goodwill as
"not proven"); Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (Florida law); Robert T. Donaldson, Inc. v. Aggregate Surfacing Corp.
of America, 47 A.D.2d 852, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 375 (2d Dep't 1975);
Kwipco, Inc. v. General Trailer Co., 267 Or. 184, 515 P.2d 1317, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 125
(1973). Cf. Isenberg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d 1016 (pre-Code breach of warranty
case), modified on rehearing on other grounds, 84 Ariz. 364, 329 P.2d 882 (1958).
559 Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 943 (1976).
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The method of proving injury to goodwill may vary with the na-
ture of the enterprise. A buyer catering to a few significant cus-
tomers may establish his loss by showing that specific patrons have
left the fold because of the breach. 560  Where this tactic is un-
available, the buyer may introduce his records of profits earned
before and after the injury. 56' Because diminished profitability is
crucial to his case, the buyer whose income pattern is erratic,5 62 or
whose profits actually increased following the breach, 56  will find
it difficult to prove goodwill damages. As the owner of goodwill
property, the buyer may be competent to testify to its worth be-
fore and after the breach, but if his opinion is unsupported by
other evidence, it will probably not carry him to the jury.564  If
the buyer sells his business, the difference between its sale price
and its pre-breach value as a going concern will help ascertain the
amount of his goodwill loss. 565
The drafters of the Code made no explicit allowance for
goodwill damages; nor could they, in a workable Code, itemize all
manner of injury. Instead, they established a policy of liberal re-
covery of damages, 566 proved in any manner reasonable under
the circumstances, 567  and designed to make the plaintiff
560 See Sol-O-Lite Lam. Corp. v. Allen, 223 Or. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960) (pre-Code case).
Cf. Isenberg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d 1016 (pre-Code case denying recovery be-
cause buyer failed to show loss of customers), modified on rehearing on other grounds, 84 Ariz.
364, 329 P.2d 882 (1958). But cf. Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188,
17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying recovery for goodwill where carpet seller
alleged statewide injury to reputation but merely proved blacklisted by two local schools).
561 See, e.g., Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
210 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Southwest Ice & Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla.
279, 220 P.2d 257 (1950) (negligence action).
562 See, e.g., Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (amount of goodwill injury too speculative where buyer's sales pattern
erratic, nature of his business changing, competition increasing, and buyer not expanding
to meet market).
563 See, e.g., Robert T. Donaldson, Inc. v. Aggregate Surfacing Corp. of America, 47
A.D.2d 852, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 375 (2d Dep't 1975); Kwipco, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Trailer Co., 267 Or. 184, 515 P.2d 1317, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 125 (1973). Courts should
not deny goodwill damages merely because profits have surged after breach, as long as the
buyer can show that diminished reputation prevented an even greater surge.
564 See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1975)
(dictum), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). Cf. Isenberg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d
1016 (in pre-Code warranty action, owner's opinion, alone, insufficient), modfied on rehear-
ing on other grounds, 84 Ariz. 364, 329 P.2d 882 (1958).
565 See, e.g., R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 122 (10th
Cir. 1975).
566 See U.C.C. § 1-106(1), reprinted in note 316 supra.
567 See U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 4, reprinted in oiote 514 supra.
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whole. 5 68 This spirit underlay the opinion in Westric Battey Co. v.
Standard Electric Co.56 9  Westric sought damages for injury to its
goodwill caused by defective components incorporated in the bat-
teries it sold. Evidence admitted to establish the injury consisted
of (1) the estimate of a competitor who had considered buying
Westric and had appraised Westric's goodwill prior to the breach;
and (2) the testimony of an expert who calculated the anticipated
profit attributable to Westric's goodwill, both before and after the
breach.570 The court upheld an award for Westric, stating: "Al-
though intangible (and not easy to prove), good will is nonetheless
real." 571 Furthermore, the "amount cannot and hence need not
be proven with absolute precision." 57 2  The Westric decision dis-
plays judicial recognition of commercial reality. When hard-
headed businesspersons trade daily in the property of commercial
reputation, no court can justifiably continue to sweep goodwill
under a carpet already crowded with leprechauns and UFO's.
This Project endorses a flexible approach to the proof of con-
sequential damages. Where they survive, per se rules precluding
recovery for the lost profits of a new business, and for injury to
commercial reputation, should be laid to rest. In their wake,
courts should permit juries to estimate damages on the best evi-
dence the case permits, subject to supervision by the trial judge.
When considering damages to reputation or the lost profits of a
new business, courts should focus on the property interest of the
buyer at the time of the breach. Treating goodwill and the "value
of the chance" as assets, rather than aspirations, conforms with
commercial practice, and appears less like prophesy. Both courts
and litigants should find this a more palatable approach than
"winner-take-all."
e. The Issue Restated. The fear that "allowing full compensa-
tion might impose on the party in breach a crushing burden,
greatly out of proportion to the benefit that he originally ex-
pected to derive from his bargain,"' 57 3 has haunted the law for
years. 574 In their quest for fair limits on the liability of commer-
568 See U.C.C. § 1-106(1), reprinted in note 316 supra.
569 522 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1975).
570 Id. at 988.
571 Id. at 987.
572 Id. at 987 n.2.
573 Farnsworth, supra note 489, at 1199-1200.
574 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 490, § 141, at 575-76. In Great Am. Music Mach.,
Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F. Supp. 877, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (M.D. Tenn.
1975), the court denied certain consequential damages, noting:
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cial sellers, courts have attempted to employ doctrines unsuited
for the task. If foreseeability has proved to be a dull knife, the
certainty doctrine is a meat axe-a hit-or-miss evidentiary stan-
dard with no inherent relation to the needs or intent of the parties.
f. Suggestions. The Code has gone part way toward reducing
the seller's risk by inviting him to disclaim warranties and limit
remedies. 575  Such devices allow parties to allocate risk at the out-
set rather than gamble on judicial hindsight once the deal has
soured. Courts ought not to disturb these provisions, where con-
scionable, only to narrow newly-opened doors with foreseeability
and certainty. Many commercial parties, however, do not con-
template disaster or do not provide for it in their agreements; nor
is it satisfactory to answer that they should or could have and,
because they did not, seller must bite the bullet.
The problem may expose its own Achilles heel. Perhaps some
sellers do not attempt to limit their liability for breach of implied
warranties because they are unaware that the law has imposed
them. Implied warranties arise by operation of law, reflecting a
policy decision favoring the buyer's right to rely on receiving qual-
ity goods, regardless of the seller's intent. Since the warranty
emanates from policy rather than intent, perhaps policy should
draw its boundaries. Courts have long used the doctrine of prox-
imate cause to carve out case-by-case limits on tort liability, re-
gardless of the foreseeability of the damage or its ease of
proof.576  A similar approach to implied warranty cases could
acknowledge the disproportionality of the damage to the seller's
expected revenue, the relative ability of the parties to absorb or
distribute the loss, and the remoteness of the injury.5 77  Courts
A rule of damages which should embrace within its scope all the consequences
which might be shown to have resulted from a failure or omission to perform a
stipulated duty or service would be a serious hindrance to the operations of
commerce and to the transaction of the common business life. The effect would
often be to impose a liability wholly disproportionate to the nature of the act or
service which a party had bound himself to perform and to the compensation
paid and received therefore.
Id. at 885, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 391 (quoting Baker v. Riverside Church, 61 Tenn. App. 270,
290, 453 S.W.2d 801, 809 (1970) (quoting Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232,
237 (1867))). Cf Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 291, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1,
19 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing disproportionality argument against abolishing privity re-
quirement for consequential damages) (dictum).
515 "Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available
the section on contractual limitation of remedy." U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 3.
"' See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 160, §§ 41-45.
5 7 Courts are generally assumed to consider these factors already, in the guise of
foreseeability and certainty. See notes 489-90, 509-10 and accompanying text supra.
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applying the Code have occasionally referred to proximate cause
in this sense but have not squarely addressed the issue.57 8 At
least one court has expressly found sufficient connection between
warranty and tort theory to allow doctrinal migration from one to
the other.57 9  And in Baden v. Curtiss Breeding Service,580 a federal
district court drew the kind of line one would expect to find in a
case decided under tort theory. The buyer was allowed to recover
for the anticipated calf crop lost when seller's artificial insemina-
tion service failed, but, as a matter of law, could not recover for the
would-be progeny of the first generation calves. 581 The court
beefed up its discussions of foreseeability and certainty by reveal-
ing what may have been its ultimate theme: "[T]he purpose of the
Uniform Commercial Code, taken with other applicable law, is to
reach some reasonable rule of damages." 582
'7' See Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 648, 291 N.E.2d
92, 103, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 47, 53 (1972) ("The issues of the foreseeability and the proxi-
mateness of consequential damages sustained by a plaintiff as a result of a breach of im-
plied warranty are for determination by the jury."); Klages v. General Ordnance Equip.
Corp., 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 373, 367 A.2d 304, 313, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 22, 35 (1976)
(personal injury case interpreting § 2-715(2)(b) as adopting.tort definition: "Proximate
cause is designed ... to define such limits on recovery as are economically and socially
desirable.").
579 Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 246 N.W.2d 687, 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 869,
872 (Minn. 1976) (assumption of risk proper defense to personal injury because "breach of
warranty is in part a tort theory subject to traditional tort defenses").
580 380 F. Supp. 243, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 400 (D. Mont. 1974).
581 It may seem arbitrary to hold that the uncertainties up to the first calf crop
may be tolerated but that no matter what the proof is the uncertainties beyond
that point will not be. At some point, however, the degree of uncertainty per-
mitted becomes a question of law.... In the case of the second calf crop we
must project a supposititious calf into a period of supposititious fertility fol-
lowed by a supposititiously successful breeding which is in turn followed by a
supposititiously successful calving, and hence motherhood.
Id. at 245, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 403. To speak of certainty while drawing a line beyond which
no proof can go hardly seems consistent. This "supposititious" chain the court constructs
may conjure up a seminal case on proximate cause, Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y.
210 (1866). The railroad company negligently set fire to its own building. The fire spread
to a neighbor's house, and the neighbor sued. The court, recognizing the need to draw a
line that would shelter negligent parties from potentially infinite liability, held that the
injury to the neighbor's property was too remote to justify holding the railroad liable. Id. at
216-17. Similarly, proximate cause rulings in implied warranty cases could reflect a policy
decision to choose a point and draw a line.
582 380 F. Supp. at 245, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 403.
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LIMITATIONS ON WARRANTY LIABILITY
We have thus far examined the circumstances that create
both express and implied warranties in commercial sales. In addi-
tion, we have explored the range of remedies available to a buyer
whose seller has breached his warranty obligations. Often we have
presupposed a passive seller, content to leave the resolution of
warranty issues to the Code rather than the contract. The pre-
supposition is, of course, unrealistic; through careful contract
drafting, sellers can significantly limit their exposure to warranty
liability. By effectively employing section 2-316, a seller may ne-
gate all implied warranties in virtually all commercial transactions.
Although express warranties are more resistant to disclaimer ef-
forts, section 2-719 authorizes significant limitations on buyer re-
covery for breach of warranty.
Our focus now shifts to contractual limitations on warranty
liability. Some tension exists between the application of the rele-
vant Code sections to commercial and consumer transactions. The
drafters recognized the commercial utility of permitting parties to
allocate contractually the risks inherent in any sale. But the draft-
ers tempered the ability of sellers to alter the Code's allocation of
risk by imposing procedural and substantive requirements de-
signed largely to protect unsophisticated buyers. 583  As we shall
see, courts are less likely to insist upon strict compliance with
these requirements in commercial cases, where the policy basis for
their applicability is weakest.
A. Disclaimers and Express Warranties-Section 2-316(1)
Because express warranties by definition go to "the basis of
the bargain," 584 sellers should not be allowed to disclaim
them.58 5  Section 2-316(1) sets forth the Code's position toward
conflicts between express warranties and language of disclaimer:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit war-
513 The drafters of the Code might have exhibited less concern for unsophisticated
buyers if the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), had been in effect at the time the Code was drafted.
"4 See notes 71-158 and accompanying text supra.
5'5 "The very idea that a seller may disclaim an express warranty may seem illogical or
dishonest." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-2, at 351.
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ranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol
or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
The message is plain: A seller may not disclaim an express
warranty created by the parties' agreement. Although earlier
drafts expressed the principle more forthrightly, 586 the present
version remains consistent with the subsection's goal to protect the
buyer from surprise.587 Courts regularly refuse to disturb ex-
press warranties even in the face of explicit attempts at nega-
tion.588 Nevertheless, the subsection as presently worded guards
against overbroad application by buyer-oriented courts; it ensures
that language of disclaimer will prevail where the basis-of-the-
bargain test or the parol evidence rule prevents warranties from
arising.
1. Warranty Language in the Written Agreement-Consistency
a. Words of Disclaimer and the Basis of the Bargain. An express
warranty, once created, will survive any attempted disclaimer. Yet
words of disclaimer may forefend express warranties at an earlier
stage of analysis by keeping warranty language out of the basis of
the bargain. By emphasizing that words of warranty and words of
disclaimer can often be construed consistently, subsection (1) re-
minds courts that the underlying goal of buyer protection does
not override section 2-313's express warranty requirements.
"' The 1952 version of § 2-316(1) provided: "If the agreement creates an express war-
ranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative."
587 Comment 1 to § 2-316 explains the section's purpose:
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales
contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It seeks to
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express
warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicu-
ous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
588 See, e.g., O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1152
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (parol warranty, if admissible, prevails over disclaimer); Auto-Teria,
Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (express warranty
that customers' coins could automatically operate brush unit in car wash system prevailed
over blanket disclaimer); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind.
App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498 (1972) (express warranties as to health of
chickens would prevail over disclaimers); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 23 U.C.C. Rep. 603
(Minn. 1978) (express warranty against herbicide carryover damage would prevail over
disclaimer); Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375 (Mont. 1977)
(disclaimers ineffective against express warranties in sale of irrigation system); Drier v.
Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 323 (S.D. 1977) (parol warranty not
limited by written waiver or disclaimer).
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Section 2-316(l)'s approval of consistent construction espe-
cially aids sellers of experimental goods. Descriptive language in
such contracts will necessarily be more aspirational than factual.
U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.,589 for example, in-
volved the sale of experimental manufacturing equipment. The
contract expressly warranted materials and workmanship but
stated that no other express warranties would arise unless the
word "guarantee" was used. 59° The contract further provided
that, "in view of the variables present effecting (sic) the capacity of
the machine, no guarantee can be extended."' 59' Despite these
words of disclaimer, the buyer alleged that the following language
created an express warranty: "This conveyor is especially designed
with a deflection tolerance of t 1/32" across each conveyor
plate."592  If the description of deflection tolerance created an
express warranty, it would supersede words purporting to remove
it from the same agreement. The Code, however, requires courts
to read warranty language together with words of disclaimer to
determine whether an express warranty actually arose.593 The
U.S. Fibres court, noting both the buyer's awareness that the
equipment was unproven and the language of disclaimer, held
that no express warranty was created.594  No inconsistency existed
under section 2-316(1) because the descriptive language did not
reach the basis of the bargain.595
589 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975).
590 Id. at 1045, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 3.
591 Id., 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 2.
592 Id., 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 3.
593 The 1952 draft (quoted in note 586 supra) could be read to require courts to ignore
disclaimer language when determining whether express warranties have been created. See
1955 N.Y. LAw REvISION COMM'N, supra note 72, at 405-06.
591 Accord, Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Ents., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 57, 349
N.E.2d 627, 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1320-21 (1976). In Alan Wood Steel, the court held
that a disclaimer and a provision that "descriptions are approximate and intended to serve
as a guide" indicated that identification language was not part of the basis of the bargain.
Consequently, no express warranty arose as to the lifting capacity of the hoist crane sold.
By admonishing courts to examine words of disclaimer in the basis-of-the-bargain de-
termination, § 2-316(1) enables a seller to state his warranty generally and then define its
contours. For example: "Seller warrants these tires against all damage attributable to road
hazards. Road hazards do not include fire or other vehicles." Although the first sentence,
alone, could create a warranty covering damage from fire or other vehicles, the second sentence
removes such hazards from the basis of the bargain. If, however, the second sentence were to cut
deeper into the common understanding of"road hazard," it might become inappropriate to read
the words consistently.
5 In Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 546-
47, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 920, 933 (D. Mass. 1977), the seller's statement that a pollution control
device would "handle Plastisol fumes" merely referred to the product's intended use and
thus created no inconsistency problem. Gilbert could be read to hold either that the rep-
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A caveat is in order. In U.S. Fibres, the court indicated that,
had the conveyor been tried and proven, the description might
have created an express warranty despite the words of dis-
claimer.596  The careful seller whose products are not experimen-
tal or whose buyers are unsophisticated should avoid words of de-
scription altogether.
b. "Time Warranties"-A Special Problem of Consistency. Sellers
frequently make express warranties of limited duration. The time
qualification may assume either of two forms: a direct limit on
duration or a limit on the time from delivery in which a buyer
must notify the seller of any breach. The latter form cannot be
justified as a clause setting the time from discovery for notifica-
tion of breach,597 nor as a shortened statute of limitations. 598  Its
real effect is to exclude warranties covering nonconformities that
are not reasonably discoverable within the time period. Since the
Code frowns upon sellers' modifications of express warranties,
courts should not permit sellers to evade its prescribed procedures
by mislabeling their disclaimers.
Where the buyer cannot reasonably detect a nonconformity
until after the warranty's purported expiration, the court faces
two choices under section 2-316(1): either the warranty does not
reach the "undiscoverable defect" or the time limit fails as incon-
resentation was not an affirmation of fact or promise that the goods would control Plastisol
fumes, or that an affirmation existed but did not become part of the basis of the bargain.
In either case, no express warranty would arise under § 2-313.
596 509 F.2d at 1046, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 4.
597 U.C.C. § 2-607(3) requires notification of breach to be given within a reasonable
period after the breach is or should be discovered. Although § 1-204(1) permits the parties
to define a period which is not "manifestly unreasonable" for notification, the Code does
not authorize alteration of the point when the period begins to run. Thus, a clause requir-
ing notification within a specified period after del/very is best viewed as an attempted mod-
ification of warranty. Even if analyzed as a limitation of the time for notice, it would not
exclude a cause of action based on a breach that is not discoverable until after the time
lapses-the negative time allowed for notification would be manifestly unreasonable. See
notes 603-05 and accompanying text infra.
598 U.C.C. § 2-725(1) authorizes parties to reduce the period in which an action may be
commenced but does not authorize them to shorten the period allowed for notifying the
seller of a claim for breach. Moreover, the section does not authorize reduction of the
statute of limitations to less than one year.
In Benton County Public Utility Dist. No. 1 v. General Elec. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. 55
(E.D. Wash. 1976), a buyer sought recovery under an expired express warranty. The buyer
had discovered a defect within one year from delivery and argued that § 2-725(1) requires
express warranties to run at least one year. The court rejected the buyer's reasoning, hold-
ing § 2-725 inapplicable to limitations on warranty duration.
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sistent with the express warranty. In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David
Ferguson, Ltd.,5 99 an affirmation that yarn was "merchantable" di-
rectly clashed with a clause that disallowed all claims made after
processing.600 The buyer processed, the yarn shaded, the buyer
sued, and the seller hid behind his time limit. Citing section
2-316(1), the court rejected the seller's defense:
[Section 2-316(1)] provides that warranty language prevails
over the disclaimer if the two cannot be reasonably reconciled.
Here, the contract expressly creates an unlimited express
warranty of merchantability while in a separate clause purports
to indirectly modify the warranty without expressly mentioning
the word merchantability. Under these circumstances, the lan-
guage creating the unlimited express warranty must prevail
over the time limitation insofar as the latter modifies the war-
ranty. 60
1
The seller could have avoided consistency problems by limiting his
express warranty to defects actually discovered prior to process-
ing.
A closer case would arise under the following clause: "Seller
warrants these goods to be free of defects in materials and work-
manship. This warranty is limited to one year." Since the first sen-
tence creates an unlimited warranty, the subsequent disclaimer as
to defects not discovered within one year seems irreconcilable. Yet
such warranties abound. In most instances, a finding that the time
limitation is inconsistent with the language creating the express
warranty would exceed the buyer's legitimate expectations. These
clauses loudly proclaim a promise limited in duration. Only within
the stated period may the buyer reasonably rely on the promise;
only within that period does the warranty become part of the
basis of the bargain. Whether a time limitation is consistent with
an unbridled quality representation should depend upon the prox-
imity of the language, the length of the time period, and the
nature of the goods sold. For example, an inconsistently worded
ten-day limitation in a sale of complex equipment, where most
599 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968). For further discussion
of Wilson Trading, see notes 856-61 and accompanying text infra.
600 Relevant portions of the contract are quoted in text accompanying note 857 infra.
601 23 N.Y.2d at 405, 244 N.E.2d at 689, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1218. But see Blends, Inc. v.
Schottland Mills, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 377, 316 N.Y.S.2d 912, 8 U.G.C. Rep. 816 (1st Dep't
1970) (exclusion of claims arising after dyeing in sale of yarn not "unfair").
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defects would remain hidden until much later, so saps the war-
ranty as to nullify the deadline under section 2-316(1). Less dras-
tic limitations, however, regularly prevail.6 0 2
Even consistent time limitations have succumbed to buyers'
claims of unreasonableness. In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 60 3 the seller limited the express warranty on
compressor parts to fifteen months from shipment. The court
held that the fifteen month period might be an unreasonable
limitation on warranty because the seller apparently knew that the
vital spare part could not be purchased elsewhere. 04 Despite
such precedent, "reasonableness" attacks are difficult to justify.
Express warranties are created by contract. Where a seller war-
rants only against defects discovered within a specified period, the
Code provides no basis for judicial extension of the express war-
ranty. Moreover, courts often can permit recovery for latent
defects without resort to a "reasonableness" analysis. Words of
description outside the warranty clause may create additional war-
ranties, permitting a finding of inconsistency based upon the fac-
tors mentioned above.60 5 Further, no evidence in Transcontinental
Gas suggested that the seller had complied with the Code's re-
quirements for modifying the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity. Courts should permit buyers to recover under implied
602 See, e.g., Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
1080 (10th Cir. 1974) (limit on warranty to six months or 100 hours of operation upheld in
commercial sale of rebuilt aircraft); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009,
20 U.C.C. Rep. 873 (Utah 1976) (manufacturer of motor home protected by "12 month or
12,000 mile" warranty in ultimate consumer's claim based on defects occurring two years
after original sale).
603 9 U.C.C. Rep. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd mem., 326 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't
1971).
604 For another example of such "reasonableness" analysis, see Majors v. Kalo Labs.,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (citing undiscoverability of
defects in soybean inoculant, court voided provision requiring buyer to give notice of any
defect within 120 days of delivery).
605 See text accompanying note 602 supra. Thus, in the sale of a "new Ford truck," the
descriptive language might create a warranty that the engine will function for more than
one year despite a one-year limitation in the seller's warranty clause. The Transcontinental
court did not address the possibility of inconsistency under § 2-316(1). Similarly, in Com-
munity Tel. Servs., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 686
(D.S.D. 1977), the court found a six month limitation of warranty "unreasonable" in the
sale of a television broadcasting tower and permitted the buyer to recover for the tower's
collapse during a blizzard. Since the express warranty of wind resistance appeared in the
specifications, separate from the time limitation, the court could have reached the same
result by finding inconsistency under § 2-316(1).
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warranties of unlimited duration despite limitations on express
warranties. 0"
2. Parol Warranties
In addition to making disclaimer language relevant in basis-
of-the-bargain determinations, section 2-316(1) further protects
sellers by ensuring that their warranty liability will be determined
entirely by what the Code recognizes as the parties' agreement.
The subsection refers explicitly to section 2-202,6o7 making it clear
that the same standards of admissibility apply to evidence of ex-
press warranties as apply to evidence of other terms of the agree-
ment.608 Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chemicals,
Ltd. 60 9 illustrates this uniform application. The case involved a
sale of large quantities of paint for use in a housing project. The
written agreement provided: "Deer-O-Paints are warranted to
conform to formula and sample, but not as to use or applica-
tion."' 610 Despite the disclaimer, the buyer attempted to intro-
duce an alleged oral representation that the product required
only a one coat spray application. Conceding the statement's in-
admissibility under section 2-202, the buyer argued that section
2-316(1) creates an exception for parol warranties. The court dis-
agreed: "We recognize that these are precisely the same represen-
tations which the trial court excluded under the parol evidence
rule. In our opinion, they are not now rendered admissible
66 A limit on the duration of an express warranty should not affect the duration of
ineffectively modified implied warranties. See notes 760-63 and accompanying text infra.
607 U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
1;0 Comment 2 to § 2-316 bolsters the conclusion that alleged parol warranties should
not receive the same treatment as language in the written agreement. The Comment states:
"The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties by its
provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence .... "
609 24 Ariz. App. 331, 538 P.2d 760, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 353 (1975).
;0 Id. at 333, 538 P.2d at 762, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 354.
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merely because appellant chooses to characterize them as express
warranties." 61 '
A resourceful buyer will not easily forsake his effort to cir-
cumvent the parol evidence rule. Comment 1 to section 2-313
provides some solace: "'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' as-
pects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of
that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to
the basic dickered terms." Read separately from section 2-316(1),
this Comment might suggest that even parol express warranties
would survive disclaimer language. This specious reasoning has
met with some success in consumer cases.612 Commercial buyers,
however, probably could not convince courts that the Comment
negates section 2-316(1)'s clear reference to section 2-202.
A thorough analysis of the Code's parol evidence rule exceeds
the scope of this Project.613  Generally, courts in commercial cases
do not hesitate to give literal effect to section 2-202 when buyers
allege parol warranties. 61 4  Section 2-202 excludes all parol evi-
dence that contradicts "a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein." Thus, a blanket disclaimer will normally pre-
clude oral warranties. 61 5  Even in the absence of a disclaimer, a
611 Id. at 334, 538 P.2d at 763, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 356. In other words, parol representa-
tions inadmissible under § 2-202 are not "words ... relevant to the creation of an express
warranty" within the meaning of § 2-316(1).
612 In Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 403 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974), the
court admitted evidence of oral affirmations that a mobile home would conform to a sam-
ple although the writing contained a blanket disclaimer. The court grounded its decision
on Comment I to § 2-313. The court also cited Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d
611, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 235 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), a more justifiable decision allowing parol
evidence to clarify an ambiguity in the written express warranty. See Durbano Metals, Inc.
v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 299 (Utah 1978).
13 For more extensive commentary on § 2-202, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§§ 2-9 to 2-12, 12-4, at 65-81, 354-56, and Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence
Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DUKE L.J. 881.
614 See cases cited in notes 615 & 617 infra. But see Woodruff v. Clark County Farm
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498 (1972) (with-
out reference to § 2-202, court holds written disclaimer possibly inoperative under
§ 2-316(1) against alleged oral warranty of chickens' health).
615 See Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
115 (D.S.C. 1974) (oral representations that computer would handle buyer's business not
part of subsequent written agreement containing blanket disclaimer and merger clause);
Economy Forms Corp. v. Kandy, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 944, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 93 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (integrated purchase order disclaiming any warranties not incorporated therein
excludes alleged oral warranty of fitness of concrete forms), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1400 (5th
Cir. 1975). But see Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251,
310 A.2d 491, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 449 (evidence of oral express warranties admissible if consis-
tent with blanket disclaimer), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973). Since a blanket
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finding of integration -that "the writing [was] intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement"r616 will nullify all parol warranties. 617 Of course, a
buyer who successfully establishes the ambiguity of warranty or
disclaimer language in the writing will be able to introduce other-
wise inadmissible evidence for interpretative purposes. 61 8  Where
the writing contains neither disclaimer nor integration language,
the path should be clear for incorporating parol warranties.6 1 9
Even a disclaimer that has been overridden by a written ex-
press warranty may prevail over an alleged parol representation.
disclaimer can never be consistent with express warranties, the buyer seeking to recover on
parol warranties must establish that the writing containing the disclaimer was not intended
to be "a final expression of their agreement." See O'Neil v. International Harvester Co.,
575 P.2d 862, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (admitting evidence of seller's
oral representations and conduct to determine finality of writing containing disclaimer and
merger clauses); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 323 (S.D. 1977)
(parol evidence admissible to prove express warranty despite disclaimer where writing not
intended as final). Of course, a limited disclaimer that contradicts the proferred evidence
will exclude it as effectively as a blanket disclaimer. See Shore Line Props., Inc. v. Deer-O-
Paints & Chems., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331, 538 P.2d 760, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 353 (1975), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 609-11 supra.
616 U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
61' See, e.g., Shore Line Props., Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chems., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331,
538 P.2d 760, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 353 (1975). In commercial cases at least, courts generally
view merger clauses as conclusive evidence that the parties intended the writing to be com-
plete and exclusive. See, e.g., Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215
S.E.2d 10, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 82 (1975) (representation in advertising brochure ineffective to
prove express warranty that refrigeration unit would maintain zero degree temperature
where writing contained integration clause); FMC Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., 90 Misc. 2d
1043, 396 N.Y.S.2d 993, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (merger clause precludes
admission of evidence that seller orally represented machine would conform to sample).
But see Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 377 A.2d 672,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 1242 (1974). In Acme Pump, a merger clause in a written contract for the
sale of bookkeeping machines did not prevent consideration of oral representations "over
and above" the express written warranty. The court's reasoning was not clear; presumably
it found the writing "not complete and exclusive" or considered the warranty language
ambiguous.
618 See Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 235 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1973).
619 See Werner v. Montana, 378 A.2d 1130, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 894 (N.H. 1977) (buyer
permitted to prove oral warranty that sloop would be watertight). One court, however, has
held that a fact question then arises as to whether such evidence would be contradictory.
See Centennial Ins. Co. v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 346 N.E.2d 330, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 1089 (1975).
Comment 3 to § 2-202 sets forth one instance where a court should exclude evidence
of parol warranties even though the terms are not contradictory nor the writing complete:
If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have
been included in the document in the view of the court, then evidence of their
alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.
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Suppose a beer manufacturer purchases a bottling machine. In
the written agreement, the seller expressly warrants the machine
against defects in materials and workmanship. Immediately fol-
lowing the warranty language appear the words: "There are no
other warranties, express or implied." A separate paragraph of
the contract describes the machine as capable of filling "45 bottles
per minute." Moreover, the buyer claims that the seller orally rep-
resented that the product would cut spillage to less than one per-
cent. In the six months since the sale, the machine has functioned
without defect. However, spillage has hovered at about five per-
cent (not a defect because this figure is commonly expected in
the trade), and the product has consistently filled only thirty bot-
tles per minute.
Damaged by this sluggishness and waste, the buyer sues on
two counts of breach of express warranty. He convinces the court
that the contractual reference to capacity entered the basis of the
bargain,620 where it found sanctuary against the disclaimer of
"other warranties." 621  Nevertheless, the disclaimer should over-
ride the alleged parol spillage representation. Although earlier
drafts of section 2-316(1) appeared to render words disclaiming
express warranties entirely inoperative, 622 the current version only
limits the disclaimer's scope. The disclaimer fails to operate only
to the extent that it conflicts with warranty language contained in
the writing; it remains a term of the agreement sufficient under
section 2-202 tq exclude contradictory oral statements. 23
Not even a tight writing gives the seller a license to deceive.
Section 2-721 may explain why courts so readily apply section
2-202 to parol express warranties. Under section 2-721, the
Code's remedies for breach of warranty extend in full to buyers
victimized by fraud or misrepresentation. 24 Most courts cor-
rectly refuse to apply section 2-202 where buyers raise these tort
620 The seller relies on U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975) (discussed in notes 589-96 and accompanying text supra), but
the court distinguishes U.S. Fibres on two grounds: (1) the absence of disclaimer language
directly pertaining to descriptions, and (2) the nonexperimental nature of the goods.
621 See notes 586-88 and accompanying text supra.
622 See note 586 supra.
623 See note 615 and accompanying text supra.
624 U.C.C. § 2-721 provides:
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies
available under this article for nonfraudulent breach. Neither rescission or a
claim for rescission of the contract for sale nor rejection or return of the goods
shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy.
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claims. 62 5  Professors White and Summers, however, caution
courts to "be wary of turning the fraud exception into an excep-
tion that swallows up the entire parol evidence rule." 6 26  In one
case, 627 at least, this may have occurred. Minnesota law apparently
does not require intent to deceive or even recklessness for action-
able fraud. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Min-
nesota law, found that integration and disclaimer language is in-
effective against innocent oral misrepresentations unless the
contract "explicitly states a fact completely antithetical to the
claimed misrepresentations." 628
B. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section 2-316(2)
The Code in section 2-316(2) establishes one procedure by
which a seller can effectively disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.6 29  Subsec-
tion (2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is suffi-
cient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
1. Language Requirements
a. Mentioning "Merchantability." Under section 2-316(2), sellers
attempting to exclude or modify the implied warranty of mer-
chantability must use the word "merchantability." 630 In Roto-Lith,
625 See, e.g., Tareyton Elec. Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1064
(M.D.N.C. 1977); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208 S.E.2d 794, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 598 (1974). But see Rogers-Farmer Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Barnett, 125 Ga.
App. 494, 188 S.E.2d 122, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 792 (1972) (dissenting opinion) (consumer case).
626 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 2-11, at 75.
627 Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau, 444 F.2d 169, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 189 (8th Cir.
1971).
628 Id. at 179, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 197.
629 We examine the extent to which a seller who fails to comply with the procedure may
negate warranties under subsection (3) in notes 678-748 and accompanying text infra.
Moreover, unconscionability plays a role in sellers' attempts to disclaim warranty liability.
See notes 780-92 and accompanying text infra.
630 New York courts have held that the "merchantability" requirement extends to rem-
edy limitations as well as warranty disclaimers. See Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d
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Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 631 the First Circuit apparently ignored
this requirement. The court upheld a disclaimer that read: "Seller
hereby expressly excludes any and all warranties ... ",632 A
seller could argue that this clause was sufficient to disclaim all
implied warranties under section 2-316(3)(a)6 33 because the lan-
guage "makes plain that there is no implied warranty." Such a
finding, however, would effectively rewrite section 2-316(2) to
exclude the requirement that the disclaimer mention "merchant-
ability." 634  One court explicitly refused to employ subsection (3)
(a) as an escape hatch from the requirements of subsection (2),635
and most decisions enforce the latter without reference to the
former. 636
b. Language to Disclaim the Implied Warranty of Fitness. Com-
ment 4 to section 2-316 states simply:
Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied war-
ranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded by
general language, but only if it is in writing and conspicuous. 63
17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (4th Dep't 1969), discussed in text accompanying
notes 771-73 infra; Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 631 (Civ. CCt. 1977) (consumer case following Zicari).
631 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 73 (Ist Cir. 1962).
632 Id. at 499, 1 U.C.C. Rep. at 75.
633 U.C.C § 2-316(3)(a) treats disclaimers using "as is" or similar language. See notes
678-700 and accompanying text infra.
634 Comment I to U.C.C. § 2-316 notes that the section is "designed principally to deal
with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude 'all warranties, express
or implied."' If the Roto-Lith clause can disclaim under § 2-316(3)(a), it is difficult to im-
agine a situation where the absence of the word "merchantability" would be decisive.
635 In Tareyton Elec. Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp., 21 U.C.C Rep. 1064, 1069, 1075
(M.D.N.C. 1977), the court did not permit the following language to operate as an "as is"
disclaimer: "The service and replacement provisions above are expressly in lieu of all war-
ranties, express or implied .... " But see Recreatives, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wis. 2d 255, 226
N.W.2d 474, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1258 (1975) (disclaimer negated implied warranty of mer-
chantability under § 2-316(3)(a) without mentioning "merchantability").
636 See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 N.13, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
1181, 1191 n.13 (8th Cir. 1977) ("need for contractual certainty" mandates preserving
"merchantability" requirement) (dictum); S-C Indus. v. American Hydroponics Sys., Inc.,
468 F.2d 852, 855, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1972) (incconspicuous disclaimer not
mentioning "merchantability" ineffective).
637 (Emphasis added.) Few courts have said what language excludes the fitness warranty,
perhaps because disclaimers often fail the conspicuousness requirement or because many
buyers also have access to the merchantability warranty (merchantability may provide over-
lapping protection making fitness unimportant, and if the seller thought to mention "mer-
chantability," his language would normally pass the less demanding test for exclusion of
the fitness warranty). Courts that reach the issue appearr receptive to general disclamatory
language. See, e.g., Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla. 1974)
(disclaimer of any warranty against "patent or latent defects in materials, workmanship or
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2. Conspicuousness
Section 2-316(2) requires also that implied warranty disclaim-
ers be conspicuous. Resolution of disputes over a written dis-
claimer's conspicuousness forces courts to make a policy choice.
The drafters apparently felt that the goals of certainty, long-run
buyer protection, and avoidance of difficult fact questions coun-
seled against looking beyond the "four corners" of the written in-
strument. But a court convinced that the buyer saw the disclaimer
will be tempted to enforce the small print and do justice in the
particular case. For reasons developed below, we disapprove of
judicial inquiries into buyers' actual knowledge and offer instead a
"modified objective test" based upon what the particular buyer
should have noticed.
a. The Objective Test. Section 1-201(10) defines conspicuous-
ness:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-
NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language
in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other
contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is
"conspicuous". Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or
not is for decision by the court.
This language suggests an objective test focusing on whether the
disclaimer is "so written" that a "reasonable" buyer ought to have
noticed it.638  Presumably the court would not consider evidence
capacity [or] that the equipment will satisfy the requirements of any law, rule, specification
or contract which provides for specific machinery or operators, or special methods" suffi-
cient to exclude implied warranty of fitness). Cf. Mendenhall v. Marion Foods Corp., 57
A.D.2d 1041, 395 N.Y.S.2d 808, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 54 (1977) (question of fact whether lan-
guage excluding all implied warranties as to "quality, type and productiveness" of seed
extended to exclude implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose). There are limits,
however, to what a court will permit. See Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774, 777,
20 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (seller's statement that "[tihere is no magic
implied" in sale of car wash equipment failed to disclaim implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose).
638 The Code requires disclaimers of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose to be written. Disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability, however,
apparently may be oral. Although § 2-316(2) extends the conspicuousness requirement
only to written disclaimers, one decision intimates that oral disclaimers must also be con-
spicuous. Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 861, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490, 493, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 300, 304 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972), which in dicta applied the
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as to the buyer's actual awareness or his experience and bargain-
ing position. Many courts base their decisions as to conspicuous-
ness on the written words alone. For example, one line of cases
suggests that a seller must make adequate reference on the front
of a form to a disclaimer that appears elsewhere.6 39  Other deci-
sions condemn disclaimers that do not significantly contrast with
the rest of the instrument.640
A seller must also avoid highlighting only those words in a
disclaimer that intimate the presence of warranty. Even though
the entire disclaimer is set in contrasting type, capitalization of
only the words "WARRANTY" and "MERCHANTABILITY"
might be so potentially misleading as to nullify the disclaimer.
The court in Dorman v. International Harvester Co.64 1 examined a
provision referring to an express warranty and stating: "[N]o
other warranties, express or implied, including without limitation,
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose shall apply." 642  After noting that the writing contained no
effective heading such as "DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES,"
the court stated:
The attempted disclaimer of implied warranties in the in-
stant case is ineffective for another reason. Construing the lan-
guage of the provision strictly .. ., the construction of the word-
ing is ambiguous and could easily be misleading. A purchaser
glancing at the provision would reasonably observe the italicized
language ... and would be lulled into a sense of security.6 43
§ 2-316(2) conspicuousness requirement to an oral "as is" disclaimer, enunciated a test: "At
the very least, a seller undertaking to disclaim a warranty orally should take adequate steps
to make reasonably sure that the buyer has heard the disclaimer." We found no cases
involving attempts to prove an oral disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
under § 2-316(2), perhaps because of the difficulty of proving that the seller uttered the
word "merchantability."
639 See, e.g., Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
281 (1967); Adams Van Serv. Inc. v. International Harvester Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1142
(Pa. Ct. C.P. 1973).
640 See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 110 (8th Cir.
1964); Tribble Trucking Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 63, 68 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (disclaimer in slight contrasting type inoperative as attempt "barely to comply with
the letter of the law while circumventing its spirit"); Greenspun v. American Adhesives,
Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442, 444, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 439, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Cf. Pearson v.
Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 351 (S.D. 1977) (court focused
primarily on disclaimer's size and location but apparently considered buyer's status as "busy
rancher" as well).
641 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 952 (1975).
642 Id. at 15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 519, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 955 (emphasis in original).
643 Id. at 19, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 522, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 959 (emphasis in original).
1978]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:30
b. Evidence of Buyer Awareness. In cases involving commercial
transactions, where buyers are most commonly aware of the terms
of the bargain, courts appear uneasy with an objective test of con-
spicuousness. The test seems especially troublesome when the sell-
er offers to prove that a buyer actually knew of an inconspicuous
disclaimer. Thus, a majority of courts consider buyer awareness to
support or compel a finding that a disclaimer is effective.644
True, according to section 2-316's Comment 1, the conspicuous-
ness rule is designed to protect buyers from surprise. 645  Profes-
sors White and Summers point out that "[t]his purpose should be
accomplished when the buyer becomes aware in fact of the seller's
disclaimer." 646 They remain unconvinced, however, that the
drafters intended anything but "a rigid adherence to the con-
spicuousness requirement in order to avoid arguments concerning
what the parties said about warranties at the time of the sale." 647
Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp.648 depicts a
court grasping for statutory permission to examine a buyer's
knowledge. 649 Although the disclaimer failed because it appeared
644 See U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. I
(6th Cir. 1975) (buyer's familiarity with disclaimer prevented surprise); Fargo Mach. &
Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 80 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (actual awareness a factor in upholding arguably inconspicuous disclaimer); O'Neil v.
International Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862, 865, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1152, 1154 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978) (buyer's knowledge of "as is" disclaimer rendered it effective thus obviating question
whether such disclaimers must be conspicuous); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Nat'l Gas
Co., 568 P.2d 1273, 1277-78, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 654, 655-57 (Okla. 1977) (inconspicuousness
plus lack of evidence that buyer knew of disclaimer rendered disclaimer ineffective); Smith
v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla. 1974) (seller required buyer to
read disclaimer, satisfying conspicuousness requirement); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 873, 876 (Utah 1976) (disclaimer in consumer
transaction inconspicuous "in the absence of any evidence that this disclaimer was called to
the [buyer's] attention"). Cf. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind.
App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 498 (1972) (in jurisdiction where "as is" dis-
claimers must be conspicuous, "as is" disclaimer inoperative absent evidence buyer's atten-
tion brought to it). But see Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972) (inconspicuous dis-
claimer in sale of automobile ineffective although buyer admitted reading it).
645 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1, provides in part that § 2-316 "seeks to protect a buyer
from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by ... permitting the exclusion
of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect
the buyer from surprise."
646 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-5, at 361.
647 Id.
648 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (1973).
649 The Code may permit a court to consider the buyer's awareness when the seller has
called the buyer's attention to the provision. Such action might constitute a valid oral dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of merchantability if the seller mentioned "merchantabil-
ity."
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in a security agreement,6 50 the court disagreed with the lower
court's finding that it was inconspicuous. The court relied heavily
on Comment 1 to section 2-316, which states in part that section
2-316 permits "the exclusion of implied warrarities only by con-
spicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from
surprise." 651 Focusing on the italicized language, the court
reasoned: "Although the emphasized language might refer only to
[section 2-316 (3)], certainly actual awareness of the disclaimer is
another circumstance which protects the buyer from the surprise
of unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer."652
c. The Modified Objective Test. The court in Strick suggested
that the "other circumstances" of Comment 1 might refer only to
the methods of negating implied warranties set forth in section
2-316(3). This was understatement. As White and Summers indi-
cate, the buyer's knowledge is the very fact issue the drafters in-
tended to avoid by focusing the court's attention on the writing
itself.65 3  To admit evidence of state of mind--normally a fact
question-conflicts with the Code's determination to make con-
spicuousness a question of law.6 54  Finally, courts that allow a
650 For a discussion of security agreement disclaimers, see notes 673-77 and accompany-
ing text infra.
651 (Emphasis added.)
652 283 N.C. at 434, 196 S.E.2d at 718, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 1065 (emphasis in original).
The court further supported its decision by stating: "Perhaps an additional circumstance of
this sort arises where, as here, the buyer is a non-consumer with bargaining power substan-
tially equivalent to the seller's." Id. Accord, Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Comment 1 provides basis
for considering buyer's knowledge).
Some consumer-oriented courts have required actual knowledge of a disclaimer as a
condition to its effectiveness. See, e.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super.
441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1968); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d
983, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 901 (Colo. 1975) (en banc) (as modified on denial of rehearing and
clarification (1976)). In Hiigel, which involved a conspicuous disclaimer in the sale of a car
to a consumer, the result turned on the nature of the buyer:
[A]lthough a general disclaimer clause may negate implied warranties if there is
a negotiated contract between a commercial seller and a commercial buyer, it is
not appropriate to a consumer sale. This is so unless it is shown that "the so-
called disclaimer was clearly brought to the attention of the buyer and agreed
to by him .... "
Id. at 989-90, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 905 (quoting Cherokee Inv. Co. v. Voiles, 166 Colo. 270,
275, 443 P.2d 727, 729 (1968)). There is no statutory support for these consumer deci-
sions, and no court has required actual knowledge in recent commercial litigation. See
Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 433 (Ky. 1970); Ar-
chitectural Alum. Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 1159 (Sup. Ct. 1972); 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, § 2-316:23.
653 See notes 646-47 and accompanying text supra.
654 Section 1-201(10) assigns the determination of conspicuousness to the court.
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buyer's actual knowledge to resurrect an inconspicuous disclaimer
undercut the long-run goal of encouraging sellers to make their
disclaimers conspicuous.
We propose an alternative approach for those courts that
wish to turn their attention toward the buyer. Although arguably
not the intent of the drafters, section 1-201(10)'s words "reason-
able person against whom it is to operate" may permit a modified
objective test. This test would allow courts to focus not only on
the writing, but on the commercial buyer's experience and size as
well. Where parties of relatively equal bargaining power
negotiated the contract terms, a court could appropriately find
that the buyer "ought to have noticed" a disclaimer despite its
inconspicuous print. The modified objective test would enable
courts to distinguish between commercial and consumer buyers
without compromising the drafters' goal of avoiding inquiry into
the parties' negotiations. Since courts would probably expect the
reasonable consumer to notice only objectively conspicuous lan-
guage, this approach would continue to promote disclaimer visibil-
ity. Although no court has based a finding of conspicuousness
solely on the size and experience of the buying enterprise, some
courts either allude to the possibility or weigh the factor heav-
ily. 655
In commercial litigation, focusing on the buyer permits courts
to consider trade usage or prior course of dealing when determin-
ing what buyers ought to have noticed. For example, in Velez v.
Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp.,656 the buyer and seller had dealt
with each other for fifteen years using the same invoice. The job
superintendent who ordered lumber knew that past invoices con-
655 See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 n.13, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
1181, 1191 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1977) (approving argument that "conspicuousness is unnecessary
in situations involving commercially sophisticated parties of relatively equal bargaining
strength"); Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537,
547, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 920, 934 (D. Mass. 1977) (that "the 'person' against whom the dis-
claimer is to operate is a sophisticated entity" contributes to conspicuousness finding);
Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 80, 90 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (buyer's sophistication, bargaining power, and actual aware-
ness obviate need for conspicuousness to prevent surprise); Tribble Trucking Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 63, 69 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (disclaimer inconspicuous
and "this standard of conspicuousness might be applied more leniently in favor of a
purchaser less sophisticated in business and legal matters" than buyer); Avenell v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 155, 324 N.E.2d 583, 586, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 671,
675 (1974) (finding of conspicuousness based in part on fact that buyer was "prominent,
sophisticated entity").
656 41 A.D.2d 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 69 (2d Dep't), rev'd on other
grounds, 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 617 (1973).
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tained disclaimers. The court held that "these circumstances ...
rendered the disclaimer ... sufficiently conspicuous so that he
ought to have noticed it despite the smallness of the type
used." 657
3. Disclaimer or Limitation of Remedy Subsequent to Contracting
A disclaimer of implied warranties or other limitation of lia-
bility operates only when it is an element of the parties' agree-
ment. Because implied warranties arise when the parties enter
into a contract for sale, any subsequent attempt to disclaim them
must comply with section 2-209 on contract modification. 658  Sec-
tion 2-209 does not require consideration for modification, but
the parties must agree to the change. Courts are reluctant to find
buyer assent to a term that operates solely to his disadvantage.65 a
Moreover, section 2-209(3) may require that the parties comply
with section 2-201's statute of frauds. Hard questions arise in the
common situation where a printed disclaimer accompanies or fol-
657 Id. at 749, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 252, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 73. See Checker Taxi Co. v.
Checker Motor Sales Corp., 376 F. Supp. 997, 999, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 371, 374 (D. Mass.
1974) (remanding implied warranty action for explanation of finding that "a reasonable
commercial buyer would not have noticed [disclaimer] on an order form used for more
than 10 years"). For further discussion of warranty exclusion through course of dealing
and trade usage, see notes 727-48 and accompanying text infra.
658 U.C.C. § 2-209 provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no con-
sideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except
by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as
between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant
must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Sec-
tion 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other
party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the
retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance
on the waiver.
659 In Cambern v. Hubbling, 307 Minn. 168, 238 N.W.2d 622, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 653
(1976), many of the 179 calves delivered by seller under an oral agreement subsequently
died of bronchopneumonia. At the time of delivery, the buyer signed a receipt purporting
to relieve the seller of liability for loss due to the health of the cattle. The court found no
assent to the seller's attempt at modification because the buyer was unaware of the dis-
claimer's presence in the receipt. See note 664" and accompanying text infra. Comment 2 to
U.C.C. § 2-209 suggests that in some situations a seller may need "an objectively demonstra-
ble reason for seeking a modification" even against a commercial buyer.
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lows the delivery of the goods. Section 2-207 660 referees the ensu-
ing "battle of the forms."
a. Frequently Encountered Fact Patterns. In a simple retail sale,
a conspicuous disclaimer on the outside of a package should be
effective. 661 The term is an element of the seller's offer which
the buyer accepts when he purchases the goods. In contrast, a
disclaimer hidden inside a sealed package would normally fail the
Code's conspicuousness test.662
A seller wishing to disclaim should do so when he enters into
an oral or written agreement with the buyer. Failing this, the seller
who later delivers goods with disclaimers tacked on may find
himself stuck with implied warranties. 663  His disclaimers are
merely proposals for modification, and the buyer's acceptance of
the goods does not constitute agreement to modify. 6 4  On the
660 U.C.C. § 2-207 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written con-
firmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
661 See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, § 2-316:28.
662 A disclaimer not visible on the face of the goods might nevertheless be conspicuous if
a trade usage or course of dealing puts the buyer on notice of its probable presence. See
notes 730-37 and accompanying text infra.
66 Courts regularly invalidate disclaimers received subsequent to delivery. See Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1164 (1971)
(warranty disclaimer delivered after consumer sale invalid as unilateral attempt by seller to
limit obligations), aff'd on rehearing sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors,
Inc., 252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W.2d 351 (1972); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc.,
35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 57 (1971) (disclaimer in manual arriv-
ing after delivery ineffective).
664 See, e.g., Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 988 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (disclaimer in manual delivered with new car not, part of contract), cert.
denied, 267 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972); Woodward v. Naylor Motor Sales, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1269
(Mich. Dist. Ct. 1974) (acceptance of automobile is not acceptance of disclaimer in
operator's manual); Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375 (Mont.
1977) (disclaimer in manual which arrived subsequent to contract formation did not affect
implied warranties); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13,
457 S.W.2d 864, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 159 (1970) (disclaimer on label of roofing materials ineffec-
tive to modify contract); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d
1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 42 (1971) (disclaimer on label of herbicide did not affect seller's
ability to obtain indemnity from manufacturer for buyer's crop damage). But see Eichen-
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other hand, if the seller had enclosed equivalent provisions in
prior transactions, he could argue that this course of dealings in-
corporated the belated disclaimer into the agreement. 6 65
In some transactions, the seller's first communication with the
buyer is his delivery pursuant to the buyer's order. The seller's
timing of acceptance should not affect the result. The shipment of
the goods with disclaimer affixed operates as an acceptance by the
seller of the buyer's offer,6 66 and section 2-207 treats the dis-
claimer as a proposed additional term. 667 A disclaimer of implied
warranties materially alters an agreement6 68 and, therefore, will
berger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (N.D. 1976) (court implied that,
had buyer seen label on bags of herbicide prior to crop spraying, disclaimer would have
bound him).
665 See notes 730-37 and accompanying text infra. The case of Geo. C. Christopher &
Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1256
(1974), modified on other grounds, 215 Kan. 510, 525 P.2d 626, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 370 (1974),
illustrates several strategies in the battle of the forms. A seller orally agreed to make a
series of deliveries of primer paint to a buyer he had dealt with over a number of years.
Along with each delivery, the seller sent an invoice disclaiming implied warranties. Seller
alleged that he had followed this same course pursuant to similar agreements with buyer in
years past. In vain, seller offered three arguments to save his disclaimers. First, he alleged
that the agreements of years past validated the disclaimers by course of dealing that
applied to all deliveries in the most recent agreement. Id. at 191, 523 P.2d at 715-16, 14
U.C.C. Rep. at 1263. The court apparently misunderstood this plausible contention and
brushed it aside. Id. at 192, 523 P.2d at 716, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 1264. Second, seller argued
that each delivery under the recent agreement formed a new contract including the dis-
claimers. Id. The court ruled, however, that the parties had entered into a complete con-
tract when buyer accepted seller's bid, long before the first delivery. Id. at 192-94, 523 P.2d
at 716-17, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 1264-66. (Even if each delivery had formed a new contract,
the disclaimers would normally be excluded, by § 2-207, as mere proposals for modifica-
tions that the buyer never agreed to. Seller might have answered that the series of prior
deliveries, each a discrete contract, formed a course of dealing validating disclaimers in
each subsequent delivery.) Third, seller argued that, even if the deliveries were not discrete
contracts, they established a course of performance of the agreement that incorporated the
disclaimers. Id. at 194, 523 P.2d at 717, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 1266. The court disagreed,
citing § 2-316(2), because the disclaimers were inconspicuous. Id. at 194-95, 523 P.2d at
717-18, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 1266-68.
666 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
667 Under § 2-207(1), the seller's delivery operates as an acceptance even though it
proposes an additional term.
668 See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 73 (1st Cir.
1962) (proposed disclaimer materially altered contract); Furtado v. Woburn Mach. Co., 19
U.C.C. Rep. 760 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1976) (proposed disclaimer materially altered contract).
Cf Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (whether buyer's proposed terms without disclaimer materially
altered seller's proposed terms with disclaimer a fact question).
Comment 4 to § 2-207 includes disclaimers among the types of clauses that would
normally materially alter the contract.
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not become part of the contract unless the buyer expressly agrees
to it.669
One line of cases seemingly obviates the need for a section
2-207 analysis. In holding a disclaimer on the label of a herbicide
ineffective, a Washington state court6 70 set forth a broad rule for
determining a disclaimer's validity:
A disclaimer to be effective must be bargained for.... Dis-
claimers of warranty are disfavored in the law and ineffectual
unless explicitly negotiated between the buyer and seller, and
set forth with particularity showing the particular qualities and
characteristics of fitness which are being disclaimed. 67 1
A negotiation requirement, however, would unduly hamper
sellers' attempts to disclaim warranties. The Code imposes no such
condition to a disclaimer's effectiveness.6 7 2
669 A proposed additional term that materially alters the contract does not become a
contract term unless the other party expressly agrees. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) & Comment 3.
In essence, the Code treats a material term as a proposal for modification, and the buyer's
acceptance of delivery would not constitute his agreement. See note 664 and accompanying
text supra. In jurisdictions following Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 1
U.C.C. Rep. 73 (1st Cir. 1962), the same facts would result in an effective disclaimer of
implied warranties. See Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F.
Supp. 537, 547, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 920, 934 (D. Mass. 1977) (court followed Roto-Lith but
made additional findings "[i]n the event that the First Circuit overrules Roto-Lith"). Roto-
Lith held that a party's acceptance, if it proposes an alteration advantageous only to him, is
conditional on assent to the proposed alteration. This widely criticized rule transforms the
seller's acceptance into a counter-offer which the buyer accepts when he takes delivery. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 1-2, at 29.
Of course, a disclaimer requiring the buyer to return the goods if he does not accept
the additional term excludeg implied warranties in any jurisdiction if the buyer accepts
delivery. Section 2-207(1) would characterize the seller's delivery as an acceptance "ex-
pressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different term." In effect, the deliv-
ery would constitute a counter-offer which governs the agreement upon the buyer's accep-
tance. See Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (court gave
effect to disclaimer attached to seed bags which made buyer's power to accept delivery
contingent on exclusion of implied warranties).
670 Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
42 (1971).
671 Id. at 200, 491 P.2d at 1350, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 46. See Dorman v. International
Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 19-20, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522-23, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 952,
960 (1975) (disclaimer on reverse side of document separate from signed contract ineffec-
tive because not bargained for).
6'72 The drafters apparently thought that the conspicuousness requirement sufficed to
protect buyers from unbargained-for language of disclaimer. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Com-
ment 1.
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b. Security Agreement Disclaimers. Section 9-206(2) provides
that Article Two governs disclaimers of warranties in purchase
money security agreements. 673  Comment 3 explains:
[Subsection (2) ] prevents a buyer from inadvertently abandon-
ing his warranties by a "no warranties" term in the security
agreement when warranties have already been created under
the sales arrangement. Where the sales arrangement and the
purchase money security transaction are evidenced by only one
writing, that writing may disclaim, limit or modify warranties to
the extent permitted by Article 2.
Thus in Holton v. Bivens, n74 a disclaimer of express warranties in a
security agreement which alone evidenced the contract excluded a
seller's alleged parol representations. 75 But in Tennessee Carolina
Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp.,67 6 where a written contract for
the sale of 150 truck trailers contained no warranty exclusion, the
court refused to validate disclaimers of implied warranties in six
subsequent security agreements. Although the result in Strick is
consistent with the Comment's language, the statute merely states
that a security agreement must comply with Article Two to dis-
claim warranties. The security agreements could thus have
worked a modification under section 2-209.677
C. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section 2-316(3)(a)
Section 2-316(3)(a) seems wholly to undermine section
2-316(2)'s disclaimer requirements. Section 2-316(3)(a) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty ....
073 U.C.C. § 9-206(2) provides:
When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the Article on
Sales (Article 2) governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification
of the seller's warranties.
674 9 U.C.C. Rep. 836 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (not to be considered as precedent by
direction of Oklahoma Supreme Court).
675 Cf. Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 323 (S.D. 1977) (court
apparently operated under assumption that disclaimer in security agreement alone evidenc-
ing contract could bar parol evidence).
676 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (1973).
677 U.C.C. § 2-209 is reprinted in note 658 supra.
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Since subsection (2) is "[slubject to subsection (3)," and sub-
section (3) can be satisfied "[n]otwithstanding subsection (2)," a
seller can argue that subsection (3)(a) effectively negates the con-
spicuousness requirement, the need to mention "merchantability,"
and the requirement that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose must be in writing.678 In most
cases, however, courts have resisted the temptation to read the
subsection expansively. 679
1. Language Requirement
The record before the Alabama Supreme Court in Mobile
County Gas District v. National Cash Register Co. 680 illustrates the
confusion caused by section 2-316(3)(a). The seller, who was seek-
ing the balance due on a contract for the sale of an automatic
billing machine, persuaded the trial judge to give the following
charge: "[A]ll implied warranties in a contract are excluded by
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties."'6 81  The appellate court held
the charge erroneous for failing to require conspicuousness. 682
Except for omitting "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise,"
however, the lower court had accurately restated the poorly
drafted section 2-316(3)(a).
Although courts regularly validate disclaimers that use "as is"
language, 683 they hesitate to recognize other expressions as effec-
tive subsection (3)(a) disclaimers. 684  Consider the following at-
678 The effect of an oral "as is" on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose under § 2-316 will not likely be litigated. The statement would probably negate any
justifiable reliance by the buyer and prevent the implied warranty from arising. See notes
251-74 and accompanying text supra.
679 See notes 683-95 and accompanying text infra.
680 295 Ala. 188, 326 So. 2d 105, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 908 (1976).
681 Id. at 190, 326 So. 2d at 108, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 909.
682 Id. at 190-91, 326 So. 2d at 108, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 909-10.
683 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 337 So. 2d 352, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 307 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1976) (sale of mobile home); Triple C. Leasing, Inc. v. All-American Mobile Wash, 64
Cal. App. 3d 244, 134 Cal. Rptr. 328, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1030 (1976) (lease of mobile wash
van); Harison-Gulley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Carr, 134 Ga. App. 449, 214 S.E.2d 712, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 962 (1975) (used car sale); Lectro Mgmt. Inc. v. Freeman, Everett & Co., 373 A.2d
544, 546, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1289, 1292 (Vt. 1977) (lease of office equipment).
684 See Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 138, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 351, 355
(S.D. 1977) ("we accept no responsibility for the results obtained following [cattle vaccine's]
use" did not disclaim implied warranties); cases cited in notes 635 supra and 687 infra. But
see Willis v. West K). Feeder Pig Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d 899, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
1010 (1971) (statement of "Company Policy" providing for refund of purchase price of
feeder pigs under certain circumstances disclaimed implied warranties under subsection
[Vol. 64:30
1978] ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES 193
tempts to disclaim: (1) "buyer accepts the goods AS IS"; or (2)
"there are no implied warranties." Clearly the language in the
second disclaimer best "makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty." But most courts agree that the second statement will not
disturb the implied warranty of merchantability. 685 Any other re-
sult would render meaningless the section 2-316(2) requirement
that "merchantability" be mentioned.
Litigation in this area should decrease as contract draftsmen
gain more familiarity with the Code's requirements, but unusual
attempts to disclaim persist. For example, there is some conflict
whether a recital that the buyer accepts goods "in their present
condition" or agrees that they are "in good condition" excludes
implied warranties. Courts have shown some acceptance of "pres-
ent condition," equating it with "as is," 686 but at least one court
has drawn the line to exclude "good condition."687
(3)(a)); Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla. 1974) (statement
that lessor makes "no warranty" and "all liabilities ... are assumed by lessee" satisfies re-
quirements of subsection (3)(a)). Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 2-316 adds "as they stand" to the
expressions sanctioned by subsection (3)(a).
6' See notes 635-36 and accompanying text supra.
686 See Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 267, 196
S.E.2d 357, 358, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 628, 629 (1973) ("accepted in its present condition" dis-
claimed implied warranties in sale of machinery); First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill. App.
2d 227, 235-36, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784-85, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 777, 780 (1965) ("Buyer acknowl-
edges ... acceptance of... car in its present condition," coupled with buyer examination,
disclaimed implied warranties). Cf MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919, 23 U.C.C.
Rep. 65, 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) ("in the same condition as it is on this date" apparently
satisfied language requirement but inconspicuous). But see Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 57
Tenn. App. 100, 105, 415 S.W.2d 344, 346-47, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1032, 1034 (1966) ("accepted
in its present condition" not valid disclaimer under § 2-316(3)(a)).
Anderson suggests that the effectiveness of "present condition" language should de-
pend on surrounding circumstances. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, § 2-316:37, at 705.
Where the statement means only that no alterations will be made, the language does not
relate to implied warranties. The presence of "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise"
in subsection (3)(a) permits the same approach toward "as is" and "with all faults" provi-
sions.
67 Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 945 (1972) ("[b]uyer acknowledges delivery and acceptance of said motor
vehicle in good condition" not effective disclaimer). The court distinguished "good" from
"present":
We believe acceptance of an automobile in its "present" condition is signifi-
cantly different from acceptance of a car in "good" condition. The term, "pres-
ent condition," we agree, is like "as is" and "with all faults," since those terms
make no direct assertion that the vehicle is qualitatively either good or bad, but,
instead, imply a warning to the buyer that he may be purchasing a car in its
present condition with whatever faults it may possess. On the other hand, to
state that a vehicle is in "good condition" at the time of delivery does not, in
our opinion, call the buyer's attention to the exclusion of any warranties, but
simply seeks to reassure the buyer that the car he is purchasing is a "good" one.
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2. Conspicuousness
The apparent absence of a conspicuousness requirement for
"as is" disclaimers68 8 receives more attention than the vaguely
worded subsection demands. One commentator suggested that
section 2-316's underlying policy of preventing buyer surprise re-
quires that "as is" disclaimers be conspicuous. 689  Professors
White and Summers are less anxious to rewrite the Code, but
would consider conspicuousness as one factor in section
2-316(3)(a) analyses. 690
Some courts refer to the language of subsection (3)(a) and
hold the conspicuousness requirement inapplicable to "as is" dis-
claimers,691 but the majority of decisions cite the goal of buyer
awareness and test subsection (3)(a) disclaimers according to the
conspicuousness standard set forth in subsection (2).692 Fairchild
Industries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd. 693 exemplifies the rationale of
Id. at 356, 292 N.E.2d at 174, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 954.
A recital that a buyer has examined the goods and finds them to be in good condition
may help determine whether implied warranties are disclaimed under § 2-316(3)(b). See
notes 724-26 and accompanying text infra.
688 "The draftsmen took pains to state that the rules in subsection (2) operate 'subject to
subsection (3)' and that subsection (3) provisions are operative 'notwithstanding subsection
(2).' Consequendy it seems that the 'as is' language need not be conspicuous." Hogan, The
Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 n.29 (1962).
689 While the subsection does not explicitly so provide, it would seem that these
phrases and expressions would have to be stated conspicuously to become ef-
fective disclaimers. Such a requirement is consistent with the general rule that
disclaimer must "call" the risk to "the buyer's attention" and "make ... plain [to
him] that there is no implied warranty."
1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 77.
690 It probably violates the intent of the draftsmen to read such a requirement into
subsection (3) (a)-after all, they could easily have provided for it expressly.
But conspicuousness, should be relevant in determining whether the term was
sufficient to call the buyer's attention to the disclaimer and make its meaning
plain to him.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-6, at 366.
69' See, e.g., DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd
on opinion below, 511 F.2d 1162, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 75 (5th Cir. 1975) (inconspicuous "as is"
clause in contract for lease of hens constituted effective disclaimer); Gilliam v. Indiana
Nat'l Bank, 337 So. 2d 352, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 307 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (conspicuousness
requirement does not apply to subsection (3)(a)) (dictum); Smith v. Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d
394, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 649 (Okla. 1974) (buyer's actual knowledge and absence of conspicu-
ousness requirement made subsection (3)(a) disclaimer effective in lease of truck-tractor).
692 See MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977);
cases cited in note 695 infra. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 248, 264-67 (1976). The first
decision to take this position was Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J.
Super. 383, 396, 268 A.2d 345, 353, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1257, 1267 (1970).
693 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 663 (1975).
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those courts that refuse to read the statute literally. In Fairchild
Industries, the purchase agreement for a helicopter contained an
inconspicuous "as is" clause. Beginning with the premise that sub-
section (3)(a) is unclear as to which subsection (2) requirements
are dispensed with,694 the court searched for legislative intent:
In light of the legislative purpose of § 2-316 to insure that
exclusions of warranties are brought to the attention of the
buyer, we are persuaded by the argument that, while expres-
sions like "as is" put the buyer on notice of the disclaimer, they
do so only when brought to the buyer's attention. This means
that in the case of a written disclaimer, the writing must be
conspicuous. Acceptance of the argument advanced by Fair-
child would mean that a written exclusion of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability, expressly mentioning that word,
would be ineffective unless conspicuous; and that the written
language, "'There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof,'" would be equally ineffective to
exclude a warranty of fitness unless conspicuous. Yet, the words
"as is" even if buried in the fine print of a lengthy document,
would exclude all implied warranties. We fail to see how this
anomalous result would further the avowed purpose of § 2-316
"to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained lan-
guage of disclaimer." The words "as is" are sufficient to put the
buyer on notice that there are no implied warranties, but only
when they are brought to the attention of the buyer.6 95
3. A Narrow Reading of Section 2-316(3)(a)
We urge courts to read subsection (3) narrowly in order to
prevent the erosion of subsection (2)'s buyer protections, but we
disagree with the Fairchild Industries approach. Instead of sweep-
ing the statutory language under the rug, courts should dust off
subsection (3)'s phrase: "unless circumstances indicate other-
wise." 696  White and Summers suggest that consumer sales might
694 Professor Hogan demonstrates the weakness of this premise. See note 688 supra.
69- 274 Md. at 187, 333 A.2d at 316-17, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 667-68. Compare Fairchild
Industries with Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d
490, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 300 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972). Citing both subsections (2) and (3), Primavera
stated that "the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly provides that written disclaimers of
warranties must be 'conspicuous.'" Since the court apparently misread the statute, its
rationale will not likely be followed.
6a For a rare example of analysis under the phrase, see Cindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale
Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1257 (1970). Gindy
involved the sale of new semi-trailers. By custom of the trade, "as is" clauses were common
in the sale of used vehicles but not in the sale of new ones. Relying on the introductory
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constitute such "circumstances," and that courts might recognize
subsection (3)(a) disclaimers only in commercial transactions. 97
Comment 7 to section 2-316 characterizes subsection (3)(a) as
"merely a particularization of paragraph (c) which provides for
exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade."
Since a usage of trade will not bind a noncommercial buyer who is
not held to be aware of it,698 the drafters may not have intended
"as is" disclaimers to work against consumers. 699 If courts con-
fine the section to commercial transactions, the conspicuousness
issue will lose significance due to courts' increasing willingness to
examine the particular buyer's knowledge and experience when
adjudicating the validity of disclaimers.70 0
4. "As Is" and Express Warranties
By its terms, subsection (3)(a) applies only to implied warran-
ties. However, pre-Code law generally recognized an "as is" clause
as a disclaimer of parol express warranties as well.70 ' Because the
Code contains no language requirement for excluding express
warranties, courts should continue the pre-Code pattern. Section
2-316(1) would prevent an "as is" clause from negating an express
warranty in a written agreement, 70 2 but the phrase should over-
ride parol representations. As a blanket disclaimer of express war-
ranties, the "as is" provision would contradict alleged parol war-
ranties, thereby rendering them inadmissible under section
2-202.703
language of § 2-316(3)(a), the court held that the trade custom neutralized the "as is"
clause in the sale of new trailers. 111 N.J. Super. at 397, 268 A.2d at 353, 7 U.C.C. Rep. at
1266.
697 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-6, at 365.
... See U.C.C. § 1-205(3).
611 Cf Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1141, 1144 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("the clause 'unless the circumstances indicate otherwise' ... precludes
a finding that automatic absolution can be achieved in the sale of used consumer goods
merely by the inclusion in a bill of sale of the magic words 'as is' ").
700 See notes 644-57 and accompanying text supra.
70 See generally 24 A.L.R.2d 465, 574-79 (1969).
702 See notes 586-88 and accompanying text supra.
... See note 615 and accompanying text supra. In Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l
Servs. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 628 (1973), the
court allowed a subsection (3)(a) disclaimer to exclude evidence of alleged oral representa-
tions by the seller that machinery was sold in "good condition." Cf Conran v. Yager, 263
S.C. 417, 211 S.E.2d 228, 116 U.C.C. Rep. 320 (1975) (alleged oral agreement to correct
defects in house excluded by "in present condition" clause although Article Two inapplica-
ble to real estate). See generally I R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, at § 2-316:36.
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D. Disclaimers Implied from Circumstances
1. By Examination-Section 2-316(3)(b)
Section 2-316(3)(b) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he de-
sired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in
the circumstances to have revealed to him ....
Under pre-Code law, implied warranties did not arise as to those
defects that the buyer would have discovered if he had exercised
an opportunity to examine. 70 4  Subsection (3)(b) modifies this
rule. Under this section, implied warranties will arise even where
the buyer has had an opportunity to inspect unless, before enter-
ing the contract, the buyer has (1) examined the goods or sample
or model "as fully as he desired," or (2) ignored the seller's de-
mand to examine the goods.705  Nevertheless, some courts still
apply the seller-oriented pre-Code rule. 70 6
704 See Uniform Sales Act § 15(3); 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 167, at 77.
705 See Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033, 1035 n.2, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1143, 1145 n.2
(5th Cir. 1978) (implied warranties excluded as to horse where buyer did not examine after
seller's demand). Comment 8 to § 2-316 evidences the drafters' intent to modify the "op-
portunity to inspect" rule:
In order to bring the transaction within the scope of "refused to examine"
in paragraph (b), it is not sufficient that the goods are available for inspection.
There must in addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer examine the
goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the buyer on notice that he is as-
suming the risk of defects which the examination ought to reveal. The lan-
guage "refused to examine" in this paragraph is intended to make clear the
necessity for such demand.
See Austin Lee Corp. v. Cascades Motel, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 642, 643-44, 182 S.E.2d 173,
174, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 462, 463-64 (1971) (although buyer received sample bedspreads, im-
plied warranty not negated because seller did not demand examination); Ambassador Steel
Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 503-04, 190 N.W.2d 275, 280, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
1019, 1023-24 (1971) (where buyer neither examined steel nor refused demand by seller to
examine, implied warranty of merchantability not negated).
71 See, e.g., Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 528, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 810, 818 (D.D.C. 1971) ("Opportunity to inspect the product in question
which has been declined or not pursued precludes the existence of implied warranty, except
as to a defect which would not be revealed upon a reasonably careful examination." (em-
phasis added)); Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188
S.E.2d 108, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 789 (1972) (no actual inspection or demand to examine used
airplane, but question of fact whether buyer should have discovered defects). Cf. Richards
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Courts have not explicitly defined what must occur before a
buyer has examined "as fully as he desired." A buyer who re-
quests an examination and thereby obtains a reasonable opportun-
ity to inspect might lose his implied warranties whether or not he
has actually examined the goods. In Michael-Regan Co. v. Lin-
dell,70 7 a seller furnished samples of tabletops at the buyer's re-
quest. The wood warped and the buyer sued. Pursuant to a find-
ing that the buyer "had an opportunity to inspect, test, and
examine the [sample] tabletops furnished by [the seller]," 708 the
court held that the buyer had waived the implied warranty of
merchantability. These facts justified the court's apparent lack of
concern with the extent to which the buyer actually examined the
goods. Where a buyer's conduct leads a seller reasonably to con-
clude that the buyer examined the goods, no implied warranties
against discoverable defects should arise. 70 9  The buyer has
examined the goods "as fully as he desired" even though he has
not examined them at all. A cautious seller will demand inspection
and disclaim warranties; a smart seller will do both in writing.
The statute and Comment emphasize that for an examination
to exclude implied warranties, it must occur prior to the making
of the contract.710  Acceptance after a post-contractual inspection
may preclude rejection or revocation of acceptance, 71' but the in-
Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 550, 489 P.2d 366, 367, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1199, 1200
(1971) (although complete inspection would require effort, buyer may not assert implied
warranties after failing to take advantage of opportunity to inspect).
707 527 F.2d 653, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 958 (9th Cir. 1975).
708 Id. at 661, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 961.
709 But in Austin Lee Corp. v. Cascades Motel Inc., 123 Ga. App. 642, 182 S.E.2d 173, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 462 (1971), the Court refused to find implied warranties disclaimed even
though the buyer requested and received bedspread samples for the purpose of examina-
tion. The Court focused on the absence of a seller demand and did not consider the
possibility that the buyer had examined as fully as he desired.
The Austin Lee decision is also notable for the implication that a refusal of a seller's
demand to examine a sample can negate implied warranties. However, Professors White
and Summers note:
While the words "sample or model" are used in connection with an actual
examination by the buyer, they are not used in connection with his refusal to
examine. This wording would indicate that a disclaimer does not arise by virtue
of paragraph (b) when the buyer refuses to examine a sample or model.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-6, at 367 n.85.
710 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8 provides in part:
"Examination" as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with inspection
before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made. It
goes rather to the nature of the responsibility assumed by the seller at the time
of the making of the contract.
711 See U.C.C. § 2-607.
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spection itself will not limit the buyer's freedom to invoke implied
warranties. 12  The following clause from a contract for a sale of
railroad cars illustrates this point:
All construction is subject to inspection by you or your au-
thorized agent who may have access to any part of our plant
where any of this work is in progress. Cars to be satisfactory in
every respect before acceptance and final inspection and accep-
tance to be at our plant. Should you waive inspection, then in-
spection for the Purchaser will be performed by our regular
inspection forces and said inspection will constitute acceptance
of the cars at our works by your Company.7 13
This clause should not affect implied warranties. Even if the lan-
guage can be construed as a demand for inspection, the right to
examine does not arise until after the creation of the contract.7 14
Nevertheless, some decisions have erroneously applied subsection
(3)(b) to examinations occurring after contract formation. 15
712 A buyer's use of a product when he has actual or constructive knowledge of defects
may affect his ability to recover consequential damages. See notes 915-27 and accompany-
ing text infra.
713 Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1372, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181, 1188-
89 (8th Cir. 1977).
714 "When the right to inspect arises after the creation of the contract .... acceptance of
goods, even with knowledge that they do not conform to the contract, may preclude rejec-
tion but it does not impair any other remedy." Id. at 1372-73, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 1190 (8th
Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). The Soo Line court found that the contract language did
not affect express warranties and therefore permitted the buyer to recover. See Murray v.
Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 298 (1976) (exami-
nation after formation of contract did not affect implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose). Cf. Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 323, 521 P.2d 281, 290,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 929 (1974) (implied warranty may be excluded or modified where
inspection made before, but not after, contract formation) (dictum).
715 In Davis v. Pumpco, Inc. 519 P.2d 557, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 89 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), the
court cited subsection (3)(b) (omitting the words "before entering into the contract") in
holding that a buyer's examination after acceptance of pipe glue used in a mobile home
project disclaimed an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Cf. Georgia
Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d 108, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 789 (1972) (court denied summary judgment as to exclusion of implied warranties by
examination because fact question existed as to whether defects should have been discov-
ered prior to acceptance); Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy Sorenson Orchard Co., 66 Mich.
App. 642, 645-46, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 100, 102 (1976) (applicability of
subsection (3)(b) turns on whether inspection occurs prior to acceptance). In some cases, the
acceptance of goods and the contract formation may coincide. See note 669 and accom-
panying text supra. It is unclear whether this was the case in either Georgia Timberlands or
Michigan Sugar.
Of course, the buyer's use of a product after he should have discovered its defects may
limit his ability to recover for breach of implied warranty. Comment 8 to § 2-316 provides
that under these circumstances the breach might not be the proximate cause of the buyer's
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To negate implied warranties, the seller need not dem-
onstrate that the buyer actually discovered defects in the goods.
Subsection (3)(b) merely requires that the examination "ought in
the circumstances" to have revealed the defects. Where cir-
cumstances permit only a limited examination, implied warranties
will remain in force against defects that only a more thorough
examination could have uncovered.7 1 6  Where an examination is
less complete than circumstances allow, however, the buyer waives
warranties against all defects that an appropriate examination
would have revealed.7 17
Comment 8 indicates that a court should consider the buyer's
skill when determining what defects the buyer's examination
should have revealed. 718  Courts apply this principle without hesi-
tation to exonerate sellers from liability to commercial buyers. In
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 7 9 a buyer of wiglet cases ap-
proved samples after examination. The buyer did not discover a
damage. Thus, although the court in Davis erred in allowing the buyer's post-agreement
examination to negate the implied warranty, it probably was correct in denying consequen-
tial damages to the buyer. See notes 915-27 and accompanying text infra.
116 See, e.g., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 443 (6th Cir. 1977) (one-month period for testing seeds insufficient time to discover
defects). Thus, in a sale of livestock, a visual examination will not exclude implied warran-
ties of good health. See Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415,
20 U.C.C. Rep. 298 (1976) (rhinitis in pigs); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan.
311, 323, 521 P.2d 281, 290, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 916, 929 (1974) (brucellosis in cattle) (dic-
tum). Similarly, a test drive of a car will not affect implied warranties as to latent mechani-
cal defects, although it may exclude warranties as to discoverable defects. See Harison-
Gulley Chevrolet v. Carr, 134 Ga. App. 449, 214 S.E.2d 712, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 962 (1975);
Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 731 (1975); Testo
v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 54
(1976).
717 See, e.g., Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. 636, 645 (D. Conn. 1975) ('If... a buyer examines a sample or model of the goods
to his full satisfaction, no implied warranty of merchantability arises with respect to defects
which an examination ought to have revealed to him."); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58
Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 830(1973) (no implied warranty arose as to
absence of contaminants in mink food even though buyer who examined did not test pesti-
cide content). Cf. Durbano Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 299 (Utah 1977) (examination of unspecified extent excluded implied warran-
ties).
718 The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods
in the circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the exami-
nation.... A professional buyer examining a product in his field will be
held to have assumed the risk as to all defects which a professional in the
field ought to observe, while a nonprofessional buyer will be held to have
assumed the risk only for such defects as a lyman might be expected to
observe.
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
719 402 F. Supp. 1017, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636 (D. Conn. 1975).
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defect in the handle housing during the pre-contract inspection,
but the court would not permit recovery based on the implied
warranty of merchantability.
The scope of the exclusion obtained through a buyer's exami-
nation depends not only on the examination made, but on the
examination that should have been made by the particular
buyer.... In the present situation we are not confronted with a
consumer who would not notice imperfect construction or de-
fects apparent only to a trained eye. Rather the plaintiff Fried-
man was an informed buyer who designed the product in issue
and held mechanical and design patents covering similar
cases.... Had the cracking in fact resulted from a defectively
thin handle housing, that weakness cannot be said to have been
latent so as to have been undiscoverable during Friedman's
examination.7 2 0
Although subsection (3)(b) applies only to implied warranties,
a pre-agreement examination can affect express warranties as
well. For example, examinations can remove affirmations or de-
scriptions from the basis of the bargain.7 2 ' But when the buyer
cuts his examination short in justifiable reliance on a seller's
statements and consequently fails to uncover defects, the express
warranties should not be affected. 722  Nor should the failure to
inspect for defects covered by the express warranty negate im-
720 Id. at 1025, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 646 (citations omitted). Cf Michael-Regan, Inc. v.
Lindell, 527 F.2d 653, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 958 (9th Cir. 1975) (buyer experienced in wood
industry should have discovered wooden tabletops' potential to warp); Chaq Oil Co. v.
Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 879, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 806, 808-09 (Tex. Ct. App.
1973) (visual examination should have revealed to buyer-engineer that machine not in
running condition); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 830 (1973) (mink food expert should have discovered contaminants). Because
the Valiga court found that the buyer's examination negated the reliance necessary for an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to arise under § 2-315, and that the
seller did not breach the implied warranty of merchantability, it did not need to reach
§ 2-316(3)(b). Likewise, in Blockhead the court found insufficient reliance for an implied
warranty of fitness. Thus, where a buyer's claim is based only on a § 2-315 fitness war-
ranty, the court should determine whether the elements of the warranty exist before
plunging into a § 2-316(3)(b) exclusion analysis.
721 See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra. Express warranties should remain in
force even where a buyer's examination reveals a defect if the buyer still has reason to
expect a delivery conforming to the seller's representations. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 89, at § 2-316:46.
722 See Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 323, 521 P.2d 281, 291, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 916, 929 (1974) (buyer's failure to test livestock for disease or pregnancy in
reliance on seller's assurances did not limit express warranties); Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. 998 (D.C. Super. 1973) (express warranties unaffected where presale inspection of
motorcycle did not reveal falsity of seller's statements).
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plied warranties against the same defects; the seller's assurance
would constitute "circumstances" removing the defects from the
ambit of what the examination should have revealed. 723
Occasionally a contract recites that "buyer has examined the
goods fully and accepts them in good condition." Since subsection
(3)(b) requires that the buyer either actually examine the goods or
refuse to do so, such a clause should not exclude warranties.72 4
To regard the clause as determinative would allow the seller to
circumvent the language requirements of subsection (2). Coupled
with a buyer opportunity to examine, however, the clause might
evidence a seller demand which could satisfy subsection (3)(b). 725
Moreover, if the word "present" were substituted for "good," the
clause could constitute a subsection (3)(a) disclaimer.7 26
2. By Course of Dealing, Trade Usage, or Course of Performance-
Section 2-316(3)(c)
Section 2-316(3)(c) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.727
723 In Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 323, 521 P.2d 281, 291, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 916, 929 (1974), the court noted that the buyer's visual examination did not
exclude implied warranties as to the health of the livestock even though testing facilities
were available. The court based this conclusion on the seller's failure to demand that the
buyer fully examine the livestock. Since the buyer actually examined the goods, however,
the court could more appropriately have characterized the seller's assurances as "cir-
cumstances" which removed the defects from among those which the buyer ought to have
discovered.
724 See, e.g., Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 392, 186 S.E.2d 161, 165,
10 U.C.C. Rep. 568, 574-75 (1972) (acknowledgement of examination in contract signed
before delivery ineffective to disclaim implied warranties in sale of mobile home because
examination impossible until after delivery).
The parol evidence rule should not exclude evidence of lack of an actual examination.
First, it is difficult to view an acknowledgement that an examination occurred as a "term"
of the agreement sufficient to exclude contradictory evidence under § 2-202. Second,
§ 2-316(3)(b)'s requirement of an actual examination should enable a court to inquire into
what actually occurred. Finally, even if the acknowledgement is a contract term, its only
purpose is to disclaim warranties. Since the acknowledgement of examination fails to men-
tion "merchantability," it is invalid under § 2-316(2).
725 In Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Millon & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771, 774, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 78, 81 (D. Wyo. 1973), the buyer's opportunity to inspect coupled with a
clause acknowledging that inspection had occurred provided one basis for finding no im-
plied warranties in a lease of business machines. However, the court appeared to regard
the contract clause as the sole determinant of warranty exclusion.
726 See notes 686-87 and accompanying text supra.
727 U.C.C. § 1-205 defines course of dealing and usage of trade:
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Arguably, this subsection serves no purpose since other Code
provisions ensure that evidence of course of performance, course
of dealings, and usage of trade may supplement the parties'
agreement. 728  Perhaps the drafters added subsection (3)(c) an-
ticipating that courts might view section 2-316's methods for dis-
claiming warranties as exclusive.7 29
As noted above,7 30 a trade usage or course of dealing can
breathe life into an otherwise ineffectual disclaimer clause. Courts
have applied this doctrine to give effect to written disclaimers or
remedy limitations injected into an already existing contract731 as
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the par-
ties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The exis-
tence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established
that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the
interpretation of the writing is for the court.
U.C.C. § 2-208(1) defines course of performance:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for perfor-
mance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance ac-
cepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the
meaning of the agreement.
728 Under § 1-205(3), a course of dealing or trade usage may "give particular meaning to
and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." Section 2-208(1) makes course of per-
formance "relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." Moreover, § 2-202 (re-
printed in note 607 supra) enables all three types of evidence to supplement the terms of a
written agreement.
729 For a similar discussion concerning § 2-314(3), see notes 299-304 and accompanying
text supra.
730 See note 665 and accompanying text supra.
731 See, e.g., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1066, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1977) (trade usage and course of dealings validated
post-contractual liability limitations on seed bags) (dictum); D.O.V. Graphics, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Ohio Misc. 37, 39, 347 N.E.2d 561, 563, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 842,
844 (1976) (limitation of liability on packages of photographic paper became part of con-
tract because through course of dealings buyer knew of its presence). Cf Geo. C. Christ-
opher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 192, 523 P.2d 709, 716, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 1256, 1264 (post-contractual disclaimers cannot support course of dealing de-
fense but may support course of performance defense), aff'd on rehearing, 215 Kan. 510,
525 P.2d 626, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 370 (1974); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J.
Super. 439, 447, 330 A.2d 384, 388, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 133, 138 (1974) (trade usage did not
validate remedy limitation in camera package because of failure to show buyer was trade
member or aware of trade usage), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 139 (1975).
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well as to inconspicuous disclaimers 732 and disclaimers that fail to
mention merchantability.7 33  A court should recognize a "post-
agreement" disclaimer where a course of dealings or trade usage
indicates that the buyer should have expected its presence.73 4 An
inconspicuous disclaimer which is familiar from past party deal-
ings or is common in the trade presents greater analytical diffi-
culty. If a court focuses on what the particular buyer ought to
have noticed, a course of dealings or trade usage can render the
disclaimer conspicuous.7 35 Courts employing an objective test 7 36
should require actual knowledge of past inconspicuous disclaimers
because the Code presumes that buyers do not notice such lan-
guage. Even then, the terms of the disclaimer should be defined
by the trade usage or course of dealings alone rather than by the
writing.737
732 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft, 439 F.2d 1150, 1158, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 992, 999
(5th Cir.) (similar warranties in prior sales of airplanes might have prevented buyer sur-
prise and obviated need for conspicuousness), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Checker
Taxi Co. v. Checker Motor Sales Corp., 376 F. Supp. 997, 999, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 371, 374.
(D. Mass. 1974) (remanded for explanation of finding that disclaimer in order form used
by parties for 10 years in sales of taxi cabs inconspicuous); Velez v. Craine & Clarke
Lumber Corp., 41 A.D.2d 747, 748-49, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, 252, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 69, 73 (2d
Dep't) (buyer's knowledge of disclaimer in past dealings in trade and with particular seller
rendered disclaimer conspicuous), rev'd on other grounds, 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750,
350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
711 In Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1066, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1977), the court suggested that it would uphold a modifica-
tion failing to mention "merchantability" if it was present in prior dealings. Since
§ 2-316(2) intimates that a disclaimer lacking the magic word fails to notify the buyer that
the merchantability warranty is excluded, the seller wielding § 2-316(3)(c) should have to
show that the buyer understood the impact of the disclaiming language. In Agricultural
Services, however, the court mistakenly treated a damage ceiling as a warranty modifica-
tion. See generally notes 769-78 infra.
734 In such cases, the disclaimer becomes a term of the seller's offer or part of the
seller's acceptance conditioned on the buyer's acceptance of the additional term. See U.C.C.
§§ 1-205(3), 2-207(1). When the post-agreement disclaimer differs materially from dis-
claimers in the trade or prior party dealings, the language of the past disclaimers should
govern the seller's warranty liability. If the post-agreement disclaimer increases the seller's
exposure, the buyer may successfully argue that the disclaimer represents an agreement to
modify the course of dealings or trade usage, but he would then be bound by the dis-
claimer in the present transaction.
71- See cases cited in note 732 supra.
'3' See notes 638-43 and accompanying text supra.
'11 In "objective test" jurisdictions the court should ascertain the trade usage or course
of dealings by examining prior disclaimers. The inconspicuous disclaimer in question
would be important only to show that the parties had not agreed to modify trade usage or
prior dealings.
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Warranty exclusions through course of dealings are most com-
mon where prior agreements between the parties contained dis-
claimers.73 8 Conceivably, though, "a sequence of previous
conduct between the parties" could imply a demand for an exami-
nation, thereby negating warranties under subsection (3)(b). Also,
a course of performance in a prior transaction could create a course
of dealings exclusion in the present one. In J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v.
William Davies Co.,7 39 a contract for the sale of meat provided: "If
the product tests less than 85% Lean by chemical analysis, seller
will allow for excess fat content at invoice price and buyer will
accept such as full settlement." 740 After determining that the
contractual remedy for breach of express warranty was exclusive,
the court rejected the buyer's claim for recovery under section
2-714 for breach of implied warranty; the buyer's acceptance of
the contract settlement formula in a prior transaction, coupled
with the present contract's language, excluded the implied war-
ranty of merchantability as to the fat content of the meat.'
Many sellers demand that their buyers pay for repairs. If a
buyer accedes to such demands, he may, through course of per-
formance, have forfeited his implied warranties.7 42  Occasionally
a buyer will wish to disregard implied warranties for the sake of
preserving an ongoing business relationship. The course of per-
formance and course of dealings decisions should caution buyers
to pay for repairs only after declaring that they are not waiving
their rights as to future breaches.
Courts most often invoke subsection (3)(c) to exclude implied
warranties through trade usage. To qualify under the subsection,
a seller must establish that the trade usage exists, 743 that the par-
ticular transaction falls within its scope,744 and that the buyer is
either a trade member or possesses actual or constructive knowl-
738 See, e.g., Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d
711, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1055 (1973) (no evidence to support course of dealings exclusion of
implied warranties in sale of truck trailers).
739 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 394 (1976).
740 Id. at 4, 351 N.E.2d at 245, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 396.
741 Id. at 3, 351 N.E.2d at 247, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 399.
742 See, e.g., Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, -, 364 A.2d 1221, 1226,
20 U.C.C. Rep. 603, 608 (1975) (buyer's payment of $300 for repairs compelled conclusion
that implied warranty excluded).
743 See Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, 192 Neb. 168, 219 N.W.2d 750, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1093
(1974) (no trade usage excluding implied warranty as to soundness of animals).
744 See Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d
108, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 789 (1972) (seller failed to establish scope of trade usage excluding
implied warranties in sales of used airplanes).
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edge of the trade usage. 745 Trade usages frequently exclude im-
plied warranties in agricultural transactions 46 and in sales of
used goods in certain industries. 747  Sellers' attempts to apply
trade usage to other types of sales meet with varying success. 74 8
E. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties-Section 2-317
Under pre-Code law, express warranties often displaced im-
plied warranties.7 49  Section 2-317 has significantly altered the
rules governing the cumulation and conflict of warranties. It pro-
vides:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed
as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such
construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall
determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that in-
tention the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent
sample or model or general language of description.
715 Under § 1-205(3), the trade usage must be one "in the vocation or trade in which [the
parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware" (emphasis added). Courts have
carried this qualification over to § 2-316(3)(c). See Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 164 Mont.
296, 302, 521 P.2d 924, 928, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 651, 654 (1974) (buyer of farm equipment
actually or constructively aware of trade usage excluding implied warranties); Herbstman v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 447, 330 A.2d 385, 388, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 133,
138 (1974) (buyer of camera not bound by unfamiliar trade usage allegedly limiting rem-
edies in retail sale of camera), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 39 (1975).
746 See, e.g., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1066, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1977) (seed); Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 503 F.2d 953
(10th Cir. 1974) (cattle); Torstenson v. Melcher, 195 Neb. 764, 769, 241 N.W.2d 103, 106,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 484, 488 (1976) (breeding bull). But see Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, 192
Neb. 168, 219 N.W.2d 570, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1093 (1974) (rejecting Nebraska's pre-Code
rule that trade usage excludes implied warranties as to soundness of animals). The Torsten-
son court distinguished Ruskamp by reading it as based on the substantiality of the seller's
evidence of trade usage. 195 Neb. at 770, 241 N.W.2d at 106, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 488.
M See, e.g., Georgia Timberlands v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Gi. App. 404, 406, 188 S.E.2d
108, 110, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 789, 791 (1972) (trade usage that used airplanes not warranted);
Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 164 Mont. 296, 521 P.2d 924, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 651 (1974)
(trade usage that used farm machinery not warranted).
748 See, e.g., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md.
App. 452, 463, 339 A.2d 302, 309-10, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 88 (1975) (evidence did not
support contention by seller of roofing materials that trade usage excluded all warranties
except that bond could be issued); Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 637,
643 (Bait. Super. Ct. 1971) (trade usage excludes implied warranties in blood transfusion)
(dictum).
719 See generally Annot., Express Warranty as Excluding Implied Warranty of Fitness, 164
A.L.R. 1321 (1946).
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(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied war-
ranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
Before proceeding under section 2-317, the court must make
a threshold finding that it is unreasonable to construe warranties
consistently. Moreover, Comments 2 and 3 indicate that the three
specific rules of section 2-317 are designed to help ascertain the
parties' intent, not to supplant it.7 50  Thus, a court must look to
the circumstances surrounding a sale before the rules in subsec-
tions (a), (b), and (c) come into play. But a seller who has led the
buyer to believe that all warranties could be complied with is es-
topped from asserting any inconsistency as a defense to the
buyer's claim.7 5
1
1. Consistency Among Warranties-A Test
When are warranties inconsistent? The text of section 2-317
leaves the question essentially unanswered. In an attempt to in-
crease buyer protection, the drafters created a strong presump-
tion that warranties are cumulative.7 52  Professors White and
Summers point out that this presumption is consistent with the
policy embodied in section 2-316 that warranties are preserved
unless the seller complies with explicit disclaimer require-
ments.7 53  Comment 2 to section 2-317 indicates that warranties
750 Comment 2 states that "[t]he rules of this section are designed to aid in determining
the intention of the parties as to which of inconsistent warranties which have arisen from
the circumstances of their transaction shall prevail." Comment 3 adds: "These rules are not
absolute but may be changed by evidence showing that the conditions which existed at the
time of contracting make the construction called for by the section inconsistent or un-
reasonable."
7 5 See U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2.
752 Comment 1 to § 2-317 reiterates that "all warranties are made cumulative unless this
construction of the contract is impossible or unreasonable."
753 For two reasons we believe that courts should exercise some restraint in ruling
that multiple warranties are inconsistent. First, 2-316 provides several devices
for disclaiming warranties, and the comments to that section indicate a policy
of preserving implied warranties unless the seller complies with the prescribed
formal requirements. Second, in nearly all cases the seller drafts the sales
agreement including the express warranty clause; in those cases it seems
reasonable to place the burden of multiple warranties on the seller, since he
had the opportunity to resolve any possible inconsistencies.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 375.
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are consistent if the seller can comply with all of them. 754  By
applying this test, courts could maximize buyer protection without
forcing sellers into warranty dilemmas.
2. Consistency Between Express and Implied Warranties
Comment 9 to section 2-316 articulates the Code's position
toward conflicts between express and implied warranties in sales
by specifications:
The situation in which the buyer gives precise and com-
plete specifications to the seller is not explicitly covered in this
section, but this is a frequent circumstance by which the implied
warranties may be excluded. The warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose would not normally arise since in such a situa-
tion there is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer. The
warranty of merchantability in such a transaction, however,
must be considered in connection with [section 2-317] on the
cumulation and conflict of warranties. Under paragraph (c) of
that section in case of such an inconsistency the implied war-
ranty of merchantability is displaced by the express warranty
that the goods will comply with the specifications. Thus, where
the buyer gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither of the
implied warranties as to quality will normally apply to the transaction
unless consistent with the specifications. 7 55
Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Halverson Corp.756 addressed the
problem anticipated by Comment 9. A Las Vegas hotel used de-
tailed specifications in purchasing carpeting. The Nevada Su-
preme Court reversed an award of damages for excessive shading
in the carpeting. Noting that the seller had complied precisely
with the specifications and that any "defect" resulted directly from
the type of yarn that the buyer had specified, the court ruled that
the express warranty by specifications negated the implied war-
ranty of merchantability.757 Any other result would have forced
the seller to breach either the express or implied warranty.758
754 U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2, provides in part:
To the extent that the seller has led the buyer to believe that all of the warran-
ties can be performed, he is estopped from setting up any essential inconsis-
tency as a defense.
755 For a discussion of cases dealing with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose in sales involving specifications, see notes 266-68 and accompanying text supra.
756 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 605 (1974).
757 Id. at 119, 520 P.2d at 236, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 609.
758 Accord, Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d 317, 327, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 805,
819 (6th Cir. 1971) (buyer's employee could not recover under implied warranties for in-
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The question of consistency arises as well when an implied
warranty reaches a defect that an express warranty does not.759 A
buyer's precise specifications as to the materials and design of a
car's interior, for example, should not displace an implied war-
ranty of merchantability as to the car's engine. A finding of incon-
sistency would effectively undo section 2-317's carefully designed
presumption of cumulativeness and reinstitute the pre-Code rule
that an express warranty negates all implied warranties.
White and Summers perceive inconsistency in asserting an
implied warranty of merchantability for an alleged defect which
had been covered by an expired express warranty. 760 Even in the
absence of a disclaimer complying with section 2-316, they would
hold that a "24,000 mile or 24 month" express warranty of no
defects as to certain parts displaces the implied warranty of mer-
chantability as to those same parts. They reason that the parties
probably intended the express warranty to be exclusive, and ap-
parently weigh this more heavily than the policy of requiring
compliance with section 2-316 to disclaim. But if construing these
warranties as consistent is reasonable, then section 2-317 makes
juries resulting from absence of overhead guard on forklift truck because buyer ordered
truck without guard); Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1026, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 636, 646-47 (D. Conn. 1975) (where specifications required thin handle hous-
ing for wiglet cases, no implied warranty of merchantability applied to handle housing);
Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 430, 494 P.2d 115, 117, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 582, 583-84
(1972) (seller's compliance with buyer's specifications excluded implied warranties); Con-
solidated Supply Co. v. Babbitt, 96 Idaho 636, 639, 534 P.2d 466, 469, 16 U.C.C. Rep.
1254, 1257-58 (1975) (compliance with buyer's specifications in sale of drain excluded im-
plied warranties).
Implied warranties satisfying § 2-314 or 2-315 should coexist with specifications where
the seller can comply with all. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 9; General Instr. Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 146-47, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 829, 832
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (seller who used oil not conforming to specifications breached both express
and implied warranties) (dictum), aff'd mein., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974).
7" See, e.g., Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, Inc., 192 Neb. 168, 173-74, 219 N.W.2d 750,
754-55, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1093, 1097-99 (1974) (express warranty of pig's freedom from
specific diseases not inconsistent with implied warranty of fitness for breeding); Lanphier
Constr. Co. v. Fowco Constr. Co., 523 S.W.2d 29, 40, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 713, 717-18 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1975) (explicitly rejecting pre-Code rule, court held express warranty that asphalt
paving for parking lot would comply with state specifications not inconsistent with implied
warranty of fitness). But see Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 250, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 777, 779 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) ("Texas Courts have consistently held that
where there is an express written warranty, the seller will not be bound beyond the terms
of the warranty.").
In Ruskamp, the pigs did not breed because they were inflicted with rhinitis, a disease
unmentioned in the warranty. Since the implied warranty of merchantability did not con-
flict with the express warranty but was merely broader in scope, the buyer could have
relied upon it as well as on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
70 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 373-75.
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party intent irrelevant.76' A finding of cumulativeness merely
requires the seller to provide goods free of latent defects and to
rid them of nonconformities discoverable within the warranty
period. Since the seller can comply with both warranties, his obli-
gations are not inconsistent. Even so, a court could find all im-
plied warranties disclaimed under section 2-316(3)(c) if trade
members generally regard the express warranty as exclusive. Simi-
larly, an item that outlives its express warranty may be merchant-
able. 762 But, section 2-317 is triggered only where the seller faces
inconsistent obligations.76 3
711 Implied warranties arise regardless of party intent. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, dis-
cussed in notes 159-314 and accompanying text supra. Under § 2-317, party intent becomes
significant only after a finding of inconsistency.
711 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-7, at 374.
711 See Lee v. Air Care, Inc., 325 A.2d 598, 599, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 612, 613-14 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1975) (seller's implied warranty of merchantability coexists with manufacturer's ex-
press warranty); Forte Towers South, Inc. v. Hill York Sales Corp., 312 So. 2d 512, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (air conditioning system carried implied warran-
ties despite one-year express warranty); Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451,
357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (expiration of express warranty did
not preclude buyer of new car from recovering under implied warranty of merchantability)
(dictum).
Although courts divide on this issue, most seem to support our analysis. For example,
in Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d
418 (Fla. 1972), the court permitted recovery for defects in an air conditioning system
under common law warranties of merchantability and fitness despite the expiration of a
one-year guarantee on equipment, materials, and workmanship. Citing Koellmer v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 276 A.2d 807, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 668 (1970), cert.
denied, 160 Conn. 590, 274 A.2d 884 (1971), discu.ed in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §
12-7, at 374, the court stated: "[Ilt has consistently been held that an express warranty is
not inconsistent with, does not negate or exclude implied warranties of fitness and mner-
chantability. They may easily coexist. We hold such a coexistence lies here." 258 So. 2d at
14, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 320.But see Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales Inc., 557 P.2d 1009,20 U.C.C.
Rep. 873 (Utah 1976) (mobile home retailer unable to recover from manufacturer after
expiration of one-year express warranty).
Essentially the same issue arises when the express warranty is still in effect, but a buyer
elects to pursue an implied warranty. This occurs most frequently where a limitation of
remedy seems to apply only to express warranties. See notes 848-52 and accompanying text
infra. We would view the warranties as coexistent unless compliance with both is not
reasonably possible. See Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 103-05, 397
N.Y.S.2d 677, 681-82, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 631, 636-37 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977) (buyer permitted to
sue under ineffectively disclaimed implied warranty of merchantability as well as unexpired
express warranty); General Instr. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp.
139, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (single defect breached both express and implied
warranties), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974). However, courts should apply con-
tractual limitations of remedy in all actions for breach of warranty unless the contract
language plainly precludes such application. See Beaunit Corp. v. Volunteer Nat'l Gas Co.,
402 F. Supp. 1222, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 697 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (court did not reach question of
warranty coexistence because limitation of remedy applied to all warranties). Cf Lankford
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Questions of consistency between express and implied war-
ranties usually involve the implied warranty of merchantability.
Section 2-317(c) provides that an inconsistent express warranty
will not displace the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose; 764 the buyer reliance required for the fitness warranty
to arise precludes reliance on an inconsistent express warranty.
76 5
3. Conflicts Among Express Warranties
Sections 2-317(a) and (b) govern conflicts among express war-
ranties. Under the Code's hierarchy, the more specific of seller's
conflicting representations presumptively governs the buyer's ex-
pectations. 766  However, party intent may supersede the Code's
rules. 67 Suppose Bert, whose Beer Palace serves "the tallest
drafts in town," is attracted by a brochure boasting nineteen-inch
taps for draft beer. His present nineteen-inch taps are rather
drab, and he decides to investigate further. Pursuant to a quick
and somewhat confused telephone conversation, the seller drops
by with a fourteen-inch sample tap. Bert screws the tap onto an
extra keg and finds to his pleasure that his employees like it. He
submits a purchase order for thirty new taps "as per sample and
brochure specification," and the seller understandably responds
by delivering fourteen-inch taps. To his dismay, Bert discovers
that the new taps, when affixed to his bar, are too short to fill the
town's tallest glasses. In the ensuing lawsuit, he argues that under
section 2-317(a) his specification that the taps conform to the
brochure should prevail over the express warranty created by the
sample. The court appropriately dismisses Bert's suit. On these
facts, the parties apparently intended the sample to govern their
v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 777 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (express
warranty with exclusive remedy precluded implied warranty action in sale of new car). But
see Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 208, 216, 230 N.W.2d 380, 383, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 721, 726 (1975) (limitation of remedy inapplicable to implied warranty) (dic-
tum).
764 See O'Brien v. Wade, 540 S.W.2d 603, 607, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 386, 391 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (express warranty to furnish dog's pedigree papers does not negate implied warranty
that dog fit for use as retriever).
75 A court may not need to consider § 2-317 where an express warranty apparently
conflicts with an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. If the buyer satisfies
the implied warranty's reliance requirement, the inconsistent express term might not reach
the basis of the bargain. Conversely, an express term that forms part of the basis of the
bargain probably precludes the reliance necessary for the inconsistent implied term.
766 See I W. HAWKLAND, supra note 183, at 74-75; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §
12-7, at 375.
7 See notes 750-51 and accompanying text supra.
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dealings, and the seller complied with the consequent "fourteen-
inch" warranty. 768
F. Remedy Limitations
1. Distinguished from Disclaimers
Section 2-316 authorizes sellers to use disclaimers to prevent
warranties from arising. Once a warranty is effectively disclaimed,
the seller is safe from the possibility of any liability under it. Simi-
larly, section 2-317 allows certain warranties to override other, in-
consistent warranties, thereby limiting buyers' rights. Yet even
where warranties exist, the Code allows sellers to narrow the
scope of their resulting liability. For better or worse, the drafters
chose to make the procedures for disclaiming warranties and for
limiting remedies entirely distinct. Section 2-316(4) sends sellers to
sections 2-718 and 2-719 if they desire to limit remedies for
breach of express or implied warranty. 769  Comment 2 to section
2-316 resolves any statutory ambiguity by explaining that the
drafters envisioned separate treatment of the two techniques for
limiting buyer recovery:
This Article treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential
damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate
from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no
768 In Stewart-Decatur Sec. Sys. v. Von Weise Gear Co., 517 F.2d 1136, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
24 (8th Cir. 1975), the buyer extensively tested a model gear motor for opening the jail
doors it manufactured. Pursuant to the buyer's requests, the seller made several changes in
the model, but the buyer expressed no dissatisfaction with the model's input speed of 3200
r.p.m. The buyer finally approved the model, but the purchase order he submitted
specified an input speed of 1590 r.p.m. When motors identical to the model arrived and
proved inadequate for his needs, the buyer claimed that under § 2-317(a) his specifications
should constitute the express warranty as to input speed. Although the court held § 2-317
inapplicable, it noted that, according to Comments 2 and 3, the § 2-317 hierarchy only
suggests party intent and should not be applied rigidly. Id. at 1140 n.12, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at
30-31 n.12. See notes 750-51 and accompanying text supra. The court found that the par-
ties intended the model to govern their dealings and held that the seller performed in
accordance with the agreement. Id. at 1140, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 30.
Although parties rarely allege conflicts among express warranties, they sometimes do.
See Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 371, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 80, 89 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (express warranty that machine free of defects con-
sistent with advertisements of machine's capabilities). Ordinarily a seller will not make con-
flicting warranties rendering full compliance impossible. Further, two inconsistent "express
warranties" probably could not both reach the basis of the bargain.
769 U.C.C. § 2-316(4) provides:
Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy (sections 2-718 and 2-719).
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warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting rem-
edies for breach of warranty. Under subsection (4) the question
of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections referred to
rather than by this section.
Commentators, noting the extent to which a remedy limita-
tion can cut off the recovery of a damaged buyer, have criticized
the separate treatment of disclaimers and remedy limitations.77 °
Some courts ignore the Code's distinction and impose the re-
quirements of section 2-316 on attempts to limit remedies as well
as to disclaim warranties. For example, Zicari v. Joseph Harris
Co. 771 held that a limitation of remedy in an action based on the
implied warranty of merchantability was ineffective because it did
not mention "merchantability." The court reasoned that the lim-
itation was a "modification" of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability within the meaning of section 2-316(2).772
The Zicari court failed to account for the distinction between
warranty disclaimers and limitations of remedy. An effective war-
ranty exclusion negates express or implied quality obligations;
there is no warranty for the seller to breach. A limitation of rem-
edy, on the other hand, does not affect the scope of a warranty's
coverage; it merely determines the applicable remedy once a
breach occurs. 773 Under this analysis, the Zicari court should not
have classified the remedy limitation as a warranty modification
subject to section 2-316(2).
In Orrox Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,774 a federal district court noted
and rejected Zicari. The buyer claimed that the seller breached an
implied warranty of merchantability. The seller argued that the
following clause excluded all liability:
NO OTHER WARRANTY SHALL BE IMPLIED, AND ANY STATU-
TORY WARRANTIES SHALL BE DEEMED WAIVED. It is expressly
agreed that we shall have no liability for consequential dam-
770 See Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 VA. L. REv. 791 (1977).
771 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (4th Dep't 1969).
772 Id. at 22-23, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 924-25, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 1251-52. Similarly, in Gram-
ling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, rehearing denied, 253
Ark. 361, 485 S.W.2d 189, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 710 (1972), the court initially applied the con-
spicuousness requirement to an exclusion of consequential damages. In denying rehearing,
however, the court refused to apply the conspicuousness requirement, holding instead that
the exclusion did not expressly apply to breach of implied warranty.
'73 See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at 274-75; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §
12-11, at 383-84.
774 389 F. Supp. 441, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 354 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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ages ... and that our liability shall in no event exceed the
purchase price of the equipment.
7 7 5
After determining that the clause did not disclaim the implied
warranty because it lacked the word "merchantability, ' 776 the
court examined the effect of the remedy limitation.
This court is impressed that, while § 2-316(1), (2), (3) applies to
the exclusion or modification of warranties, Subsection (4) is
merely a reference to §§ 2-718 and 2-719 which involve limita-
tions in remedies or damages for breach of warranty; that
neither §§ 2-718 nor 2-719 contains any provision or require-
ment for expressly mentioning "merchantability" and that,
therefore, the parties, within the contemplation of the wording
of § 2-719, "may limit or alter the measure of damages recover-
able under this Article ... I" without specific mention of "mer-
chantability." . .. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court
that a limitation of damages for breach of an implied warranty
of merchantability is not a modification of the warranty and
that it may be effected without specific reference to merchant-
ability. 777
The Orrox court captured the drafters' intent, and a majority
of cases treat disclaimers and remedy limitations distinctly. 778
Nevertheless, one might question the wisdom of the drafters'
choice. One commentator suggests that courts should impose
identical controls on disclaimers and remedy limitations because
775 Id. at 442-43, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 355-56.
776 Id. at 444-45, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 359. The court properly rejected the argument that
an effective § 2-316(3)(a) disclaimer had been made. See notes 630-36, 683 and accompany-
ing text supra.
777 Id. at 445-46, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 359-60 (footnote omitted).
77 See, e.g., Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364,
381, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 101 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (conspicuousness irrelevant to remedy limi-
tation in sale of industrial equipment); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French Oil
Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606, 612, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 650, 653 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (con-
spicuousness required for disclaimers of warranties but not for limitations of remedy);
Checker Taxi Co. v. Checker Motor Sales Corp., 376 F. Supp. 997, 999-1000, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 371, 374 (D. Mass. 1974) (§ 2-316(4) requires that courts treat issues of disclaimers
and limitations separately and conspicuousness not required for latter); Gramling v. Baltz,
253 Ark. 361, 362, 485 S.W.2d 183, 189, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 710, 711, aff'g on rehearing 253
Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1121 (1972). Cf. Adams Van Serv., Inc. v.
International Harvester Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1142, 1147-49 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1973) (limitation
of remedy upheld although appears in same clause and same size print as inconspicuous
disclaimer). But see Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 155, 324
N.E.2d 583, 587, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 671, 675-76 (1974) (conspicuousness requirement applies
to limitations of remedy although not expressly required by Code) (dictum); R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 64, § 89, at 276.
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both types of liability limitation can have the same effect.779  This
reasoning fails to recognize that the Code's unconscionability doc-
trine prevents remedy limitations from acting as disclaimers in
disguise.
2. Unconscionability and Liability Limitations
The drafters of the U.C.C. left the development of the un-
conscionability doctrine largely to the courts. Although commen-
tators express varying degrees of satisfaction with this approach,
they agree that the Code itself offers no workable definition. 780
Section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination. 781
Unconscionability bears directly on three types of liability
limitations: disclaimers of implied warranty, exclusions of con-
sequential damages,78 2 and exclusions or limitations of primary
779 See Note, supra note 770, at 791, 797.
780 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 4-2, at 116-17; Ellinghaus, In Defense of Uncon-
scionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 758 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967).
781 Comment 3 amplifies the first phrase of § 2-302(1): "The present section is ad-
dressed to the court, and the decision is to be made by it." Nevertheless, at least one court
has referred the question of conscionability to the jury. See Adams Van Serv., Inc. v. Inter-
national Harvester Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1142, 1149 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
712 Unconscionability may also bear on attempts to limit recovery of incidental damages,
but we have discovered only one case involving such a limitation. In Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, Inc., 22 U.C.C. Rep. 945 (Minn. 1977), the court struck down an exclusion of
incidental damages in the sale of a new car as having failed of its essential purpose under
§ 2-719(2). The court stated: "Where a buyer has justifiably revoked acceptance,
[§ 2-719(2)] precludes the invocation of a clause limiting liability with respect to the recovery
of incidental damages. To withhold incidental damages from a buyer revoking acceptance
is to make cancellation of the contract a less than adequate remedy." Id. at 956-57. The
court's analysis is flawed. The "incidental" damages involved in the case were costs of re-
pair and maintenance of the defective automobile. Such costs, however, should be charac-
terized as either primary or consequential, depending upon the circumstances. See notes
417-66 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, an incidental damage exclusion, like a
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damages. 783  In examining the relation of section 2-302 to each
type of limitation, we adopt as our guide the analytical framework
posited by Professor Leff7 8 4 and refined by subsequent commen-
tators. 78 5  Briefly, Professor Leff distinguishes procedural uncon-
scionability ("bargaining naughtiness") from substantive uncon-
scionability ("evils in the resulting contract"). 78 6  He explains that
the Code and Comments lack clarity because the drafters were
unwilling to decide what, if any, bargaining niceties could im-
munize an oppressive clause from judicial invalidation. 787
a. Warranty Disclaimers. The Code's explicit authorization of
implied warranty disclaimers suggests that courts are not free to
brand such clauses substantively unconscionable. A damaged
buyer must show not only that the clause operates harshly, but
that the seller introduced it in an objectionable manner. Both Pro-
fessor Leff (who would subject disclaimers only to the demands of
section 2-316)788 and his most ardent critics agree that warranty
disclaimers are never per se unconscionable. 789  Given this initial
consequential damage exclusion (see note 855 and accompanying text infra) can never fail
of its essential purpose. Presumably, the purpose of such a clause is to exclude incidental
damages, and thus it will succeed unless the court chooses to deny it effect. However,
exclusions of incidental damages may be vulnerable to unconscionability attacks. Although
§ 2-719(3) expressly authorizes sellers to exclude consequential damages, nowhere does the
Code explicitly endorse incidental damage exclusions. Since incidental damages are inti-
mately connected with the rights of rejection and revocation, exclusions of these damages
may deter buyers from exercising these rights. Moreover, many incidental damages arise
by virtue of the duties the Code imposes upon the rejecting or revoking buyer. See note
427 supra. It may be unfair for the Code to require a buyer to incur expenses connected
with the seller's default and then not require the seller to reimburse him. In short, a buyer
who justifiably rejects or revokes nonconforming goods, but is deprived of recovering the
costs accompanying his rejection or revocation, may be receiving less than the "fair quan-
tum of remedy" the drafters envisioned.
783 Absent parol evidence questions, a court should not resort to § 2-302 to invalidate a
disclaimer of express warranties. Any express warranty in the agreement would prevail
over the disclaimer. See notes 586-88 and accompanying text supra. But see Industralease
Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Ents., Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482, 488-89, 396
N.Y.S.2d 427, 431, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 4, 10-11 (2d Dep't 1977) (absent parol evidence barriers
court resorted to unconscionability to overcome disclaimer of express warranties). Where a
disclaimer bars parol evidence of express warranties, the court should examine the writ-
ing's finality and the possibility of fraud before addressing its conscionability. See notes
615-17, 624-28 and accompanying text supra.
784 See Leff, supra note 780.
785 E.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 780.
7 8 Leff, supra note 780, at 487.
787 Professor Leff suggests that the drafters of § 2-302 were caught between the diffi-
culty of prescribing conscionable bargaining procedures and the unpopularity of declaring
certain contractual provisions unconscionable per se. "Thus faced with a dilemma, ... the
draftsmen opted for a third solution. They fudged." Id. at 501.
788 Id. at 523.
7 8 See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 780, at 793.
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substantive validity, coupled with the buyer's procedural protec-
tions outlined in section 2-316(2), it is not surprising that courts
rarely apply section 2-302 to disclaimers in commercial transac-
tions. Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc.,79 0 typifies the judicial response to
a commercial buyer's assertion of unconscionability. The seller
brought an action to foreclose a lien on industrial equipment, and
the buyer counterclaimed for damages based on breach of express
and implied warranties. The seller moved to dismiss the coun-
terclaim, pointing to a contractual disclaimer of implied warran-
ties and a limitation of remedies to repair and replacement. The
buyer countered that the seller, by refusing to repair or replace
the equipment, defeated the disclaimer and caused the remedy
limitation to fail of its essential purpose under section 2-719(2).
Refusing to dismiss the counterclaim, the court held that whether
the remedy limitation on express warranties failed of its purpose
was a question of fact to be determined at trial.7 9 1  Turning to
the disclaimer of implied warranties, however, the court noted
that the seller had complied with section 2-316, and stated:
There is some question whether language that complies
with UCC 2-316 could be unconscionable under 2-302. There is
also an argument that unconscionable conduct which obviates a
limitation of liability clause under UCC 2-719(3) would also ob-
viate a disclaimer of warranties clause under that same sec-
tion.... If there is some conduct that could render a disclaimer
of warranties ineffective in a commercial setting, such conduct
is not present in the case at bar. At trial, [buyer] will not be
allowed to recover damages that otherwise would have been re-
coverable but for the disclaimer of warranties language in the
contract.
792
790 369 F. Supp. 882, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
791 Id. at 890, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 378.
792 Id. at 891, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 378-79. See Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv.
Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 628 (1973) ("in present
condition" disclaimer valid under § 2-316(3)(a) not unconscionable); Westinghouse Credit
Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 553 (1973) (dis-
claimer valid under § 2-316(2) not unconscionable) (citing Avery); Bill Stremmel Motors,
Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 418-19, 514 P.2d 654, 657, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 435,
438 (1973) (disclaimer in lease of communications equipment between parties of equal bar-
gaining power not unconscionable); Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 693-94,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 312, 315 (Tenn.) (disclaimer in sale of automobile cannot violate § 2-302 if
it complies with § 2-316(2)) (dictum), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974). But see Sarafati v.
M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
442, 444 (2d Dep't 1970) (manufacturer's disclaimer of implied warranties unconscionable
as to commercial buyer of automobiles as well as to buyer's lessee), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d
613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1972).
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b. Consequential Damage Exclusions. As with warranty disclaim-
ers, the drafters were generally permissive toward consequential
damage exclusions. Section 2-719(3) 793 permits such clauses, and
is neutral as to their conscionability in the commercial context.7 94
Comment 3 to section 2-719 calls them "merely an allocation of
unknown or undeterminable risks." Thus, unless the seller has in-
troduced it in an unfair manner, a court should enforce a conse-
quential damage exclusion in a commercial sales contract.795
Nevertheless, some courts have struck down consequential
damage exclusions where "latent" or "undiscoverable" defects
have caused large losses. 796  In Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,797
for example, a seller of soybean inoculant represented his product
as "100% GROWER GUARANTEED" but in the same clause excluded
consequential liability. The buyer could not discover the product's
ineffectiveness until after he had incurred large expenses for
cultivating, planting and harvesting a crop that ultimately
793 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
Professors White and Summers criticize several early consumer cases which used § 2-719(3)
to invalidate disclaimers in personal injury actions. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-12,
at 392-96. See Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1141, 1144 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (grant of summary judgment to seller on basis of disclaimer in con-
sumer personal injury action would contravene policy of § 2-719(3)). Comment 3 to § 2-719
emphasizes the independence of §§ 2-316 and 2-719: "The seller in all cases is free to
disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316."
794 The statute does not make consequential damage exclusions prima facie conscionable
with respect to commercial losses. It merely states that such clauses are not prima facie
unconscionable. See County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp.
1300, 1308, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-11, at
384 n.146. But cf. Fahlgren, Unconscionability: Warranty Disclaimers and Consequential Damage
Limitations, 20 ST. Louis U. L. J. 435, 436 n.1 1 (1976) (since buyer bears burden of proving
unconscionability, exclusions initially considered conscionable).
79- Where circumstances cause a limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose within the
meaning of § 2-719(2), a court might refuse to enforce an accompanying exclusion of
consequential damages. See notes 877-86 and accompanying text infra. The failure of
purpose does not affect the exclusion's conscionability; a contract clause is unconscionable,
if at all, from its outset. See U.C.C. § 2-302.
796 Some of these courts invalidate consequential damage exclusions by declaring that
they have failed of their essential purpose under § 2-719(2). See, e.g., Neville Chem. Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 655, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219, 1224-25 (W.D. Pa.
1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 81 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). For a critical discussion of these cases, see notes
854-55, 887-94 and accompanying text infra.
797 407 F. Supp. 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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failed. 798 Emphasizing that "the remedy left to a purchaser after
operation of the exclusion is grossly disproportionate to the ex-
penditures an injured party would be expected to make in order
to avail himself of the value of the product," 799 the court declared
the exclusion unconscionable.
The court missed the mark.8 0 0  A consequential damage ex-
clusion is not substantively unconscionable when applied to a
latent defect. A seller may exclude liability altogether for such
defects by disclaiming implied warranties or limiting an express
warranty's duration. The Code does not distinguish discoverable
from latent defects. Indeed, the drafters expressly approved the
contractual allocation of "unknown" risks.80' As Professor Eddy
points out, it is probably the buyer's inability to avoid consequen-
tial losses that tempts courts to place the risk of "undiscoverable"
defects on the seller. 0 2 Nevertheless,
[i]t does not follow that because the loss is not avoidable, the
parties should not be free to allocate it as they see fit. One can
imagine a spectrum with risks avoidable only by the seller on
one end and risks avoidable only by the buyer on the other. In
between fall two other classes of risks: those avoidable by both
parties and those avoidable by neither. It is difficult to see what
is unfair about two contracting parties shifting a risk from
either class of risks in this central portion of the spectrum to
one or the other party. If there is a type of risk allocation that
798 Id. at 22, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 595.
799 Id. at 22-23, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 595.
800 On the facts before it, the Majors court could have found for the buyer without
placing undue focus on the latency of the defect or the extent of the resultant damages.
Tests of the soybean inoculant had established "grave doubt" about its effectiveness, but
the seller failed to convey this information to the buyer. Id. at 22, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 595.
The seller's conduct might, therefore, have given the buyer a cause of action in tort for
misrepresentation or negligence which the liability limitation would be unlikely to reach.
Moreover, U.C.C. § 1-203 imposes an obligation of good faith upon contracting parties
which § 1-102(3) prohibits them from disclaiming. Thus, the court could have found that
the manufacturer exercised bad faith by keeping the doubts about his product to himself,
and that he was therefore estopped from asserting the liability limitation. Instead, the court
glanced only cursorily at the seller's behavior, and pronounced exclusions unconscionable
when applied to latent defects that cause extensive damages. See 407 F. Supp. at 22-23, 18
U.C.C. Rep. at 596.
801 U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 3; V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 869,
9 U.C.C. Rep. 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1971) ("Section 2-719 was intended to encourage and
facilitate consensual allocations of risks associated with the sales of goods. This is particu-
larly true where commercial, rather than consumer sales are involved"). At the planning
and bargaining stage, the commercial buyer is better able than his seller to estimate poten-
tial consequential loss from latent defects.
002 See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section
2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28, 46-47 (1977).
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should be subject to special scrutiny, it is probably the shifting
to one party of a risk that only the other party can avoid.80 3
Courts that disallow claims of substantive unconscionability in
commercial transactions are even less likely to be impressed with
arguments focusing on the bargaining process. Statements that
"unconscionability rarely exists in a commercial setting" pervade
the case law,80 4 and recent cases reveal only one successful buyer.
In Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,8 0 5 a service station operator alleged
that defective gasoline supplied by the defendant oil company
caused a fire which destroyed his property. The dealership con-
tract excluded consequential damages, but the court did not. In
view of the Code's recognition of such damage limitations, the
court noted that "a determination of unconscionability cannot ...
be based on their substantive content alone."8 06  Focusing instead
on the buyer's limited education, the absence of bargaining, and
the inflexibility of the seller's carefully drafted form contract, the
court voided the provision.8 0 7
The peculiar facts of Johnson suggest that the case will proba-
bly have only minimal impact on consequential damages clauses in
commercial sales; a retail dealer contract which was the fruit of
great bargaining disparity effectively locked the buyer into his re-
lationship with Mobil. Except in those cases involving "undiscov-
103 Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). An early draft of § 2-719 may shed some light on the
drafters' intent. Section 57-A(2) of the Second Draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act
provided that a contract may, "[bletween merchants, provide that consequential damages
are limited or excluded, notwithstanding that they flow from defects not reasonably discov-
erable by the buyer, if such defects are not due to avoidable fault on th\ part of the seller."
Revised Uniform Sales Act § 57-A(2) (2d draft 1941).
804 See, e.g., Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364,
381, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 80, 101 (E.D. Mich. 1977); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding &
Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444
F.2d 372, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 206 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
105 415 F. Supp. 264, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 637 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
06 Id. at 268, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 641.
101 The Johnson court indicated that "the voluntary, knowing assent of the other party"
forms the crux of procedural conscionability. Id. at 269, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 641. As relevant
factors in determining whether this standard is met, the court listed "age, education, intel-
ligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the con-
tract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations in the
printed terms were possible, [and] whether there were alternative sources of supply for the
goods." Id. at 268, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 641.
Since conspicuousness is all that most courts require for a valid disclaimer even in
consumer cases, a more stringent "knowing assent" test for less drastic liability limitations is
difficult to justify. At least one court has held conspicuousness relevant to the conscionabil-
ity of a remedy limitation. See Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544
P.2d 20, 23, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 584, 589 (1975).
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erable latent defects," a significant erosion of the long line of
cases dismissing claims of unconscionability in commercial settings
seems unlikely.808
c. Primary Damage Limitations. The Code, as interpreted by
the Comments, makes one form of damage exclusion substantively
unconscionable even in commercial transactions. Comment 1 to
section 2-719 provides:
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend
to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must ac-
cept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum
of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in
the contract. Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the
remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner
is subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made avail-
able by this Article are applicable as if the stricken clause had
never existed. Similarly, under subsection (2), where an appar-
ently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails
in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the sub-
stantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general
remedy provisions of this Article.
A clause that does not, on its face, provide a "fair quantum of
remedy" is not "apparently fair and reasonable," and therefore
fails the Code's test of conscionability. Although section
808 See U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043, 1048, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 1, 5-6 (6th Cir. 1975) (dictum); Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc.,
490 F.2d 696, 699, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1974); Posttapes Assocs. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 411-12, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 855, 861-63 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lincoln
Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 278, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 407, 426 (D. Me.
1977) (alternative holding); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 572, 579, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 360, 370 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd mem., 527 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520, 524-25, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 631, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill
Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606, 612, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 650, 653-54 (N.D. Iowa 1974); J.D.
Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Il1. App. 3d 1, 4-5, 351 N.E.2d 243, 246, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 394, 398-99 (1976); Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, Inc., 217
Kan. 88, 95, 535 P.2d 419, 424, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1280, 1285 (1975); Westfield Chem. Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1293, 1296 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977); Kleven v. Geigy
Ag. Chems., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 718 (1975); Architectural
Alum. Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 499-500, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823-24, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 1159, 1163-64 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 27 N.C. App.
689, 695-96, 220 S.E.2d 361, 366, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 359, 364-65 (1975), aff'd, 290 N.C. 502,
226 S.E.2d 321 (1976).
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2-719(1)809 permits parties to limit or alter available remedies,
Comment 1 warns sellers that they cannot exclude all recovery for
breach. Where a seller does not properly disclaim warranties
under section 2-316, he may not completely thwart a buyer's ex-
pectations of protection through a "remedy limitation."8 1 0 Profes-
sor Leff agrees that the Comment describes a minimum standard
of conscionablilty which operates without regard to pro-
cedural fairness. 81 1  He fails, however, to discern the "fair quan-
tum of remedy" a seller must provide, concluding only that an
exclusion of all remedy falls below the standard. 812  We think the
Comment, read in its statutory context, hints at a more precise
definition of the conscionable minimum.
First, section 2-719(3) and Comment 3 allow sellers to exclude
consequential damages for commercial loss. 81 3 Comment 1
further suggests that a fair and reasonable clause must merely
preserve the "substantial value of the bargain" for a victim of
breach. Professor Eddy convincingly argues that "value of the
bargain" refers to the value of conforming goods. 81 4  Similarly,
809 U.C.C. § 2-719(1) provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of
the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitu-
tion for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the mea-
sure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or
to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
810 Like express warranties, implied warranties reflect notions of buyer expectation and
reliance. See notes 159-62 and accompanying text supra.
'll Left, supra note 780, at 518-19. Indeed, the professor praises the Comment's stan-
dard as less murky than § 2-302's "oppression" and "unfair surprise" standard. Id. at 519.
812 [T]he Code reflects a substantive decision on this point. It did not say that
remedies for breach could not be limited to less than those provided in the
Code, but it did provide that remedy for breach could not be eliminated by
agreement. Certainly, section 2-719 did not settle all of the problems, most
particularly what a "minimum adequate remedy" might be. But it did settle the
question to the extent of providing that no remedy at all was in fact below that
requisite minimum.
Id. at 518 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, at
276 ("under section 2-719, all remedies are not taken from the buyer") (emphasis in origi-
nal); Ellinghaus, supra note 780, at 794 ("exclusion of remedies is-except as to 'consequen-
tial damages'-not permissible") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
813 See notes 793-95 and accompanying text supra.
814 After tracing the drafts of § 2-719 and its Comments, Professor Eddy concludes that
"this language, when it entered the Code, was associated with a particular type of limited
remedy [repair or replacement of defective parts], the 'essential purpose' of which was to
222
19781 ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES
the exclusive remedies suggested by section 2-719(1)815 (repay-
ment of the price or repair or replacement of defective parts) will
normally ensure that the buyer receives the value of the goods as
warranted. One can infer, therefore, that a remedy limitation cut-
ting substantially into a buyer's primary damage recovery is sub-
stantively unconscionable. 816
The above rule should apply in sales of standardized goods,
where the price paid generally reflects the value of the goods as
warranted. With custom-made or experimental goods, however,
the conscionable minimum may be significantly less. If a seller
shows that he reduced the purchase price in exchange for a dras-
tic remedy limitation, the contractual remedy may still be
adequate. Of course, a court can uphold the limitation without
compromising the Comment's apparent prohibition of primary
damages exclusions; when the buyer pays substantially less than
the value of the goods "as warranted," words of warranty may not
reach the basis of the bargain. 817
provide an economic means of assuring goods of warranted characteristics." Eddy, supra
note 802, at 39.
8" Reprinted in note 809 supra.
SI See Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 106, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677, 683, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 631, 639 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977) (limitation of remedy to one repair or replace-
ment of automobile engine "might very well be unconscionable") (dictum).
817 Raybond Elecs., Inc. v. Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 409, 528 P.2d 160,
16 U.C.C. Rep. 121 (1974), illustrates the process by which commercial parties may bargain
for a conscionable remedy limitation substantially below the value of functioning goods.
After considerable negotiation, the parties settled on most of the contract terms governing
the sale of a system for curing glue used in the production of doors. The seller warranted
the system against defects and excluded consequential damages. The buyer's real interest
in the system, however, was its output, and it negotiated vigorously for a guarantee that
the system could produce a door every ten seconds. The seller was unwilling to go quite so
far and instead consented to a "Special Agreement":
Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co. may return the two 50KW output generators,
freight prepaid, anytime within 3 months of delivery, if the heating cycles ex-.
ceed 10 seconds on hollow core doors. If the generators are returned, Raybond
will credit Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co. with 2I3rds of the original sales price.
Id. at 412, 528 P.2d at 163, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 126 (emphasis in original).
Despite the seller's conscientious efforts, the system failed repeatedly when operated at
the desired capacity. In the ensuing litigation, the buyer focused its unsuccessful uncon-
scionability attack on the exclusion of consequential damages. Had the buyer challenged
instead the apparent primary damage limitation, it doubtless would have fared no better.
Since the buyer was "aware that the system might not be capable of producing a door
every ten seconds," (id at 415, 528 P.2d at 166, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 129), no express war-
ranty as to capacity arose. The court recognized that the "Special Agreement" was merely
an allocation of business risk in the sale of an experimental product.
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3. Problems of Party Characterization
a. A Rationale for the Distinction Between Disclaimers and Remedy
Limitations. As the preceding discussion suggests, the drafters an-
ticipated that sellers might attempt to dodge section 2-316's re-
quirements by eliminating all remedies under section 2-719. Sec-
tion 2-719 and Comment 1 short-circuit this route. The Code
itself thus denies that a disclaimer and a remedy limitation can
have the same effect; it requires courts to categorize such provi-
sions according to the result sought rather than the language used
by the parties. Although section 1-102(3) authorizes parties to
vary the effect of most Code provisions, 818 sections 2-316 and
2-719 impose specific restrictions on efforts to alter warranties or
remedies. For example, a seller may not disclaim implied warran-
ties except by conspicuous language, 819 and a limited remedy will
not operate if it fails of its essential purpose. 82 0  Sellers should
not be allowed to escape these requirements by mislabeling dis-
claimers or remedy limitations.
Consider the following clauses:
1. Buyer may not recover damages for defects in stationary
parts.
2. The implied warranty of merchantability is not applica-
ble to stationary parts.8 21
The clauses seek the same result: to preclude an action for dam-
ages attributable to stationary parts. If both clauses are incon-
spicuous, it would be absurd indeed to recognize the first as a
valid limitation of remedy while striking the second as a dis-
claimer; where a seller extends no remedy at all for defects in
specified parts, he makes no warranty as to those parts.8 2 ' A
818 Section 1-102(3) provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
8'19 See notes 638-57 and accompanying text supra.
820 See notes 853-904 and accompanying text infra.
821 Note, supra note 770, at 797.
822 Even as a "remedy limitation," the first clause is substantively unconscionable-it
provides no remedy for breach of warranty. See notes 809-12 and accompanying text supra.
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court should ignore the parties' characterization and apply section
2-316 to each of the above clauses.82 3
The relative laxity of the Code's requirements for limitations
of remedy appears to be the product of line-drawing by the draft-
ers. For any particular nonconformity, a total exclusion of liabil-
ity must survive more stringent tests than a partial exclusion of
liability. Admittedly, a limitation of remedy, such as an exclusion
of consequential damages, might exclude all meaningful remedy
for a particular breach. For example, defects in a two-dollar can
of oil can ruin a million-dollar machine. The policy that underlies
section 2-316's conspicuousness requirement for disclaimers-
preventing buyer surprise-seems equally applicable to such limi-
tations. In a proper situation, a court can and should apply some
form of the conspicuousness test to remedy limitations. For
example, a number of courts point to the conspicuousness of a
clause as affecting its conscionability. 824  Conspicuousness may
also help determine whether a limited remedy is "expressly
agreed to be exclusive" under section 2-719(1)(b), a reading which
gains support from Comment 2's admonition that a remedy's
exclusivity must be "clearly expressed." 825
823 Failure to look beyond form to substance leads to the appearance of anomalous Code
treatment of the two clauses in the text. This error led one commentator to recommend
that courts ignore the Code's dichotomy between disclaimers and limitations. See Note,
supra note 770, at 797.
824 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
955, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (whether "important terms [are] hidden in a maze of fine print"
is one circumstance to consider in determining unconscionability). In Schroeder v. Fageol
Motors, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 584 (1975), involving a sale of a
truck to a commercial buyer, the court reversed a lower court's application of § 2-316(2) to
a consequential damage exclusion. Remanding for a determination as to conscionability,
the court noted that "'conspicuousness' and 'negotiations' are factors, albeit not conclusive,
which are certainly relevant when determining the issue of conscionability in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Id. at 260, 544 P.2d at 23, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 589 (emphasis in
original).
825 See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak, 131 N.J. Super. 439, 448, 330 A.2d 384, 389, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 133, 138 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 39 (1975) (conspicuousness one factor in determining whether remedy expressly
agreed to be exclusive under § 2-719); notes 834-47 and accompanying text infra.
In most negotiated commercial sales contracts, it will make little practical difference
whether courts apply the conspicuousness requirement to remedy limitations, thanks to
their increasing willingness to focus on what the particular buyer noticed or should have
noticed. See notes 644-57 and accompanying text supra. A requirement that "merchantabil-
ity" be mentioned to limit remedy for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
would have greater impact. There appears to be no policy reason, however, for accepting
this approach, adopted in Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (4th Dep't 1969) (discussed in notes 771-73 and accompanying text supra).
The significance of a limitation of remedy does not vary with the warranty to which it
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b. "Warranties of Repair." Another problem of characteriza-
tion arises when a seller promises to repair or replace defective
parts. Consider the following clauses:
1. Seller warrants the goods to be free of defects in materials
and workmanship for one year. Seller's liability under this
warranty is limited to repair and replacement of defective
parts.
2. Seller warrants that he will repair or replace parts found to
be defective in materials and workmanship for one year.
Seller makes no other warranty.
These provisions convey the same message, and proper appli-
cation of the Code demands that courts characterize each as an
express warranty with an exclusive remedy for its breach.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have treated such clauses as
"warranties of repair." 826 These courts fail to account for section
2-719(1)(a)'s treatment of repair and replacement as a remedy. 827
Nor does a promise to repair goods fit the Code's definition of an
express warranty. Section 2-313(1)(a) requires that promises relate
"to the goods" in order to constitute express warranties. 828  If a
promise to repair relates to the goods, then so would nearly every
provision in a contract of sale. We think that a promise to repair
relates not to the goods, but to the seller's performance. 829 A New
applies. Thus, a rule imposing different standards for different warranty breaches will only
add confusion to an already muddled field of law.
828 See, e.g., Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App. 94, 102, 298 So. 2d 26,
33, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 85, 90-91, cert denied, 292 Ala. 718, 298 So. 2d 34 (1974); Judd Constr.
Co. v. Bob Post, Inc., 516 P.2d 449, 451, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 800, 802 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973);
Collum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 6 Ill. App. 3d 317, 322, 285 N.E.2d 532, 536, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
333, 338-39 (1972); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667-69, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. 1158, 1162-65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
827 U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a) provides in part: "[T]he agreement may ... [limit] the buyer's
remedies ... to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts
828 U.C.C. § 2-313 is reprinted in text following note 43 supra.
829 A number of courts ignore the "repair warranties" characterization given by the par-
ties and treat promises to repair as attempts to create exclusive remedies. See, e.g., Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 53 (D.C. Super Ct. 1972) (promise
to replace film); Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.
2d 319, 320, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 325, 326-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (promise to repair or
replace automobile parts). Cf Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 755-
57, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 832, 836-39 (3d Cir. 1976) (promise to replace defective film treated as
attempted remedy limitation); Zahler v. Star Steel Supply Co., 50 Mich. App. 386, 213
N.W.2d 269, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 1043 (1973) (breach of one year "replacement warranty"
arose from defect, not from failure to replace).
In McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 14
(1975), a consumer sought recovery for personal injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent which allegedly resulted from a blowout. The tire manufacturer's warranty statement
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Jersey case 8 30 illustrates the confusion rampant in the courts. A
seller had promised to repair a camera "at no charge within one
year after purchase, except for damage caused by accident or
abuse," but warned that, "[e]xcept as mentioned above, no other
warranty, express or implied, applies to this camera." 831  The
lower court permitted the buyer to recover the purchase price,
finding that the seller breached an express warranty against de-
fects and that the parties had not expressly agreed that the rem-
edy of repair would be exclusive, as required by section 2-719
(1)(b).832 The supreme court reversed, holding that the clause
was not a warranty against defects, but merely a warranty that the
seller would repair such defects as might occur.833 The contract
language entitled the buyer to believe he had a warranty-a war-
ranty that, under the Code, could only relate to the camera itself.
By blurring the distinction between warranty and remedy, the
court avoided considering whether the repair remedy was exclu-
sive.
guaranteed against damage from road hazards, excluded consequential damages, and pro-
vided the buyer with the following exclusive remedy:
If a tire fails to give satisfactory service under the terms of this guarantee, return it to
the nearest Korvette Tire Center. We will replace the tire charging only the pro-
portionate part of the sale price for each month elapsed (or mileage used) from
date of purchase ....
Id. at 423, 347 A.2d at 256, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 18 (emphasis in original). Since the con-
sumer buyer was likely to recover damages for personal injury despite the exclusion, the
manufacturer argued that his only warranty was to replace the tire. The court disagreed.
Citing a pre-Code case (Rittenhouse, Winterson Auto Co. v. Kissner, 129 Md. 102, 98 A.
361 (1916)), the court classified the guarantee against damage as the seller's express war-
ranty.
An assurance that [goods] would perform in a certain way for a given period of
time in the future constituted an express warranty because it had reference to
the existing quality, capacity or condition of the goods. An assurance that the seller
would, at some time in the future, perform certain services in the event that the
goods should not conform to the representation, so that the warranty was
breached, constituted an executory promise or contractual undertaking because
it had reference, not to the existing quality, capacity or condition of the goods,
but rather to the assumption of an affirmative contractual duty to be per-
formed in the future.
There is nothing in the language of [section 2-313] which requires a depar-
ture from these basic principles which were applied under both the common
law and the Uniform Sales Act.
28 Md. App. at 427, 347 A.2d at 258, 18 U.C.C. Rep. at 21 (emphasis in original).
S30 Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 39
(1975), rev'g 181 N.J. Super. 439, 330 A.2d 384, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 133 (App. Div. 1974).
831 Id. at 7, 342 A.2d at 184, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 42.
832 131 N.J. Super. 439, 447, 330 A.2d 384, 388, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 133, 137-38. See note
835 infra. We discuss the requirement that parties must expressly agree to make a remedy
exclusive in notes 834-47 and accompanying text infra.
s33 68 N.J. at 11-12, 342 A.2d at 186-87, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 46.
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4. Exclusiveness of Remedy-The Language Requirement of Section
2-719(1)(b)
Section 2-719(1)(a) permits the parties to provide remedies in
addition to those extended by the Code, but the seller who prom-
ises, for example, to repair or replace defective parts usually de-
sires to supplant and not supplement Code remedies. To achieve
exclusivity, he must harken to section 2-719(1)(b):
[R]esort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole
remedy.
Courts have considerable discretion when evaluating words of
exclusivity.8 34  Whether the remedy was "expressly agreed to be
exclusive" will often depend upon how sophisticated the buyer is.
When the buyer is a consumer, the court will scrutinize the con-
tract language closely and often override the apparent intent of
the parties.8 35
Section 2-719(l)(b) does not require any particular words; it
only requires express terms clear enough to inform the particular
buyer that the remedy is exclusive.a 6 In most commercial cases,
the intent of an express provision should control.8 37  In Fredonia
834 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 12-9, at 379.
835 Perhaps the most frequent victim of insufficiently explicit language in consumer
cases is the seller who makes a promise to repair or replace defective goods "in lieu of
other warranties or obligations." Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 985 (1971), held that such a clause did not make an automobile purchaser's
remedy of repair exclusive, and permitted the consumer to recover the consequential
property damages resulting from a fire in his car. The court reasoned: "There is no lan-
guage anywhere in the warranty form 'expressly' stating that the remedy of repair or re-
placement of defective parts is to be the exclusive remedy. The language ... goes only to
'obligations' and 'warranties,' not to remedies." Id. at 184, 465 S.W.2d at 85, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
at 990. See Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361, 485 S.W.2d 189, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 710 (1972)
(repair remedy not expressly exclusive); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super.
439, 330 A.2d 384, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 133 (1974) (exclusive warranty of repair did not create
exclusive remedy for breach of warranty in sale of camera), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1,
342 A.2d 181, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 39 (1975); Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99,
106, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682-83, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 631, 638 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977) (used car
seller limited "liability" rather than "remedy" to repair and replacement, enabling buyer to
recover purchase price).
$36 U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 2 authorizes courts to require clarity:
Subsection (1) (b) creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies
are cumulative rather than exclusive. If the parties intend the term to describe
the sole remedy under the contract, this must be clearly expressed.
81 In J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 394 (1976), the seller represented that the fat content of meat would not
exceed 15%. The contract further provided that "seller will allow for excess fat content at
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Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp.,838 a contract for the sale of broad-
casting equipment provided that "repair or replacement ... shall
constitute the fulfillment of all RCA's obligations in respect of the
equipment furnished hereunder." 839 The court upheld the sell-
er's contention that repair or replacement constituted the sole rem-
edy for breach of warranty without quibbling about the differ-
ence between an "obligation" and a "remedy."8 40
The language of limitation ... does not state explicitly that the
remedy provided for is to be the exclusive remedy. However, it
is clear that the contractual limitation is intended to be exclu-
sive because the language of the contractual limitation states
that repair and replacement "shall constitute the fulfillment of
all RCA's obligations in respect of the equipment furnished." 
841
Even in commercial sales, the contract must express at least
some intent to make a remedy exclusive. 842  As an apparent ex-
ception to this rule, however, courts have held that a trade usage
or course of dealing may limit a buyer to a stated remedy.8 43 The
invoice price and buyer will accept such as full settlement." Id. at 3, 351 N.E.2d at 245, 20
U.C.C. Rep. at 397. Finding the allowance to be the buyer's sole remedy, the court stated:
"A remedy will be held to be exclusive when that is the reasonable construction of the
contract despite any failure to employ the word 'exclusive.'" Id. Accord, Calloway v. Man-
ion, 572 F.2d 1033, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1143 (5th Cir. 1978) (court upheld arguably unclear
statement of exclusivity made orally to knowledgeable buyer of horse); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 53 (D.C. Super Ct. 1972) (promise to replace
film "without other warranty or liability" valid limitation of remedy). But see Curtis v. Mur-
phy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 145 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (provision that
replacement of defective materials sole warranty did not create exclusive remedy because
intent not clearly expressed).
838 481 F.2d 781, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds,
569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978).
839 Id. at 798, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 1105.
840 Compare this result with that in Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d
80, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 985 (1971), discussed in note 835 supra. The promise to repair or replace
is both a remedy and an obligation. Breach of the obligation is relevant in a failure-of-
purpose determination. See notes 869-76 and accompanying text infra.
841 Id. (emphasis in original).
842 See Ralston Purina Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 540 F.2d 915, 19 U.C.C.
Rep. 1348 (8th Cir. 1976) (remedy options given buyer of chickens in event of material loss
not exclusive); Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 261 (4th Cir. 1972) (clause enabling buyer to withhold 10% of contract price
until seller completed installation of equipment held not to preclude buyer's recovery of
damages in greater amount).
843 See, e.g., Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751,756, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 832,839
(3d Cir. 1976);J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243,20 U.C.C.
Rep. 394 (1976) (parties' prior dealings support remedy exclusivity in sale of meat). Cf.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 53 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972)
(buyer's familiarity with trade practices a factor in rendering film replacement his exclusive
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Code allows such circumstances to supplement an agreement, 844
but a term born of trade usage can hardly be christened "ex-
press." 845 Yet there appears no sound policy against exclusivity
by trade usage or course of dealing, since the same practices may
exclude large elements of damages 8 46 or disclaim warranties al-
together.8 47  The drafters probably did not consider the full im-
pact of the "expressly agreed" requirement, and courts should
queue-up in the lengthening line of commercial cases.
remedy); North Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, 75 Mich. App. 391, 400, 254 N.W.2d 899,
904, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 62, 67 (1977) (trade usage that price adjustment exclusive remedy for
nonconforming steel shipment).
Courts in nonwarranty cases suggest that no express statement is required to make a
liquidated damages provision the exclusive means of recovery. See Ray Farmers Union
Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 683 (N.D. 1975); Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 139 (N.D. 1974).
Cf Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 794 (1973) (implying that liquidated damages clause and provision allowing
for additional remedies are inconsistent).
844 See U.C.C. § 1-205(3).
845 U.C.C. § 2-314(3) provides that warranties are implied when created by trade usage or
course of dealing. Thus, one can reasonably infer that other terms arising from course of
dealing and trade usage are implied.
Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 832 (3d Cir.
1976) illustrates the difficulty of finding express agreement through an implied term. In
remanding for a determination whether there was a trade usage that limited the commer-
cial buyer to replacement of defective film, the court explained:
Section 2-719 permits individuals to limit their damages by agreement, and
in its definition of "agreement," § 1-201(3) includes the course of dealing or
usage of trade as "circumstances" to establish "the bargain of the parties in
fact." § 1-205(3) provides that "any usage of trade ... of which they are or
should be aware give[s] particular meaning to and supplement[s] or qualiflies]
terms of an agreement." That a party is bound by a trade usage of which he
"should be aware" implies that a limitation of damages may be imposed even if
the parties did not explicitly and expressly negotiate it. The totality of the
agreement, however, must include a provision, present in the trade usage, or
otherwise expressed, that the limited remedy is an exclusive one.
Id. at 756, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 839. On remand, the buyer argued that to prove the trade
usage, the seller should be required to show "the repeated assertion of claims against
Kodak and the invocation of the limitation by Kodak in response to these claims." 450 F.
Supp. 407, 409, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 855, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The court disagreed, holding
that evidence that industry members accept a trade usage limiting remedies suffices to
sustain a jury finding that such a usage exists. Id. at 410, 23 U.C.C. Rep. at 860.
A similar problem arises when buyers attempt to persuade courts that implied warran-
ties may "explicitly" extend to future performance under § 2-725. See notes 1019-22 and
accompanying text infra.
146 There is no requirement that an agreement to exclude consequential damages be
express. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
141 See notes 727-48 and accompanying text supra.
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5. Scope of Remedy Limitations
A second language requirement extends to every remedy
limitation, whether an exclusive remedy, a consequential damage
exclusion, or a ceiling on damages. This requirement arises not
from the Code itself, but from general principles of contract in-
terpretation. Consider the following clause:
Seller warrants these goods against defects in materials or
workmanship. Seller's obligation if the goods do not meet this
warranty is limited solely to replacing or repairing defective
parts. The above remedy is exclusive and there are no other
warranties express or implied.
Because the word "merchantability" is absent, the clause does not
effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. 848
Moreover, express warranties may lurk elsewhere in the agree-
ment despite disclaimer language.8 49  Since the remedy limitation
applies only to "this warranty," poor draftsmanship has exposed
the seller to unexpectedly broad liability.8 50 A careful seller will
draw his remedy limitation to corral all warranty breaches. 851 And
the truly cagey seller might extend the limitation to claims based
on negligence or strict tort liability. Many courts uphold such limi-
141 Section 2-316(2) requires that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability
use the word "merchantability." See notes 630-36 and accompanying text supra.
"' See note 605 and accompanying text supra.
850 For example, in National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413,
417, 225 N.W.2d 785, 787, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 656, 659 (1975), an express warranty in the sale
of an accounting machine was followed by a provision that the seller's "obligation if the
equipment does not meet these warranties is limited solely to correcting the defect or fail-
ure, without charge." This language did not prevent the buyer from recovering the pur-
chase price for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Accord, S-C
Indus. v. American Hydroponics Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852, 855, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 937, 940-41
(5th Cir. 1972) (exclusive remedy for defects in component parts of greenhouse not appli-
cable to defect in greenhouse as whole); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361, 362, 485 S.W.2d
183, 189, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 710, 711 (1972) (consequential damage exclusion inapplicable to
implied warranties); Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 A.2d 231, 238-39,'11
U.C.C. Rep. 963, 969 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (limitation of liability for defects in materials
and workmanship in sale of ship inapplicable to express and implied warranties of design);
Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 208, 216, 230 N.W.2d 380, 383, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 721, 726 (1975) (limitation of remedy applicable to express warranty did not
affect buyer's recovery under implied warranty in sale of car) (dictum), aff'd on other
grounds, 399 Mich. 617, 250 N.W.2d 736 (1977).
851 The seller then should be able to invoke the remedy limitation even in a suit brought
under an ineffectively disclaimed implied warranty. See Beaunit Corp. v. Volunteer Natural
Gas Co., 402 F. Supp. 1222, 1224, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 697, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Cyclops
Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 476, 482, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 415, 423 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd
mem., 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975).
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tations in commercial sales contracts, although most jurisdictions
require clear language. 85 2
6. Failure qf Purpose-Section 2-719(2)
Although initially conscionable, a remedy limitation may sub-
sequently "fail of its essential purpose" under section 2-719(2).
a. When Applicable. Section 2-719(2) provides:
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in
this Act.
Professor Eddy argues convincingly that section 2-719(2) was
drafted with a single type of remedy limitation in mind: repair or
replacement of defective goods. 85 3  The generality of the lan-
guage in subsection (2) seems to preclude so narrow an interpre-
tation, but the phrase "failure of purpose" makes little sense when
applied to some other liability limitations. 854  For example, an
exclusion of consequential damages cannot fail of its essential
purpose. 85 5  Comment 3 to section 2-719 describes such an exclu-
sion as "merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable
risks." When a court denies recovery for consequential loss, the
damage limitation achieves its only purpose.
Nor can a warranty modification fail of its purpose. A clause
that allocates to the buyer all risk of damage from certain de-
ficiencies accomplishes precisely what the parties intended. But
courts may overlook this truism. In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David
Ferguson, Ltd., s56 yarn purchased for the manufacture of sweaters
852 See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149-50, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 1087, 1091 (3d Cir. 1974) (fact question as to clarity of attempted exclusion of
strict tort liability in sale of helicopter).
853 See Eddy, supra note 802, at 39. For another recent treatment of the failure-of-
purpose doctrine, see Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose:
A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977). Of course,
not every "repair or replacement" remedy can fail of its purpose. Section 2-719(2) applies
only to "exclusive or limited" remedies and is inapplicable where the repair or replacement
clause merely furnishes the buyer with an alternative course of action in the event of
breach. See Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 276-77, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. 407, 423-24 (D. Me. 1977) (alternative holding).
854 For a discussion of other plausible applications of the phrase, see notes 895-98 and
accompanying text infra.
855 Unfortunately, some courts hold provisions that exclude consequential damages to
fail of their essential purpose when latent defects cause extensive losses. See notes 888-94
and accompanying text infra.
856 23 N.Y.2d 398, 400-01, 244 N.E.2d 685, 686, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
1213, 1214 (1968).
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shaded considerably after processing. In pertinent part, the con-
tract read as follows:
2. No claims relating to ... shade shall be allowed if made
after weaving, knitting or processing, or more than 10 days
after receipt of shipment....
4 ... It is expressly agreed that no representations or
warranties, express or implied, have been or are made by the
seller except as stated herein, and the seller makes no warranty,
express or implied, as to the fitness for buyer's purposes of
yarn purchased hereunder, seller's obligations, except as ex-
pressly stated herein, being limited to the delivery of good mer-
chantable yarn of the description stated herein. 857
The New York Court of Appeals assumed that the buyer could
not reasonably have discovered the "shading defects" before knit-
ting and processing. Noting that the provision would "eliminate
any remedy for shade defects not reasonably discoverable within
the time limitation period," the court held that the "remedy limi-
tation" may have failed of its essential purpose under section
2-719(2).858
The court correctly perceived the effect of the clause, but
failed to see the logical consequence of its observation. The provi-
sion was analytically identical to a time modification of war-
ranty.8 59  Yet, while purporting to exclude latent defects from
warranty coverage, it failed to mention merchantability and was
inconsistent with the express warranty. Implied and express war-
ranties therefore extended to every aspect of quality, rendering
the clause ineffective as a remedy limitation as well; to the extent
it excluded all liability for breach of warranty, the clause was sub-
stantively unconscionable under section 2-719.86o Only "an
apparently fair and reasonable clause" can fail of its purpose, and
Comment 1 to section 2-719 indicates that a provision excluding
all remedies does not qualify. 861  Thus, although it properly
857 Id. at 401, 244 N.E.2d at 686, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 110, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1214.
858 Id. at 404, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217.
'19 See notes 597-602, 818-22 and accompanying text supra. In effect, the clause dis-
claimed warranties against defects not discoverable until processing.
880 See notes 809-17 and accompanying text supra.
861 Absent procedural deficiencies, a remedy limitation cannot both be unconscionable
and fail of its essential purpose. Comment 1 to § 2-719 stresses that, to qualify for failure
of purpose analysis, a clause initially must have been fair and reasonable. That is, it must
have sought to provide a minimum adequate remedy for all breaches of warranty. Other-
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found for the buyer, the court employed the "failure of purpose"
doctrine to perform a task for which unconscionability alone was
suited.
b. Failure of an Exclusive Remedy of Repair or Replacement. An
exclusive remedy of repair or replacement can fall short of its
essential purpose. That purpose, observed one court,
is to give the seller an opportunity to make the goods conform-
ing while limiting the risks to which he is subject by excluding
direct and consequential damages that might otherwise arise.
From the point of view of the buyer the purpose of the exclu-
sive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract
within a reasonable time after a defective part is discovered.862
Professor Eddy, also focusing on conformity to the bargain, con-
curs: "Such a 'repair or replace' provision not only operates equit-
ably but also minimizes senseless economic waste. It assures that in
the end the buyer will receive substantially what was bargained
for-a functioning item meeting the contract description." 863
Comment 1 states that a limited remedy breaks down under
section 2-719 when it "fails in its purpose or operates to deprive
either party of the substantial value of the bargain." One com-
mentator reasons that "under 2-719(2) the test for continued effi-
cacy of a remedy limitation clause is substantial bargain depriva-
tion, in addition to, or instead of, failure of essential purpose." 864
We reject so expansive a reading. The exclusive remedy of repair
or replacement seeks simultaneously to exclude resultant damages
and provide a "means of assuring goods of warranted characteris-
tics." 86 Similarly, the remedy of refund substantially restores the
wise, it was substantively unconscionable (see notes 809-17 and accompanying text supra)
and therefore invalid under § 2-302, without ever triggering § 2-719. See Anderson, supra
note 853, at 771 ("section 2-302 speaks to a provision unconscionable at the time of making
the contract whereas 2-719(2) ... speak[s] to an agreement valid at its inception which is
rendered questionable by intervening circumstances").
Professor Eddy would alter Comment l's analytical sequence. He would prefer that a
court ask first whether the parties intended the limited remedy to apply under the cir-
cumstances. If they did, the remedy succeeds of its purpose, and the court would then
address the remedy's conscionability. Eddy, supra note 802, at 31-32. Despite the reversed
order of issues, both Professor Eddy's and Comment l's approaches treat failure of pur-
pose and unconscionability as nonoverlapping zones of attack against remedy limitations.
862 Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 105, 109 (D.
Del. 1973).
863 Eddy, supra note 802, at 61-62.
864 Anderson, supra note 853, at 766 (emphasis added).
865 Eddy, supra note 802, at 39.
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warranted value of goods while disallowing further recovery. 8 66
When the contract provides such a remedy, the buyer has bar-
gained for goods of warranted value and a remedy to ensure that
he receives that value in goods or cash.8 67 If the remedy suc-
ceeds of its purpose, the buyer receives the value of his bar-
gain.8 6 8  Thus, the Comment's reference to "value of the bargain"
simply clarifies, without expanding, the phrase "fails of its essen-
tial purpose."
When does an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement of
defective goods "fail of its essential purpose?" Since the purpose
of the remedy is to give the buyer conforming goods, the remedy
fails whenever the seller does not perform his obligation. In Soo
Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,8 69 freight cars developed seri-
ous structural defects. The Eighth Circuit held that the seller's
refusal to repair had caused the limited remedy to fail of its pur-
pose, and enunciated a workable rule: "A limited remedy fails of
its purpose whenever the seller fails to repair goods within a
reasonable time. Section 2-719(2) becomes operative when a party
is deprived of its contractual remedy and it is unnecessary to
prove that failure to repair was willful or negligent." 8 7 0
Courts split on whether a seller's good faith should shield him
when a buyer pleads failure of purpose. A number of recent cases
support Fruehauf's implication that the seller's state of mind is not
relevant in deciding whether a remedy of repair has failed of its
purpose,8 7' but other courts seem to intimate that the seller's
"6 We discuss failure of this remedy in notes 887-904 and accompanying text infra.
Recall that remedies must aim to restore at least the warranted value of the goods to pass
the test of substantive conscionability and become subject to failure-of-essential-purpose
analysis. See notes 809-17, 861, and accompanying text supra. Indeed, restoration of this
conscionable minimum may be the essential purpose to which § 2-719(2) refers.
67 The buyer has not bargained for damages in excess of the goods' warranted value in
situations where the remedy succeeds of its essential purpose. We discuss recovery of con-
sequential damages after a failure of purpose in notes 877-86 and accompanying text infra.
868 Some courts have employed an expansive reading of the Comment to upset remedy
limitations under § 2-719(2) where a buyer suffers large resultant losses. See notes 888-91
and accompanying text infra. These courts equate consequential damages with bargain
value and, in so doing, ignore the language of § 2-719(2). When the limited remedy aims
to restore the value of the goods while excluding resultant damages, consequential losses
alone will not cause it to fail. If the provided-for remedy is enforced, the buyer will receive
the value of his bargain, and the purposes of the limited remedy will be achieved in every
respect.
869 547 F.2d 1365, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181 (8th Cir. 1977).
870 Id. at 1371 n.7, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 1187 n.7.
876 In Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) the court found a failure of purpose despite the seller's
conscientious efforts to repair:
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good faith and best efforts to repair will save the remedy. 2 The
latter decisions underplay the significance of the seller's breach of
warranty. Regardless of the seller's diligence, the buyer who re-
ceives a promise or affirmation that has become part of the basis
of the bargain should not have to bear the cost of nonconforming
goods. The exclusive remedy is invariably termed "repair or re-
placement," not "best efforts to repair or replace." Indeed, if the
seller's sole obligation were to exercise his best efforts, the fairness
of the buyer's "quantum of remedy" would be in doubt.87 3
Professor Eddy agrees that failure of purpose should turn
"upon the result obtained, rather than the character of the war-
rantor's behavior."8 7 4  He further urges courts to consider the
nature of the goods warranted when evaluating the success of re-
Had the numerous repairs seller performed actually remedied the principal
defects in the H-100 and enabled it to run as an automatic machine should
have, buyer's remedy for breach would have been meaningful. As cir-
cumstances stand, the repairs were not effective to completely cure the breach
and make the machine operate in an automatic fashion, yet buyer has now
exhausted the limited remedy afforded him. Where such circumstances cause a
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, [section 2-719(2)] provides that
buyer may have his remedy as provided by the Code generally.
Id. at 381-82, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 101. Accord, V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d
864, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 670 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure of exclusive remedy turns on whether there
was "failure of consideration"); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323
F. Supp. 1300, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (exclusive remedy of repair or replace-
ment in sale of industrial equipment could fail of essential purpose despite seller's good
faith), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Cf
Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426-27, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 105, 109-10 (D.
Del. 1973) (court states that exclusive remedy of repair or replacement fails whenever war-
rantor fails to correct defect within reasonable time, but quotes with approval language
indicating need for bad faith); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584,
600-01, 510 S.W.2d 555, 566, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1281, 1292 (1974) (although stating that
repair or replacement "remedy fails whenever the warrantor ... fails to correct the defect
wihin a reasonable period," court quotes with approval language indicating need for bad
faith).
'72 See American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp 435, 453-54,
19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1023-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (determination that defendant acted in bad
faith or was willfully dilatory in rendering repairs under repair obligation would sustain
finding of failure of purpose); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385
F. Supp. 572, 578-79, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 360, 369 (D.D.C. 1974) (seller's best efforts to repair
turbine generator, coupled with finding that buyer did not lose substantial value of bar-
gain, precludes finding of failure of purpose), rev'd mem., 527 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc. 369 F. Supp. 882, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 368 (D. Mich. 1974) (willful
refusal to repair equipment would prove failure of purpose); Jones & McKnight Corp., v.
Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 307 (N.D. I11. 1970) (seller's willful breach
of promise to repair or replace would cause failure of purpose).
873 A "best efforts" rule could easily deprive buyers of any recovery for breach of war-
ranty. See notes 809-17 and accompanying text supra.
874 Eddy, supra note 802, at 72. Accord, Anderson, supra note 853, at 780 (cases focusing
on sellers' fault generally nonsensical).
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pairs.8 7 5  Thus, more promptness and conformity should be re-
quired in repairs of standardized goods than of complex,
custom-made equipment.8 76
c. Effect of Separate Consequential Damage Exclusions After Fail-
ure of Purpose. Once a buyer vaults the "exclusive" remedy, he
must overcome an even more imposing barrier to full recovery-
the everpresent "no consequential damages" clause. 7 7 Although
section 2-719(2) gives the buyer remedies "as provided in this Act"
when a limited remedy fails, section 2-719(3) explicitly authorizes
limitations of consequential damages. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
Welding & Engineering Corp. 878 vindicated a consequential damages
exclusion even though the seller's exclusive obligation to repair or
replace parts of industrial equipment had failed of its essential
purpose.
Plaintiff would have UCC 2-719 read in such a fashion as
to result in all limitations whatsoever being stricken in any
event in which an exclusive remedy should fail of its essential
purpose. A better reading is that the exclusive remedy clause
should be ignored; other clauses limiting remedies in less dras-
tic manners and on different theories would be left to stand or
fall independently of the stricken clause. Since the clause
excluding consequential damages has been held not uncon-
scionable, and is not otherwise offensive, it will be applied.87 9
87 Eddy, supra note 802, at 76-79.
876 At the extreme end of the spectrum, Professor Eddy would place experimental goods
such as the conveyor-oven involved in U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 449, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 254 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1
(6th Cir. 1975) (discussed in notes 589-96 and accompanying text supra). Eddy, supra note
802, at 77. He notes the lower court's adoption of a "best efforts" standard, but suggests
that the parties' clear understanding that the seller might fail is more pertinent. Id. at 79.
The Eighth Circuit preferred to rest on a finding that no express warranty arose as to the
oven's capabilities. 509 F.2d at 1046, 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 3-4.
877 An exclusive remedy of repair and replacement excludes consequential damages in
and of itself. But when the remedy fails, courts readily award such damages in the absence
of a separate exclusion. See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 105 (D. Del. 1973). Thus, a court could bypass a consequential damages exclu-
sion by viewing it as extraneous language or as a mere elaboration of the exclusive remedy.
See Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
368 (E.D. Mich. 1974). However, if the failure-of-purpose doctrine has such sweeping ef-
fects, sellers might simply exclude consequential damages rather than give the buyers the
more desirable "repair or replace" remedy.
878 323 F. Supp. 1300, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 444 F.2d 372, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
879 Id. at 1309, 8 U.C.C. Rep. at 448-49. The court noted, however, that a seller's bad
faith might invalidate the consequential exclusion on an estoppel theory. Id. at 1308, 8
U.C.C. Rep. at 447.
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Other courts have held otherwise. Courts that require bad
faith for failure of purpose similarly point to the seller's wrongful
conduct when allowing consequential damages. 880 The court in
Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc. 88 1 denied summary judgment to a
seller who had allegedly refused to repair defective equipment
and now sought shelter in its consequential damage exclusion.
At trial the defendants may be able to prove that the plaintiff's
conduct was such as to make the remedy provided by the con-
tract fail of its essential purpose.... [T]his court feels that it
would not be equitable to allow the seller to refuse to perform
the one remedy available to the buyer and then be freed of any
responsibility caused by this failure. In a sense, there are two
breaches of the contract; the first being the failure to deliver
goods conforming to the express warranty, and the second
being the failure to correct the nonconformity as was promised
in the party's [sic] agreement. 882
In American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 19
U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court held that the failure-of-purpose issue was a
fact question for trial, but granted seller's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
consequential damages. Although the turbine generator involved had been inoperable for a
total of ten months and was presently alleged to be unsafe and functioning below its war-
ranted capacity, the court upheld the consequential damages exclusion as independent of
the exclusive remedy. Id. at 457-59, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 1030-32. The decision's harshness
was mitigated somewhat by the court's broad characterization of primary damages. Accord,
Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
1281 (1974) (absent unconscionability, consequential damages not recoverable despite ex-
clusive remedy's failure of purpose).
A recent case seized upon the "different clauses" language in County Asphalt and Ameri-
can Electric and made consequential damage recovery turn on the location of the exclusion
in the contract. See Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 278, 22
U.C.C. Rep. 407, 425 (D. Me. 1977) (no consequential damage recovery, in part because
exclusion contained in "independent contractual clause ... wholly apart from the guaran-
tee of repair and replacement"). But see J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d
540, 551, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 694, 702 (Del. Super. Ct), appeal dismissed, 377 A.2d I (Del. 1977)
(location of clause not determinative).
880 See, e.g., Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43, 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 307, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (buyer entitled to assume seller "would not be unreasonable
or wilfully dilatory" in making repairs under warranty; breach of promise to repair al-
legedly caused bulk of damages). Cf. U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 449, 465, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 254, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (seller's willful and dilatory
failure to honor repair remedy makes seller liable for consequential damages despite exclu-
sion) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1043, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1975);
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572, 578-79, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 360, 369 (D.D.C. 1974) (seller's conscientious repair efforts preclude liability for con-
sequential damages), rev'd mem., 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
881 369 F. Supp. 882, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
882 Id. at 890, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 378.
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The Koehring rationale should presumptively apply to pur-
pose failures regardless of the seller's efforts.883 Normally, the
buyer has bargained away his right to consequential damages in
reliance on the seller's promise to repair or replace. When the
seller fails to meet the obligation, the exclusion should logically
and equitably collapse. 884  However, courts should heed Koehring's
suggestion that a buyer's consequential damages should not ex-
ceed those flowing from the limited remedy's failure. Since a "re-
pair or replace" remedy allows the seller a reasonable time to
make goods substantially conform to his warranties,8 85 a court
should honor the parties' allocation of consequential damages aris-
ing prior to the time of failure. The actual failure of purpose was
the only unanticipated event. When, after the remedy has failed,
the seller persists in futile repair efforts despite the buyer's clearly
expressed dissatisfaction, remedy limitations should not ordinarily
bar the buyer from recovering resultant damages. The damages
in such a case flow directly from the seller's failure to fulfill his
contractual obligation.88 6
d. Failure of Price Repayment Remedies and Damage Ceilings.
An exclusive refund remedy typically seeks to return the substan-
tial value of warranted goods while excluding resultant damages.
If the seller makes prompt payment, this purpose is met. A clause
limiting damages to the purchase price should never fail of its
essential purpose. Like exclusions of consequential damages and
modifications of warranty, a damage ceiling may not create an
"exclusive or limited remedy" within the meaning and purview of
883 A seller's good faith might be relevant when the seller fails to comply with a nonex-
clusive "repair or replacement" remedy. Such a remedy cannot fail of its purpose (see note
853 supra), but a buyer who gives the seller a chance to make the goods conform is sacrific-
ing immediately available alternative remedies. If the buyer then suffers consequential los-
ses flowing from the seller's bad faith in repair and replacement, the seller should not be
able to assert a separate exclusion as to such losses. Cf. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 274-78, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 407, 420-26 (D. Me. 1977) (consequential
damage exclusion enforced without discussion of seller's good faith).
884 See Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 382, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 80, 101-02 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (consequential damage exclusion ineffective de-
spite numerous repair efforts by seller). Professor Eddy, however, would uphold conse-
quential damage exclusions whenever the seller had made good faith repair efforts. Eddy,
supra note 802, at 84-88. We would presume that the parties did not intend to exclude
consequential damages flowing from a failure of essential purpose. However, since this no-
tion rests on the assumption that the buyer was relying on the remedy's success, the seller
should be allowed to demonstrate a contrary intent.
885 See notes 862-76 and accompanying text supra.
888 Accord, Anderson, supra note 853, at 776-77 (unconscionable to read consequential
damage exclusion as applicable to damages resulting from failure of essential purpose of
limited remedy).
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section 2-719(2). In any event, since its only apparent purpose is
to exclude resultant damages, it will "fail" only if a court refuses
to enforce it.8 87 Nevertheless, refund remedies and damage ceil-
ings have occasionally been held to fail under section 2-719(2)
when defects are undiscoverable before the buyer sustains large
losses.
In Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,888 a buyer re-
ceiving contaminated oil sustained large losses in settlements with
its own customers. The court held that a clause limiting recovery
to the purchase price failed of its essential purpose under section
2-719(2) because it left the buyer with "below a bare minimum in
quantum" of remedy. 88 9 The court reasoned that the remedy
was designed to restore the buyer to his pre-contractual position
and had failed due to the undiscoverability of the contaminant. So
construed, the limitation would fail whenever damages exceeded
the purchase price. The holding sapped the exclusionary clause of
any meaning and permitted the buyer to recover resultant dam-
ages which he had agreed to bear himself.
Neville Chemical typifies those cases that apply uncon-
scionability and failure-of-purpose analysis interchangeably to
avoid resultant damage limitations. 890  The courts reason that an
undiscoverable defect caused a buyer to lose his "value of the bar-
gain" or "fair quantum of remedy," and that the limitation there-
fore failed of its essential purpose or is unconscionable. 891 These
courts fail to recognize that the clause generally leaves the buyer
the value of his bargain (measured by the parties as the price of
the goods) and that the clause at the outset permits a fair quan-
tum of remedy (the value of the bargain). When a remedy's pur-
pose includes loss allocation, it does not fail merely because loss
187 See text accompanying note 855 supra.
888 294 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd in part, vacated in part on
other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 81 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970)
(discussed in Eddy, supra note 802, at 52-56).
889 Id. at 655, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1224.
890 See Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22-23, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592,
595-96 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (where goods contain latent defects, exclusion of consequential
damages unconscionable because it makes purchase price remedy fail of purpose). Cf Wil-
son Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 404-05, 244 N.E.2d 685, 687-
88, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1217 (1968) (latent defects would cause provision excluding all
liability for defects not discoverable within 10 days to fail of essential purpose).
891 A remedy limitation cannot fail of its essential purpose and be unconscionable at the
same time. See note 861 and accompanying text supra.
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occurs.892  Moreover, absent seller's bad faith,893 the undiscover-
ability of defects should not make a bargained-for allocation of risk
unconscionable. 8 94
Nevertheless, a price-repayment remedy could fail of its pur-
pose. For example, the exclusive remedy would fail where the
seller wrongfully refuses to refund the price. 895  Moreover, if the
purpose of price repayment is to enable the buyer to promptly
acquire substitute goods, even an undelayed refund may cause the
remedy to fail; substitute goods might not be readily available,89 6
992 In Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 855
(E.D. Pa. 1978), a buyer of defective film sought consequential damages despite the pres-
ence in the agreement of an exclusive remedy of replacement. Citing Neville Chemical, the
buyer argued that the defect's undiscoverability had caused the remedy to fail despite the
seller's willingness to comply with its duty to replace. Pointing out that the latency of de-
fects was the primary reason the seller attempted to limit recovery, the court concluded
that "rather than failing of its essential purpose the limitation of remedy clause operated
exactly in the circumstance it was intended." Id. at 411, 23 U.C.C. Rep. at 862.
893 As in Majors v. Kalo Labs., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592 (M.D. Ala.
1975) (discussed in notes 797-803 and accompanying text supra), the seller's bad faith pro-
vided the Neville Chemical court a more appropriate rationale for voiding the liability limita-
tion. The bad faith inherent in the seller's failure to notify the buyer about a new sub-
stance in the oil should have precluded the seller from asserting the damage ceiling. In
affirming Neville Chemical, the Third Circuit focused on the seller's negligence and held the
remedy limitation inapplicable.
854 See Eddy, supra note 802, at 46-48; notes 800-03 and accompanying text supra. The
consequences of a discoverable breach may be just as severe to a buyer. J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v.
William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 394 (1976), in-
volved a sale of meat in which the exclusive remedy for excessive fat content was an ad-
justment in price presumably measuring the difference between the value of the goods as
warranted and as delivered. The seller breached an "85% lean" warranty, causing large
consequential losses arising from the buyer's inability to comply fully with its contracts for
resale. Nevertheless, the value of his bargain was preserved, and the court refused to allow
other methods of recovery. The court noted that an exclusive remedy does not fail of its
purpose "whenever a contracting party loses money because a limited remedy provision
prevents him from being fully reimbursed for the damages caused by the other party's
breach." Id. at 4, 351 N.E.2d at 246, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 398.
895 Cf North Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, Inc., 75 Mich. App. 391, 400-01, 254 N.W.2d
899, 905, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 62, 67 (1977) (exclusive remedy of price adjustment for deliv-
ery of nonconforming steel failed of purpose when seller refused to comply).
M96 See Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 520 P.2d 978, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (1975) (seller's failure to repair or replace steel would cause exclusive
remedy of replacement or refund of price to fail of essential purpose apparently because
buyer could not procure substitute steel in time to complete construction contract). Cf J.A.
Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 551-52, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 694, 702-03
(Del. Super. Ct.) (exclusive remedy of replacement of turbine generator at seller's expense
would fail of purpose if buyer could not procure substitute without delay, enabling buyer
to recover consequential damages despite separate consequential damages exclusion), appeal
dismissed, 377 A.2d I (Del. 1977).
In Jones, a contract for the sale of a turbine generator permitted the buyer to reject
any defective equipment up to one year. Upon such rejection the seller's liability was lim-
ited to repair or replacement "within a reasonable time ... and in the event of failure by
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or the market price may have risen sharply since the time of con-
tracting.897 Absent an explicit understanding to the contrary,
however, courts probably should not hold that a repayment rem-
edy fails merely because the buyer cannot obtain a substitute in a
reasonable time. Usually the buyer should be able to foresee the
possibility of breach and the problems of substitution. Thus, al-
though the prompt acquisition of substitute goods may form one
purpose of a repayment remedy, the essential purpose is most
likely the return of consideration.898
The recent trend toward employing failure-of-purpose
analysis to negate exclusions of consequential damages may lead
more sellers to draft "alternative exclusive remedies." Consider
the following clauses:
1) Buyer's sole remedy for breach of warranty or other obliga-
tion is repair or replacement of defective parts by the seller,
or, in the event the seller fails to repair or replace within a
reasonable time, refund of the purchase price by the seller.
2) In no event shall the buyer be entitled to consequential
damages.8 99
the seller so to do, the Purchaser [could] make such replacement" at the seller's expense.
Id. at 549 n.l, 22 U.C.C. Rep. at 698 n.l. A separate clause excluded any recovery of
consequential damages. The seller contended that the exclusive remedy could not fail be-
cause it granted the buyer an alternative in case the seller failed to repair or replace.
In refusing to grant summary judgment to the seller on the issue of consequential
damages, the court observed that an essential contractual purpose might be the receipt by
the buyer of conforming goods within a reasonable time. Id. at 550, 22 U.C.C. Rep. at 700.
To the extent that the buyer was unable to obtain substitute goods after a failure of the
seller to live up to his promise to repair or replace, the remedy would fail of its essential
purpose. Assuming that the seller's failure resulted from lack of good faith the buyer could
recover consequential damages for any subsequent delay in procuring substitute goods.
89' The buyer may then be deprived of the value of his bargain within the meaning of
Comment I of § 2-719.
898 In J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 697 (Del.
Super. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 377 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977) (discussed in note 896 supra), the court's
characterization of the remedy's purpose as a means of providing the buyer with conform-
ing goods was probably appropriate. The contract explicitly referred to replacement by the
buyer rather than a mere price refund. If the buyer was unable to obtain a replacement,
the remedy likely failed of its essential purpose. In Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr.,
Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 480, 540 P.2d 978, 987, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1126, 1139 (1975), however,
the court relied on the large losses resulting from the defect's undiscoverability rather than
identifying the remedy's purpose as enabling prompt reacquisition. For discussion of the
fallacy of overriding resultant damage limitations on the basis of undiscoverable defects,
see notes 796-803 and accompanying text supra. The court in Marr Ents. v. Lewis Refriger-
ation Co., 556 F.2d 951, 955, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1322, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1977), examined a
similar remedy of replacement or refund but distinguished Jorgensen on the ground that
defects in a refrigeration unit were discoverable at an early stage.
899 See Marr Ents. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951, 954, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1322,
1325 (9th Cir. 1977); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 549 n.1, 22
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This provision reduces the likelihood of a finding of failure of
purpose. At the point where an exclusive remedy of repair or
replacement would fail of its essential purpose, 900 the seller may
still refund the price and avoid an award of consequential dam-
ages.901 There is nothing unfair in this. Normally, a buyer bar-
gains away his right to consequential damages in reliance upon
the seller's promise to repair or replace. The seller's non-
compliance with that promise than justifies an award of con-
sequential damages. 90 2 The first hypothetical clause, however,
allows for no such reliance. The contract makes clear that the par-
ties contemplate the possibility of noncompliance, and provides a
substantively conscionable remedy for that event.90 3 Only where
the seller neither repairs nor replaces nor refunds the price
within a reasonable time should the buyer be able to override a
separate exclusion of consequential damages.90 4
VI
DEFENSES TO WARRANTY ACTIONS
A. Buyer's Contributory Conduct
Comment 13 to section 2-314 describes a vital link between
seller's breach of warranty and buyer's recovery of damages.
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course
necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty but
the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of
the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In
U.C.C. Rep. 694, 698 n.1 (Del. Super. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 377 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977); Earl M.
Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 470, 540 P.2d 978, 982, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
1126, 1131 (1975).
900 An exclusive remedy of repair or replacement fails of its essential purpose when the
seller fails to repair or replace within a reasonable time. See notes 862-76 and accompany-
ing text supra.
901 Without the "alternative exclusive remedy" the seller would likely be liable for conse-
quential damages at least from the point where it became clear that the seller could not
repair or replace. See notes 877-86 and accompanying text supra.
902 See notes 883-86 and accompanying text supra.
903 Recall that a mere promise to exercise best efforts to repair or replace is probably a
substantively unconscionable remedy for breach of warranty. The additional promise to
refund the price, however, assures the buyer of the substantial value of his bargain. See
notes 809-17, 873 and accompanying text supra.
904 Of course, a court might construe the price refund remedy as intended to give the
buyer substitute goods. In that case, even prompt refund might not prevent failure of
essential purpose. See notes 895-98 and accompanying text supra.
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such an action an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss
resulted from some action or event following his own delivery
of the goods can operate as a defense.90 5
Unhappily, courts and parties becloud the causation issue
with terminology borrowed from tort law. 90 6  Although lawyers
must learn the jargon of their jurisdictions,90 7 the fundamental
905 (Emphasis added.)
906 The effect of a buyer's contributory conduct on his recovery "is a question that mas-
querades in many costumes." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-7, at 335. Sellers and
courts toss about such labels as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, misuse of the
product, lack of proximate cause, intervening cause, contributory fault, unjustified reliance,
and mitigation of damages.
Despite the apparent disparities in doctrine, differences among jurisdictions are often
more semantic than real. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 89, § 2-314:23, at 542-43. See generally
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-7, at 336-37. For instance, many jurisdictions will not
allow the seller to introduce evidence of the buyer's conduct under a contributory negli-
gence defense, but do allow that evidence when phrased in terms of lack of proximate
cause. See, e.g., Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insul. Co., 264 S.C. 604, 609-10, 216
S.E.2d 532, 534, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 728, 730-31 (1975); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 11-7, at 337 n.41.
907 The reported cases fail to demonstrate a consensus as to the applicability of tort-
based defenses to warranty cases. For instance, courts are divided about whether contribu-
tory negligence is a defense to a breach of warranty or a products liability claim. Some
courts allow the defense or its near relatives. See Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., 498 F.2d 952,
953 (10th Cir. 1974) (Kansas Law); Reed v. AMF Western Tool, Inc. 431 F.2d 345 (9th
Cir. 1970) (Idaho law); Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 346-47 (10th Cir.
1962) (Colorado law) (dictum); Arnaud's Rest., Inc. v. Cotter, 212 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir.
1954) (Louisiana law) (dictum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v.
Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 842 (Alaska 1967) (dictum); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976),judgment reformed on other grounds and afj'd, 547
F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1977) (unreasonable use after discovery of defect valid defense); Cole-
man v. American Universal, Inc., 264 So. 2d 451, 454, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1384, 1387 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 170, 460 P.2d 567, 573 (1969);
Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Tel. Co., 260 Md. 190, 197, 271 A.2d 744, 748, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 656, 662 (1970) (dictum); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374, 383, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 603, 609 (Minn. 1978); Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 251,
266 A.2d 855, 858, 7 U.C.C. Rep..1318, 1320 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 459, 212 A.2d 769, 782 (1965); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc.,
100 N.J. Super. 515, 522, 242 A.2d 663, 666 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 463, 251
A.2d 278 (1969); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 629, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973); Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 273; 488 P.2d 302,
305, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 777, 781 (1971); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d
969, 975, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 975, 981 (Wyo. 1970).
Other courts disallow one or more forms of the contributory negligence defense. See
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (Texas law)
(no defense unless buyer's conduct both voluntary and unreasonable), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974); Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 401, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 593, 595 (4th
Cir. 1973) (Virginia law) (dictum); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447
F.2d 660, 669, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 221 (5th Cir. 1971) (Texas law) (contributory negligence
of failure to discover defect no defense); Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d
317, 322, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 805, 811 (6th Cir. 1971) (Michigan law); Dagley v. Armstrong
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question underlying the Comment remains: Does the buyer's con-
duct "sufficiently attenuate the causal connection between defend-
ant's act and plaintiff's injury" to bar or diminish recovery? 908
To prove causation, the buyer must show that defects in the
goods were both the "cause in fact" and the "proximate cause" of
his loss. He may also have to prove that he complied with condi-
tions precedent, such as the seller's instructions for using the
goods. 90 9 In order to reduce the buyer's recovery, the seller for
his part may attempt to show that the buyer failed to mitigate his
damages. 910 The following discussion focuses on buyers' conduct
that may diminish or bar damages recoveries.
1. Cause in Fact
As part of his warranty case, the buyer must prove that his
loss would not have occurred "but for" the defects in the goods.91'
Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana law) (dictum); Preston v. Up-Right,
Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 639, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1966); Dillon v. General Motors
Corp., 315 A.2d 732, 736 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (contributory negligence of failure to
discover defect no defense), aff'd, 367 A.2d 1020 (Del. 1976); Henderson v. Cominco Am.,
Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 P.2d 873, 878 (1973) (dictum); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.,
45 Ill. 2d 418, 423-24, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 454
S.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 463, 143
S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965); Hinderer v. Ryan, 7 Wash. App. 434, 438, 499 P.2d 252, 255, 11
U.C.C. Rep. 306, 310 (1972) (contributory negligence no defense in action for personal
injuries) (dictum); Stark v. Allis-Chalmers, 2 Wash. App. 399, 405-06, 467 P.2d 854, 858
(1970).
Other breach of warranty and products liability cases using the tort concepts of con-
tributory negligence or assumption of the risk are collected in Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240
(1972), and Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965 & Supp. 1978).
908 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-7, at 336.
909 See notes 928-37 and accompanying text infra.
910 See notes 938-52 and accompanying text infra. Unlike contributory conduct, which
takes place before the defect manifests itself in injury and which may bar recovery, mitiga-
tion takes place after the buyer discovers the defect and failure to mitigate will merely
reduce the recovery. Mitigation issues often blur into foreseeability issues. See, e.g., Prutch
v. Ford Motor Co., 574 P.2d 102, 105, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 637, 640 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977)
(citing unavailability of substitute and loss that would have resulted had buyer not used
equipment, court rejected seller's argument that, since buyer used farm equipment with
knowledge of alleged defects, consequential damage not foreseeable); Whitaker v. Farm-
hand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 922, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 384 (Mont. 1977) (consequential dam-
ages allowed for malfunctioning irrigation system where buyer's failure to repair or obtain
substitute result of financial inability).
911 Plaintiff-buyer has the burden of proof of causation. See, e.g., Crocker v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 346 So. 2d 921, 923, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 349, 349-50 (Miss. 1977) (no evidence
that defect in stove caused fire that destroyed house). Circumstantial evidence of causation
may satisfy this burden. See Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. J.J. Blazer Constr. Co., 565 F.2d
401, 404, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 906, 910 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he jury could rationally deduce that
the structural disintegration of a majority of the tires, after short periods of service under
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Because most warranties describe the quality of the goods at the
time of delivery, the buyer must normally show that the goods
were defective when they left the warrantor's control.912  If the
defect appears some time after delivery, the buyer must show that
he took proper care of the goods in the interim.9 13  Similarly, a
seller can defend by showing that someone or something else
caused the buyer's loss; either the goods were not defective or
their defect did not injure the buyer.914
2. Proximate Cause
In addition to cause in fact, Comment 13 to section 2-314
requires the buyer to show "that the breach of the warranty was
normal operating conditions, was caused by latent defects attributable to the manufac-
turer"); Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d 171, 175, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 285, 290-92
(Minn. 1978) (defect in paint need not be proved by chemical analysis); Nelson v. Wilkins
Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472, 476, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1001, 1006 (Minn. 1977) (since vehicles
fit for ordinary purposes did not display enumerated defects, trial court should have al-
lowed jury to decide cause based on circumstantial evidence); Pearson v. Franklin Labs.,
Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 140, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 351, 358-59 (S.D. 1977) (testimony of veterinar-
ians and circumstantial evidence that cows vaccinated from one particular batch of vaccine
became ill while others did not, sufficed to prove that vaccine defective). But see the unfor-
tunate dictum in Heil v. Standard Chem. Mfg. Co., 301 Minn. 315, 325, 223 N.W.2d 37,
43, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 345, 352 (Minn. 1974), that "proof of causation cannot be established
through negative implication."
912 See, e.g., Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 574 P.2d 102, 105, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 637, 640-41
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 8-9, 342 A.2d 181,
184, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 39, 43-44 (1975) (consumer case).
913 See, e.g., Werner v. Montana, 378 A.2d 1130, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 894 (N.H. 1977).
914 Courts often recognize this defense without determining whether there was no
breach of warranty or no cause in fact from the breach. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Jackson Transp. Co., 126 Ga. App. 471, 475, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 311, 314-15 (1972)
(seller entitled to show that road hazard, not defect, caused tire blowout); McCleskey v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 179, 193 S.E.2d 16, 18, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
747, 748 (1972) (use inconsistent with seller's instructions); Chisholm v. J.R. Simplot Co.,
94 Idaho 628, 631, 495 P.2d 113, 116, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 999, 1002 (1972) (use inconsistent
with seller's instructions).
Once a buyer establishes a defect, however, the seller can only argue that the defect
did not cause the buyer's consequential damages. See, e.g., Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. J.J.
Blazer Constr. Co., 565 F.2d 401, 404, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 906, 910 (6th Cir. 1977) (buyer
recovers where seller failed to show "product misuse or other intervening cause" after
buyer established nonconformity); Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 762,
159 S.E.2d 171, 174, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 909, 911 (1967) (jury questions whether buyer's use of
drug contrary to package instructions barred recovery for burns suffered when pharmacist
sold more concentrated drug than prescription called for); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co.
v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483, 490-91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (misuse of product bars plaintiff-
buyer's recovery, even where product nonconforming, if injury would have occurred were
product conforming) (dictum).
Counsel for buyers, however, should not ignore the distinction. Proof of a defect enti-
tes the buyer to recover primary damages as to goods accepted and retained (see notes
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the proximate cause of the loss sustained." 91 5  Thus, even if the
loss would not have occurred "but for" the breach, where an in-
tervening cause attenuates the connection between the breach and
the loss, a court may bar 91 6 or reduce proportionately 91 7 the
buyer's consequential damage recovery. Despite its tort law ori-
gins, the proximate cause concept is firmly woven into the fabric
of the Code.918
325-413 and accompanying text supra), and incidental damages as to goods rejected or
revoked (see notes 414-65 and accompanying text supra). Thus, even when he cannot show
that the defect caused his consequential losses, the buyer need not go home emptyhanded.
915 (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 527,
24 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1978); Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d
188, 191-92, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1975); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island
Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 97-99, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1117, 1126-28 (E.D. Tenn. 1977);
Geiger v. Sweeney, 201 Neb. 175, - 266 N.W.2d 895, 989-99 (1978); Herman v. Mid-
land Ag Serv., Inc., 200 Neb. 356, -, 264 N.W.2d 161, 172, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 590, 594
(1978). As the Herman and Geiger cases demonstrate, courts may often interpret proximate
cause to mean cause in fact. In Geiger, the seller claimed that an act of God (severe winds),
rather than a structural defect, was the proximate cause of a grain bin being blown away
from its foundation. 201 Neb. at -, 266 N.W.2d at 899-900.
916 For example, a carpet dealer claimed loss of customers and goodwill because carpet-
ing supplied to it for resale was defective. The court held that the proximate cause of the
dealer's loss was not the carpeting's defectiveness, but rather his foisting of the goods on
his customers. "It was not the defective carpet per se, but the fact that [the dealer] knew of
the defects, yet authorized the installation without bringing the defects to the attention of
school officials, that caused [his] removal [from county school board bidding lists]." Aldon
Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 192, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1002, 1007-08 (5th
Cir. 1975).
9'7 The court may reduce the buyer's recovery if his negligence or fault contributed
causally to his own injury. For example, in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 24
U.C.C. Rep. 555 (Tex. 1978), the buyer ignored the seller's warning that a defect in a
reactor heater made the heater unsafe. The Texas Supreme Court held:
[I]n a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty the buyer may not
recover consequential damages to the extent that the buyer's negligence or fault
was a concurring proximate cause of such damages. To the extent the product
was unsuitable and proximately caused the damages, the buyer may recover
consequential damages for breach of warranty. Under the present holding
where both the unsuitable product and the buyer's negligence are found to be
proximate causes of the damage, an additional determination must be made by
the trier of fact: that being the respective percentages (totalling 100 percent) by
which the concurring causes contributed to the consequential damages.
Id. at 568 (emphasis in original). See Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d 171,
176, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 285, 293 (Minn. 1978) (dictum); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264
N.W.2d 374, 383, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 603, 609 (Minn. 1978) (dictum).
918 The Code contains a proximate cause requirement in § 2-715(2)(b): "Consequential
damages resulting from the seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proxi-
mately resulting from any breach of warranty." The absence of similarly explicit language
in § 2-715(2)(a) suggests that the proximate cause test applies only to personal injury and
property damage. But the Official Comments undermine this view. Comment 13 to § 2-314
does not limit the proximate cause requirement to personal injury and property damage
cases. Moreover, according to Comment 5 to § 2-715, "[s]ubsection (2)(b) states the usual
rule as to breach of warranty, allowing recovery for injuries 'proximately' resulting from
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Simply putting the warranty to the test will not bar the
buyer's recovery.91 9 Suppose Burt Buyer runs a newsstand in
Manhattan. A cigar grows from the side of his mouth. Occasion-
ally, he removes the cigar to berate a customer, placing it on a
pile of yesterday's Times. Worried about this fire hazard, Burt buys
a warranted fire extinguisher from Sam Seller. One day, during
an especially long harangue, the newsstand catches fire. Burt's fire
extinguisher fizzles and fails while his newsstand burns to the
ground. Burt sues Sam for the loss of his newsstand and lost prof-
its. Can Sam prove Burt's contributory negligence as a bar to re-
covery? No! Burt relied upon the warranty for protection against
his carelessness.9 20  He put the warranty to the test.9 21
On the other hand, suppose Burt tries the fire extinguisher
and discovers that it does not work, but continues to use yester-
day's Times as an ashtray. Burt should recover only primary dam-
ages; the loss of the newsstand and profits are his to bear. Com-
ment 5 to section 2-715 states: "[If the buyer] did in fact discover
the defect prior to his use, the injury would not proximately re-
sult from the breach of warranty." 9 22  The buyer's conduct inter-
venes between the defect and his loss.
the breach." (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that the proximate cause require-
ment applies to all consequential loss resulting from breach of warranty. One can assume
that § 2-715(2)(a) losses must flow proximately from the breach. The section as drafted
simply emphasizes the additional requirement of foreseeability: "requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (emphasis
added).
919 Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 279, 283, 520 P.2d 146,
148, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 940, 943 (1974). See Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir.
1962) (Uniform Sales Act); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254, 258 (6th
Cir. 1960) (Uniform Sales Act).
920 See Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1962) ("One may well rely upon
a warranty as protection against aggravation of the consequences of one's own careless-
ness.") (Uniform Sales Act case).
92! Putting the warranty to the test should, however, have its limits. Burt's friend Boris
has a nastier habit: he enjoys setting fire to copies of prestigious law reviews. Not wanting
to set his highbrow newsstand on fire, Boris also buys a warranted fire extinguisher. Dur-
ing one of his more enlightening debauches, Boris turns to his fire extinguisher, which
naturally fails to operate. In the final analysis, whether Boris's conduct proximately caused
the loss may depend upon whether it was reasonable for Boris not to test or inspect the
fire extinguisher before setting his fires. See notes 923-27 and accompanying text infra.
912 It would appear that an individual using a product when he had actual know-
ledge of a defect or knowledge of facts which were so obvious that he must
have known of a defect, is either no longer relying on the seller's express or
implied warranty or has interjected an intervening cause of his own, and there-
fore a breach of such warranty cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of
the ensuing injury.
Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Tel. Co., 260 Md. 190, 196-97, 271 A.2d 744, 747, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 656, 661 (1970).
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If Burt remains unaware of the defect, a court may bar re-
covery for failure to inspect the goods. According to Comment 5
to section 2-715, "[wlhere the injury involved follows the use of
goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the
question of 'proximate' cause turns on whether it was reasonable
for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as would
have revealed the defects." 923  Whether the buyer's failure to in-
spect is reasonable may depend upon such factors as the difficulty
of inspection,924 the buyer's degree of expertise and prior experi-
Despite widespread recognition of this defense, its scope remains problematic. Compare
Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Tel. Co., 260 Md. 190, 195-97, 271 A.2d 744, 746-47, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 656, 660-61 (1970) (television set emitting sparks and smoke obviously
dangerously defective) and Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co., 66 Mich.
App. 642, 646, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695-96, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 100, 102-03 (1976) (buyer's know-
ing use of seller's adulterated sugar in production process barred recovery for resulting
losses) with Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 574 P.2d 102, 104-05, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 637, 640
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (buyers recovered for damaged crop despite use of defective plowing
equipment where non-use would have resulted in no crop at all). Prutch implies that use of
a product with knowledge of a defect will not bar recovery where such use is "reasonable."
In the same vein, dicta in Michigan Sugar suggests that use with knowledge of a defect will
not bar a buyer's consequential damage recovery where such use is foreseeable by the
seller. 66 Mich. App. at 646, 239 N.W.2d at 695, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 103.
The seller may explicitly warn the buyer of the dangerous state of the product. In
Phillips v. Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 74 (W.D. Pa. 1977) seller delivered an
electric horsewalker (a carousel-like device for exercising horses) without a proper electrical
ground. Buyer ignored seller's admonition not to use the device until an electrician had
connected it properly. Id. at 877, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 75. In denying recovery for the
electrocution of one horse and injuries to three others, the court found that although the
seller had breached implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, the jury correctly
concluded that the buyer's assumption of the risk barred recovery. Id. at 879-80, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. at 77-79.
923 Cf. Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 3-5, 120 N.W.2d 786,
788-89 (1963) (jury could find that buyer should have examined soft drink before consum-
ing the remainder of it after she found or should have found that it contained glass parti-
cles) (non-Code).
As Comment 5 indicates, even if the buyer does make an inspection, his conduct may
be unreasonable if the inspection does not turn up the defect. Comment 13 to § 2-314
suppdrts this: "Action by the buyer following an examination of the goods which ought to
have indicated the defect complained of can be shown as matter bearing on whether the
breach itself was the cause of the injury." (Emphasis added.)
924 In General Instr. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 13
U.C.C. Rep. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974), a buyer's
failure to discover that sleeve bearings for bomb fuses were packed in oil of the wrong
thickness barred him from consequential damages. The nondiscovery was unreasonable
because "[a] mere visual inspection of the whole contents of the bag would at least have put
anyone who regularly handled these bearings on notice that something was amiss." Id. at
149, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 836. Cf Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App.
495, 503-04, 190 N.W.2d 275, 278-80, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1019, 1023-24 (1971) (where only test
for carbon content and not an ordinary examination would have revealed defects in struc-
tural steel, § 2-316(3)(b) would not exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchant-
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ence with the goods, 92 5 or the magnitude of potential loss. 926  If
the seller assures the buyer that the goods are not defective or
that the defect is cured, a court may require the buyer to show
that his subsequent reliance was reasonable.927
Because of the inherent malleability of tort-based concepts
like proximate cause, courts can often do what social policy and
fairness demand. In general, policies pertinent to commercial
transactions argue for holding a commercial buyer to a more
stringent duty to inspect the goods. The commercial buyer is bet-
ter able to discover or insure against a breach of warranty than is
the consumer and, in some cases, the seller.
3. Conditions Precedent
A condition precedent is a contractual duty that the buyer
must fulfill before the seller's warranty obligation becomes en-
forceable.9 28  Unlike other kinds of contributory conduct, there-
fore, failure to comply with a condition precedent does not bar
recovery by interrupting the chain of causation between the
breach and the loss; 929 it simply prevents the warranty from
maturing.
ability on grounds of "defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed").
925 In General Instr. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 139, 13
U.C.C. Rep. 829, 834-36 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974), discus-
sed in note 924 supra, a bomb manufacturer received sleeve bearings packed in noncon-
forming oil of a different color than the specified oil. Id. at 148, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 835. In
holding unreasonable the bomb manufacturer's failure to timely discover the defect, the
court stated: "Prior to [the present shipment], plaintiff had received and handled approx-
imately 1,500,000 properly impregnated bearings. A frequent buyer of a particular prod-
uct must be held to a higher standard in discovering defects in that particular product
than a casual buyer." Id. at 149, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 836.
926 The disproportionality between the contract price and the foreseeable consequential
loss may alone indicate that the buyer should have inspected the goods more carefully.
927 See, e.g., Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 279, 285, 520 P.2d
146, 149, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 940, 945 (1974) (buyer can recover for injuries caused by
malfunctioning safety hood if, in view of her own observations, she reasonably relied on
seller's assurance that hood had been repaired).
928 See, e.g., Veretto v. Eli Lilly & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1254, 1256, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1239,
1241-42 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (conditions precedent in applying pesticide to land before war-
ranty of effectiveness matured).
929 Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances of a case, some courts will view a fail-
ure to comply with a condition precedent as a cause intervening between the breach and
the loss. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 179, 193
S.E.2d 16, 18, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 747, 748 (1972); Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga.
App. 760, 762, 159 S.E.2d 171, 173-74, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 909, 911 (1967); Chisholm v. J. R.
Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 628, 631, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 999, 1002 (1972).
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Conditions precedent take various forms, from the simple
"use as directed" instructions 9 30 common in advertisements, to re-
quirements that the buyer notify the seller of defects that the
seller has promised to cure, 31 to complex maintenance and
record-keeping requirements.9 32  As with other aspects of the
warranty, a condition precedent's vitality depends upon whether it
has become part of the basis of the bargain.9 33 Once this
threshold is crossed, the buyer must prove compliance with the
condition. 34
The buyer's failure to satisfy a contractual responsibility relat-
ing to the goods may be characterized in terms of either condition
precedent or proximate cause. The distinction makes a difference.
Condition-precedent theory automatically bars recovery because the
warranty never became enforceable.9 35  Proximate cause theory
"0 See, e.g., Veretto v. Eli Lilly and Co., 369 F. Supp. 1254, 1256, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1239,
1241 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 474 S.W.2d 789, 793, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 30, 35-36 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
931 See, e.g., Veretto v. Eli Lilly and Co., 369 F. Supp. 1254, 1256, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1239, 1241
(N.D. Tex. 1974). The seller naturally does not wish to assume liability for failing to pro-
vide a remedy until he knows that his performance is due. Manufacturers of expensive
machinery find this condition particularly important. See generally Potomac Elec. Power Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572, 577-78, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 360, 367 (1974),
rev'd mem., 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
932 See, e.g., Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522, 525, 198 N.W.2d 57, 60, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 1131, 1133 (1972) (action on express warranty in sale of pickup truck
barred where buyer failed to prove he performed required maintenance and received cer-
tificate of compliance).
9'3 Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 516 S.W.2d 726, 731, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 777, 784
(Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (buyer's cause of action for breach of express warranty barred where
buyer failed to follow instructions on seller's label and instructions part of basis of bargain);
W.G. Tufts and Son v. Herider Farms, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 300, 303, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 942, 944
(Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (instructions found on label of seller's product that would have pre-
vented injury to cows not relevant in determining breach of express warranty unless part
of basis of bargain).
934 Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522, 525-26, 198 N.W.2d 57, 61, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 1131, 1134 (1972); Veretto v. Eli Lilly and Co., 369 F. Supp. 1254, 1256, 14 U.C.C.
Rep. 1239, 1241 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
'35 In Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522, 198 N.W.2d 57, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
1131 (1972), a Ford dealer warranted a truck subject to the condition that buyer not only
maintain the vehicle but also present to any Ford dealer evidence of such maintenance to
receive written confirmation. Without a dealer's written confirmation, seller was not obli-
gated to repair. The farmer changed the oil and filters himself, but he did not present
proof of such for a dealer's certification. Although the seller did not challenge the
adequacy of the buyer's maintenance, the court denied warranty protection to the buyer.
Id. at 525-27, 198 N.W.2d at 62-64, 10 U.C.C. Rep. at 1134-35. Failure to meet a condition
precedent may thus bar recovery even though the buyer's loss did not result from that
failure.
To hold otherwise and permit recovery despite the findings of non-compliance
with the conditions precedent would, in our opinion, not only render nugatory
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impedes recovery only if the buyer's conduct contributed significantly
to causing his loss.936 We favor the proximate cause approach.
Conditions precedent encourage buyers to properly use and care
for the goods. Yet courts should hesitate to deny recovery because
of buyer's conduct that has no causal connection with his loss.
Courts should apply proximate cause analysis unless the agree-
ment explicitly and conspicuously hinges seller's warranty obliga-
tion on buyer's compliance. 937  Otherwise, conditions precedent
may unfairly frustrate buyer's reasonable expectation of warranty
protection.
4. Mitigation
Although the buyer establishes breach of warranty and causa-
tion, section 2-715(2)(a) allows him to recover only that loss
"which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or other-
wise." 938  Although the mitigation concept traditionally encom-
passes the buyer's behavior after he discovers the breach, section
2-715(2)(a) does not compel this limitation. A court might reason-
ably deny recovery to a commercial buyer for losses he could have
and meaningless the very basis of the bargain found to exist between the par-
ties, but would sanction a new and different express warranty that the promisor
had not made at the time of the sale.
Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 516 S.W.2d 726, 732, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 777, 785 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1974).
936 See notes 915-27 and accompanying text supra.
911 In Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d 171, 176, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 285, 292
(Minn. 1978), a buyer of paint failed to follow directions printed on the paint cans' labels.
In affirming a judgment for the buyer, the court distinguished cases in which "compliance
with the directions [was] ... a condition precedent to the existence of the express warranty
sued on. Here no comparable stress was laid on the importance of the directions, and they
certainly were not specific and precise.... "
938 A buyer might try to avoid the mitigation requirement in § 2-715 (2)(a) by seeking
consequential damages under subsection 2(b): "injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty." Unlike subsection 2(a), subsection 2(b) does not
contain a foreseeability requirement (see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 10-4, at 324;
note 918 supra) or an explicit mitigation responsibility. The drafters probably envisioned
some overlap between the coverage of the subsections. Nevertheless, subsection 2(a) ex-
presses a commercial focus by referring to "loss" instead of injury and by its foreseeability
requirement, which suggests parties can control the risk through contractual planning.
Subsection 2(b) appears designed for consumer situations and discrete injuries suffered by
consumer or commercial buyers. Thus, although it could be called a "property injury"
under subsection 2(b), the loss resulting from a leaky silo that rots the corn stored within
fits best under subsection 2(a). But if a defective foundation causes the silo to collapse and
kill a sheep, the event fits best as an injury to property under subsection 2(b). Courts
should not allow commercial buyers to avoid the mitigation doctrine by suing under sub-
section 2(b). The "good faith" commercial reasonableness required by § 2-103(I)(b) cer-
tainly encompasses the commercial buyer's duty to minimize damages flowing from a
breach. See note 317 supra. Further, Comment 2 to § 2-715 mentions good faith as a re-
quirement of "subparagraph (2)," not just subsection 2(a).
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prevented by making contingent plans against the possibility of
breach. 939
In any event, the breaching seller generally has the burden of
proving that the buyer could have avoided or minimized the loss
by reasonable effort and expense. 940  The buyer's unreasonable
failure to minimize his loss will reduce, but not bar, his damage
recovery.94' Moreover, at least one court suggests that a buyer
will not be penalized for failing to mitigate where the seller passed
up an equivalent opportunity to do so. 942
The buyer's duty to mitigate is not "absolute" or "unlim-
ited." 943  To receive full consequential damages, he need not
have chosen what in hindsight appears to have been the best
course of action. 944 The buyer must simply have acted reason-
939 Suppose the operation of buyer's factory, a $1 million-a-day enterprise, depends on
an inexpensive cotter pin, available only by mail. If the cotter pin breaks and buyer has
neglected to procure a spare, shouldthe factory owner recover for profits lost in the time it
takes to order a new part? The buyer could argue that he simply put the warranty to the
test. See notes 919-21 and accompanying text supra. The seller, in turn, may argue that in
not keeping spare parts, the buyer failed to act in a commercially reasonable manner
under § 2-103(1)(b). Alternatively, the seller could frame his argument as one for "an-
ticipatory mitigation," that is, that the buyer has a pre-breach duty to minimize his poten-
tial loss. Where the buyer can prevent most consequential losses by a trivial expenditure,
perhaps he should be required to do so. The strength of this argument increases as the
potential loss grows larger relative to the preventive expense. Anticipatory mitigation fits
quite nicely into the "reasonably be prevented" language of § 2-715(2)(a). On the other
hand, anticipatory mitigation adds a pre-breach foreseeability requirement for the buyer.
The drafters use of the word "cover" in § 2-715(2)(a) may indicate that the buyer need
only prevent losses that he foresees or should foresee after the breach occurs.
9'0 See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 8
(3d Cir. 1978); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 639 (8th
Cir. 1971); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 335, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 1070, 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Whitaker v.
Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 922, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 384 (Mont. 1977); Hardwick v.
Dravo Equip. Co., 279 Or. 619, 626, 569 P.2d 588, 591, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 968, 973 (1977).
At least one court places the burden of proof on the buyer to show that he could not
reasonably have "covered." See Cargill, Inc. v. Fickbohm, 252 N.W.2d 739, 742, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 1226, 1230 (Iowa 1977).
941 See, e.g., Dunn Buick, Inc. v. Belle Isle Plumbing, Heating & Air Cond. Co., 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) ("failure to mitigate goes only to the amount of dam-
ages and is not a complete bar to Buyer's action").
42 "Where both the plaintiff and the defendant have had equal opportunity to reduce
the damages by the same act and it is equally reasonable to expect the defendant to
minimize damages, the defendant is in no position to contend that the plaintiff failed to
mitigate." S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 530, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 10
(3d Cir. 1978) (alternative holding).
943 See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 510, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 640 (8th
Cir. 1971).
944 U.C.C. § 2-712, Comment 2, provides:
The test of proper cover is whether at the time and place the buyer acted in
good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it is immaterial that hindsight may
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ably under the circumstances; "I and whether he has done so is a
question for the jury.94 6
Circumstances may prevent the buyer from attempting to
mitigate. For example, the buyer may have no reason to know of
the ongoing consequences of the defect,947 or he may not be able
to reasonably afford measures to limit his loss. 94 8  In such cases,
the buyer can safely keep and use the goods without endangering
his consequential damage recovery.
When mitigation is feasible, it may take one of several forms.
If the buyer rejects or never receives the goods, he may cover
under section 2-712. 949 If he accepts the goods, he might sup-
plement perceived deficiencies, 950 alter commercial plans to make
the best of a bad situation, 95 or make do until some later time
when a reasonable alternative materializes. 952  In sum, the seller
later prove that the method of cover used was not the cheapest or most effec-
tive.
See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529-30, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 8-
1 1(3d Cir. 1978) (although trial court's preference for one of several mitigation alternatives
may have been best choice, buyer's decision to continue performance with unsatisfactory
contractor was reasonable) (alternative holding).
91' See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 7
(3d Cir. 1978); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. Rep.
74, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (unreasonable for buyer to resell nonconforming pre-planting
fertilizer piecemeal when it could have shipped whole cargo to its plants for regrinding
and resale as "out-of-condition" bulk fertilizer).
946 See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509-10, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 639-40
(8th Cir. 1971); Owens v. Clow Corp., 491 F.2d 101, 104, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 339, 342-43 (5th
Cir. 1974); Lake Village Implement Co. v. Cox, 252 Ark. 224, 232, 478 S.W.2d 36, 42, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 1398, 1405 (1972).
"I See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp. 438 F.2d 500, 508-09, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 637-40
(8th Cir. 1971); Bevard v. Howat Concrete Co., 433 F.2d 1202, 1203, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 966,
968 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
948 See, e.g., Camrosa County Water Dist. v. Southwest Welding and Mfg. Co., 49 Cal.
App. 3d 951, 956, 123 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 780, 783 (1975); Whitaker v.
Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 922-23, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 375, 384-85 (Mont. 1977).
Moreover, the buyer's reasonable mitigation expenses should be considered consequen-
tial damages of the breach. See notes 333, 414-16 and accompanying text supra.
949 See generally Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal.
App. 3d 209, 217-20, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111, 116-18, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 643, 650-53 (1971); S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 353, 358, 350 N.E.2d
321, 325, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1125, 1130 (1976); Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 920,
296 N.E.2d 871, 873, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1082, 1085 (1973); Valley Die Cast Corp. v. A.C.W.,
Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 336-37, 181 N.W.2d 303, 310-11, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 488, 498 (1970);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3.
9" See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529-30, 24 U.C.C.
Rep. 1, 8-11 (3d Cir. 1978).
M' See, e.g., Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 244-45, 206 N.W.2d 377, 384,
12 U.C.C. Rep. 830, 836 (1973).
912 See, e.g., Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 329, 334, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 1070, 1074-75, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
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will be unable to attack the buyer's conduct to reduce the conse-
quential damage recovery so long as the buyer acts reasonably to
minimize his loss.
B. Privity-Section 2-318
"Privity" denotes the relationship between contracting par-
ties.955 Where no contractual relationship exists, no privity of
contract exists. Until recently, the absence of privity shielded re-
mote manufacturers and sellers from liability to persons aggrieved
by defective or unsafe products. Manufacturers owed no duty to
nonprivity plaintiffs to exercise care in the manufacture of their
products; 954 privity thus formed a prerequisite to products liabil-
ity torts. Similarly, only a party, assignee, or intended third-party
beneficiary to a contract could recover damages from a party in
breach of the contract. 955  Because warranty is a hybrid of tort
and contract, 956 lack of privity provided an effective defense
against warranty actions.
In this century, American legislatures, courts, and commen-
tators have crippled the privity doctrine in the products liability
field. 957  The assault on privity has proceeded primarily on four
151 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "privity of contract" as
"that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties. It is
essential to the maintenance of an action on any contract that there should subsist a privity
between the plaintiff and defendant in respect of the matter sued on." Id. at 1362. See 4
CORBIN, supra note 495, at § 778; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-2, at 327.
'" See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
15- See note 953 supra.
95' See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1126-27 (1960); 42 HARV. L. REV. 414, 414-15 (1929). But see 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra
note 167, § 1.1905, at 86.
957 See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, supra note 956. The assault upon the citadel of privity began
when the New York Court of Appeals held that an automobile manufacturer owed a duty
of due care to an ultimate user of one of its vehicles. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). Later, as negligence doctrines and sales
warranties proved inadequate to shift the loss caused by unsafe products from injured
consumers to remote manufacturers, courts invented strict liability in tort, a doctrine unen-
cumbered by privity requirements. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971); Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation in
New England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 ME. L. REv. 181, 183-93 (1967); Prosser, supra note 956, at 1103-24.
The American Law Institute has encapsulated strict liability in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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policy fronts. First, manufacturers and suppliers seem best able to
distribute losses caused by unsafe products because they can pass
on the cost of products liability or liability insurance in the price
of the goods they sell.958 Second, strict liability of remote man-
ufacturers to ultimate consumers and bystanders serves the dual
purpose of compensating injured parties for the harm they suffer
and deterring the manufacture of unreasonably dangerous pro-
ducts.959 Third, "[t]he supplier, by placing the goods upon the
market, represents to the public that they are suitable and safe for
use; and by packaging, advertising or otherwise, he does every-
thing that he can to induce that belief." 960 Courts will thus obli-
gate the supplier to make good his representations. Finally, the
purchaser of an unsafe product could ordinarily recover damages
from the retailer, who in turn could seek indemnity from the
manufacturer. A direct avenue of recovery from the purchaser to
the manufacturer avoids the waste and risk entailed in that cir-
cuitous route to recovery. 961
Some of the policies underlying the judicial assault on privity
apparently influenced the drafters of the Code. In the 1952 draft
they included section 2-318, which read:
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
95' See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(concurring opinion, Traynor, J.); Prosser, supra note 956, at 1120-21; Note, Economic Loss
in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 926, 952-53 (1966).
959 See Prosser, supra note 956, at 1122-23.
960 Id. at 1123. As Prosser has noted, the intermediate seller is usually a mere conduit,
and his position on the distributive chain should not preclude recovery where the manufac-
turer has induced reliance on the quality of his product. Id. See Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59-60, 207 A.2d 305, 309, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 599, 603 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, - , 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960).
961 See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 62-63, 207 A.2d 305, 310, 2
U.C.C. Rep. 599, 605-06 (1965); Prosser, supra note 956, at 1123-24. U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a)
alleviates the "circuity" problem, within the context of Article Two, by helping the retailer
to coerce the manufacturer into court. That section provides:
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for
which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the
seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be
bound in any action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact
common to the two litigations, then unless the seller after reasonable receipt
of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound.
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A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 962
This section, which is now Alternative A of the three alternative
provisions recommended by the Code drafters, amounts to a legis-
lative designation of third-party beneficiaries to a warranty,
thereby extending the warranty beyond contractual designations.
Three aspects of Alternative A deserve mention. First, the
designated third-party beneficiaries include only members of the
buyer's family or household, or guests in his home, and then only
those reasonably likely to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods. Second, the harm covered by Alternative A is specifically
limited to personal injury, where the policies for expanding liabil-
ity are strongest. Third, Alternative A erodes the horizontal priv-
ity requirement but is silent about vertical privity. Horizontal priv-
ity exists when a person occupies a contractual position, no matter
how remote, on the same chain of distribution as the manufac-
turer. A buyer is thus in horizontal privity with the retailer from
whom he buys the goods, with the supplier who sold to the re-
tailer, and with the manufacturer of the goods. The buyer's
friend who uses the goods is not in horizontal privity with anyone.
Vertical privity, on the other hand, exists only between parties
occupying adjacent links on the distributive chain. 963 The buyer
of goods is in vertical privity with the retailer but not with the
supplier or manufacturer.
Alternative A represents a legislative declaration that a
buyer's family, household, or guests, if foreseeably affected by the
goods, will have the same cause of action against sellers of defec-
tive products as does the buyer. Alternative A thus dispenses with
the horizontal privity requirement as to certain nonprivity users.
962 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFr (Text & Comments ed. 1952).
963 One court has suggested that vertical privity deals with the question 'from whom does
the warranty run," whereas horizontal privity addresses the question "to whom does the
warranty run?" Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 379, 307 A.2d
398, 400, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 769, 770 (1973) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 457 Pa. 24, 319
A.2d 903 (1974). See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 64, § 91, at 282-83; Donovan, supra note
957, at 218.
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The drafters acknowledged Alternative A's silence on the
issue of vertical privity in Comment 3 to section 2-318:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within
its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser.
Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended
to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, *given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain.96
4
On its face, this Comment indicates that Alternative A is not
meant to affect the requirement of vertical privity, leaving the
matter to judicial determination. Some courts, however, find in
the Comment a license to extend the legislative inroads on hori-
zontal privity, and to provide a cause of action to parties not on
the distributive chain who are not specifically mentioned in sec-
tion 2-318.965 In essence, these courts read Alternative A more
as a minimum guarantee to consumers than as a precise allocation
of risk. The Permanent Editorial Board, however, has read a
negative inference into the section "limiting beneficiaries to the
family, household and guests of the buyer." 96 6  This suggests that
964 (Emphasis added.)
9" See, e.g., Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 398, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 681,
684-85 (10th Cir. 1967); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991, 993, 11 U.C.C.
Rep. 977, 979 (M.D. Pa.'1972); Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 289, 292-93,
339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719-21, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 61, 64-65 (4th Dep't 1973); Salvador v. Atlantic
Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 382-85, 307 A.2d 398, 401-03, 12 U.C.C. Rep.
769, 772-74 (1973), aff'd, 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). Despite Alternative A's exclu-
sive focus on horizontal privity, the lower court in Salvador refused to recognize the
horizontal-vertical distinction as a basis for decision:
Plaintiff's right of recovery should not be made to depend on a narrow
distinction between horizontal privity and vertical privity, which is a distinction
without a difference as far as concerns lack of contractual relationship. If either
horizontal or vertical privity is lacking between plaintiff and defendant, the re-
sult is the same: a lack of contractual relationship. Since such a lack of contrac-
tual relationship was held in [Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d
848, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 925 (1968), a vertical privity case,] not to be a bar to recov-
ery in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty, we determine that in this case
as well, plaintiff-employee is not barred from his assumpsit action based on
implied warranty.
224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 385, 307 A.2d at 403, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 774. Cf. McNally v. Nichol-
son Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (Me. 1973) (although Comment 3 to § 2-318
explicitly allows case law growth on vertical privity only, Comment 2 to § 2-313 suggests
that literal specifications of § 2-318 are mere guideposts and not restraints on erosion of
horizontal privity requirements).
966 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No.3, at
13 (1967) (emphasis added). According to the report, some states also viewed § 2-318 as
restrictive, and rejected the section entirely or drafted more expansive versions. Id. One
commentator suggests that Comment 3 precludes reading § 2-318 with a negative infer-
ence. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIs. L.
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courts exceeding Alternative A's horizontal limits overstep the
judicial role by amending existing legislation, 67 and frustrate the
Code's underlying policy of uniformity. 968
Recognizing that courts in certain jurisdictions had already
exceeded the parameters of Alternative A, the Permanent Edito-
rial Board in 1966 drafted two more legislative alternatives in
hopes of preventing the proliferation of non-uniform approaches
to privity.9 69
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
REV. 597, 616-19. This analysis, however, misses the Comment's vital horizontal-vertical
distinction.
9'7 See Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 469-70, 470 S.W.2d 348, 352, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 398, 402 (1971) ("[T]o extend to any person not within the categories mentioned in
the statute the right to bring an action upon warranty without privity of contract would, in
effect, be amending the statute under the guise of judicial construction. This we should not
do."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972).
968 According to U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c), one purpose of the Code is "to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions."
Because the drafters have clearly spoken on the issue of horizontal privity in Alterna-
tive A, an extension of protection beyond its explicit limits would contravene the drafters'
intent. Thus, Alternative A courts that defer to the legislature on horizontal privity issues
would not be guilty of the buck-passing practiced by courts that refuse to apply warranties
in lease transactions, an issue upon which the drafters have not spoken. See notes 20-21
and accompanying text supra.
969 Comment 3 to § 2-318 explains:
The second alternative is designed for states where the case law has already
developed further and for those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries.
The third alternative goes further, following the trend of modern decisions as
indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in
extending the rule beyond injuries to the person ....
The 1966 Report of the Permanent Editorial Board explained the history of the § 2-318
Alternatives.
[Alternative A] was criticized in California as "a step backward," and was omit-
ted from the Code as enacted in California and in Utah. Non-uniform versions
were enacted in ten states, and proposals for amendment have been made
elsewhere. There appears to be no national consensus as to the scope of war-
ranty protection which is proper, but the promulgation of alternatives may pre-
vent further proliferation of separate variations in state after state. Alternative
B is therefore promulgated in substantially the 1950 form, and Alternative C is
drawn to reflect the trend of more recent decisions as indicated by Restatement
of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965), extending the rule beyond
personal injuries.
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 3, at
13-14 (1967).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:30
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual
to whom the warranty extends. As amended 1966.970
Alternatives B and C broaden the class of warranty beneficiaries,
both horizontally and vertically. 97 1  Although Alternative B per-
petuates the personal injury limitation, Alternative C appears to
also allow recovery for property damage and economic loss. 97 2
The two most commonly litigated issues regarding privity in
commercial settings are (1) whether a buyer's employee may re-
cover from the manufacturer or supplier for personal injuries
caused by a defective product-a horizontal privity issue; and (2)
whether a buyer may recover damages for economic loss from a
remote manufacturer or supplier-a vertical privity issue.
1. Employees as Third-Party Beneficiaries
Under Alternatives B and C, employees should easily qualify
as persons "who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or
970 As of publication, 28 jurisdictions have adopted Alternative A or similar provisions:
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida (extends to employees), Geor-
gia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin,
Five jurisdictions have adopted Alternative B or similar provisions: Alabama, Kansas,
Maryland, New York, and Vermont.
Eleven jurisdictions have adopted Alternative C or similar provisions: Arkansas, Col-
orado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming.
Five jurisdictions have adopted their own expansive provisions: Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia. Texas has simply adopted a statute declar-
ing the matter of privity one for judicial rather than legislative action; California has omit-
ted the section altogether.
971 Alternative A is definitely aimed at horizontal privity, referring only to beneficiaries
normally not positioned on the distributive chain. Alternatives B and C are more inclusive,
referring to any persons likely to be affected by the goods. The sweeping language of these
two Alternatives includes persons on the distributive chain. Before the adyent of Alterna-
tives B and C, Comment 3 stated that the section was neutral as to vertical privity. After
Alternatives B and C were added, the Comment, referring to Alternative A, was amended
to state that "the section in this form" (emphasis added) is neutral as to vertical privity, thus
making it clear that this neutrality did not extend to Alternatives B and C.
972 Professors White and Summers suggest that Alternative C should be limited to per-
sonal injury and property damage and should not extend to economic loss. They draw this
conclusion from the Permanent Editorial Board's explicit reference to Restatement 402A
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be affected by" goods purchased by their employers. Courts in
Alternative A jurisdictions, however, split as to whether employees
may recover damages for personal injuries from manufacturers of
defective products purchased by their employers. The Supreme
Court of California, where privity is entirely the child of the
courts, has apparently accepted the argument that an employee is
"a member of the industrial 'family' of the employer-whether
corporate or private-and ... thus stand[s] in such privity to the
manufacturer as to permit the [employee] to be covered by war-
ranties made to the purchaser-employer." 973  In Alternative A
jurisdictions, however, such an argument distends the statutory
language.
Some courts in Alternative A jurisdictions read Comment 3 to
section 2-318 as a license to ignore the statute in defining the
(see note 969 supra) which is limited to personal injury and property damage. See WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 11-5. Although we do not believe that the Board's ambiguous
reference to the Restatement is dispositive, we agree with the policies, put forth by White
and Summers, that militate against allowing nonprivity plaintiffs to recover economic loss.
See notes 988-91 and accompanying text infra.
973 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 347, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869, 353 P.2d
575, 581 (1960). Although the Peterson court may have accepted the plaintiff's "industrial
family" argument, it relied more heavily on two other factors:
In the first place, it is a matter of common knowledge, and of course known to
vendor-manufacturers, that most businesses are carried on by means of the as-
sistance of employes and that equipment or supplies purchased by employers
will in actual use be handled by the employes, who in this respect may be said
to stand in the shoes of the employer. Moreover the term "privity" itself ap-
pears to be of uncertain origin and meaning and to have been developed by the
courts and applied in various contexts.... One of the customary definitions is
that "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same thing or
right of property; it implies succession.... Thus, in the present context, the
employe had the successive right to the possession and use of the grinding
wheel handed over to him by his purchaser-employer, and, we believe, should
fairly be considered to be in privity to the vendor-manufacturer with respect to
the implied warranties of fitness for use and of merchantable quality upon
which recovery is here sought.
Id. at 347-48, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 869, 353 P.2d at 581. The first principle, although appro-
priate in the common-law context, would fall short in an Alternative A jurisdiction. The
narrow language of Alternative A does not allow for a "common knowledge" approach that
expands the section's scope. Nor is the court's definitional approach satisfactory either at
common law or within the Code. The definition of privity contemplates a succession of
property interests. An employee usually has no interest or right of possession in the prop-
erty of his employer. Rather, most employees possess only a duty of use. An employee is
thus generally not in privity with the vendor of his employer's equipment.
The Tenth Circuit has nevertheless adopted a "common knowledge" approach within
the context of the Code. See Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
681 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying Oklahoma law and upholding employee's recovery against
manufacturer of product owned by employer).
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parameters of protection.9 7 4  At least two courts,9 75 recognizing
the narrowness of Comment 3's language, have turned instead to
Comment 2 to section 2-313, which provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct pur-
pose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a
contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract....
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries ex-
pressly recognize this case law development within one particular
area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the
intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance
in dealing with further cases as they arise.97 6
Because this Comment is more ambiguous than Comment 3 to
section 2-318, courts could more easily read it as condoning judi-
cial erosion of the horizontal privity rule. If, however, the "one
particular area" that Alternative A addresses is horizontal privity,
then courts are free to roam only "[b]eyond that" area.9 77
Employees in jurisdictions that read Alternative A narrowly
could normally recover for personal injuries, despite the lack of
horizontal privity, under a strict liability theory.9 7 8  Alternatively,
if the seller of the goods has expressly warranted their safety, the
employee could perhaps show that he is the intended beneficiary
of the express warranty. 979
974 See notes 965-68 and accompanying text supra.
9,5 McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 919-20, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 381, 389-90
(Me. 1973); Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 289, 292, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719-
20, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 61, 64 (4th Dep't 1973).
976 (Emphasis added.)
9" The Comment's reference to § 2-318 may fairly be read as directed towards Alterna-
tive A only, since the Comment was on the books before Alternatives B and C appeared.
The latter two Alternatives, which extend warranty protection beyond the limits of vertical
privity, thus do not preclude this interpretation of "one particular area."
The court in McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (Me.
1973) approached then veered away from this analysis. The court recognized that the "one
particular area" that Alternative A deals with is horizontal privity, but it proceeded to
explain that horizontal privity remains subject to judicial abrogation informed by § 2-318's
"guideposts." Id. at 920, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 390.
M See, e.g., Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991, 993, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 977,
978-79 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Larson v. Clark Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 277, 278, 518 P.2d 308,
308-09, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 49, 50 (1974); Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 870, 218
S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975). See generally note 957 supra.
9 See, e.g., Froysland v. Leef Bros., 293 Minn. 201, 207, 197 N.W.2d 656, 660, 10
U.C.C. Rep. 785, 787 (1972).
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In most jurisdictions, Alternative A constitutes a substantial if
not insurmountable barrier to breach of warranty actions by
employees. Even where courts acknowledge the expansive lan-
guage of the Official Comments, they often consider the adoption
of Alternative A, rather than one of the more liberal alternatives,
as expressing a legislative unwillingness to abolish entirely the
privity requirement in breach of warranty actions. 980  Other
courts cleave to the words of Alternative A without explicitly re-
ferring to its selection over B or C as an expression of legislative
intent.981  These courts conclude that Comment 3 leaves vertical,
but not horizontal, privity to judicial determination.9 82  This def-
erence to the legislature appears best to reflect the intent of the
drafters. 83
2. Economic Loss
Our society places greater value in protecting against bodily
injury and property damage than in ensuring that people receive
the benefits of their bargains. Although anti-privity policies are
less compelling when applied to economic loss, some courts have
allowed such recoveries to plaintiffs not in vertical privity with the
defendants. Several approaches achieve this result. New Jersey,
for example, expanded its tort doctrine of strict liability without
privity, developed in personal injury cases, to embrace economic
loss. 9 8 4  Alternatively, some courts fit the parties within the con-
980 See, e.g., Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 350 F. Supp. 949, 956-57, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
1140, 1148-50 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), affd 486 F.2d 538, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 471 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 697, 699-701 (Okla. 1975);
Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 468-70, 470 S.W.2d 348, 351-52, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
398, 401-02 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972). Cf. Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622,
625, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 906, 910 (Okla. 1974) (Alternative A bars injured bystander from
raising Code warranty claim).
981 See Anderson v. Watling Ladder Co., 472 F.2d 576, 577, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1138, 1139
(6th Cir. 1973) (applying Tennessee law); Hill v. Parsons-Jurden Corp., 15 U.C.C. Rep.
788, 795-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (discussing West Virginia version of § 2-318); Handy v. Uni-
royal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596, 599, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 632-33 (D. Del. 1971) (applying
Pennsylvania sales law); Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 536; 538-39,
218 S.E.2d 260, 262, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 962, 964 (1975) (applying Code definition of
"buyer"); Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 48 Ohio App. 2d 148, 150-51, 356 N.E.2d 303,
305-06, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 645, 647-48 (1975) (applying Alabama law).
"2 See notes 963-64 and accompanying text supra.
9'3 See notes 966-68 and accompanying text supra.
984 See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d 305, 312, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. 599, 608-09 (1965). The Code did not apply because Santor's operative facts occurred
before the Code took effect in New Jersey. In a subsequent case applying New Jersey law,
the applicability of the Code did not stop the court from invoking Santor and reaching the
same result. See Fashion Novelty Corp. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 331 F. Supp. 960,
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tours of traditional contract theory. For example, a court may
characterize a remote manufacturer and an ultimate consumer as
a seller and buyer dealing directly with one another. 985 Where
express warranties exist, a court can overcome strict privity re-
quirements by determining that the plaintiff is a third-party ben-
eficiary of the warranty between the manufacturer and the
seller. 986
Most courts deny recovery for economic loss to nonprivity
plaintiffs asserting breach of warranty claims. The case law reveals
three distinct yet overlapping rationales. First, many courts simply
adhere to traditional contract notions, holding that privity is abso-
lutely essential to recovery. 98 7  Second, courts may defer to the
legislature; Alternatives A and B of section 2-318 apply only to
personal injury cases. 988  Many courts construe those provisions
narrowly, rejecting the more expansive interpretation seemingly
condoned by Comment 3.989 Third, some courts focus on the
inapplicability of recognized anti-privity rationales to cases not in-
volving personal injury or property damage. 990 Viewed together,
9 U.C.C. Rep. 1038 (D.N.J. 1971). The district court apparently relied on Comments 2
and 3 to §§ 2-313 and 2-318, respectively, to reconcile Santor and the Code. 331 F. Supp. at
965, 9 U.C.C. Rep. at 1039. However, at least one court has expressed unwillingness to
extend strict liability in tort to allow recovery for economic loss against a remote manufac-
turer. Alfred N. Kaplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 203-04, 364 N.E.2d
100, 107, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 644, 652-53 (1977) (dictum).
915 Courts have adopted this approach where a leasing or financing company is inter-
posed between the seller and buyer. See, e.g., Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register
Co., 216 Kan. 213, 220, 531 P.2d 41, 47, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 302, 310 (1975); Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 122-23, 232 A.2d 405, 417, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 542, 558 (1967).
986 See Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 165, 528 P.2d 992, 994, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 332, 335 (1974), modified on other grounds, 86 Wash.2d 256, 544 P.2d 20, 18
U.C.C Rep. 584 (1975). See also 4 CORBIN, supra note 495, §§ 772-855.
987 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598, 600, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 39, 42 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1971); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 41, 240
N.W.2d 124, 125, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 490, 491 (1976).
98 Unlike Alternatives A and B, Alternative C is not limited on its face to any particular
type of harm. Comment 3's reference to the Restatement of Torts, however, suggests that
the drafters may have intended Alternative C to apply only to personal injury and prop-
erty damage cases. See note 972 and accompanying text supra.
989 See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435,
450, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1009, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (considering New York (Alternative B)
and Pennsylvania (Alternative A) versions of § 2-318); Dudley v. Bayou Fabs., Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 788, 791, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1033, 1036 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (applying Alabama law);
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1025
(1974) (dictum); Hardesty v. Andro Corp., 555 P.2d 1030, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 352 (Okla.
1976).
990 In James Sausage Co. v. Novalco, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1027 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975),
the court discussed the inapplicability of the circuity-of-actions and risk-spreading
rationales (see notes 958, 961, and accompanying text supra) and concluded: "The UCC
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these three rationales strongly support the requirement of vertical
privity for the recovery of economic loss.
C. Notice-Section 2-607(3)(a)
Code section 2-607(3)(a) provides:
Where a tender has been accepted ... the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered
any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy ....
The buyer who fails to give his seller timely notice forfeits his
right to damages, revocation of acceptance, and specific perform-
ance. 991 Yet despite the ease and importance of compliance,
the case law is crowded with remorseful buyers who have failed to
give timely notice.
Notice requirements, whether emanating from section
2-607(3)(a) or from contractual terms,992 serve two basic purposes.
First, by affording the seller an opportunity to remedy the defect
voluntarily, 993 timely notice prevents needless litigation and
minimizes damages. 994  The notice requirement deters buyers
from lulling sellers into a false sense of security while damages
mount.995 Second, notice promotes fairness of litigation by allow-
ing the seller time to gather evidence and prepare for trial.996
adequately affords the buyer who chooses his seller with care a remedy for his economic
loss. We find no compelling justification for extending the ambit of such liability to parties
remote from the transaction." Id. at 1034. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-5, at
334-35; Note, supra note 958, at 943-58.
991 See, e.g., Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 591, 510 S.W.2d
555, 561, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1281, 1285 (1974); Dold v. Sherow, 220 Kan. 350, 351, 552 P.2d
945, 947, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1356, 1358 (1976); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 88 S.D. 612,
616, 226 N.W.2d 157, 159, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 737, 738 (1975). But the seller can waive this
objection by failing to raise it at or before the pre-trial conference. See Dold v. Sherow, 220
Kan. 350, 353, 552 P.2d 945, 949, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1356, 1359 (1976). See generally WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 11-9. The availability of common-law fraud actions or strict
liability in tort may alleviate the drastic effects of § 2-607(3)(a).
992 For a discussion of contractual provisions relating to notice, see note 597 and accom-
panying text infra.
993 Wn & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-9, at 344.
s9' For a discussion of mitigation of damages, see notes 938-52 and accompanying text
supra.
11" See U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
996 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-9, at 344. See, e.g., Dold v. Sherow, 220 Kan.
350, 352, 552 P.2d 945, 948, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1356, 1359 (1976); Brendsel v. Wright, 301
Minn. 175, 178, 221 N.W.2d 695, 697, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 603, 604 (1974). White and Sum-
mers identify a third policy underlying notice:
A final, and less important policy behind the notice requirement is to give the
defendant that same kind of mind balm he gets from the statute of limitations.
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Section 2-607(3)(a) serves as a gapfiller, designed to set notice
requirements where none have been agreed upon. This accounts
for its generality. Rather than dictating results in particular cases,
the section directs courts to the commercial settings of the transac-
tions and the general policies of the Code. Two questions focus
this investigation: (1) what is the content of an effective notifica-
tion? and (2) what is a reasonable time?
1. Content
Comment 4 to section 2-607 provides that proper notice
under that section "need only be such as informs the seller that
the transaction is claimed to involve a breach." 997 Courts occa-
sionally straitjacket buyers by requiring more specificity than the
Code demands. 998 But the protests normally made by disap-
pointed buyers usually satisfy section 2-607(3)(a). 999 The seller's
efforts to repair the defect should establish, prima facie, that he
received effective notice. Upon discovering a possible defect, how-
There is some value in allowing a seller, at some point, to close his books on
goods sold in the past and to pass on to other things.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-9, at 344. Because the duty to notify arises only after
the buyer discovers or should discover the breach, latent defects can dilute the seller's
"mind balm" by stretching the effective notice period into the indefinite future.
997 Comment 4 to § 2-607 provides in part:
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller
know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. There is no
reason to require that the notification which saves the buyer's rights under this
section must include a clear statement of all the objections that will be relied on
by the buyer, as under the section covering statements of defects upon rejection
(Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to be a claim
for damages or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy. The
notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be such
as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and
thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.
998 In KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 50 (8th Cir.
1972), the court of appeals found that a lessee forfeited any warranty rights it might have
possessed by failing to give the lessor timely notice of a breach. Id. at 1385, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
at 54. In light of the district court's finding that the lessor "had continual notice of the
unsuitability of the equipment by reason of [lessee's] constant complaints.., from the date
of ... delivery" (327 F. Supp. 315, 325, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 649, 663 (W.D. Ark., 1971)), the
Eighth Circuit appears to have applied § 2-607(3)(a) too restrictively. Neither of the principal
policies behind the notice requirement supported the lessor; the lessee's complaints pro-
vided the lessor ample opportunity to cure and to prepare for negotiation or litigation.
999 See, e.g., Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. I. Klayman & Co., 379 F. Supp. 1306, 1313, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 1055, 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774, 781, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 336, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. Sonus Corp., 362
Mass. 246, 262, 284 N.E.2d 880, 889, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1363, 1374 (1972); Eckstein v.
Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 6, 321 N.E.2d 897, 901, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 373, 376 (1974).
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ever, a prudent buyer will plainly state in writing that he claims
the goods are not as warranted.
As Comment 4 indicates, the buyer need not state all the objec-
tions upon which he intends to rely. ° °° But his failure to alert
the seller to the full extent of the breach may preclude recovery.
In Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co., 1001 the buyer
of 800 bags of sugar returned sixty-eight bags containing exces-
sive "pan scale." Although the buyer noticed some "pan scale" in
the 732 bags remaining, it proceeded to use the sugar for process-
ing frozen diced apples. The buyer's customer rejected the apples
because of the "pan scale," and the court rejected the buyer's war-
ranty claim for lack of notice. 100 2 The court felt that once the
seller had corrected the sixty-eight defective bags, it was entitled
to relax; notice as to the sixty-eight bags lulled the seller into be-
lieving that the other 732 were of good quality.' 0 0 3
2. Reasonable Time
A buyer discovering a breach of warranty should give notice
as quickly as he can dial the seller's phone number. But not all
buyers play it safe. Whether notice reached the seller within a
reasonable time is a "vexatious and frequently litigated" 1004 fact
question because the answer in any particular case depends upon
a variety of factors.0 0 5  These factors include the commercial
context, past conduct of the parties, and the discoverability of the
defect. Any formula that focuses on only one factor distorts the
results. Thus, courts generally eschew rigid time limits, although
an occasional dictum calls some calendar period unreasonable as a
matter of law.10 06
Factual variations may run the gamut from a consumer in-
jured by a latent defect in an electric toaster to a wholesaler re-
ceiving a bad shipment of potatoes. Comment 4 admonishes
courts to treat these cases differently:
1000 See Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 6, 321 N.E.2d 897, 901, 16 U.C.C.
Rep. 373, 376 (1974); note 997 supra.
1001 66 Mich. App. 642, 239 N.W.2d 693, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 100 (1976).
1002 Id. at 647, 239 N.W.2d at 696, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 103 (alternative holding).
1003 Id.
1004 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-9, at 343.
1005 "What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and
circumstances of such action." U.C.C. § 1-204(2).
o06 See, e.g., Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 645 (W.D. Ky. 1972) ("any
notice after more than one month is generally unreasonable").
1978]
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The time of notification is to be determined by applying
commercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time"
for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by
different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for
the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat
commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of
his remedy.
The policies of commercial good faith and protection of the sell-
er's ability to take prompt remedial action figure most promi-
nently in the determination of a reasonable time. Thus, while the
produce wholesaler may have only hours to contact his seller
about nonconforming potatoes,' 0 0 7 a manufacturer may have sev-
eral weeks to notify his component parts supplier about customer
complaints. 10 0 8  Of course, no duty to notify arises until the buyer
"discovers or should have discovered" seller's breach of war-
ranty.' 009
The seller by his conduct may extend the period for notice.
Assurances that a problem does not exist or will disappear, such
as "that's the way it's supposed to sound," or "they always take a
while to break in," operate as an equitable toll.1010 The buyer's
conduct may also affect the reasonableness of a time period.
Notice of a breach of warranty following close on the heels of
seller's action for the price smacks of commercial bad faith and
may be held tardy.1 0 1 ' So too, the buyer who knowingly uses
1007 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-9, at 344.
1008 See Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 284 N.E.2d 880, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 1363 (1972).
1009 See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). At what point the buyer should have discovered latent de-
fects is a question of no small import and no simple resolution. In Waddell v. American
Breeders Serv., Inc., 161 Mont. 221, 505 P.2d 417, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1157 (1973), a cattle
rancher bought semen for artificial insemination of his cows. The buyer put the insemi-
nated cows in a pasture with a "clean-up" bull to cover any cows that had not been success-
fully impregnated. When the buyer discovered that the clean-up bull was "overused," he
replaced it with another bull. Months later, when the failure of his calf crop made it clear
that the semen had been defective, the buyer notified and sued the seller. The seller pro-
tested that the buyer should have given notice when he replaced the clean-up bull; he
should have known that the semen was not working when he saw how hard the bull was
working. Unpersuaded, the court held that the buyer's later notice was timely. Id. at 227,
505 P.2d at 421, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1161. But compare Brunner v. Jensen, 215 Kan. 416,
524 P.2d 1176, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 64 (1974), where the buyer of cows warranted to be preg-
nant saw that some of the cows had come in heat and notified the seller of a possible
breach within a week of receipt. Id. at 419-20, 524 P.2d at 1179, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at 68.
1010 See Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 873,
877 (Utah 1976).
1011 See Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629, 645 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
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defective goods, but does not give notice until it is too late for the
seller to remedy the defect, may be denied recovery.101 2
D. The Statute of Limitations -Section 2-725
Section 2-725 provides in part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has ac-
crued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the
period of limitation to not less than one year but may not ex-
tend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, re-
gardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered.
In most commercial warranty cases, application of section
2-725 is a simple matter. The buyer must bring his action within
four years after seller tenders the goods. Section 2-725, however,
allows variation both in the timing of accrual and in the ensuing
period of limitation.
1. Timing of Accrual
Statutes of limitations force plaintiffs to strike while the
evidentiary iron is hot.'0 13  Thus, a tort cause of action accrues at
the time of injury because the primary evidence is then ripest.'01 4
1012 See Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co., 66 Mich. App. 642, 646,
239 N.W.2d 693, 965-96, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 100, 103 (1976); Davis v. Pumpco, Inc., 519 P.2d
557, 561, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 89, 92 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). This rule is a corollary to rules
concerning proximate cause and mitigation of damages. See notes 915-27, 938-52 and ac-
companying text supra.
1013 "The purpose of all statutory limitations is fairness to the defendant, courts, and the
public in general, by protecting them from the disruptive effect of tenuous claims asserted
after witnesses and evidence have been lost." 75 W. VA. L. REV. 201, 206 (1972). See De-
velopments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
1014 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-8, at 339-40. New York Court of Appeals
Chief Judge Breitel has offered a related reason:
[A] tort is a wrong committed between persons not in contractual relationship or
at least not dependent upon the contract ..... For most torts, there is no cause
of action until injury occurs .... Hence, it is all but unthinkable that a person
should be time-barred from prosecuting a cause of action before he ever had
one.
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In contrast, a Code warranty claim normally accrues at tender of
delivery, presumably because the condition of the goods at the
time of delivery is central.
Defects lurking in tendered goods, however, may not surface
within four years after delivery. Section 2- 7 25's accrual at the time
of tender may seem unfair to the buyer who is time-barred before
he can reasonably discover the breach. 10 15  Nevertheless, by en-
suring that liability will terminate at a definite time, section 2-725
allows sellers to properly plan their businesses. 0 16
Section 2-725(2) strikes a different balance "where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discov-
ery of the breach must await the time of such performance."10 1 7
The seller cannot use the Code's time bar to indirectly modify or
vitiate his express promise of durability. In such cases, the four-
year period does not begin to run until "the breach is or should
have been discovered." 1018
Courts uniformly refuse to recognize this exception in actions
under sections 2-314 and 2-315, because implied warranties by
definition cannot "explicitly" extend to future performance. 0 19
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 211, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
1015 Buyers injured in their person or property by latent defects may be able to avoid
§ 2-725's accrual rule by suing on negligence or strict tort liability theories. Causes of action
in tort generally accrue at the time of injury. See note 1014 supra. Whether a court should
apply the tort time bar or § 2-725 is primarily a consumer-oriented issue that is beyond the
purview of this Project. For a general discussion, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
§ 11-8, at 339-40. Nevertheless, the commercial buyer should not overlook the possibility of
recovering economic losses in a strict liability action. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 599 (1965) (plaintiff recovered in strict tort
for diminution in value of deteriorating goods).
Section 2-725 may work even greater hardship on a plaintiff not on the distributive
chain. A guest injured by the goods in the buyer's home, for example, would probably
have had no knowledge of the time when his warranty claim accrued and no opportunity
to inspect the goods when tendered. The availability of strict liability in tort could undo
any unfairness to plaintiffs not in privity. Less harshness occurs if the plaintiff is a buyer.
The buyer, who lacks vertical privity with the remote manufacturer, can sue his immediate
seller. Such a warranty cause of action accrues upon tender to the buyer rather than upon
the manufacturer's tender to the seller.
1016 The Official Comment to § 2-725 refers to the four-year period "as the most
appropriate to modern business practice. This is within the normal commercial record-
keeping period."
1017 U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
1018 Id.
"019 See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1100-04, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
978, 981-87 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Irons v. Ford Motor Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 556, 558 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288, 292, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 976, 980 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134, 1135,
9 U.C.C. Rep. 1228, 1229 (D. Conn. 1971); Rutland v. Swift Chem. Co., 351 So.2d 324, 22
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Although goods might be unmerchantable unless they last for
more than four years,' 0 20 and a "particular purpose" could con-
ceivably extend into the future, 10 2 1 courts have applied section
2-725 strictly to bar recoveries.' 0 22
Even beneficiaries of express warranties have difficulty con-
vincing courts that their warranties explicitly extend to future
performance. Professors White and Summers suggest that the
"life time guarantee" and the promise "that an automobile would
last for 24,000 miles or four years whichever occurred first"
exemplify warranties of future performance.' 0 2 3  Yet some courts
and commentators read such warranties to describe only a present
capability to endure.1'24 These folks err. It is hard to envision a
U.C.C. Rep. 1180 (Miss. 1977); Sponseller v. Meltebeke, 280 Or. 361, - n.2, 570 P.2d
974, 976 n.2, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 1182, 1185 n.2 (1977). Cf Buckland v. Mercury Outboard
Center, Inc., 58 Mass. App. Dec. 146, 147-48, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1159, 1160 (1976) (no
explicit extension where no express warranty existed).
1020 One commentator suggests that the implied warranty of merchantability and
§ 2-725's "explicitness" requirement are inherently inconsistent, and should be reconciled
either by deleting the word "explicitly" from § 2-725 or by redefining the merchantability
warranty so that it explicitly extends to future performance. Note, Merchantability and the
Statute of Limitations, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 321, 332 (1974).
1021 [I]t should be clear that this extension of the normal warranty period does not
occur in the usual case, even though all warranties in a sense apply to the
future performance of goods. The [second sentence] of 2-725(2) applies only in
a case in which the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance."
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-8, at 341.
1022 In Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 Il1. App. 3d 411, 343 N.E.2d 530, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 1218 (1976), a purchaser of bricks sued nine years after delivery, alleging a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because the brick facing on his house
had deteriorated. Despite buyer's argument that "the nature of brick is such that a buyer
can reasonably expect it to last for many years," the court refused to find a future perform-
ance exception and held the action time-barred, Id. at 413, 343 N.E.2d at 532, 18 U.C.C.
Rep. at 1219-20.
1023 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 11-8, at 341-42. See Rempe v. General Elec. Co.,
28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 647 (1969); R. NORDSTROM, supra note
64, § 185, at 564 ("if the seller warranted the goods for (say) two years, the four-year
period does not begin until the buyer discovered or should have discovered the breach").
1024 See Thalrose v. General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971), aff'd mem., 41 A.D.2d 906, 343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Ist Dep't 1973); Citizens Utils. Co. v.
American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 416-17, 184 N.E.2d 171, 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d
194, 198 (1962) (pre-Code case holding representation that electric generating sets "'capa-
ble of continuous operation at full rated capacity for a full normal machine life span of at
least 30 years' ... is a warranty of present characteristics, design and condition and should
not be stretched by implication into a specific promise enforceable at the end of 30 years");
1 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 80, § 212, at 549 n.5 ("[A] representation that a machine
will work well for five years is a representation as to its present condition in effect. The
representation means that the machine as it stands is so well constructed as to be capable of
enduring use for that period.").
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more explicit warranty of future performance than a promise that
a product will last a given number of years. Any prospective war-
ranty necessarily includes a statement about present condition, be-
cause the future performance of goods depends, in part, upon
their present state.
Although a future performance warranty must explicitly refer
to the future,'0 2 5 it need not specify a particular time. Thus, a
warranty that a burial vault "will give satisfactory service at all times"
fit the future performance exception. 10 26
In order to invoke the exception in section 2-725(2), prospec-
tive language must describe "the performance of the goods."
Here, the distinction between warranties and remedies plays a
crucial role. 10 27  Thus, a seller's promise to remedy defects surfac-
ing within a specified period of time will not postpone the accrual
of a cause of action on the underlying warranty.' 0 2
2. Period of Limitation
Once his Code cause of action has accrued, the plaintiff nor-
mally has four years in which to sue. But section 2-725(1) allows
the parties, in their original agreement, to reduce that period to
not less than one year. Courts should require that language as-
serted to shorten the limitation period actually refer to the time in
which a plaintiff may bring suit. Language specifying the time in
which the buyer must notify the seller of breach, or language
1025 See Binkley v. Teledyne Mid-America Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186-87, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. 1I1, 115 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (machine's production capacity warranty that did not refer
to future not prospective, despite buyer's inability to discover breach until future time),
affd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972). But in Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416,
417-18, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 735, 736-37 (C.P. 1965), the court held a warranty of a heating
system to be prospective, despite the absence of an explicit reference to future perform-
ance, where the breach could not be discovered until cold weather came. Perry disre-
garded the conjunctive language of § 2-725, which requires both future reference and
latency of breach.
1026 Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 573-74, 344 N.Y.S.2d I01,
103, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 665, 665-66 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.) (emphasis in original).
1027 For a discussion of the warranty-remedy distinction, see notes 826-33 and accom-
panying text supra.
1028 In Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W. 2d 696, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 1088 (1977), a written agreement accompanying the sale of a transformer
read in part: "If [defects appear] ... within one year from the date of shipment ... the
[seller] shall thereupon correct any defect." Id. at 171 n.1, 253 N.W.2d at 697 n.1, 21
U.C.C. Rep. at 1089 n.1 (emphasis omitted). The court correctly construed this language
"not as a warranty for future performance, but rather, a specification of the remedy." Id.
at 171, 253 N.W.2d at 697, 21 U.C.C. Rep. at 1090.
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creating remedies or express warranties of limited duration,
should not alter the time bar. 102 9
Andrew M. Baker
Donald R. Frederico
John H. McKeon, Jr.
Phil Mueller
Donald A. Bailey
1029 In Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1974), seller's warranty covered defects for "a period of 12 months or
12,000 miles, whichever first occurs." Id. at 451, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 669, 15 U.C.C. Rep. at
103. The court rejected seller's claim that this language reduced the period of limitation to
one year.

